Ethics

INTERNATIONAL

JOURNAL OF ETHICS

Devoted to the Advancement of Ethical Knowledge and Practice.

ISSUED QUARTERLY

EDITORIAL COMMITTEE

HENRY C. ADAMS, PH.D., Ann Arbor.
FELIX ADLER, PH.D., New York.
GIACOMO BARZELOTTI, PH.D., Naples.
STANTON COIT, PH.D., London.
ALFRED FOUILLÉE., PH.D., Paris.
HAROLD HÖFFDING, PH.D., Copenhagen.
FR. JODL, PH.D., Vienna.
J. S. MACKENZIE, Litt.D., Cardiff.
J. H. MUIRHEAD, M.A., Birmingham.
JOSIAH ROYCE, PH.D., Cambridge, Massachusetts.

Managing Editor, S. BURNS WESTON, Philadelphia

OXFORD UNION SOCIETY

VOL. XIII

OCTOBER, 1902, JANUARY, APRIL, AND JULY, 1903

Philadelphia: INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF ETHICS, 1305 Arch St.
London: SWAN SONNENSCHEIN & CO., Paternoster Square

1903

Digitized by Google

BJ1
E8y
v. 13
(Oct. 1902-
Sept. 1903)

21736

Digitized by Google

CONTENTS OF VOL. XIII.

ARTICLES.

	PAGE
BREN, R. The Ethics of Saint Paul	493
COOK, WALDO L., Criticism of Public Men	1
DARWIN, MRS. FRANCIS. The Religious Training of Children by Agnostics	269
DEWEY, JOHN. Emerson: The Philosopher of Democracy	405
FOUILLÉE, ALFRED. The Ethics of Nietzsche and Guyau	13
HAMMOND, FREDERICK. The Search for Unity of Belief	466
HOWERTH, IRA W. What is Religion?	185
HOWISON, G. H. Personal Idealism and its Ethical Bearings	445
MCTAGGART, J. ELLIS. Some Considerations Relating to Human Immortality	152
METCALF, IDA M. The Pampered Children of the Poor	87
MOORE, G. E. Mr. McTaggart's Ethics	341
MORRISON, WILLIAM DOUGLAS. The Treatment of Criminals in England	27
PERRY, RALPH BARTON. The Practical Consciousness of Freedom	40
PERRY, RALPH BARTON. The Practical Man and the Philosopher	482
PRATT, JAMES BISSETT. The Ethics of St. Augustine	222
ROBERTS, GEORGE LITCH. The Domain of Utilitarian Ethics	320
ROBINSON, M. E. Marriage as an Economic Institution	171
ROYCE, JOSIAH. What Should be the Attitude of Teachers of Philosophy Towards Religion?	280
SALTER, WILLIAM M. Emerson's Views of Society and Reform	414
SCHILLER, F. C. S. The Ethical Basis of Metaphysics	431
SCHUBERT, G. The Political Babel	297
SORLEY, W. R. Betting and Gambling	421
STEWARDSON, LANGDON C. The Moral Aspects of the Referendum	133
STURT, HENRY. Happiness	207
TAYLOR, A. E. Mind and Nature	55
TYRRELL, GEORGE. Christianity and the Natural Virtues	286
WILDE, NORMAN. The Limitations of Ethical Inquiry	458

REVIEWS.

AINSWORTH, A. R. *The Outlines of Metaphysics*, by J. S. Mackenzie	257
BALL, SIDNEY. *Contemporary Socialism*, by John Rae	128
BALL, SIDNEY. *Democracy and the Organization of Political Parties*, by M. Ostrogorski	501
BARKER, H. *Leaders of Religious Thought in the Nineteenth Century*, by S. H. Mellone	528

Digitized by Google

PAGE

BARROWS, S. J. *Crime in Its Relation to Social Progress*, by Arthur Cleveland Hall 254
BROOKS, JOHN GRAHAM. *The Dawn of Day*, by Frederich Nietzsche. 511
CHAPMAN, S. J. *The Social Problem: Life and Work*, by J A. Hobson 112
FAIRBROTHER, W. H. *The Religion of Plutarch: A Pagan Creed of Apostolic Times*, by John Oakesmith 530
FINDLAY, J. J. *The Training of Teachers and Methods of Instruction*, by S. S. Laurie 264
GRANGER, FRANK. *Momenta of Life*, by James Lindsay 98
GRANGER, FRANK. *Reason and Revelation: An Essay in Christian Apology*, by J. R. Illingworth 508
GREENSTREET, W. J. *Principles of Class Teaching*, by J. J. Findley . 259
HAMILTON, C. I. *Principles of Political Economy*. by J. S. Nicholson 265
HOBSON, JOHN A. *Democracy and Social Ethics*, by Jane Addams .. 375
HUSBAND, MARY GILLILAND. *The Methods of Ethics*, by Henry Sidgwick 251
HUSBAND, MARY GILLILAND. *The Ethical Philosophy of Sidgwick*, by B. F. Hayward 262
JASTROW, MORRIS, JR. *A Sketch of Semitic Origins: Social and Religious*, by George Aaron Barton 104
JASTROW, MORRIS, JR. *Optimism and Pessimism in the Old and New Testaments*, by Adolph Guttmacher 513
JONES, W. JENKYN. *Studies in Political and Social Ethics*, by David G. Ritchie 498
KELSEY, CARL. *The Criminal: His Personnel and Environments*, by August Drähms 122
KELSEY, CARL. *The Science of Penology*, by Henry M. Boies 122
KELSEY, CARL. *Experimental Sociology*, by Frances A. Kellor 122
LINDSAY, JAMES. *Philosophy and Life and Other Essays*, by J. H. Muirhead 385
LATTA, R. *Dictionary of Philosophy and Psychology, etc.*, by James Mark Baldwin 114, 516
MARETT, R. R. *The Origin and Significance of Hegel's Logic*, by J. B. Baillie 126
MACFARLANE, C. W. *The Social Unrest*, by John Graham Brooks .. 392
MCTAGGART, J. ELLIS. *Personal Idealism*, by Henry Sturt 246
MORRISON, WILLIAM DOUGLAS. *The Study of Religion*, by Morris Jastrow, Jr. 101
MUIRHEAD, J. H. *The Varieties of Religious Experience*, by Wm. James 236
MUZZEY, DAVID SAVILLE. *The Hand of God in American History*, by Robert Ellis Thompson 266
SALTER, WILLIAM M. *Constructive and Preventive Philanthropy*, by Joseph Lee 503
SANGER, A. D. *National Education*, by H. E. Armstrong, H. W. Eve, Joshua Fitch, W. A. Hewins, John C. Medd, T. A. Organ, A. D. Provand, B. Reynolds, Francis Stoves and Laurie Magnus 395

Digitized by Google

PAGE

SANGER, C. P. *Poverty: A Study of Town Life*, by B. Seebohm Rowntree 129
SANGER, C. P. *The Strength of the People*, by Helen Bosanquet 383
TAYLOR, A. E. *Philosophy: Its Scope and Relations*, by Henry Sidgwick 377
THRILLY FRANK. *Ethik*, von Max Wentscher 370
TROTTER, W. F. *Principles of Western Civilization*, by Benjamin Kidd 398
WELTON, J. *The Making of Citizens*, by R. E. Hughes 505

LIST OF AUTHORS REVIEWED.

ADDAMS, JANE 375
ARMSTRONG, H. E. 395
BALDWIN, JAMES MARK 114, 516
BAILLIE, J. B. 126
BARTON, GEORGE AARON 104
BOISE, HENRY M. 122
BOSANQUET, HELEN 388
BROOKS, JOHN GRAHAM 392
DRAHMS, AUGUST 122
EVE, H. W. 395
FINDLEY, J. J. 259
FITCH, JOSHUA 395
GUTTMACHER, ADOLPH 513
HALL, ARTHUR CLEVELAND 254
HAYWARD, B. F. 262
HEWINS, W. A. 395
HOBSON, JOHN A. 112
HUGHES, R. E. 505
ILLINGWORTH, J. R. 508
JAMES, WILLIAM 236
JASTROW, MORRIS, JR. 101
KELLOR, FRANCES A. 122
KIDD, BENJAMIN 398
LAURIE, S. S. 264
LINDSAY, JAMES 93
LEE, JOSEPH 503
MACKENZIE, JOHN S. 257
MAGNUS, LAURIE 395
MEDD, JOHN C. 395
MELLONE, S. H. 528
MUIRHEAD, J. H. 385
NICHOLSON, J. S. 265
NIETZSCHE, FREDERICH 511
OAKESMITH, JOHN 530
ORGAN, T. A. 395
OSTROGORSKI, M. 501
PROVAND, A. D. 395
RAE, JOHN 128

Digitized by Google

PAGE

REYNOLDS, B. 395
RITCHIE, DAVID G. 498
ROWNTREE, B. SEEBOHM 129
SIDGWICK, HENRY 251, 377
STOVES, FRANCIS 395
STURT, HENRY 246
THOMPSON, ROBERT ELLIS 266
WENTSCHER, MAX 370

Digitized by Google

INTERNATIONAL

JOURNAL OF ETHICS.

OCTOBER, 1902.

CRITICISM OF PUBLIC MEN.

"See how differently men reason about public right and wrong as compared with the way they reason about personal right and wrong. We all reproach Machiavelli and his memory, and yet we pardon to rulers the practices we despise in his books."—*Thomas B. Reed.*

THE letters of Junius are the classic, in the English language, of abuse of public men. Modern journalists are discreet, tender and chaste compared with the writer who, as Mr. Lecky says, is chiefly responsible for the fact that anyone remembers the Duke of Grafton as a British statesman. The duke has come down to us as the most abused politician of his time. And no one who reads his Junius with understanding can escape the conviction that the young nobleman who once conducted the king's government was severely used. Our modern rulers should turn to those extraordinary letters and note what his Grace of Grafton had served with his coffee and rolls.

Lecky says that Junius wrote with a malignity that was fiendish. But it is worth noting that the duke was no saint. "A young man of great position, strong passions, weak character," writes the same historian of Grafton. "His notorious indolence, vacillation, and indifference, the contrast between his old friendship for Wilkes and his recent policy, and the careless and undisguised profligacy which led him, on one occasion,—when still prime minister,—to appear publicly at the opera with a well-known courtesan, were all sources of

Digitized by Google

scandal and weakness." If, therefore, Junius was outrageous, we must admit that the duke had invited outrageous treatment.

It is not proposed to maintain that, in general, the victims of pamphleteers and the press have, in any period, merited the full force of the assaults made upon them. Even with a vein of truth upon which to work, the critics of public men have often exaggerated and distorted the weaknesses or offences they undertook to denounce. This has been true ever since the days of Addison and Swift. We may be sure that even the corruption of Sir Robert Walpole was magnified by the writers for the opposition. Certainly Dr. Johnson never could do justice to the "whig dogs." Thomas Jefferson, in one of his campaigns, had to face charges embodied by a Connecticut clergyman in a sermon, widely circulated for political effect, according to which Jefferson had embezzled trust funds and swindled widows and orphans.

But let us seek the larger facts. Assaults upon the private characters of public men were far more common during the Eighteenth century and the larger part of the Nineteenth than they are in our own time. Speaking in averages, the private character of public men to-day, particularly the private character of statesmen of the first rank, is much higher and purer and sweeter than it was a century or a century and a half ago. Controversy on these points will not be raised by persons who are familiar with history. When the freedom of the press was achieved in England in the Eighteenth century, public life was placed under the glare of criticism and publicity for the first time. The spectacle was far from inspiring. Parliamentary seats were bought and sold on a large scale and the morals of the court and the aristocracy were scandalously loose. Now, what Methodism did not do to revivify and purify the life of the English nation a free press accomplished. Thanks to vituperators like Junius it became unfashionable, and then unpardonable, for a prime minister to appear at the opera with a woman of the town.

Referring to the countries which have democratic institutions somewhat advanced, it must be conceded that the very

Digitized by Google

license with which the press pursued public men for two centuries has powerfully helped to make high public station impossible to men of loose private life. It might even be asserted that abuse of public men has been the main factor in making impeccable private morals the first necessity to the successful pursuit of public office.

Even Lord Melbourne could not swear in the presence of the youthful queen and it followed, as Mr. Gladstone used to say, that the accession of Victoria drove profanity from the British court. In a somewhat analagous way the rise of the free press has reacted upon the public life of democracies. The preliminary question asked nowadays by political managers is whether the possible candidate carries with him the faintest aroma of scandal. No party willingly enters a popular campaign burdened with the defence of a scandalous private life. Notwithstanding the exaggeration, the libel, the scurrility, which have long accompanied criticism of rulers, public life has been largely purged by this process. Rough it has been and often brutal, perhaps, like a grinding process of nature, yet popular government has been benefited and the net result has been good.

It may be doubted if many realize how important a duty remains in the criticism of public men, after the highest standard of morals affecting private character has been established. The fact that there is a certain double standard of ethics in public life is not so clearly understood as it ought to be. Yet the province of criticism, yes, even the function of abuse which is criticism running amuck, must be interpreted in the light of the actual ethical status of statesmanship. In considering this phase of the question it is necessary to know very clearly that the average morality among a people is far lower than the highest individual morality, that national morality is no higher than the average popular morality, and that international morality, or the average morality of many peoples of varying civilizations, is lower than the best national morality. Statesmen and politicians, however, deal with national and international problems and the consequence is that, at the very best, they are guided in their conduct of public affairs

Digitized by Google

by the average morality of the forces they handle or confront. So it happens that statesmen of "irreproachable character" often do things, of a public nature, that are indefensible in the code of individual ethics. Bismarck's mutilation of the Ems dispatch in order to precipitate war with France may be regarded as an act of high statesmanship, but it is inconceivable that Bismarck would have forged the signature to a check. His private morality was far above his public morality, and that may be said of public men, in general, the world over.

Have we, after all, advanced so very far beyond Machiavelli's standard for rulers, as stated in the eighteenth chapter of "The Prince"? Let us scrutinize again that celebrated passage:

"How worthy it is in a ruler to keep faith, to practice fair dealing, and not cunning, everybody agrees. Nevertheless, experience in these days teaches us that those rulers have done great things who have made little account of keeping faith, who have had cunning to bewilder men's minds, and that in the end they have overcome those who have based their conduct on honest dealings. . . . . A prudent ruler cannot, nor ought he to keep faith, when such fidelity shall turn against him, and the reasons which moved him to make his promises are spent. . . . . And a ruler will never lack pretexts to color his breach of faith. Of this I could give numberless examples in our own times, and show how many treaties, how many promises, have been made naught by the faithlessness of rulers; and he who best has played the fox has prospered best. But it is necessary to know well how to conceal this nature, and to be a great deceiver and hypocrite; for men are so simple and yield so readily to the wants of the moment, that he who will trick shall always overcome another who will suffer himself to be tricked. . . . . We must recognize this, that a ruler, and especially a new ruler, cannot observe all those things which men deem good; being often obliged, for the welfare of the State, to act contrary to humanity, contrary to charity, contrary to religion. And, besides, he must have a mind ready to shift as the winds and eddies of fortune bid; not to depart from good, if he can help himself, but to know how to do evil, if he must. Therefore a ruler must take great care that no word shall slip from his mouth that shall not be full of piety, trust, humanity, religion and simple faith, and he must appear, to the eye and ear, all compact of these. . . . . Let a ruler, then, make the State prosper, and his methods always will be judged honorable, and be praised by all; because the vulgar are always caught by appearance and by the event; and in this world there are none but the vulgar."

It may be confessed that Machiavelli had a certain delightful candor. He was the first great writer on politics who fol-

Digitized by Google

lowed an inductive method and who boldly drew his conclusions from the facts of the life around him. Having been a public man himself, he knew from experience and observation that in making a distinction between the standards of public and private morality he was but recognizing one of the most fundamental principles of the politics both of his own age and of previous ages. Indeed Professor W. A. Dunning, in his recent essay on the Florentine, has said that Machiavelli's "attitude toward morality and religion was scientifically justifiable"—meaning doubtless that it was solidly based on the facts of mediæval statesmanship. Although Machiavelli's doctrine was bitterly and justly antagonized by the ethical influences that characterized the Reformation, "the practice of the age continued to furnish, like all preceding ages, incontestable evidence that the 'reason of state' took precedence, in political life, of the moral code which was recognized as valid between man and man." And Professor Dunning proceeds to show how Frederick the Great, while denouncing academically the teachings of the Italian, illustrated them in a very distinguished way as the head of a State.

If it be considered wanton to charge that modern statesmanship is not far removed from the Machiavellian stage, then let us observe what is soberly said by men of repute in our own times. We need not go back to Hume, who had a low opinion of the morality of statesmanship, nor to Sir Henry Maine, who wrote that the party leader "is debarred by his position from the full practice of the great virtues of veracity, justice and moral intrepidity." There are more recent utterances to refer to. The late Earl Dufferin, after a lifetime in the diplomatic and administrative service of the British crown, said that "force and not right is still the dominant factor in human affairs." Mr. James Bryce, whose experience in British politics has been extensive and whose knowledge of public affairs in several countries is fully as profound as that of any man of his time, has written of the English that they "have two moralities for public life, the one conventional or ideal, the other actual. The conventional finds expression not merely in the pulpit, but also in the speeches of public men." Mr.

Digitized by Google

Bryce adds: "The actual morality, as one gathers it in the lobbies of the legislative chambers, or the smoking rooms of the political clubs, or committee rooms at contested elections, is a different affair. It regards (or has till very lately regarded) the bribery of voters as an offence only when detection has followed; it assumes that a minister will use his patronage to strengthen his party or himself; it smiles at election pledges, as the gods smiled at lovers' vows; it defends the abuse of parliamentary rules; it tolerates equivocations or misleading statements, proceeding from an official, even when they have not the excuse of State necessity."

John Fiske, only a short time before his death, in paying a tribute to Huxley's superb honesty and fidelity to truth, was moved to contrast the public man with the scientist:

"A statesman is seldom, if ever, called upon to ascertain and exhibit the fundamental facts of a case without bias and in the disinterested mood which science demands of her votaries. The statesman's business is to accomplish sundry concrete political purposes, and he measures statements primarily, not by their truth, but by their availableness as means toward a practical end."

"Not by their truth!" Yet truth-telling is one of the simplest virtues. Was it singular that the venerable and distinguished scientist, Professor Virchow of Berlin, who had learned politics from long experience in the political field, should have said that "when one knows persons who will bear the responsibility of the world's events before history one is faced by a complete riddle"? The riddle is the very one we are now considering—the double standard of morality among public men.

In his essay on "The Dutch Republic," Frederic Harrison writes of William the Silent that he never had "that native veracity of soul, that absolute transparency and rectitude of purpose which is so singularly rare in statesmen." Why should those qualities be "singularly rare" in statesmen? George Washington, in Mr. Harrison's view, was a marvel,—why? Because of his "unshaken devotion to right, his perfect justice, his transparent truthfulness and lofty sense of right" on the one hand; and, on the other, because his public career as the chief of a State in a great crisis was tarnished by "no

Digitized by Google

falsehood, no baseness, no outrage, no crime." No one can reflect concerning this language without noting that the shining virtues which Washington possessed as a statesman are not uncommon among ordinary men. All of us are personally acquainted with individuals whose devotion to right, justice, truth, honor, is almost absolute. To tell the truth is no great merit even among schoolboys. To be honest, just and honorable is nothing "singularly rare" among men who stand by the forge or follow the plow. Yet when these primary virtues are displayed by a great statesman in his conduct of public affairs they are considered positively remarkable by his contemporaries and by the writers of historical essays. The humor of this was not lost on Bagehot, who calls attention, in his essay on Sir Robert Peel, to the Duke of Wellington's solemn tribute to Peel's veracity. It was "his most striking characteristic," noted the duke,—who felt that he must bear special witness to it. And Bagehot dryly adds: "Simple people in the country were not a little astonished to hear so strong a eulogy on a man for not telling lies. They were under the impression that people in general did not. But those who have considered the tempting nature of a statesman's pursuits, the secrets of office, the inevitable complications of his personal relations, will not be surprised that many statesmen should be without veracity, or that one should be eulogized for possessing it."

It is so important that the comparatively indifferent morality of statesmanship be understood, that this phase of the subject may be pursued somewhat further. The German philosopher Nietzsche is often dismissed as a madman. "A good war," said he, "sanctifies every cause." Yet Nietzsche has been referred to by a competent writer in THE INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF ETHICS as really "the spokesman of a point of view that, in a less extreme form, has great influence." The "point of view" is that morality and statesmanship are third cousins. That it has its present-day supporters even in the universities is clear from such articles as have lately been written by the Scotch scholar, Professor Ritchie, and from the remarkable essay on "The Ethics of Expansion" which a

Digitized by Google

Cornell Professor produced not long ago. The point made by the Professor was simple enough—there is no ethics in expansion, and it appeared that he was glad of it.

Senator Tillman's difficulty is that of many of us. The successor of Calhoun and Hayne has his faults but his candor is unsurpassed. It was he who said in the United States Senate concerning the statesmen he had come in contact with: "I confess I have felt somewhat at a loss how to judge men who in one aspect appeared to be so high and clean and honorable, and in another appeared more or less despicable." When, however, it is well understood that there exists one moral standard for private life and another for public life, the problem is simplified. Only a conception of the double standard can make intelligible Mr. Joseph Chamberlain's emphatic assertion in the House of Commons a few years ago, that in fomenting the Jameson raid and in betraying at the same time the confidence of her majesty's high commissioner, Cecil Rhodes had done nothing "inconsistent with his personal honor." Many excellent people were not a little puzzled and even troubled by Mr. Chamberlain's view. For Mr. Rhodes had been prime minister of Cape Colony at the time he had secretly engineered the attack upon a State with which her majesty's government was at peace. Mr. Chamberlain was not joking. He judged Mr. Rhodes's act as a statesman by a standard entirely different from that by which his acts as a mere citizen would be measured. And, if the two standards be allowed, it follows that Mr. Chamberlain's assertion was true. A "colossus" was quite above so parochial a thing as "personal honor."

We must be able to comprehend that, historically and scientifically considered, the moral standard of statesmanship has necessarily remained rather low. Morality must develop in the individual before it can develop in the mass of individuals; and it cannot attain a high average of excellence among a people until it has asserted its authority in the majority of individual souls. There have always been great moral teachers, like Jesus and Confucius, before there have been triumphant moral codes permeating whole civilizations.

Digitized by Google

Inasmuch as statesmen have to deal with great masses of men, looking to them for moral support and even for moral guidance, they naturally accept the moral ideals which exude from men in bulk. Nor can it be forgotten that the world has not gone beyond the point where national interests are pre-eminently selfish. Self-interest, in a national sense, is the pole star of a statesman. A whole people never yet has been capable of a deliberate and unmixed self-sacrifice in the interests of another people. Self-sacrifice is a common virtue among individuals, but it has been impossible to a nation, owing to the conditions of its existence. And in dealing with that more or less conscious, intelligent entity called the State, the statesman is necessarily influenced by the moralities inherent in his trade.

What should be the attitude of the critic of public men? And let us first suppose that unsupposable thing—that the perfect critic dwells upon earth. He must meet difficulties even if his criticism be absolutely judicial and fair. If he calls by their right names some of the public acts of a statesman he is liable to be denounced as a vituperator by that statesman's admirers and friends, for when the one attacked is known of all men to be blameless in his private character the inference is swift in the mind of every supporter that his public life must be equally spotless and regulated by a moral standard not less high. Now that public life has reached a stage when a popular leader of the first rank must at least be true to his wife and pay his debts and befriend his poor relations, the critic faces a public which, like Bagehot's "simple-minded" country people, innocently assumes its favorite's whole public career, moral standards and all, to be modeled upon the noblest and sweetest virtues of the fireside. It follows that people who estimate Bismarck by his devotion to his home, or Cecil Rhodes by his gifts to education, or his affection for his friends and his dogs, would resent a perfectly just characterization of the mutilation of the Ems dispatch or of the Jameson raid.

Or suppose that the critic frankly tells the people that a statesman should not be judged by the ethical code that ap-

Digitized by Google

plies to private life. Whatever happens to stain the great man's public career, the critic, let us assume, should teach the masses that a statesman has a license to pocket his conscience, especially when "national interests" are involved. The facts and the theory as to the double standard of morality, based on the lower ethical development of men in bulk as compared with the highest type of civilized man, could thus be elucidated. Now that might be very "temperate" and "judicial" and "philosophical" as criticism, but what would be the moral effect of such teaching upon the public mind? Is there a citizen of repute and intelligence who would dare to have openly preached to the people of this country the idea that a statesman may rightly do things which would take him into the criminal courts or deprive him of the society of gentlemen if perpetrated in the circle of private life? How long would it be before A, B, and C—practical men who mean well, but not unnecessarily well—would be saying, "Now if that is proper for Bismarck to do, why isn't it proper for me to do?" And "if Cecil Rhodes can do that for the British empire why can't I do it for my own pocket?" However far some may go in defending the dubious acts of nations or statesmen representing nations, they would never risk the moral pollution of the people by openly preaching in the press or on the platform the double standard of private and public morality. They would not dare!

In the light of this analysis, the question as to the function of criticism of public men comes nearer to being answered. The honest critic has no choice, in the interests of public morals, other than to hold public men up to the highest standards of individual morality. He must judge the acts of statesmen and of nations by the same ethical code to which the individual citizen is bound to conform. He can recognize no double standard because one standard is lower than the other, and in morals, as in money, there is a law according to which the baser may drive the better from circulation.

A conclusion like this, you will say, is very fine, but what of the abuse of public men which so abounds in the free press and on the platform? Unfortunately there are no critics,

Digitized by Google

writing in the white heat of political issues, who are perfectly fair. Perfect critics have never been born; nor are they likely to be born until human kind reaches perfection, when critics, in the course of nature, will disappear because there will be nothing to criticise. It may be said, conversely, that so long as there is anything to criticise the world will never have a perfect critic. Curiously enough, criticism implies not only the possibility of imperfection but the possibility of imperfection in the critic, although there may be critics who would haughtily resent such an assertion. We must deal, therefore, with the melancholy fact that there is no perfect criticism and that there never can be perfect criticism of public men. All of it must be lacking in the attribute of absolute justice.

Yet criticism should not cease on that account. Nor should it be seriously restricted because some of it drops into abuse. For even abuse, or vituperation, has one merit. As censure it is generally based on a high standard of morals. That is to say, if a vituperator charges a public man with lying, he proceeds on the assumption that lying is wrong. The vituperator makes an unjust charge, but, the personal justice of the charge aside, he certainly does hold on high the standard that lying is forbidden to public men. The vituperator maintains no public allegiance to the double standard of morals. Indeed, the more abusive he becomes, the more censoriously insistent is he that the object of his attack should be held strictly to the most advanced code of ethics which controls the acts of the individual in private life. And this is true, whatever the motives of the critic may be in his assaults.

That form of criticism which runs to abuse no one would applaud, for its offences against justice are rightly reprobated. Its relation to the question of criticism, however, is too singular not to command attention. Evidently a natural accompaniment of freedom of speech and freedom of the press, the public abuse of public men, whether by orator or journalist, is preëminently a characteristic of the more democratic countries. In Germany, where the press laws are severe, there is very little of it; in Russia, where the press censorship is absolute, there is none of it.

Digitized by Google

But we must note the difference between Russia and Germany, on the one hand, and America and England, on the other, in the matter of moral standards as applied to public affairs. There are no great nations within the pale of western civilization whose leading statesmen are less bound by a high code of morals in diplomacy than those of Germany and Russia. And in no other nations of the same rank are the leading statesmen less obliged to justify their acts to the people on high moral grounds. In America and England, however, where criticism is freest and where it passes most readily into abuse, the leading statesmen, more than in any other country, must be guided by lofty ideals in their public acts; at least, they must find a moral justification for those acts satisfactory to the majority of the people, and, so far as possible, to censorious opponents enjoying unrestrained access to the platform and the public prints.

Nothing could be more desirable than that the moral standards by which national and international politics are conducted should conform to the highest moral conceptions of which the human race is capable; and nothing is surer than that the only way by which that can be accomplished is to judge the public acts of statesmen by the best standards of private morality. Criticism, then, must be permitted free play, even if at times it runs to an extreme of censoriousness that works injustice to individuals. All criticism should be sincere and within the bounds of sanity. Vituperation is the weakness of the system much as the spring freshet is the weakness of a great river, yet untrammeled criticism should be prohibited because of vituperation no more than the river should be made to run dry because each year it overflows its banks. Just as the attacks on the private characters of public men have made it impossible for the dukes of Grafton to wield the ruling power in the State, so the sharp, even abusive, criticism of statesmen, on account of their public acts, operates at least to emphasize the ethical basis of politics and to supplant the old double standard of morality with that single standard which men as individuals are bound to regard as the ideal of human conduct. The function of criticism is a part of the

Digitized by Google

political evolution peculiar to party government and to democracy. Given the free platform and the free press, even with their superlatives, hyperboles and mendacities, and you have one of the most puissant of forces making for righteousness in government.

As for the honest critic of public men, he can never do injury to the State if (adapting somewhat a saying by Huxley) he makes it his aim: "To smite all humbugs, however big; to give a nobler tone to politics; to set an example of toleration for everything but lying; to be indifferent as to whether the work be recognized, so long as it is done."

WALDO L. COOK.

SPRINGFIELD, MASS.

THE ETHICS OF NIETZSCHE AND GUYAU.*

I.

Nietzsche has not that supreme originality which he claims for himself. Mix Greek sophistry and Greek scepticism with the naturalism of Hobbes and the monism of Schopenhauer, corrected by Darwin and seasoned with the paradoxes of Rousseau and of Diderot, and the result will be the philosophy of Zarathoustra; although it is apparently advanced, and its form is fascinating to ingenuous youth in search of novelty, it is none the less essentially ancient and reactionary. It is hostile, in every possible sense, to all which we call modern progress. "*Modern,* that is to say false," Nietzsche reiterates in every variety of tone, and he devotes a chapter in his last work to anathematizing "Modernity." He fancies himself secure from the tyranny of all those prejudices which emanate from the "herd" or are due to environment; and yet no one more than this singer of the praises of force and of war has gathered

*This article will be included in a book, which is to appear soon, entled "Nietzsche et l'immoralisme."

Digitized by Google

together into a single heap all the gregarious prejudices of a Germany still feudal in the midst of the nineteenth century, all those dominant ideas which spring from the race, the environment and the moment, and combined them with corresponding ideas derived from antiquity, the Middle Ages and the Renaissance. Whatever is most "advanced" and most "retrograde" in German thought is to be found in this singer of Zarathoustra. The whole of the German criticism of religions and of philosophies finds expression in his work in studied blasphemies and in every kind of negation; but these same negations are succeeded by enthusiastic affirmations, only the more enthusiastic the more they are devoid of proof; and the object of this enthusiasm is a conception of society which recalls the Middle Ages and a conception of the world which carries us back to ancient paganism.

Just as La Rochefoucald attempted to account for all manifestations of spirit in terms of self-love, so does Nietzsche attempt to explain every act of man whether alone or in society by the will to be powerful and to have the mastery. Such "transmutations of values" and such transpositions of feelings are always possible and always contain a part of the truth, whatever the terms may be which are transposed. To one person the mainspring of every action is self-love, to another it is the will to live; to another it is the love of power; to another every act contains a germ of altruism; to another all is due to thought, conscious or unconscious; a passion is, to Pascal, "a precipitation of thoughts;" while to certain German psychologists it is "an unconscious reasoning," etc. Whence comes this possibility of trying so many different reductions and transvaluations in the matter of our personal and social inclinations? From the very simple fact that our feelings always embrace the whole of ourselves and with the whole diverse parts; hence in any given feeling these diverse parts can always be found. It is only necessary for us to emphasize a certain order of terms or of values for us to recognize it in all our individual and collective desires. This it was which enabled La Rochefoucauld to find everywhere an element of self-love: it is evident that man can never, even in his greatest act of

Digitized by Google

devotion to society as a whole, cease also to love himself, though it be only as a being capable of such devotion. Nietzsche finds his satisfaction in another way: that of finding everywhere the will to be powerful. The capital sins might equally well be taken in turn, and the claim made that every inward motive could be traced back to pride, or if preferred, to love of pleasure, or again to avarice, envy or indolence. Even activity would enter into indolence, because it follows the law of the *least* effort, etc. Or again the cardinal virtues might be taken, and the mainspring of action be found in each of them in turn, in prudence, in courage or in temperance. There would thus be values to suit every taste. Litterateurs and poets may take pleasure in such vague paradoxes; but the philosopher must assign to each element its exact share. Moralists in general, by which I mean literary moralists, have mingled the most subtle sophistries with their most delicate observations, and, on the whole, whether they bear the name of Montaigne, Charron, Pascal, La Rochefoucauld, La Bruyére, Vanvenargues, Rivarol, Chamfort or Nietzsche have sophisticated the natural feelings of man to a marvellous extent. To the philosopher, however, every theory may be of service if he knows how to extract the truth from it. There is an element of truth in Nietzsche's analyses, and it is this: will is present everywhere and has a natural tendency to enlarge its sphere and to overcome obstacles. Thanks to this fact, already familiar to us all, Nietzsche is able to point out a struggle against obstacles and an instinct of development in every act of individual will; then passing on to the social order, he transforms, more than the facts warrant, every relation of man to his fellows into the will to rule others, to have them in subjection, to make them serve his own ends. Even in the lover, he shows a power which grows, and this often in the face of obstacles, so that to love is, in his view, once more to will to dominate, to will to be powerful. The beloved, again, has found his way into the heart of another "to steal away its strength," in some way to take advantage of it. We see from all this the easy task Nietzsche set himself: every philosopher can undertake it as well as he, after the same fashion, and

Digitized by Google

propose to himself as a theme how to unmask the will to rule, as it appears in the individual and in society.

Having adopted Schopenhauer's theory of the Will, Nietzsche combines it with Darwin's theory of the universal struggle. Individuals are the centres of will, each one aspiring to be all, to control all and to appropriate all.

But the *"bellum omnium contra omnes"* of Hobbes, becomes with Nietzsche as with Darwin, in a way a law of beneficence and a law of progress. The sufferings of the individual, the extinction of the weak to the advantage of the strong, of inferior races to the advantage of superior races—all this is to be accepted with joy and with love. This, no doubt, is the right of the strongest, but Nietzsche ends by interpreting it in the most elevated and disinterested sense, as a law whose working is for the good of the superior human or even superhuman race which selection will bring forth.

We see developed in Nietzsche all the consequences commonly drawn from Darwin, especially in Germany, by the partisans of force. He is an aristocrat and the enemy of every democracy, as are all the Darwinians who are determined to apply the Darwinian law, pure and simple, to human society. He is the enemy of socialism, which is a coalition of the weak and the miserable against this law of the strongest which is to bring about their extermination. He is no less the enemy of anarchy, because there again is hostility to authority and the rule of the strong. He is, however, the enemy of the State, and even of society, because the State and society are ruled by the "law of the herd," and their tendency is, in his opinion, to stifle individuality, especially superior individuality. The woman's movement irritates him, because he regards it as an insurrection of the weak sex against the strong. Pessimism irritates him, because he sees in it a tendency to degeneration and decadence (and in this he agrees with Guyau who has shown pessimism to be at the same time an effect and a cause of the weakening of vitality). Finally, pity, charity, solidarity, all seem to him causes of decadence.

If we accept Zarathoustra's words, "War and courage have brought about greater things than love of our neighbor. It

Digitized by Google

is not your pity, but your bravery, O warriors, which until now has saved victims." The great example which Nietzsche invokes is the foundation and the duration of the Roman empire, the object of his profoundest admiration; he never stops to ask whether the Roman empire was not founded as much or even more upon the feeling of solidarity, of devotion to the whole, than upon courage and war. If the Romans knew no "pity," they at least knew "piety" towards their country.

Nietzsche constantly sets the "noble" over against the "good." "The *noble* is determined to create something new and a new virtue. The *good* desires the old and that the old be preserved." Thanks to this definition, as arbitrary as it is aristocratic, Nietzsche is able to scoff at the good and the just, to despise them and to oppose to them pretended new "values." He has made morality the synonym of legality and blind routine, of a dormant intelligence and heart.

Nietzsche was a great spirit; but unfortunately he was a false spirit. In spite of this, however, he uttered many truths or half-truths.

II.

By what means is Nietzsche to be refuted? By himself. In his writings, rich in thought as they are, it is true he has put the poison alongside the food but he has also included the antidote. First, he lays down the will to rule as the principle of every moral and social idea; then he says to us: "Every animal, the philosophic animal, like all the rest, strives instinctively towards an *optimum* of favorable conditions in which he can best display his strength and attain to the fullness the feeling of his power; every animal has, too, an instinctive horror and yet a sort of subtle need, *superior to all reason*, of every kind of trouble and hindrance which does arise or could arise in his path towards the *optimum*—(it is not of the path towards *happiness* that I am speaking, but of the path to power, to action, to the fullest activity, which is, in truth, in most cases the path to *unhappiness.*)"* Nietzsche does not

*"Genealogie de la Morale," 3d dissertation § 7.

Digitized by Google

see that this parenthesis contained the refutation of his entire system. Was not his claim, practically, to oppose himself to the pessimism of Schopenhauer by substituting the triumphant will to be powerful for the continually defeated will to live? And now he recognizes that the development of power does not lead to happiness, but far oftener to unhappiness. How then is he to persuade humanity that the way which ends in suffering is also that which leads to the best, the *optimum?* Such an optimism is singularly pessimistic.

Nietzsche's errors in ethics come from his neglect to analyze and to fathom the idea of life, of vitality and of vital power upon which he wishes to base his doctrine of morals. Is the instinct to live, the instinct to live no matter how or in what condition? Or is it the instinct to live *more?* Or is it the instinct to live *better?* And in what does the *more* differ or not differ from the *better?* And in what does the *better* itself consist? Is it in more power or in certain quality of power? Is it in more enjoyment or in a certain quality of enjoyment? Is not the instinct to live or the instinct to be powerful, at bottom, the instinct to act, to think and to enjoy? When suffering becomes unbearable the instinct to live and to act grows weak, and to such a degree that the desire of death and actual suicide become possible.

"It is not enough," says Zarathoustra, "to increase and multiply; you must also *rise higher.*" But are not the highest instincts those which are the most favorable to the growth of the life of the individual and of the species? This cannot always be said to be true with regard to the individual, since these instincts sometimes condemn the individual to be sacrificed; but it is the case with regard to the species, if it be understood that not *preservation* pure and simple be the end, but a greater *happiness,* or rather a happiness of a superior *quality;* so that we end by moving in a circle, and it still remains to determine what is superior, independently of the question whether this superior is realized in an individual or in individuals taken collectively.

Guyau is one of the predecessors of Nietzsche. The German thinker has covered with marginal notes his copies of

Digitized by Google

"L'esquiesse d'une morale sans obligation ou sanction" and "l'Irreligion de l'avenir." But Guyau does not fall into the errors of Nietzsche. If we place ourselves exclusively at the point of view of the will to live, we are obliged, as Guyau has shown, to look for the foundations of morality; first in the domain of causality, not in that of finality, in the domain of the actually existent desire, not in that of the desirable; second, in the common domain of the conscious and the unconscious, which is precisely the basis of life. Upon these foundations Guyau and Nietzsche have built up ethics without obligation or sanction; but Guyau this represents only the substructure in a complete system of morals.

In our opinion it is Guyau who is right. The true and definitive ethics is not a science which can seek its own proper jurisdiction merely in the region of causality; it is, by its very definition, a science of finality and even of reflective finality. Positive morals leaves on one side, says Guyau, the notion of the *desirable* and confines itself to the *ascertainment* of what in reality is *desired*, "the target constantly aimed at by humanity," just as the geometrical centre aimed at by a rifleman is determined according to the law of the binomial, by ascertaining the distribution of bullet-holes at varying distances from the centre. But this is, definitively, to treat ethics from the point of view of *another science*, of a natural philosophy of manners. It is necessary to rise higher. Just as, in physiology it is impossible to ignore the fundamental fact of function, and in physics to ignore matter and force, so in morals we cannot ignore the fundamental notion of a deliberate and voluntary *aim*, and consequently the notion of the *desirable*. In whatever way this notion may be conceived, whether as some idea of duty or simply the ultimate satisfaction of our own nature, it cannot be entirely absorbed in the thing desired, without destroying alike morality and the object of morality. And this is what Nietzsche has done.

Similarly the moralist cannot be content to descend into the domain of the unconscious in order to find there the rule of the conscious will, that is to say, an ideal aim. To do this he must ascend to the deliberate will and explore its domain.

Digitized by Google

Nietzsche, like Guyau, takes as the principle of morals what he calls, *intensity* of life. But what is that intensity? Is it a simple affair of quantity? And if so, what measure shall we apply to it? Even if we should succeed—to suppose what is impossible—in measuring the force of life, it would still be necessary to estimate its *direction,* for upon this the wise use of force depends. The word force thus used is, besides, only a figure of speech. Psychological intensity is felt and cannot be measured; besides it is felt in regard to this or that psychological fact, not in regard to life as a whole. Is then the intensity of life a question of *quality* and of value? What further measure shall we apply? For example, has the intensity of sensations the same *value* as the intensity of thought? Has that of thought, in its turn, the same value as that of will? Doubtless at the heart of things, it is highly probable that the most truly moral life is, on the whole, the most truly intense, the most *lived;* but looking only at such facts as can be seen and tested, if the greatest intensity usually involves the greatest expansion of life, it does not always involve its generous expansion in regard to others. The ethics of life is, with Nietzsche as with Guyau, an ethics of intensity and of vital expansion, but results in totally different consequences. Although these consequences may be insufficiently justified, they prove none the less the uncertainty of intensity as a criterion when the attempt is made to apply it *in concreto.*

Miss Simcox, in a theory analogous to that of Guyau, endeavors to reduce natural good to "the greatest possible abundance and the greatest possible variety of vital power." In other words, it is "the possession of abundant and fully developed faculties, both active and passive, the exercise of which is orderly and equal." But, in the first place, in what does this *order* of the faculties consist, which supposes the subordination of the inferior to the superior? Again, how are we to recognize superior faculties? It will be answered, "among all the possibilities of combination, that which *harmonizes* the greatest *number* of the *strongest* tendencies must be given the preference." The important thing, then, is always to know which are the strongest tendencies. They are, it is said,

Digitized by Google

those which result by heredity from modes of conduct which have already had the greatest strength and the most success among our ancestors; these modes of conduct are precisely those which tend to the preservation and development of society. Man feels the pressure upon his individual will of all the unknown series of natural motives, which, on the whole, have urged his ancestors oftenest in a good rather than a bad direction. This is what Guyau had already said: "The moral agent," he wrote, "will feel himself pushed in this direction, by an entirely natural and rational tendency, and will recognize that there must be a sort of inward *coup d'ètat* for him to escape from this pressure: it is that *coup d'ètat* which is called a fault or a crime." But the very possibility of such a *coup d'ètat* proves that the tendencies which should be the strongest are not always so. The criterion is, then, overthrown. Further the *coup d'ètat in* question—crime—appears to Nietzsche to be itself that which is the best, the "healthiest" the most fully in accord with the will to be powerful. In order to avoid this objection, Miss Simcox is obliged to define the strongest tendencies: they are, "those which are most *persistent.*" She thus goes back to Darwin's theory of permanent instincts, the momentary violation of which cannot prevent their final reappearance in the form of remorse. But, as Guyau showed us before Nietzsche, these persistent tendencies of the species include immoral or at least non-moral tendencies as well as moral tendencies. The instinct of vengeance, for instance, is very *persistent,* especially among the Corsicans: Nietzsche would see in this a splendid manifestation of life. The love of property and even the desire for the goods of others are also very permanent tendencies. Nietzsche well says: "If the master is able to appropriate the goods and the person of his slave, this is according to nature." It would be necessary to draw up a list of tendencies in the order of their permanency in the species, which is not easy; and were this list actually made out, we should always ask, as Nietzsche does, why it is required that the individual should sacrifice his *strongest* tendency to that which is most *permanent* in the entire *species,* or even to the most permanent tendency in himself. Besides there is one

Digitized by Google

tendency preëminently enduring in the individual, as in the species: self-love. If everything is to give way to self-love, as Stirner demands, and also Nietzsche himself, there is no question that we are acting in accordance with an enduring and indestructible tendency, which always reappears and always will reappear. It is, then, when man is not selfish, when he does not regard himself as "unique," that he should chiefly suffer "remorse."

Finally, if we examine still more closely the strongest and the most permanent tendencies of the species—the residue in us of the actions of our ancestors—we recognize in them by that very fact the survivors and the signs of an *antecedent* condition of human nature. Hence to follow these tendencies is to go forward putting our feet in those places where our ancestors have left the deepest and most perceptible impressions. By doing this we only *keep on* in the same path as our ancestors; the one ideal is then to do again what the herd has done. Now, such an ideal as this does not necessarily include the idea of progress, nor even of evolution; the purely evolutionary ethics of life, instead of making us turn towards the future would end by making us keep our faces turned towards the past. To avoid this objection we must find tendencies, which, while they sum up the results of the past, also anticipate the future; but let these tendencies once be separated, in theory, from the others, and the reason why the individual should submit to them still remains to be found. Morals cannot, then, be a pure question of dynamics, a simple problem of *forces,* even if these be conceived of as intensity of inward power. The "will to be powerful" remains under all its forms, an indeterminate principle.

More recently M. Simmel has borrowed afresh a moral criterion from the idea of a quantitative maximum for which he gives three successive formulas: Do that which, directly or indirectly produces: 1st, the maximum of a satisfied will; 2d, the maximum of life; 3d, the maximum of activity. The analogy between these principles and those of Guyau in regard to the most intensive and the most extensive life has been justly commented upon. But the principle of Guyau did not

Digitized by Google

embrace the category of quantity alone: Guyau demanded "fecundity" of life, its "expansion" and "centrifugal direction" as well. Quantity in the rough meant to him only "power" to which "order" should be added, that is an organization of power in view of some end to be attained. This end always remains to be determined.

In order to attain it, have we nothing to do but to give ourselves up to the movement of life, as Nietzsche wishes, and shall all ethics hold literally to these two sayings: *Sequere naturam,* or, if you will: *sequere vitam?* No, because life, whether it be individual or social, contains the germ of discord as well as the germ of concord. One of the capital laws which biological evolution has brought to light, and upon which Nietzsche has laid special emphasis is precisely the "struggle for life." We have seen that this struggle does not prevent harmony in life: it is this which Guyau has shown, it is this which Nietzsche has too often forgotten. The struggle may also depend more upon the circumstances of environment, than upon the essential nature of the life itself, notwithstanding Nietzsche's opinion to the contrary. But as there will always be a material environment and material necessities for human activity, the struggle will always go on upon certain points, and will involve in the future, as it has always done in the past, a state of more or less open warfare between opposing interests, a conflict of egoistic tendencies with those which are disinterested. Now the object of morals is precisely peace, agreement, harmony. Morals should then set over against the actual life, mixture of struggle and agreement that it is, an *ideal* life, which is not for this reason in contradiction to the other as Nietzsche claims; on the other hand, neither is it simply such a life as that which abandons itself to purely *vital* impulses. The *natural* direction of life which Nietzsche alone takes into account is one thing; the *ideal* and *moral* direction which we should impress upon it by a deliberate act of the will is quite another thing. If morality consisted of nothing more than living, we should all be moral; the misfortune is that in certain cases morality consists in dying.

If man is to make progress in a truly moral sense he must

Digitized by Google

not be preoccupied merely with a stronger, more persistent and more intense life, but with a life more disinterested and more universal; hence he must constantly place the intensity of life in its extension *towards others,* that is to say, the quantity in the quality and the value. This it is to which Guyau invited him: he sees the genuinely intense life in the generous and fruitful life, which "lives for many others" and it was thus he lived himself. But this entire harmony of intensity with expansiveness exists only in great souls; in others it is imperfectly *realized.* As a result of evolution man in becoming man has still remained an animal, and one of the laws of animality which will always persist in the multitude is the struggle for life. The biological theory of evolution has widened the horizon of the struggle without changing its nature. It cannot, alone, transform all purely vital relations into moral ones, any more than the telescope can make the field of vision go beyond the relations of objects in space, by opening it up to the stars. Besides we have seen that Nietzsche, in the name of life, simply and entirely does away with morality.

Guyau himself had very plainly marked the limit which the doctrine of evolution can not overstep, nor even attain. This limit is, according to him, "devotion, sacrifice." How indeed shall the ethics of life set about obtaining from the individual, in certain cases, a sacrifice, which is not merely partial and provisional, but definitive and without compensation? "Charity," says Guyau, "urges us to forget what our right hand has given, but reason counsels us to look well to what it gives." The three psychological equivalents of duty in the doctrine of life, according to Guyau—expansive activity, expansive intelligence, expansive sensibility—are valuable supports for morality, but for a double use. Doubtless ever-increasing solidarity does tend, as Guyau has shown, to do away with the conflict between each individual and the whole. But this universality of love, this complete fusion of the sensibilities which would make duty useless is still only an ideal: in actual reality we are yet in the thick of the struggle, and there will always be Nietzsches to remind us of it. The autonomy between the good of the individual and the good of the whole does then

Digitized by Google

often exist in fact; and Guyau has shown this in the second part of his "Esquisse." This autonomy is not resolved in the present by dismissing its solution to an indefinite and problematical future as does Spencer. The ideal must be our rule of action not because it will be real to-morrow, but because this ideal has for the individual to-day a value superior to his persoanl happiness and to his personal *life*.

III.

Finally, according to both Guyau and Nietzsche, the idea of life remains ambiguous, because it has two distinct spheres: that of the outer world and that of consciousness. From the physical point of view, life is only a mechanism, more complex than any other, in that it is able to renew itself and to make itself a kind of centre of a cartesian whirlpool; but it is always a mechanism, as Descartes well understood. Hence from this side a doctrine of morals cannot be built up. All that can be said is that, even in its mechanical aspect, life is essentially a construction although always accompanied by that destruction which was almost all that Nietzsche saw. The practical problem of life, physically considered, is to establish a balance between construction and destruction to the advantage of the former. This is, however, only the material side of life. In point of fact that which constitutes the essence of life is the inward not the outward; it is the inner activity with the more or less confused sensibility which goes along with it. In other words, it is the *psychological* basis which is of importance, and which alone can enlighten us as to true moral "values." Now, from the psychological point of view, the doctrine of Nietzsche is as we have seen only the old theory of an unconquerably egoistic will, of an ineluctable self-concentration. La Rochefoucauld and Helvetius were among the French masters of Nietzsche. But contemporary psychology has refuted this theory of pure egoism and has shown that altruism is also essential to life, that it too is fundamental and primordial. The Darwinian mechanism of selection which makes those triumph who are best adapted to their environ-

Digitized by Google

ment, expresses a physiological law of nature, which no doubt has its application to human society; but this is only one of the laws of action in the real world. Psychological laws are entirely different; neither can sociological laws be reduced to the selection of the strongest, nor to a mere struggle for power. The Nietzschian interpretation of Darwinism, as a morality of masters and slaves, is incomplete and false. The same is true of another Nietzschian view, which, as with Rolph, leads to "an insatiable thirst for power," without defining in what power consists, why it is exercised and upon what. Nietzsche reared a complete metaphysic and an entire epic poem upon this narrow basis which is only a fragment of the truth. Far from being the foundation of a truly scientific system of ethics, the metaphysic of Nietzsche is, on the contrary, a negation of those laws which are the most firmly established by a genuinely *scientific and philosophic* biology and sociology. His unbridled individualism is in manifest contradiction to that idea of solidarity which is becoming more and more dominant in the eyes of both biologists and sociologists. The German thinker saw only one of the great laws of nature, that of division and opposition; he did not see the other and more fundamental one: that of union and harmony.

After this examination of the teachings of Guyau and Nietzsche our conclusion is that the idea of morality ought not to be in hopeless opposition to nature itself and to life; the end to be pursued should not be in contradiction to the cause which is to realize it; there should be what Guyau calls a "coincidence" between finality and causality. In order to be possible, the reconciliation of individual and universal ends, which is the proper object of ethics, should not be absolutely contrary to the very nature of man, to the essential tendency of the human will. The ideal, which is the harmony of the individual with the whole, must first have some foundation in reality; without this it would not be what we call a force-idea, it would be a pure utopia only to be realized by miracle and supernatural grace. The possibility of a system of morals demands, then, that the ideal be already realized in part by man, that there shall actually be in us a point of junction be-

Digitized by Google

tween the ideal and the real, whence the harmony already begun may be further carried on; it is necessary that the fusion of the individual and the universal be already accomplished in the very centre of our being, in the *punctum saliens,* so that it may radiate there and invade little by little the entire man. In a word, it is necessary that the individual himself have, I do not say only a "social side" as Comte and Guyau have admitted, but even a universal centre. The ethics to come will then only be able to subsist as true ethics, if it succeed in putting beyond doubt a principle of universal disinterestedness immanent in the individual himself and identical with the radical will of mankind.

ALFRED FOUILLÈE.

MENTON, FRANCE.

THE PROFESSIONAL CRIMINAL IN ENGLAND.

IN a series of articles on Crime which a late Assistant Commissioner of Police for London has been contributing to the press he appeals to men of experience in support of his proposals for treating the criminal classes with greater rigor and severity. My experience of the criminal population, it is true, is of a different character from the experience of an official whose business it has been to hunt them down, to collect evidence against them, to secure their conviction before the criminal courts and to see them safely lodged for months in prison or for years in penal servitude. An occupation such as this, necessary as it is for the protection of society, is too restricted in its operations—too much dominated by a single point of view to give the men who follow it that wide and comprehensive outlook on the criminal problem so essential for its adequate solution. It is almost inevitable that an official whose duty it has been to track out and hunt down the supposed offender should ultimately come to regard him (to use the words of one of the articles) as "a human beast of prey." It fell to my lot as a prison official to come into the closest contact day

Digitized by Google

after day, for many years, with vast numbers of the criminal population of both sexes and of all ages—from the little fellow of twelve or fourteen making his first appearance in prison, to the old and grey-headed offender who had passed the greater part of his checkered existence in the silence and solitude of the prison cell. It was an important part of my duty to try and understand the characters of these people; to look back into their past history, to trace the record of their careers; and to gauge if possible to what extent adverse parental or social circumstances had contributed to make the criminal what he is. Careful and minute examination of a large number of individual cases led me to the conclusion, which I have stated over and over again before Parliamentary Committees of Inquiry, that the criminal population as a whole, including the habitual and professional criminal, are not human beasts of prey, but the products partly of unwise prison treatment, and partly of the miserable social and economic conditions in which they have been born and bred. I have seen juveniles, committed to prison again and again, develop into professional criminals by the score. But in almost every instance it was possible to account for their sinister career without resorting to the far-fetched and odious hypothesis that they are by nature merely "human beasts of prey." It is in fact one of my firmest convictions that most of the professional criminals who are now a menace to society might under happier auspices have become honest and law-abiding citizens: and it is their treatment on the "beast of prey theory" which has made so many of them what they are.

Let me produce evidence of this belief. Most of the juveniles committed to Reformatory and Industrial Schools are either criminals or on the verge of crime. If permitted to go on in their modes of life most of these juveniles would blossom out into habitual criminals. But these young people are committed to reformative institutions before tendencies have acquired the rigidity of habits, and what is the result when they ultimately return to life in the world? Here is what the Inspector says of some of them in his recently published report: "It appears that the total number of old boys who have been

Digitized by Google

at the front is not less than 4,565. Of these 216 have been killed or have died of disease, and 351 have been wounded or invalided; three have been recommended for the Victoria Cross, ten for the Distinguished Service Medal; two have gained commissions; four have been specially mentioned in dispatches, and others have received special promotion for good service rendered." Such are some of the results of giving the incipient professional criminal, "the human beast of prey," the humble opportunity of becoming merely a private soldier in the service of the King. Our institutions for juvenile offenders are not perhaps all that they might be, and their best friends will say of them that there is room for improvement. But the principle which they embody is the true principle for diminishing the ranks of the professional criminal. It directs the attention of society, as a recent Parliamentary Committee has reported, "to cutting off the sources of the supply." To become an expert the professional criminal like every other tradesman must begin young. And he takes up with this trade because he is in the first instance a homeless or neglected outcast. All that he requires to become an honest member of society is a little social and economic opportunity. If he gets this opportunity before it is too late, society will be rewarded not only with faithful and devoted service on the field of battle but also in all those departments of life where "peace hath her victories, no less renowned than war."

It is asserted on behalf of the "beast of prey" hypothesis that when it was acted upon by sending the habitual criminal to the gallows or to penal servitude for life it had "a practical efficacy which none could ignore." This assertion is made with a great deal of assurance and dogmatism, but it is facts we want and not dogma. We want proofs drawn from the history of our penal laws that capital sentences and life sentences were effective remedies for habitual or professional crime. Such proofs cannot be produced for the simple and sufficient reason that they are not to be found. All the evidence is the other way. As a matter of fact and of history the existing system of penal treatment is a re-action, a conscious and deliberate re-action, against the futile barbarities which

Digitized by Google

preceded it. Sir Samuel Romilly, Sir James Macintosh, Sir Robert Peel and their successors were practical statesmen of the highest character and experience, and they systematically proceeded to abolish the severities of the old criminal law on the ground that they were not effective as deterrents. At the beginning of the nineteenth century the penal laws of England were written in blood. Townsend, a celebrated Bow Street runner, stated before a Parliamentary commission that he had known as many as forty people hanged in one day. At Kingston, seven persons, four men and three women, were convicted of being concerned in robbing a pedlar: "they were all hanged in Kent Street, opposite the door." One hundred and sixty different offences were punishable by death without benefit of clergy. Forgers were executed at the rate of one every three weeks between the years 1805 and 1818. I might multiply instances by the score to exemplify the drastic fashion in which criminals of all kinds were treated at the beginning of the nineteenth century. But such examples would only appal and horrify the reader. The facts are too well known to be disputed. And the point at issue is simply this: Were these drastic proceedings effective? Did they have a practical efficacy which none could ignore?

The universal testimony of historians and writers on crime who have examined this period is that the savagery of the criminal law defeated its own ends. In face of the penalties to which they knew a convicted man would be exposed witnesses would not come forward to give evidence. Even when the evidence was clear, juries would not consent to convict. Justice was partially paralyzed. The conscience of the community was at variance with the enactments of the law. The elaborate machinery of the penal system broke down. That was result number one. Result number two was the increase of crime by leaps and bounds. "The effectual means of dealing with men who make crime their profession," so far from being effectual, led to an enormous increase in all kinds of crime. Professional blackmailers lived in opulence and security. A Parliamentary Committee which sat in 1828 reported that more than sixteen banks had been forced to pay blackmail to

Digitized by Google

thieves, and that more than £200,000 worth of property had in a short space been the object of negotiation or compromise. Blackmailers received their spoils from bankers "accompanied by a clearance from every risk, and perfect impunity for their crimes." The highways outside London were infested with professional footpads, and only the other day I was told by an old lady that in the first quarter of the last century her father never used to ride down as far as Acton without a brace of pistols in his belt. In London itself the law was powerless to prevent crime. The police were unable to give protection. Shopkeepers combined to provide patrols to watch the fronts of their shops. Householders had to arm themselves against burglars, and housebreakers were kept off by man-traps and spring guns. The country was deluged with spurious coin and counterfeit bank-notes, and it has been estimated that there were as many as fifty fraudulent mints in the metropolis alone. As for the police they admitted that there were many streets in London which they dared not enter. John Sayer, a Bow Street officer, stated before a Parliamentary Committee that places such as Duck Lane, Gravel Lane, and Cock Lane, in Westminster, were so infested by gangs of ruffians that no policeman dare venture near them, unless accompanied by five or six others, for fear of being cut to pieces. Yet every one of these ruffians knew that he would be executed or transported for life if convicted of theft.

It will be seen from these facts, which are taken from official documents, that the attempt to make "really bad offenders as rare as wolves" by hanging and transporting them was given a good trial at one period of our history and absolutely failed. The failure was so complete that responsible statesmen of all parties were ultimately obliged to admit it. The logic of facts was too strong for the pre-conceived theory that punishment will be effective if you only make it severe enough. In place of that theory statesmen came round to the principle enunciated in the House of Commons by Sir James Macintosh in 1822 that the way to increase the efficiency of the criminal law is to mitigate its severity. It is on this principle that penal legislation in England has ever since proceeded. This princi-

Digitized by Google

ple has been accompanied by an enormous increase in social security and an equally great decrease in human misery and suffering. Are we to abandon a method which has made life and property more secure than it is in any other portion of the globe? Are we to depart from a system which has enlisted public opinion on the side of law, and by that transformation alone has done more to ensure the safety of life and property than all the paper penal codes that ever existed? Deep down in the hearts of the humblest classes there is at the present moment a law-abiding instinct perhaps unparalleled in any other land. Are we to disturb this instinct with all the securities it gives by shaking the foundations on which it is based? Brutal laws, says Montesquieu, brutalize the population, and if we resort once more to the systematic infliction of sentences of penal servitude for life, we shall run a risk of reducing the people to that brutal condition of mind out of which crime so often takes its rise. In addition to this incalculable mischief, sentences for life are certain to transfer the conscience of the public from the side of law into sympathy and commiseration for the criminal.

Is the professional criminal such a menace to society at the present moment as to necessitate a revolutionary change in our penal methods? Let us examine this question, for it is at the root of the whole matter. As far as it is possible to ascertain from police reports, the number of habitual criminals in our large cities has enormously diminished within the last three-quarters of a century. According to the returns presented to the Constabulary Force Commission of 1837, the number of habitual criminals known to the London police amounted to more than ten thousand. In 1899 the number of such criminals only amounted to about eleven hundred. As everybody is aware the population of London has increased with giant strides since 1837. But notwithstanding this vast increase in the general population, the habitual criminal classes have diminished to a tenth of what they were in the first half of the nineteenth century. Other large cities in the kingdom have exactly the same tale to tell. Bristol had nearly two thousand habitual criminals in 1837. According to the latest police re-

Digitized by Google

turns these numbers have now dwindled down to forty-one. Newcastle had over seventeen hundred habituals: the latest police reports say that they now amount to seventy-two. It may be said that these returns are not altogether accurate and that remark is perfectly true. They are only approximations. But approximations are not to be set down as worthless because they are not mathematically exact. There is hardly any department of life where we can get absolute mathematical exactitude: we have to be satisfied with approximate estimates. But approximations are infinitely preferable to mere undiluted guess work. They are at least resting upon a basis of fact, and evidence of some kind however imperfect is always preferable to none at all. All the evidence in our possession, and in my opinion it is very strong evidence, points to the conclusion that society at the present time is much less menaced by the habitual criminal than it was three-quarters of a century ago. It is certainly much less menaced than when the gallows, the lash, and sentences for life were in full and undisturbed possession of the field.

The extent to which criminals of all classes, occasional and habitual, plunder the public, may in some measure be estimated by looking at the figures relating to stolen property as reported to the police. These figures have been carefully tabulated by Master Macdonell in his admirable introduction to the "Criminal Returns" for 1899. According to Master Macdonell's calculations the amount of loss per head, on an average of five years, to the population of London by the depredations of criminals was less than five pence per annum. In Manchester the loss per head is less than three pence per annum. In Birmingham it is a penny halfpenny per annum. These losses, even if they do not represent the total amount of property stolen, cannot be magnified into anything very formidable or alarming. It is also to be remembered that all these losses are not inflicted by professional criminals—the men whom it is proposed to shut up for life. Anybody acquainted with the prison population knows perfectly well that the occasional criminal is perhaps more dangerous to property and produces much more widespread misery and havoc than the

Digitized by Google

professional criminal. The professional criminal steals my purse or robs my house, but these offences, bad as they are, only touch me on the surface. The occasional criminal, on the other hand, as a result of the confidence he enjoys, may swindle me of all I possess. Are we not constantly having instances of this in bank frauds for colossal sums, in the bankruptcy of fraudulent companies and in financial crimes of all kinds? These depredations on the public, spreading ruin far and wide, are not the work of professional criminals working with a common burglar's apparatus. They are the work of men with a clean record as far as the criminal courts are concerned. It is the occasional criminal of this type and not his humbler brother, the professional criminal, of whom society has to stand in greatest dread. Will shutting up the professional criminal for life make his more formidable rivals as rare as wolves? Will it do much to minimize, or anything at all to minimize, the most serious peril to which our property is exposed—I mean the peril of losing it through the defalcations of criminals in positions of trust? Let us recognize facts in this matter. It is the occasional and not the habitual criminal who is the most formidable foe to property.

In setting forth these facts I have no intention of whitewashing the professional criminal or of maintaining that our present methods of dealing with him are the best that can be devised. I merely wish to exhibit the problem of professional crime in its proper proportions. I merely wish to show that all this random talk of the country being in a state of siege owing to the operations of professional criminals is rather cheap sensationalism. It is an attempt, without substantial facts, to deliver a stab at the principles of our criminal and prison law. What are these principles it may be asked? The first of them is to treat delinquent juveniles by educational rather than punitive methods so as to prevent them joining the permanent army of crime. The second is to open a gateway of hope to the convicted adult by the exercise of conditional liberation. It is around these two principles that the criminal law of England revolves in so far as regards offenders against property. I have seen these methods in operation on thousands of indi-

Digitized by Google

vidual cases and it is my firm conviction that they are sound at bottom. All that is required to make these methods cope more effectively with habitual crime is to give them still greater elasticity. As the Home Secretary, in a recent speech to his constituents, stated that he proposed to deal with this matter, let me point out the directions in which our penal law might be made more elastic, and therefore more capable of dealing with professional crime.

According to the latest criminal returns for England and Wales the number of persons convicted of burglary in the year 1899 was 451. Of this total no fewer than 153 or thirty-four per cent. were juveniles between the ages of sixteen and twenty-one. The cases of housebreaking and shopbreaking in the same period are nearly twice as high (878) as the cases of burglary. Here again we find that juveniles between the ages of sixteen and twenty-one contribute 339, more than 38 per cent. of the whole. It is from the ranks of these juveniles, as I have been repeating for years, that the adult professional criminal is recruited. An examination of individual cases shows that these delinquent juveniles have had no industrial opportunities. They know no occupation; they have been taught no trade. They are merely hanging on the outskirts of labor, and pick up a precarious living at the best. In many cases they are the offspring of parents who are either dead, dissolute, or economically helpless, and unless a helping hand is held out to them outside their own family circle they are tremendously handicapped in the economic struggle for life. Is it to be wondered at that juveniles of this class degenerate into criminals? Is it surprising that they fall a ready prey to the wiles of the expert thief and learn a trade from him? He is willing to teach them; no one else is. In this way the susceptible young mind, casting about for an economic anchorage and finding none, is lured into a life of crime.

At the present time our methods of penal treatment, while recognizing the principle of industrial education for juvenile offenders, stop short at the age of sixteen. According to the civil law a person does not become an adult till he reaches the age of twenty-one. But the criminal law, as far as penal treat-

Digitized by Google

ment is concerned, places the age of maturity at sixteen, just a little over the age when the children of the well-to-do are beginning their education at our public schools. If we mean to reduce the proportions of professional crime, we must make our methods of dealing with juvenile offenders more elastic. We must not say that penal maturity is attained at the age of sixteen. We must not say that industrial education shall stop at that comparatively tender age. We must not rank boys over that age as adult criminals and subject them to very much the same treatment as a man of forty. I admit that something is being done, or is about to be done, to mitigate the penal elements in prison treatment for juveniles under the existing law. I understand that an attempt is beginning to be made at Borstal prison to deal with juveniles under age on industrial rather than purely punitive methods. While wishing this effort every success and believing that it may do some good, I fear that it is designed on too narrow a basis to be thoroughly effective. The criminal law itself must be made more elastic; that is, it must give wider recognition to the industrial element in penal treatment to make the experiments at Borstal really fruitful in good results. What is wanted at present is a frank acknowledgment of the fact that juvenile offenders, who are slower than other sections of the population in reaching maturity, should be treated on industrial rather than penal lines till maturity has actually been reached. If a step of this kind were openly and frankly taken and the incipient professional criminal properly trained and equipped for the industrial battle of life, I feel assured that a great step forward will have been taken in thinning the ranks of the criminal classes. From a financial point of view it should not be a very serious undertaking. The numbers to be dealt with would not exceed five hundred per annum. These juveniles have to be kept at present in prisons and penal servitude. To put their period of detention on an industrial rather than a penal footing, ought not, if properly conducted, to be a serious burden on the state. To diminish the professional criminal class, my first suggestion would be to cut off the supply of juvenile burglars and housebreakers by giving greater elastic-

Digitized by Google

ity to existing principles of legislation so as to enable these juveniles to be treated by industrial rather than merely penal methods. Teach men to be industrious, said John Howard, and they will be honest. Teach children to earn their living by industry and they will not be tempted to earn it by crime.

The second principle in our penal legislation which requires extending, in order to grapple more effectively with professional crime, is the principle of conditional liberation. At the present time a convicted prisoner whose sentence is of any considerable duration can earn a remission of it by good conduct and industry to the extent of one-fourth. That is to say, a sentence of three years' penal servitude can be reduced by nine months, a sentence of five years by fifteen months, and so on. The remission of sentence to well-conducted prisoners has recently been applied with satisfactory results to persons under sentences of from six months to two years, and there is no reason why the principle of remission should not be extended to almost all classes of short sentence prisoners. It is a great and palpable incentive to good conduct in prison, and good conduct in prison is to certain kinds of prisoners a useful preparation for good conduct outside. Whatever conduces to industry and good conduct in prison must be considered as a reforming agency of the very best description. It is by industry more than anything else that a prisoner begins to re-acquire a sense of self-esteem, a sense of the powers and capabilities that are within him, a belief in himself, a belief in his capacity to battle successfully with the economic difficulties of life. The more completely prison administration is framed on lines to stimulate and develop these qualities in the prisoner, the more successful it is likely to be. The great curse of prison discipline in the past is, in the words of Lord Kimberley's Prison Commission, that it has not only failed to reform offenders but has produced a deteriorating effect upon them. It is to this deteriorating effect of prison treatment that we owe so many of our professional criminals. If a man goes to prison deteriorated and (as a result of bad prison methods) you ultimately set him at liberty still more deteriorated, can you expect him to be anything else than a professional criminal?

Digitized by Google

He becomes one of that numerous class who may be accurately described as prison-made criminals.

The only way to prevent the prison from being a breeding ground of crime—a nursery of professional criminals—is to completely industrialize prison treatment, and to still further extend the scope of conditional liberation. The one predominant thought in the prisoner's mind from the moment of his incarceration to the day of his discharge is the prospect of liberty. The days between him and liberty are counted, the weeks are counted, the months are counted with a scrupulous and even pathetic exactitude. On entering a prison cell there is no subject on which the solitary inmate takes so deep and touching an interest as the day of his release. Here is a profound and permanent force waiting to be utilized. Industry as we know is the most powerful instrument for rehabilitating the offender in his own eyes: it is the only sure foundation of reform. The supreme aim of prison treatment should be to get the convicted man to acquire abiding habits of industry. Once this has been effected it is possible to say with some amount of confidence that the prisoner will turn over a new leaf when he goes back into the world. But prison labor is slave labor. Prisoners will only be industrious provided industry hastens the hour of their return to liberty. In these circumstances it is the business of the administration to put the highest possible premium on industry. It is its business to be able to say to the prisoner pining for liberty, If you are industrious you will shorten your detention not merely by one-fourth, as is the law at present, but by one-third, or in some cases even by one-half. In fact it might be wise not to tie down the administration to any hard and fast period at all. It might be wise to give the greatest possible elasticity to the principle of conditional liberation, enabling the authorities to deal with each individual case entirely on its merits. An extension of conditional liberation in this direction would no doubt increase official responsibilities and compel officials to pay greater attention to the character of the individual prisoner. But this is exactly what is required to make imprisonment a success. The regimentation of prison life is its weak-

Digitized by Google

ness and its snare. It is by individualization and not regimentation that good results will be obtained.

I think the main lines on which criminal law reform must proceed are now tolerably clear. If we wish to diminish the professional criminal class, two definite steps must be taken. First of all we must narrow the recruiting ground of this class by preventing juveniles between the ages of sixteen and twenty-one from swelling the ranks of professional crime. This can to a large extent be accomplished by giving greater elasticity to existing laws relating to the treatment of juvenile offenders. The industrialization of corrective discipline should not cease as it now does at the age of sixteen; it should be extended if necessary to the period of civil maturity. This method of treatment, if conducted on proper lines by competent and sympathetic officials, would cut off the supply of professional criminals by converting a large percentage of delinquent juveniles, who would otherwise become professional criminals, into industrious and law-abiding citizens. In the next place we must prevent the prison from being what it has been in the past, a nursery of habitual crime. This can only be done by the complete industrialization of prison treatment and by bringing the reforming and rehabilitating forces of industry to bear on the individual prisoner. But the prisoner will not become industrious without the strongest possible incentive. That incentive is the desire for liberty. This desire should be gratified and this incentive developed by offering a reward for consistent and habitual industry in the shape of conditional liberation on a much more extended scale than now exists. The industrialization of prison treatment and the extension of conditional liberation would counteract and perhaps nullify the deadening and degrading atmosphere of prison life. It is this atmosphere which turns the occasional criminal into the professional and confirms the professional criminal in his sinister career. I do not say that when these two steps have been taken that we shall make professional criminals as rare as wolves. It will be many a long day, no matter what measures are devised, before this happy stage of progress is reached. No delusion can be greater than to sup-

Digitized by Google

pose that it can be reached by resorting once more to the rusty, barbarous, and obsolete weapons of our ancestors. But I do believe, if we put our penal law, as Lord Rosebery would say, on an efficient and business-like footing in the matter of juvenile offenders and in the matter of prison treatment, that we can largely reduce the proportions of professional crime.

WILLIAM DOUGLAS MORRISON.

LONDON.

THE PRACTICAL CONSCIOUSNESS OF FREEDOM.

THERE is something significant in the very perversity with which this question of freedom forces itself upon our attention. No theory has met with so many apparently overwhelming defeats, and yet been so little disturbed. The Ptolemaic system of astronomy, having been overthrown by Copernicus, has remained dead. Freedom has been declared absurd and childish; and has been disproved with all the rigor of the scientific method; but, unlike the Ptolemaic system of astronomy, it still shows unmistakable signs of life. Its survival is all the more remarkable when we consider that it is opposed in spirit to all theory. To understand is to coördinate and unify. The consummation shining ahead of the theoretical man in his inquiry, is the perfectly ordered universe where the flower in the crannied wall is the key to all truth. What a bungling thing is freedom, when you compare it with such an ideal! Yet no generation has refused to entertain it as a theoretical possibility, and it is allowed to take shape and stalk abroad even in academic circles. Now it seems quite certain that if man has clung to a theoretical monstrosity with steady and unabated tenacity, it must satisfy some profound and abiding practical need. When ideas have survived a long process of demonstration and counter-demonstration, they are fairly entitled to a place among those human ideals which are suggested by that perennial and paramount problem of life. Kant cannot have been all wrong when he called freedom a postulate along with God and immorality, and found their roots in

Digitized by Google

the moral nature of man. I propose in this discussion to question the common moral consciousness about this matter of freedom, in order to discover what is there *meant* by it, and what is there *gained* by it. We may then turn to certain of the reasonings of the metaphysicians, in order to discover whether this meaning and this value are there provided for. Possibly the meaning is ignorance and the value illusion, but we can only find out by first taking the moral man at his word. Hence we begin neither with metaphysics nor even with ethics, but with the moral life.

The moral consciousness of man is a long story, and the end is not yet. But among other things we know that it apprehends, be it ever so vaguely, a standard and a set of values to which the individual attaches an unutterable sanctity. Equipped with his measure of good and evil, finite man dares to apply it to the universe, and even to condemn the universe out of his own private heart. These moral values demand the unflinching loyalty of him to whom they are revealed, even though they lead him out to do battle against overwhelming odds. Conscience submits to no majority, though the powers of Heaven and Hell combine against it. Hence that old tragedy of the religious consciousness: impotence demanding goodness of omnipotence. The obedience which the goodness of his ideals requires of him, a man calls his *duty,* and he acknowledges *responsibility* in so far as this same duty involves both loyalty and watchful efficiency. Duty and responsibility are terms which signify to most men the heart of life. The voice of duty gives a touch of sublimity to the most paltry of human beings. Duty violated, responsibility repudiated, mean worthlessness and shame. Duty obeyed, responsibility fulfilled, mean worth and honor. This cluster of meanings together with approval or disapproval, and merit or demerit, constitute our ordinary criticism of the conduct of life. With these terms we are accustomed to measure and value our neighbor and ourselves. They are the vocabulary of the universal philosophy of life, as well as the symbols of social welfare. We have now to discover in what sense *freedom* is an essential term in this same vocabulary. What do men mean

Digitized by Google

when they say that freedom denotes a practical experience and a moral value, inseparable from the general conception of life that has just been described?

In the first place, it is to be remarked that the sin and pain in the world fill men with less despair when they are not conceived as the direct expression of God's will. Moral loyalty makes religion impossible except God be acquitted of complicity in sin. The human spirit seeks relief from the incubus of a belief that lying and murder and innocent suffering are rooted in the vitals of the universe. A world in which an essential purity is contrasted with irrelevant or accidental evil, is a better world for a moral individual to live in, than one in which this evil is an inevitable constituent of the whole. In this connection freedom very clearly means the denial that everything is inevitable. The universe is said to be such that it admits, whether through free human agency or otherwise, of certain unnecessary things. It is a world in which irrelevant events occur. There are spots in such a universe that were not filled from the beginning, but which remain to be filled in one of several ways; and here, we say, evil slips in. Freedom means *alternative possibilities*. Though a certain crime may now be a matter of history, it might not have occurred; there was another possibility for that moment of time. So we can consistently regret that it was not otherwise, as in truth it might have been.

Let us turn for a confirmation of this notion of freedom to the central aspect of the moral consciousness. Is it not true that when we claim freedom for the life of duty and responsibility, we are asking again for relief from the inevitable? The moral world is a world in which we reproach ourselves and others for what has taken place, and urge ourselves and others to a more resolute performance of duty in the future. I am ashamed of myself for an act that is past when I believe that the act might have been otherwise; not that the universe might have been otherwise, but that with the rest of the universe up to that moment the same, this particular act might have been otherwise. If I knew better, then the reproach implies that I might have attended to my knowledge; if I ought

Digitized by Google

to have known better, then the reproach implies that I might have taken steps to acquire such knowledge. In either case I imply that somewhere it was possible that another event should have been substituted for the actual event, related events remaining substantially the same. On the other hand I face the future with determination and resolution, when I believe that I am to make it good by my free new purpose. Duty demands of me that I meet the occasion, and perform that which I may freely perform. In my sense of responsibility I am reminded that if I fail, evil will slip in where good belongs. The spirit of this sort of life dwells only in a world of possibilities. Every act which it inspires declares that the real which becomes through human means is not inevitable. The practical significance of such a consciousness of freedom, consists in the fact that out of it issues *the will to achieve*. The issue has been much obscured by using the term as though it represented an ideal state or condition of the individual. But obviously freedom cannot be at the same time the object and the presupposition of duty. To maintain that I ought to be free, is to presuppose the realization of the ideal as present in the very life that is urged to pursue it. Freedom is a moral circumstance, and not an object for the moral will; though in so far as the belief in its truth is a part of the moral will itself, it may be said to have an indispensable moral significance. When I acknowledge my duty and pursue the good, I am conscious of using my freedom. To disprove the truth of freedom would not affect the moral ideal for better or for worse. Nor would it deny the power of the human will, and the importance for progress of individual initiative. But it would threaten the appealing power of all these conceptions. It would devitalize the individual's moral life, because it would deny the consciousness that fosters the individual's moral earnestness. We may indeed doubt whether in respect of their own lives individuals could ever be persuaded to disbelieve in freedom, but the cogency of our argument is not contingent upon such a possibility. Where a characteristic state of mind is found to contain constantly associated aspects, it is reason-

Digitized by Google

able to argue hypothetically that the disappearance of one of these aspects would negate the whole.

There has been a very general failure to apprehend the exact nature of the part played by this consciousness of freedom. It has even been argued that a disbelief in freedom *ought* to make no difference. It is evident that to maintain that we ought to go on doing our duty anyway, whether our actions be determined or free, is to assume the continuance of the sense of duty, and so to beg the question. But more commonly it is argued that a deterministic theory of the will is morally beneficial, because it emphasizes the connectedness between character and conduct on the one hand, and between conduct and external events on the other. It is in an orderly world that acts express character and determine events. Moreover the good man is the reliable man, whose act can be anticipated when his character is known.* Now it is indubitably true that the moral agent must regard phenomena as following a fixed routine. But it is equally certain that he expects no unalterable consistency in his fellow-being, just in so far as he regards him as a moral being. To be sure, his moral nature approves another's constant goodness, but for the sake of the goodness, and not the constancy. Much more conspicuous in both approval and disapproval, is the assumption that such another is free to do either better or worse than is actually the case. Similarly, the moral agent may regard himself as a series of events, and whatever he can learn about his own habits of mind and body is of the same practical advantage as any information that he may possess respecting nature or society. But just in so far as he regards himself as a moral being, he believes himself to be capable of alternatives, one alternative being the very possibility of acquiring and profiting by a knowledge of himself. Hence the fallacy of arguing that if we were to become "fatalistic," it would "result in an earnest adherence to such physical and psychical laws governing the origination of impulse as are known, and an equally earnest search for such as are not yet discovered."† The very heart

Cf. Ritchie: "Free-will and Responsibility," *International Journal of Ethics*, Vol. V., p. 409.

†Bevington: "Determination and Duty;" *Mind*, Vol. V., p. 41.

Digitized by Google

of the matter is this *earnestness* that is so calmly taken for granted. And it is this earnestness, so indispensable for all good undertakings, that requires an accompanying belief in the will's free creative power. The truth of determinism could not be practically beneficial unless it could stir in some individual the will to make use of it; and then the will to achieve it would belie its content.

To experience this practical significance of freedom, the philosopher has only to consult his own attitude toward his own philosophy, be that philosophy libertarian or deterministic. Spinoza is the most representative and consistent of necessitarians, but when we turn from his doctrines to his life, we find that the very enthusiasm which he felt for his own moral philosophy led him to transcend it. Here he is a man of high endeavor, chiding and praising his friends, and seeking to inspire them with new ardor and higher purposes. He is far from standing to everything in "an atitude of assent," when at the close of a letter wherein he has been emphasizing the necessity of clear and distinct perceptions for the highest knowledge, he writes such words as these: "It only remains to remind you, that all these questions demand assiduous study, and great firmness of disposition and purpose. In order to fulfil these conditions, it is of prime necessity to follow a fixed mode and plan of living, and to set before one some definite aim."* Spinoza wrote a burning letter of remonstrance and exhortation to his pupil Albert Burgh upon the latter's desertion of the life of reason for the superstition of Romanism.† To another friend he addresses these words: "Meanwhile, I should like to ask you, nay I beg and entreat you by our friendship, to apply yourself to some serious work with real study, and to devote the chief part of your life to the cultivation of your understanding and your soul."‡ Spinoza could never have justified the spirit that animates such words by any demonstration in his physics of morals. Though the content of his ideal is for the most part a consistent application of his metaphysics, it only became a controlling force in his own life

*Letter LXIII., Bohn's Ed., Vol. II., p. 389.
†Letter LXXIV., ibid, p. 414.
‡Letter XLI., A, ibid, p. 359.

Digitized by Google

when he supplemented it with a belief in freedom. Spinoza has contributed to philosophy the most reasonable as well as the most exalted system of necessitarian ethics that human thought has conceived. And yet upon reflection we must admit that the exalted character of such a morality depends for us upon the half-unconscious assumption that it may be realized in human life as the result of some individual's free aspiration and endeavor. In short, define the moral ideal as you will, it only comes home to the individual when he assumes the option of realizing or neglecting it. Having obtained from the moral consciousness a statement of its claims to freedom, let us now consider the compatibility of these claims with certain philosophical conceptions of human nature. Such an inquiry will lead us to the formulation of a definite thesis.

The practical consciousness of freedom is the belief on the part of the moral individual that alternatives are genuinely possible. It is not alone the conviction that what is about to happen will happen by virtue of his own will, but that in his voluntary undertaking, a real choice is made, which might be made otherwise. In other words, it is presupposed that under identical conditions two or more different events are possible. The opposition between such a proposition and a naturalistic account of the universe is clear and unmistakable. Freedom as it has just been described, implies a succession of moments, the second of which is not contained implicitly in the first. Mechanism, therefore, avowedly contradicts freedom. In a mechanical universe every fact without exception is member of a causal series, where each state contains within itself the explication of its antecedents and the implication of its consequents. My act is only the execution of that which was decreed at the beginning of the world's history. Such an interpretation of the universe is an explicit denial of freedom, and only serves to define and illumine the meaning of that term.

But there is another kind of determinism that can assume such a multitude of disguises as to be fairly bewildering. There is an interpretation of the world that is espoused by determinists and nominal freedomists alike, which threatens to confuse hopelessly the whole issue. The interpretation in

Digitized by Google

question is as follows: In the last analysis the world is some nature that is out of time. Spinoza calls this essential nature Substance; Schopenhauer, Will; Schilling and Hegel, Reason. It may, for our purposes, be anything, so long as it is the super-temporal and immutable character of the universe. Its generic name is the Absolute. This may seem to be a very summary way of dealing with these metaphysical principles, but since we are primarily interested in freedom we are justified in treating them together, if it can be pointed out that their consequences for freedom are the same. The universe taken as a whole, it is said to have a certain fixed character *sub specie eternitatis*. The facts of the temporal sequence may or may not be free from mutual determination, but their occurrence and nature are prescribed by the character or fact of the whole. The universe, let us say, is ABC, from some all-inclusive super-temporal point of view. Then, although C is not determined by B nor B by A, each is essential to the whole. C is not inevitable from the point of view of AB, but it is nevertheless inevitable as part and parcel of the everlasting content of this specific universe ABC. This would seem clearly and explicitly to debar freedom. But, strangely enough, the philosophers who have had the most to say about freedom during this last century, are the philosophers who have been most zealous in developing and defending a metaphysics of this apparently antagonistic order. Such are Kant, Schopenhauer, Fichte, Hegel, and, as a representative of the later idealists, Prof. Royce. This may seem to be a very unwarranted and superficial grouping together of philosophers that are deeply sundered in their fundamental thought. Kant, for example, the great champion of moral freedom, is here classified with Schopenhauer, an avowed fatalist. But the Kant of the first Critique debarred freedom from the temporal-phenomenal world, and relegated it to that department of the universe which, whatever else it may be, is certainly changeless and eternal. A careful study of Kant's three Critiques fails to discover any element or event in the universe that is not inevitable.* The only kind of freedom that

**Cf.* The writer's article, "The Abstract Freedom of Kant," *Philosophical Review* Vol. IV., p. 630.

Digitized by Google

can find its way into Kant's world is of the same brand as Schopenhauer's, and can properly be discussed in conjunction with it. Then, again, it seems hard to put Fichte in such company; he to whom freedom was an enthusiasm and a gospel. To Fichte we undoubtedly owe more than to any other philosopher, for our understanding of the logical meaning and implications of freedom. But the fact nevertheless remains that the absolutism of his metaphysics makes him fundamentally a determinist. Even when a super-temporal Absolute is baptized with the name of "Free Activity," its real nature inhibits freedom. I believe that a thorough examination of the Kantian and Neo-Kantian idealists in connection with this matter of freedom, differentiates them from Spinoza in only one essential respect. Whereas that philosopher called his Absolute by the name of Necessity, these have called theirs Freedom.

Let us consider briefly the argument of these "pseudo-freedomists." The universe, they say, has a certain eternal character. The parts, since they are needed to contribute to this total character, are fixed and definite. But the nature of the world in the last analysis is inexplicable. This will be true whatever that nature may be specified to be. If the world is governed by a wise Providence, or is an interplay of blind forces, the fact that it is such a world has to be accepted without questioning. Here at last the question "Why?" is inapplicable. It is, as we say, "a matter of fact," and there is an end of it. And this is what certain philosophers have called freedom. The argument runs somewhat in this wise. What determined the universe as a whole to be what it is? Answer: Nothing. Ergo: The universe as a whole is self-determined or free. The universe *sub specie eternitatis* is an ultimate, underived and therefore free. The human individual unfortunately is not free in any of his specific acts, but he shares this ultimate nature of the world, and so participates in its irreducibility. His character is an essential part of this underived Absolute, and shares its freedom. Let Schopenhauer speak for the pseudo-freedomists. The Absolute Will he finds to be free in the sense that it is unconditioned. "The concept of freedom," he says, "is thus properly a negative concept, for its con-

Digitized by Google

tent is merely the denial of necessity, *i. e.* the relation of consequent to its reason, according to the principle of sufficient reason."* The individual character as a super-temporal reality shares with the Absolute this freedom from the principle of cause and effect. And "accordingly," Schopenhauer concludes, "while our several actions are in no wise free, every man's individual character is to be regarded as a free act. He is such and such a man, because once for all it is his will to be that man."† It is hard to take such a proposition as this seriously. It involves the misuse of definite terms, and a palpable *non sequitur*. This Absolute, because in its entirety it is an inexplicable and final fact, is said to choose itself. Given M, by hypothesis an ultimate fact, it is by definition not chosen by anything beyond itself; ergo, it is self-chosen. A similar argument might run in this way: A, being by definition the only inhabitant of the universe, was not slain by anyone else; ergo, A committed suicide. A very exacting critic might suggest that perhaps A is not dead; and similarly that perhaps M is not chosen. It is at least a possibility that the universe is such as to exclude entirely the conception of choice, and so of freedom. The assertion that M is not chosen by anything beyond itself, by no means compels us to agree that it is self-chosen.

This contingency of the universe in the last analysis is true, but it is a trifling fact and one with no philosophical significance. We can readily agree with Schopenhauer when he says of his Absolute that such an object "might not be at all, or it might be originally and essentially something quite different from what it is." But by this assertion Schopenhauer can only mean that such alternatives are conceivable, which is merely acknowledging a certain elasticity and irrelevance in human imagination. To endow "existence in general," or the Absolute, with freedom, is another and quite a different matter. What can it mean to say that existence in general is free to exist or not to exist? If existence is free, it must exist to be

*"World as Will and Idea," tr., Vol. I., p. 369.

†"Free-will and Fatalism," tr. by Saunders: "On Human Nature," p. 69.

Digitized by Google

free, and therefore cannot be free not to exist. It is exactly the same to speak of the Absolute as being free to be otherwise than it is. It must exist in order to be free, and since its character is immutable, this very existence denies its freedom. Schopenhauer undertook to reconcile the formula, *"operari sequitur esse,"* with the assertion that freedom is an attribute of the *"esse."* It is plain that if the *"operari"* is but an unfolding of the *"esse,"* the *"esse"* cannot originate in any act at all.* When freedom is utterly debarred from the sphere of action, it is inconsistent to say that the existent is free to be otherwise than it is. Then what possible reasonableness can there be in claiming freedom for an ultimate character, whether it be that of the individual or of the universe as a whole? It would only be true if freedom were defined as mere absence of external limitation. Such a definition, however, is an assumption without the support of either common sense or reason. If the nature of the universe be such as to admit of no change, then there is an inner determination every whit as antagonistic to freedom as the most rigid mechanical causation. In both cases the individual must submit to the presumption that the future, even when he makes it himself, is inevitable.

The most recent contribution to the Neo-Kantian definition of freedom has been made by Professor Royce.† "The sole possible free moral action," he says, "is then a freedom that relates to the present fixing of attention upon the ideas of the Ought which are already present." Similarly, "to sin is *consciously to choose to forget*. . . . an ought that one already recognizes." But the kind of choice here referred to is defined in this characteristic announcement: "Our theory is, that, despite all the causal dependence of the Self upon its own past, and upon all its social and natural conditions, just this act of attention, at this temporal instant, never occurred before, and will never occur again, and is, in so far, unique, individual, incapable of any complete causal explanation, and is, in consequence, the free act of this self."‡ This is a specification of the more

*Martineau's "Study of Religion," Vol. II., p. 306.

†"The World and the Individual." Second Series, "Nature, Man and the Moral Order." *Cf.* Chapters VII. and VIII.

‡Ibid, p. 359.

Digitized by Google

general statement of the earlier volume: "By our activity, then, I mean just the unique significance of the present expression of our will."* Activity, choice and freedom are thus defined as identical with the unique or individual aspect of being, and Prof. Royce's account of the matter does not exempt him from the criticism that has been urged against the more bald statement of Schopenhauer. Both fail to justify the individual's belief that by his private act he may achieve one of two or more alternatives. Both ascribe freedom to an eternal world in which the temporal series is but an aspect of a changeless whole. Under these circumstances, for a finite being who is in the midst of the temporal series, there is a sense of uniqueness, and an illusion of plural possibility; but from the supreme point of view the entire series is seen to be but the unfolding of an immutable nature.

We have now reached a point where we can propose this definite thesis: *The practical consciousness of freedom implies that the ultimate nature of the universe is subject to temporal change.* It is obvious that the question of freedom arises originally in connection with the temporal series. The act is said to be free when it is a genuine selection made at a temporal moment. The moment is temporal because it involves a subsequent moment when the selection shall be completely realized as fact. Without this succession of moments selection, according to our general understanding of that term, would be impossible. There must be a moment when there is given a plurality of plans or possibilities, and a second when one of these is actualized, and the remainder have become impossibilities. Moreover it is absolutely essential that this succession should itself determine, and not be determined by, the ultimate nature of the universe. Let M represent the first moment of time, and a, b and c the alternative possibilities presented to the agent. The individual is free only when a, b and c are genuine possibilities. He does not ask merely that they shall appear *to him* as real alternatives, but that the universe shall be of such a nature as absolutely to permit either a, b or c to become actual in N, the next moment of time. Suppose a to

*"The World and the Individual"; First Series, p. 468.

Digitized by Google

be selected, and to be actual at the moment N. In this transition from M to N, b and c have been changed from genuine possibilities to absolute impossibilities. But possibility and impossibility can rest only upon the ultimate structure of the universe. Short of this there can only be apparent possibility and impossibility. Therefore in the succession MN the ultimate structure of the universe has changed. In order that this may be, the whole universe must be in the time of which M and N are moments. Thus a finished universe, whatever be the nature of such a unity, cannot satisfy the demands of freedom. These demands can be satisfied only by a world that is in the making and subject to change and increase.

In conclusion, and by way of confirmation, let me refer briefly to the determinists' own interpretation of the moral consciousness. We may well confine ourselves to the nominal freedomists whom we have already examined, as they are alone conspicuous for their efforts to accredit the sense of duty and the sense of responsibility. Kant maintains that duty is an appeal to freedom, but he saw the implication of duty without providing for it. Admitting that duty was valid only in a world of freedom, he was obliged to relegate it to his noumenal or super-temporal region of reality. His principle of autonomy makes it necessary that the law and the will that is subject to the law shall be alike of the changeless and eternal order. So the Categorical Imperative turns out to be a law that is always obeyed. By virtue of my intelligible will I am committed irrevocably to a course of action that is prescribed by the eternal truth. As all my moral acts are regulated by this transcendental law, the only division of conduct is between acts that are morally right and acts that are morally indifferent. These latter do not properly constitute conduct at all, but are events in the phenomenal order of cause and effect. Professor Royce describes the consciousness of duty as the obligation to *attend* to the good. Duty is the implicitness of the ideal meaning in any incomplete fragment. In so far as I am real, my life has a meaning that is implicitly identical with the meaning of the whole. This meaning of the whole is the Good, and I am therefore real just in so far as I am good.

Digitized by Google

Duty is the logical appeal to me to be that which in truth I am. The freedom of my goodness consists in my participation in the individual character of the goodness of the whole. Neither the whole nor any of its parts is finally explicable in any terms save the fact that it wills to be, or finds itself good. Sin arises from the possibility of inattention. My free sinning is the fact of my inattention, a fact that is finally as arbitrary as my attention. But inattention is the negation of being, the limiting principle that accounts for degrees of reality. Inattention does not create a being that is evil. It is not permitted me to make real that which is not serviceable to the Good. Strictly speaking, then, Professor Royce's theory does not permit of both good and evil achievement, but rather only of the alternative of being and non-being. And even this alternative finally resolves itself into the two aspects possessed by any eternal meaning that is constituted by the immanence of the one in the many. Look from the many toward the one, or search for the one in the many, and you discover being and good; look from the one towards the many, or rest satisfied with the many particulars, and you experience non-being and evil. There is no provision either here or in the less metaphysical statements of Kant, for alternative being. It was Kant's own complaint against the necessitarian that he removed from the moral agent the control over his own acts; or, in Kant's own words, "that the determining principles of every action of the same belong to past time, and are no longer in his power." As Kant and his successors have left it, these determining principles do not belong to time at all. They are as completely beyond the reach of the moral agent at the time of his act as if they were a part of the causal series, for they belong to an irrevocable eternity. At the time of my temporal act, I am suffering the consequences of my eternal fiat. We are justified in applying to Kant, and to those who with him stake their moral philosophy upon a theory of super-temporal reality, the general truth that where there is no real alternative to the performance of duty, that term is stripped of its distinctive meaning for the common moral consciousness.

But can the same be said of the term *responsibility?*

Digitized by Google

Schopenhauer invites our attention here, because he retains this conception even when he discards the other. He maintains that the individual is responsible for his acts because his eternal character is underived. His responsibility is the same fact as his freedom, and both mean simply the irreducibility of an ultimate fact. "Others assert," he says, "that a man is his own work guided by the light of knowledge. I, on the contrary, say that he is his own work before all knowledge."* If a man is his own work, then, seemingly, he is responsible for himself in a very positive sense. But if the discussion up to this point has been conclusive at all, it has already demonstrated the falsity of such reasoning. The individual, as Schopenhauer describes him, can in no sense properly be said to have chosen to be. He awakes to consciousness only to find the choice already made, and his sole function is to experience its consequences. There is no ground for responsibility in the sense that the individual is the real author either of himself or his acts. However, if the individual is not responsible for himself, who or what is responsible for him? This dilemma seems to precipitate Schopenhauer's definition of responsibility in terms of an absence of ulterior conditions. But what meaning can there be in the statement that ultimate fact is responsible for itself? As our practical consciousness defines this conception, there could be no clearer instance of irresponsibility. That which could never be otherwise than it is escapes all accountability. Schopenhauer's is not the only solution of the dilemma suggested above. If the individual is not positively responsible for his character or deeds, and if nothing beyond him is responsible for them, then perhaps there is *no* responsibility for them. In other words, to say that the ultimate constitution of the universe is responsible for all temporal events and all super-temporal natures, is the same as to say that there is no responsibility whatever. We must conclude that a metaphysical theory which fails to provide for the freedom of real alternatives, fails also to provide for responsibility.

I have attempted in this discussion to deal with conceptions derived from the average moral consciousness. I have en-

*"World as Will and Idea," tr., Vol. I., p. 378.

Digitized by Google

deavored to show that the practical conceptions of duty and responsibility imply a definite conception of freedom. This conception of freedom has in turn been found to involve a metaphysical conception of fundamental importance, and a conception that is antagonistic alike to the temporal determinism of naturalism, and the super-temporal determinism of idealism. When the human individual believes that he is responsible for the fulfillment or violation of his duty, he believes that he inhabits a universe which permits a selection from among genuine possibilities and suffers absolute change. Either the positivist or the transcendentalist may have discovered a higher truth than that which can be directly derived from the moral experience. It is true, as Professor Royce says, that when one maintains a conception as finally valid, "he becomes responsible for an ontology." But whatever is done in the direction of comparing philosophy and life, is a gain for both. And where, as in this case, there is a serious difference relating to the fundamental concerns of each, it is the part of philosophy either to correct a universal misconception, or to be more faithful and direct in its interpretation of life.

RALPH BARTON PERRY.

HARVARD UNIVERSITY.

MIND AND NATURE.

THERE is no thought more familiar, and few more disquieting, to the reflective man of to-day than that of the utter deadness and soullessness of the vast world of things around us. It is indeed an inevitable consequence of influences from which we cannot withdraw ourselves that we, town-dwellers and creatures of the library and laboratory, who are perforce, in the common round of our daily life, witnesses of the practical triumphs of mechanical invention, and by the nature of our chosen studies all more or less brought acquainted with the methods and ideas of the mechanical sciences, should take the intellectual impress of our surroundings. Living in almost

Digitized by Google

hourly contact with the locomotive engine, the steam press, and the electric wire, gathering our ideals of truth and reality from the procedure and results of the experimental physicist, the physiologist, or the physiological psychologist, we cannot well escape the habitual thought of the outer world as a dreary waste of brute unconscious being, a realm of processes of a monotonous and mindless regularity, capable, by reason of this very monotony, of calculation and prediction, but devoid throughout of purpose, individuality, and moral significance. The cold glare of truth—so we are accustomed to repeat,—has long ago dispeopled our valleys, hills and streams of the visions by which they were once filled with a hundred forms of sentient purposeful life; it is only the poet who still habitually seeks in Nature a meaning and a mind with which his own may have fellowship and converse, and the charm of the poet's ideas is a quality we have long trained ourselves to believe quite independent of their truth. Even the Idealist in philosophy, who holds it as his creed that all reality is mental, is too often apt to resent the very existence of an "inorganic" world as a stone of stumbling maliciously flung down in the way of his faith.

Yet it were strange indeed if we could find much warmth of comfort in thus thinking of ourselves and our congeners as mere castaways of the creation, marooned by some inconceivable freak of destiny in the midst of a shoreless sea of meaninglessness, the sole thinking and striving beings in an unintelligent universe. If we are indeed alone as reasonable actors on this stage of the world, the remembrance of our loneliness at least strikes a chill to the heart. Even after we have schooled ourselves to see nothing in the opposing utterances of the poets but a tissue of lovely leasings, we still find ourselves constrained to seek to them, with immoral persistence, for an anodyne. Where the realities of waking life are so cheerless, a man, we think, may be no coward, and yet need a sleeping-draught.

But the very insistence with which our hearts refuse to be reconciled to this thought of the world as a soulless machine should suggest the possibility of a more rational and more manly way out of our difficulty. How if what we take for the

Digitized by Google

waking fact should itself be no more than a bad dream, begotten of ill-digested metaphysical theories; if the notion that reality is a machine should itself be, as Fechner called it, the night view, and the poet's conception the true daylight view of Nature? We should then need no drug-bottle of fiction to give us peace of mind; we should have but to wake up from our nightmare to find ourselves in a radiant sun-lit world instinct with life and purpose akin at heart to our own. It is the object of this essay to set forth reasons, which appear to me at least in principle irrefragable, for holding that this is indeed the case, and that the very suggestion of a mechanical unconscious reality contradicts itself the moment you ask seriously what it implies. The result we shall reach will be, in all essentials, the same as that of Professor Royce's essay on "Nature, Consciousness and Self-consciousness," but I propose to travel towards it by a somewhat different route, which had already led me to our common goal before I had the pleasure of reading Professor Royce's most stimulating book. We shall ask first, what kind of evidence is requisite and procurable for the existence of any finite mind other than my own; next how far what we commonly call external Nature affords such evidence. Thirdly, we may examine some of the reasons that have commonly led to the belief that Nature is a mere unconscious mechanism; finally we may indicate in the barest outline some results of general philosophical and ethical interest which seem to follow from the recognition of the universal presence of conscious mind in the natural world.

I.

When the most illustrious and original of our English philosophers set out, in the interest of spiritual religion, to attack the belief in unconscious mechanism as the full truth about any real fact, he began, it will be remembered, by an assault on the notion of unperceived material existence. Presence to a perceiving subject—this is the gist of all his arguments—is inseparable from the existence of everything that we call physical fact; the very *esse* of the physical thing and its qualities is just *percipi*. But no one man ever perceives more than

Digitized by Google

the merest fragment of the actual physical world, and there are many of its components which no man ever has perceived, and as far as we can judge, no man ever will. Hence the physical world in its entirety must be always present to an all-embracing divine experience, and it is just its presence to such an experience which we mean when we assert its existence. Now both Berkeley's antipathy to a merely mechanical theory of Nature and the general principle of his argument against it are, as it seems to me, fundamentally sound. As we shall see more fully before we have done, if you once admit the possibility that any existence may be merely mechanical, you have no logical ground for denying that the whole of existence, ourselves and our acts included, is purely mechanical, and on such a view there is room in the world of real being neither for a spiritual religion nor for a genuine morality. It is not simply that, if the world is a mere mechanism, then our ethical and religious beliefs must be mere appearance, but that they must be baseless appearance, radically at variance with demonstrable reality, and thus no better than proved illusion. And, as to the principle of the contention that presence in an experience is the very meaning of existence, it is, to my mind at least, as Mr. Bradley says it is to his, so evident that I should find it impossible to meet anyone who disputes it on common ground. Its full force will perhaps be best brought out by disregarding the special grounds upon which it is supported by Berkeley, some of them only too insecure, and restating it in the form of a challenge. Produce, we may say to the objector, any piece of fact whatever of which you are prepared to maintain the real existence, and I will undertake to show that what makes it real can be nothing but its presence as an inseparable aspect of a sentient experience. What the special fact you choose for the purpose of the experiment may be, whether a physical quality or process, an artistic effect, or a moral excellence, makes no difference to the principle of the argument. For when you have once chosen your fact, and made your assertion, "This fact, A, really exists," we shall invite you to think, as you always can, of a corresponding A which is not real but merely imaginary, and then to say what it is that makes

Digitized by Google

the difference between the real and the imaginary or unreal A. If you will try the experiment, you will always find, as Kant proved in the historical case of the hundred dollars, that the difference does not lie in the addition of a new predicate to those by which the imaginary A is characterized, but always in the actual presence of the real A to a sentient experience, its entrance into some immediately apprehended whole. Even in the case of an A which, for some reason or other, is wholly inaccessible to human perception you cannot really escape from this conclusion. For, suppose you say, "The ice at the South Pole really exists, though it is impossible for a human eye to behold it," we shall invite you to explain more precisely what you mean by such a statement. You will then find yourself in a dilemma: either you mean that the Polar ice exists with all its qualities, including those which have no meaning at all except in relation to a perceiving organ, precisely as we should see it if we were there, and in that case the ice with all its qualities must presumably be always present, as such, to an experience which is not ours; or you mean that there really exist certain conditions, such that, on the addition of one further condition, the presence of a human spectator, they would yield a perception of the ice. But, not to insist on the point that the reality of a certain object and the reality of some of its conditions are not the same thing, what do you mean by a *really existing* condition as distinguished from one which is merely imagined to exist? Any answer to this question will show that the appeal to conditions only puts the difficulty back a stage, without in any way affecting the validity of the Berkeleian contention.

Berkeley's difficulties really begin when he goes on to make an apparently simple and obvious addition to his principle. From the principle that to exist means to form an aspect in an experience, and that apart from presence in experience no sense can be attached to the term existence, he allows himself to draw the inference that the reality of sensible things consists *merely* in being perceived, their *esse* is *merely percipi.* Now it is always a *petitio principii* to argue that because A is B, therefore A is *only* B and nothing more, and the fallacy is,

Digitized by Google

in this case, destructive of the whole force of Berkeley's subsequent argument for the existence of God as the permanent percipient of the world of Nature. This is a point of such importance that it will be necessary to consider it in some detail. What Berkeley does is this: he sees, correctly enough that, except as entering into the experience of a sentient percipient nothing in Nature has any reality. He then makes a division, for which direct experience itself affords him no warrant, between the perceiving subject, on the one side, and the contents of his perception on the other. The former he takes as a permanent being of some kind or other, the latter he treats as the mere passing "ideas," or as a later form of the same doctrine phrases it, "the states of consciousness" of this permanent being. In making this division he is, of course, guided by a metaphysical pre-conception which a correct analysis of experience fails to justify. In an actual experience, such as for instance the direct apprehension of a physical reality external to myself, there may be ground for distinguishing two inseparable but not identical aspects, which form the basis of the later and more elaborate distinction of subject and object, but there is no ground for treating them as really separable in the sense that one is a mere state or modification of the other.* And, if Berkeley's procedure were sound, it would make the whole of his subsequent philosophical construction superfluous. If the objects of the physical world are *simply* states or modifications of my consciousness, there seems to be no reason why I should suppose them to have any existence at all except at the moment in which my consciousness is occupied with

*We commonly overlook this fact in consequence of an unfortunate ambiguity in the English use of such words as "sensation," "perception." "Sensation" in the sense of "the process of becoming aware of a sense-content," is, of course, a "state" or "modification" of my consciousness; hence writers of the school of Mill unwarrantably go on to infer that the sensation, in the sense of the presented content itself, is "a state of consciousness." Strictly, we ought to distinguish (1) the *process* of sensation, which is a *state of* the subject, (2) the *content* of the sensation, which is an *appearance to* the subject: (3) the *object* of which is (2) the appearance. What the nature of this last is, is the question under discussion in the following pages. Idealism of the Hume and Mill type confounds (1), (2), (3) under a common denomination.

Digitized by Google

them, and the supposition that when I am not conscious of them they are present to the mind of God becomes a gratuitous hypothesis, invented to solve a question which ought not to have been asked. The logical conclusion from the premise that objects of experience are merely states of consciousness would be that I myself am the only reality in the world over and above my momentary states; and we could scarcely formulate this conclusion without seeing how forcibly it suggests the still more radical Humian doctrine, according to which there is no permanent reality on the side of the subject any more than on that of the object, but the momentary states themselves are the totality of existence.

Why is it then that Berkeley never draws either the Solipsist or the purely phenomenalist consequence, one of which is all he is entitled to on his own premises. The answer is both obvious and instructive. There is at least one class of perceived objects which we cannot, without outraging common sense, reduce to a congeries of modifications of our own consciousness, viz., our fellow-men. Whatever the rest of the choir and furniture of heaven and earth may be, it is at least certain that the men by whom I am surrounded in my daily life are neither mere states of my own consciousness, nor yet, in the language of that preposterous Metaphysic by which Mill sought to reconcile positive science and Humian scepticism, "possibilities of sensation." While it is true that in their case, as in that of everything else, *esse* is inseparable from *percipi,* it is equally true that it is not exhausted by *percipi.* They are not merely objects for my perception, but have a further and a relatively independent existence as themselves centres of experience, whether I perceive them or no. Accordingly we find that in Berkeley's own theory, spirits have to be admitted, by the side of sensible things, as real existences, and that their reality is placed not in the fact of their being perceived but in that of their being active centres of thought and perception. Now it is this real existence of our fellows which makes Solipsism an impossible philosophical theory. Apart from the problem they create there would, as far as I can see, be no difficulty in supposing myself the *sole* abiding reality in the universe, of which every thing else would be a mere temporary state.

Digitized by Google

Hence Professor Royce seems quite right in maintaining that the very notion of external or independent existence is social in its origin and nature; the only sense we can give, when pressed, to an assertion of the independent existence of anything is to say that it has, over and above the character of being perceived by me, the same kind of reality which belongs to the experiences of my fellows. Again, the independent existence of my fellows logically carries with it as a consequence, the independent existence, in the same sense, of the rest of the physical world of which I and they form part alike, and to which our destinies are linked in the chain of historical development. We do not merely infer from the independent existence of our fellows, by a more or less loose analogical argument, the similar existence of other things resembling them in their main physical properties. The real ground of the inference is much securer, and lies in the fact that the physical world as a whole including my fellows forms a vast connected system; they and their fortunes belong, on one side at least, to the general history of the physical world, and cannot be understood without reference to that larger whole. Hence the kind of existence which is predicated of one part of the system must, by a logical necessity, be ascribed equally to the remainder. It would be a direct outrage on logic to hold that, while one comparatively small part of the results of a single continuous process of development are not merely presented contents, but have a further mental existence of their own, the rest of the system may be simply and solely my own presentations. Hence the real independent existence of our fellow-men is seen to be the indispensable *Pou Sto* from which we can vindicate that of the rest of the physical world. But if this is our reason for asserting the independent existence of things, then since the "independence" in question meant simply that the *esse* of our fellows is not *percipi* merely, but also "independent existence," when asserted of Nature at large, must have the same general meaning. Nature, too, if its independent existence is to be anything more than a mere word, must be in reality a society of percipient and conative subjects. Either this, or a mere assemblage of "ideas in my head"; there is no third

Digitized by Google

possibility which can so much as be stated in intelligible language.*

So far our general argument, agreeing in everything, except in its direct derivation from the speculation of Berkeley, with that of Professor Royce. But we have not yet faced what is really the fundamental question, the reasons for affirming the existence of our *Pou Sto* itself. Have we sufficient ground for asserting the independent existence of our fellowmen themselves? How if the protest of common sense against the Solipsist paradox should be based on nothing better than uncritical prejudice? Until we have disposed of this central doubt the whole of our idealistic construction hangs in the air. I should like to invite special attention to this part of our discussion, as I feel convinced that the treatment commonly given to the problem is wholly inadequate, besides involving serious difficulties of logical method. Where the independent existence of the rest of mankind is not simply assumed as a sort of immediate intuition for which no justification need be afforded, it is commonly declared to be proved by an argument from analogy. This is a view which appears to me, as to Professor Münsterberg, fundamentally false, and I should like to explain the nature of the error as carefully as I can.

What, let us ask, are precisely the terms of the alleged analogy, and what is its logical cogency? The more unthinking among those who hold the doctrine, say, and that the statement can be made at all is a painful proof of the thoughtlessness with which the fundamental problems of knowledge can be approached by persons who call themselves men of science, that the inference is from the resemblance of my own and my

*I suppose it may be advisable to remind the reader here that the general argument affords no warrant for any precise conclusion as to the number and kind of intelligent beings perceived by us as "external nature." *E. g.* we must not assume that they need correspond to the elementary constituents into which we divide things for the purpose of physical science, as is taken for granted by those who talk of the *Atom-Seelen*. *Cf.* Stout's "Manual of Psychology," p. 54. Again, in speaking of nature as *social*, we must remember that the various systems of non-human consciousness it contains may be separated from each other by chasms as wide as that which divides them from ourselves.

Digitized by Google

neighbor's nervous systems to a corresponding resemblance of our respective minds.* There is no need to ask whether this inference, if made, would be logically valid; it is enough to say that we never, in point of fact, have the material for the conclusion before us. What is directly given me in perceptual experience is my own mind and my neighbor's nervous system. My own nervous system, as it is thought of by the student of anatomy, is an object which I never can perceive,† unless I can somehow be present at my own *post-mortem.* The truth is rather that it is by an analogical argument from previously ascertained resemblances between my fellows and myself, among which the possession of a common type of mental life is the most important, that I infer my own endowment with a system of nerve-cells and fibres such as I discover in them by actual dissection. If the evidence for the existence of other minds than my own is to rest on analogy at all, the analogy cannot be between nervous systems; it must be of an altogether simpler kind. The inference must be from the perceived likeness between my own perceptible outward form and that of others to an equal likeness in our minds. But, to begin with, would such an analogy have any conclusive force, if it were all we had to go on? Remember, that we are now supposed to be in the position of knowing our own mind and also, to some extent our own body, but, in the case of our fellow, only the second. Now, how in this situation can I with any cogency conclude that likeness of mind will go with likeness of body? Of course, when once I know, on whatever grounds, that the beings who most nearly resemble me in bodily structure also resemble me equally closely in type of mind, I can by a reason-

Cf. Karl Pearson's "Grammar of Science," p. 57: "Consciousness is thus associated with physiological machinery of a certain character, which we sum up under brains and nerves. . . . . In our fellow-men we observe this same machinery . . . . and we infer consciousness." One can imagine what the learned professor's language would have been if he had found this piece of reasoning in the works of a "metaphysician." But popular anti-metaphysical arguments are traditionally absolved from all the rules of logic.

†In its entirety, that is. Of course I can perceive part of it *indirectly* as *e. g.*, if I make a hole in my skull and observe the reflection of a part of my brain in the mirror.

Digitized by Google

able use of analogy infer that other creatures may be expected to present a degree of mental likeness to myself corresponding closely with their amount of bodily likeness. But, unless and until I have independent warrant for crediting my human fellow with a mind of the same type as my own, the whole of this inference hangs in the air; its logical strength, if taken by itself, is precisely nil. For this reason, we must, I hold, say that the validity of analogical argument depends on the independently known fact of our psychical kinship with our fellows, and not vice versa.*

How then do we know this fundamental fact itself? The answer is, I believe, that we know it on evidence of an infinitely more conclusive character than any analogy. Indeed there is a sense in which we may truly call the existence of mind in other men a directly presented fact of immediate experience. Let me first illustrate my meaning by a simple example. I receive a letter by the post, which I believe to have come from a friend, and to express certain wishes or to communicate certain facts which my friend desires me to be informed of. Suppose the doubt were raised as to whether the letter expresses the purpose of a mind external to my own; let it be suggested that it is simply a result of certain purely mechanical occurrences, capable in the last resort of being completely resolved into a series of displacements of mass-particles or something of the sort. How can such a sceptical doubt be refuted? We might indeed proceed by analogical reasoning; we might analyze the letter into a series of up-strokes, down-strokes, horizontal lines, and so forth. We might then observe that when we ourselves write letters, we use just such a combination of strokes, and conclude by analogy that the marks before us had been produced by some other being similar to ourselves. The inference would however be worthless unless there is independent ground for the belief that *nothing but* an intelligent human being can produce just such a combination of strokes. The real ground for our confident conclusion that the letter cannot be the product of mere mechanism

*For if such minute resemblance as we have here were deceptive, it is hard to see how we could trust any inference from analogy.

Digitized by Google

is much surer; it is our direct perception that the ink-marks have a significant meaning, express a recognizable purpose of the same kind as those which compose our own inner life. What we rightly think incredible is not the mere production by an unintelligent mechanism of a particular long series of marks, but the presence in the series as a whole, if so produced, of a definite and recognizable purpose akin to those which make up our own inner life.

The importance of this consideration is so great that I may perhaps be allowed to enforce it further by an illustration within the illustration, before I return to our more general argument. Your conclusion, it might be said, is unsound: if a fount of type were shaken up and the results printed off at random, mere chance would sooner or later, but in any case within a finite time, include all possible combinations of the letters of the fount, even including such a combination as you find in a play of Shakespeare. Hence the presence of meaning in any given combination is not in itself evidence that it is the result of intelligent purpose. Such an objection would be as foolish as it is easy. In order that it should have any weight, the possible number of combinations must be finite; otherwise the probability of the result would be $\frac{1}{\infty}$ — *i. e.*, nothing. Hence, in order to get the series of letters which form a play of Shakespeare from a chance shaking up of our type, we should first require the types themselves to be exclusively those used in English printing, a condition which at once limits their number in a very special way, and should further need some very complicated restrictions to exclude the infinite repetition of individual letters. In fact, if the play of Shakespeare is to turn up as one among other chance arrangements of our material, the material must first of all be selected with the special object of getting this particular result sooner or later out of it. For instance, assuming that all our types are to be used in each shuffle, you would need as an initial condition of success to include just as many instances of each letter as there are in the play without either excess or defect. Where the possibilities are not thus limited from the start by definite

Digitized by Google

purposive selection, you are never entitled to look for a predetermined result within a finite time.*

We may then confidently affirm that the evidence for mind beyond my own rests on no mere slippery basis of analogy; it depends on the certain principle that what exhibits definite meaning and purpose issues from mind and from no other source. The men around me are known not to be ingenious automata because their words and acts are seen to exhibit intelligent meaning and selective purpose. It is from kinship of purpose, not from mere physical resemblances, that I infer my community of mind with my fellows.

Well then, how do we come to perceive meaning and purpose in the speech and actions of our fellows? How can we be sure we are not reading into certain of our experiences a significance which only exists in our own imagination? The answer is not far to seek. Precisely because I am myself a social being whose individual purposes can only be realized in vital union with a community, the reality of the purposes of my fellows is guaranteed by the very same experience which assures me of the reality of my own purpose. In getting to know myself as a being with definite and permanent aims and purposes, I am at every step learning to know myself as one unit among others in a society knit together by community of purpose. My purposes have no meaning except as part of a wider system in which they on the whole find their completion and fulfilment, but also on occasion their neutralization. Unless the purposes of my society are real, the whole of my own inner life of aspiration, struggle, success, and defeat, is itself a pure illusion. This is, I suppose, what Professor Münsterberg means when he says that we regard our fellows as having a psychical nature like our own because we have in practice to

*Of course we may, and do, calculate the probability of a given occurrence in physical nature without any explicit reference to selection by conscious intelligence. But that is because, for the practical purposes of science, we are content to take the initial limitation of the possibilities simply as a fact, without raising the more ultimate question as to what such limitation implies.

Digitized by Google

take note of their purposes. Ultimately then we may say that it is the reality of our own existence as intelligent purposive beings which is our guarantee for the existence, as more than a mere presentation, of the whole world. Our own existence involves the equal existence, in the same general sense, of our fellow-men, and this again, as we have seen, the existence, once more in the same general sense, of the whole physical world. In other words, if any perceived thing is more than a mere presentation, the whole perceptual world must be something more than mere presentation, in the same sense.

We may illustrate what has just been said by a consideration of the actual steps by which we come to be aware of the personal nature of our fellow-men. If the view as to the evidence for their personality which we have rejected were sound, we ought to find that we begin in childhood by regarding the external world generally as non-intelligent, and gradually come, as experience accumulates, to ascribe more or less of intelligent personality, to those members of it who most nearly resemble ourselves in physical structure. Such a view, however natural from a certain philosophical standpoint, appears to rest on serious psychological mistake. As far as our self-knowledge enables us to say anything about the growing mind at its earliest stages, it seems safe to assert that, at first, we know neither ourselves nor anything else as intelligent and purposive. The child does not begin by looking on all the world around him as dead, and then go on to find out that some parts of it are, like himself, alive. He begins without any sense of the contrast at all. By the same stages by which he comes to a rudimentary self-consciousness, and learns that he is himself a being with meanings and purposes, he comes also to the knowledge that there are other purposes in the world around him, of which he must take note, and to which he must accommodate himself, if his own purposes are to find fulfilment. His immediate surroundings are personal for him, at this stage, not because of a recognized resemblance to his own body in their outward shape, but because they express pleasure or anger at his behavior in practical ways, which have to be

Digitized by Google

taken into account if he is himself to get what he wants from them. His constant tendency, like that of the uncivilized man, is to regard all movement on the part of physical objects as expressive of such purposive attitude of approval and disapproval of his own purposes until accumulating experience compels him to modify this early view. And when this takes place, it is, I think, safe to say that the distinction between persons, animals, and mere things, from the comparatively early age at which it is reached, is not, as a matter of psychological fact, based upon inference from likeness and unlikeness of external shape. It is rather a consequence of the discovery that the definiteness of the purposive attitudes of which he has for practical reasons to take note, and the extent to which they depend on his own expressions of purpose are by no means the same for all objects.

There are some objects which exhibit very little variety in their attitudes; you can count on their always behaving in the same general way, no matter what the particular purposive attitude you yourself take up toward them. It is sufficient for practical purposes to take note merely of their broad general ways of behavior. These are what the child learns to call mere things. There are others which cannot be so easily disposed of. Their behavior to you depends very much on the special character of the purpose which guides your behavior to them; you have therefore to take into account, for your own practical purposes, their special ways of being affected by your own special expressions of purpose; these are living creatures, which again get distinguished into the two classes of persons and mere animals according to the greater or less individuality of purposive behavior with which their attitudes respond to our own. And finally, we do not start with a definite perception of our own purpose in particular as genuinely individual, and go on afterwards to make the discovery that those of our fellows are equally individual. It is one and the same course of experience which teaches us our own individuality and reveals theirs; we get to know them in proportion as we know ourselves, and ourselves in proportion as we know them. In any sense in which our own purposes

Digitized by Google

can be said to be presented facts, those of our fellows are the same.*

II.

Now, we may draw from what has just been said a very important consequence, which has a direct bearing on our interpretation of the being of physical Nature. We are so completely accustomed to think of Nature as the merely non-mental and non-purposive that we often fall into the notion that its merely physical character is directly revealed as a fact of immediate experience. But, if our preceding analysis is correct in principle, this cannot be the case. What experience warrants us in saying is something quite different, viz., that for our practical purposes we have no need to take account of the presence of intelligent purpose and conscious individuality in the non-organic world. We learn from experience that we may treat such purpose and consciousness as non-existent for the special objects of human life because of the regularity with which external objects, other than animals and human beings, reply to our conduct with reactions conforming to a few general types. Individual ends and purposes in inorganic Nature, if they exist, may be discounted by us in setting out to realize our own human ends. And further if they exist, it seems to be beyond our power to discover their special character. But to argue that whatever may be, for certain special objects, disregarded, or even that whatever we cannot get to know in respect of its individual character, is simply non-existent, is a gross and palpable logical fallacy. You cannot argue from our failure to identify ends in Nature that there are none there. And the prevalence of the fallacy in our popular science and philosophy is only one of many indications of the cry-

*This last contention receives still completer vindication, if we consider with Professor Royce the enormous extent to which we learn our own purpose by *imitating* the acts of our fellows. It is from the process of imitation—to a large extent at least—that I draw my knowledge of the meaning involved in the acts I imitate. This is the philosophical basis for Plato's view of the fundamental significance of imitation in moral education. The child grows into the likeness of what he imitates, because it is through the imitation that he comes to the knowledge of himself.

Digitized by Google

ing need for a more widely diffused study of the elements of a scientific Logic. But why, it will be said, should we draw any conclusion at all? Ought we not to rest in a simple declaration of our own inability either to affirm or deny on the subject? *Mit Nichten;* we have on the one side, if our reasoning has been correct, the positive necessity to ascribe to the whole perceived world reality of a certain general type, unless all existence, including our own, is to be pronounced an illusion; against this necessity, our mere failure to know precisely how this general type gets individual expression must count in the scale of Logic for nothing at all. "What can be, and must be, that therefore is," though we may be entirely unable to say in detail how it is.

Further, is it the case that our specific experience does in fact leave us with nothing more than this failure to affirm the presence of purpose and consciousness in Nature? It is no doubt so, in the sense that experience gives us no right to affirm the presence in inorganic Nature of this or that special and recognizable purpose, or of this or that special form of conscious existence. It is only superstition in its pseudo-scientific and most objectionable form which believes in the possibility of constructing a positive and detailed doctrine as to the forms of consciousness which may underlie the different types of physical process. But this is not a complete answer to our question. Apart from any such detailed interpretations of special facts of experience our whole experience of our physical environment as a whole may, I take it, be said to come to us in a certain way, and with a certain general stamp. And the question is, as to what that stamp is. Now, I think it may fairly be said, that, except as a direct consequence of certain metaphysical pre-conceptions, physical Nature as a whole does not directly impress us with a sense of mere purposelessness. In our ordinary intercourse with her, in her various moods, she certainly seems to give us rather the sense of the presence of purposes of many and varied kinds, the precise character of which is too remote from human life for our comprehension. We find in her more of the riddling Sphinx than of the corpse or the machine. It is mysterious

Digitized by Google

and baffling life rather than death which we seem to read in her changing aspects.*

Of course, it may be said that a general impression of this kind is a most uncertain guide, and must not be taken as establishing one conclusion rather than another. But it can fairly be retorted that the view which sees nothing in Nature but an ingenious machine is equally a preconception, and that the relative truth of the two views must in the last resort be decided, independently of their origin, by the extent to which each is capable of affording a consistent conception of the facts as a whole. Why the view which sees mind everywhere as the truth of Nature seems to be absolutely demanded, if we are to attach any meaning to the assertion of the existence of Nature, has already been shown, and we shall shortly deal with the positive contradictions which appear to be inseparable from the very thought of a self-existent mechanism. Meanwhile, some weight may fairly be ascribed to the general impression left on the mind by our daily intercourse with the natural world, taken in the mass.

Indeed, we may go a step further. The general impression we get of Nature, in our ordinary life, may perhaps be adequately expressed by a view like that of Professor Royce, who holds that Nature is to be thought of as a society of intelligences with which we human beings, owing to our special psychical structure, are entirely prevented from communicating. A theory of this kind at least gives expression to that sense of mystery with which the behavior of Nature most often affects us. But I doubt if it can be said to be altogether the truth. The barrier between our own mind and the mind in Nature is perhaps not so absolute as Professor Royce seems to believe. Few of us can have gone through life without some experience of those special moods in which the aspects

*That we do not realize this more strongly is, I believe, due to the artificial character of the habitual environment of the ordinary "civilized" life. The articles of human contrivance by which we are surrounded in our daily life appeal to us as mere embodiments of *our own* purposes, and thus blind us to the presence about us of purpose independent of ourselves. Even the "nature" most familiar to us is nature as subdued by artificial cultivation to the expression of man's ends.

Digitized by Google

of external Nature are found to correspond marvellously with our own moral being. Whatever pedants may say to the contrary, it is a certain fact that there are aspects of Nature which have an inexplicable sympathy with all that is purest, kindliest, and most strenuous in our own human nature. If you doubt it, try the effect of a morning alone in a pine wood in early summer, and you will find that Wordsworth's lines about the moral effects of an impulse from a vernal wood are no mere idle fancy. You may not, strictly speaking, learn any new proposition in the moral sciences from a morning spent with the Mother in one of these moods, but indisputably you come away with all that makes for goodness and truth in you strengthened by the encounter. Yet there are other, if rarer, aspects of Nature in which she seems to have precisely the same mysterious power to call out and invigorate what is worst in us. She is an ally of God often, of Satan at least now and then. Now it is easy to dismiss facts like these as the effects of imagination; but the problem they present is not to be got rid of in any such summary way. Nothing that is actual as a factor in our experience is eliminated by the mere device of labelling it as illusion. The illusion is a fact, as much as any other fact, and must have its ground in reality. By dubbing what you do not understand illusion, you merely add to the problem of apprehending its sources the further problem of explaining why it is to be accounted deceptive. We may be mistaken in discerning this or that response in Nature to our own ethical aspirations and struggles, but what is there about her, if she is in truth a mere soulless mechanism, to suggest the interpretation at all? *Wär' nicht das Auge sonnenhaft, Wie könnte es das Licht erblicken?* asks Goethe, in one of his best-known utterances; and the question may be inverted with equal justice. If Nature has neither mind nor purpose, whence her power of reinforcing by subtle suggestion so many of our own characteristic purposes? Or what sympathy could there be, for good or bad, between a purposeless mechanism and us human combatants in the secular struggle of good against bad?

Nor is it as if this sense of the human comradeship of

Digitized by Google

Nature with ourselves were merely an occasional and exceptional thing in our experience. To many of us it may indeed be so; but the great poets of Nature, the Wordsworths and Merediths, have made its reality the very foundation of their reading of life; nor does it appear why the poet's view of the world should not *prima facie* be entitled to as respectful a hearing as that of the physicist or the materialistic metaphysician. It is founded at least as surely on a basis of immediate experience, as capable, in its own way, of being consistently worked out with reference to the whole of the facts; if we reject it without inquiry, what are we but the slaves of a metaphysical prejudice? At any rate while our previous contentions remain unanswered, we may with Faust retort to the complaint that Nature seems alien to our spiritual standards of worth,

> Die Geisterwelt ist nicht verschlossen,
> Dein Sinn ist zu, dein Herz ist todt.

And we may fairly claim that our experience of Nature as a whole, when universalized and interpreted by the poet, should count in determining our attitude on the general philosophic question for as much as the infinitely more detailed, but at the same time necessarily restricted and one-sided experience of the physicist.*

III.

But we may take a bolder course with every prospect of success. We may claim that the grounds upon which Nature is so often pronounced to be mere purposeless mechanism are not legitimate deductions from any experimental fact or any true principle of experimental science, but mere metaphysical as-

*It may be said that our sense of fellowship with Nature can be explained by regarding the spiritual in ourselves as an outgrowth from natural beginnings, without ascribing spirituality to Nature herself. But (*a*) is the evolution of intelligence and purpose from the merely non-intelligent and non-purposive conceivable in any case? And (*b*) is it not a fact that the sense of fellowship extends not merely to rudimentary animal impulses, but, on occasion, at least, to our most fully human and spiritual aspirations? *I. e.* is it not Man at his highest whom we feel to be the meaning of Nature?

Digitized by Google

sumptions of the baldest kind. I propose to recapitulate here the arguments which appear to prove, first that the alleged facts which are supposed to establish the absence of mind and purpose from Nature neither warrant the conclusion, nor can so much as be shown to be genuine facts at all, and next that a self-existent and self-acting mechanism cannot ever be thought of without contradiction.

A. What then are the facts, such as they are, on the strength of which it has at one time or another been denied that Nature can be a realm of conscious purposes? I begin with the most superficial, and consequently one of the most obstinately popular, of the anti-spiritualist arguments. Nature, it is said, is regular and uniform in her operations; the very essence of mind is to be arbitrary and uncertain; where prediction and calculation are possible, the presence of mind is *ipso facto* excluded. The principle of the contention, then, is simply to set up caprice as the distinguishing characteristic of mind; to make mere irrationality the sole criterion of the presence of reason. This should be enough of itself to dispose of the argument for anyone who knows what he is talking about. Still it may be worth our while to point out that the fact itself is ridiculously misstated. It is not the case that the acts of conscious beings are simply unaccountable and unpredictable. What is true is that, in order to predict the behavior of individual intelligent agents with any degree of confidence, you need information of a very special kind. You cannot with confidence infer how they will behave by mere induction from the ascertained facts of their past behavior. You need to know the nature of the purposes which they are setting themselves to realize. If you know a man's situation and also his guiding purposes in life, you usually can, with firm confidence, draw your conclusions as to how he will behave. This we see from the assured way in which we undertake to predict and answer for the conduct of a friend, whose mind we believe ourselves to understand, in circumstances in which he has not yet been placed. All that is true in the objection is that, without insight into men's purposes, we are without the key by which their conduct must be understood and forecasted. The unity

Digitized by Google

which rational action exhibits is that of adherence to a definite plan, not of undeviating routine conformity with a rule.

Our answer to the foregoing objection leads of itself to the raising of the difficulty in a much more rational and serious form. Yes, it may be said, we fully grant all you have so far urged. But the whole diffiuclty is that, as you have yourself admitted, we do not know what the purposes of Nature, if she has any, may be, and yet are able with marked success to forecast her behavior. The test of rationality is power to adapt a preconceived plan of action to fresh situations as they arise. Hence, while, as you say, caprice is not compatible with rationality, mere routine compliance with an unmodifiable general rule is no less incompatible. But it is precisely this routine regularity which we, as a fact, find in the course of physical Nature. Undeviating mechanical conformity with general law is universal in Nature, and absolutely forbids us to attribute purpose or intelligence to her.

Now, in dealing with this undoubtedly formidable argument, we have to begin by repeating and emphasizing an admission which has already been made earlier in this essay. It is true that we cannot, by observation of facts, directly verify the presence of purposive action in inorganic Nature. It is true again that there can be no rational purpose where there is absolute, undeviating, conformity with general rule; adaptive modification of routine to meet fresh circumstances is, as the objection urges, of the very essence of rationality. It is also true that the course of Nature does appear to us to exhibit evidence of such mechanical conformity to law, though we must remember that the proposition that the conformity is absolute is a metaphysical postulate which the appeal to empirical fact can neither establish nor refute. Yet we seem to have shown that if Nature is real at all, it must have just that character of purposiveness which the objector is supposed to deny. Our task then, in meeting the objection, must be to show how what is really purposive and intelligent action may come to wear for us the appearance of mere mechanical routine.

How this can be, we may see from a consideration of such statistical laws of averages as we can establish with regard

Digitized by Google

to the behavior of masses of our fellow-men. Though prediction in the case of any individual man, without insight into the nature of his purposes, is impossible, prediction without such insight, or in other words, the formulation of mechanical general laws of the behavior of aggregates of individuals is largely possible, as is illustrated by the success of economics and sociology. Thus, I cannot say with any degree of certainty that a given individual will in a given case sell in the dearest market and buy in the cheapest, or will shoot himself, unless I possess a very thorough knowledge of his individual character and purposes. I can however say with a fair degree of accuracy, that men of business will sell in the dearest market and buy in the cheapest; or even that a certain number of Englishmen will shoot themselves in a given year. All general truths about the concrete behavior of mankind are of this average or statistical character; they hold good of an aggregate, taken *en masse,* but afford no certain conclusion about any particular individual. The reason of this is that they do not rest on any true insight into individual purposes. They indicate that there exists a certain group of purposes which steadily influence the life of a society in a certain direction, without throwing any light on the special character of those purposes themselves. Thus the approximate constancy of the annual number of suicides in a country shows that on the whole, any diminution in one of the motives leading to suicide is balanced by a corresponding increase in the effectiveness of some other motive. Approximate regularity thus proves, not absence of individual purpose, but the presence of mutually compensating purposes, of which the individual character cannot be more closely specified.

Now, it is one of the best suggestions of Prof. Ward's most suggestive Gifford Lectures that what we call the laws of Nature are, in all probability, precisely uniformities of this statistical kind. They may, that is, be one and all statements which are true as averages, when you are dealing with facts and processes in the gross, without being the exact truth about any one individual thing or process in the natural realm. Thus, our chemical statements about the atomic weight of the

Digitized by Google

elements have no serious claim to be taken as literally and exactly true about the individual atoms if indeed atoms are anything more than a fiction of our own devising, convenient for purpose of calculation, but answering to no external reality. The individual atom is not given to us as a datum for our investigations; we base all our results about it upon operating with masses which are taken to consist of huge multitudes of atoms, and assuming that any individual differences between their components may be left out of account. Hence the individual atom, when taken to be the exact counterpart of every other, may, for all we know, be just such a creation of pure theory as the average Englishman or the average middle-class man of social statistics. That, for the purpose of dealing with an aggregate of things or processes, the individual differences between its components may be disregarded, is no ground for inferring that they do not exist.

What is true of chemical statistics may be urged with equal force with respect to all the apparently exact uniformities in Nature. The appearance of mere routine and mechanism may well be due to our own inability to follow any natural process in all the wealth of its individual detail. This inability has itself several sources. Some processes we fail to follow because of the rapidity with which they take place, or for want of organs of sense adapted to observe the excessively minute. For instance, for us who cannot observe the actual strokes of a gnat's wing, but can only compute the rate at which they occur, one beat of the wing must inevitably be regarded as exactly like any other; it does not follow that each may not have an individual character of its own for the creature itself. We have only to imagine an intelligent being so constituted as to be equally unable to keep pace mentally with our own actions, to realize how easily human history itself might be reduced to an apparent repetition of a single type of mechanical reaction. Again, other processes may impress us as purposeless because of the extreme slowness with which they are accomplished. The mere fact of an intelligent adaptation to environment requiring centuries for its completion would be sufficient to make it wear the guise of mere purposeless hap-

Digitized by Google

pening to the human student. Yet, as far as we can see, the peculiar limitation of what Professor Royce calls the time-span of our attention, in virtue of which all but a few of the processes of Nature are either too rapid or too slow to be followed in their individuality, is altogether arbitrary. We have no reason to believe that the confining of attention within these temporal bounds or within any others is a consequence of the nature of intelligence as such. Hence we can see, as Professor Royce urges with so much force, that much of the apparent purposeless uniformity of Nature may be a mere illusion due to this one peculiar limitation of our own consciousness. The same can be said with reference to other circumstances which prevent us from following natural processes as individual trains of events, such as the structure of our own sense organs, the numerical limit set to our power of simultaneously apprehending a multiplicity of objects. Were these difficulties removed, could we for instance determine at will the time and space conditions of attention, or the kind and quality of our sense organs, so as to be able to follow any natural process we pleased in all its detail as an individual process, it may well be that the last vestige of mechanical regularity would disappear, and we should directly see in the changes of the natural world that purposive character which at present we miss. In such a purposive world of spiritual beings, there might of course be every grade of intelligence and rational activity from the all but barely mechanical up to the purely rational, but the merely mechanical would always represent a conceptual lower level to which there might be indefinite approximation, but which could never be actually reached in fact.

But what on such a theory becomes of science and its rigorously universal laws of Nature? Well, they remain on this theory precisely what they must be on any theory but a demonstrably mistaken one. So far as they can be verified by concrete experiment and observation, they are statements about the actual course of Nature as it appears to us, who are unable to follow individual processes as such, and have to content ourselves with results true in the aggregate. But for the practical control and prediction of natural events, in the degree

Digitized by Google

required by the needs of human life, these results are amply sufficient, and our inability to deal directly with the individual process as such is of no account. In so far as the scientific law lays claim to more than this relative validity, in so far as it pretends to rigorous universality and truth, it must be for any sane theory, what it is for ours, a pure hypothetical statement of results which follow universally and rigorously, if the premises from which they have been inferred be assumed to contain a complete enumeration of conditions. Except in this hypothetical sense no one who understands what he is doing has ever claimed rigorous scientific truth for any law of Nature. All of them, regarded as pieces of pure science, are problematic statements as to what would inevitably happen, if certain specified conditions and no others were real; not one is, or claims to be, a record of the course of an individual process as it actually takes place. And except on the strength of a metaphysical misunderstanding, no other view of the meaning of a law of Nature has ever been upheld.

B. Yet further; not only is there no force in the attempts which have been made to prove the course of Nature purely mechanical, the very concept of a pure self-existing and self-directing mechanism is an intellectual absurdity. We might well be surprised at the prevalence of mechanical theories of the world, if we would more constantly bear in mind that there are two propositions which can be made with absolute truth about all the machines with which we are acquainted. All machines without exception are the creation of intelligent and purposive agents, and all machines are the direct and transparent embodiment of specific purpose. A worse analogy than that of a machine could scarcely have been devised, from the point of view which seeks to treat Nature as a self-existing purposeless system. For no machine ever made itself, nor will any machine really maintain itself in action without the supervision and assistance of intelligence of the same kind which originally devised it. A machine is a structure specially devised to perform work of a given kind. Thus it owes its very existence to previous purposive limitation of the possibilities to be got out of it, with the view to the realization of a def-

Digitized by Google

inite end. It is the very incarnation of purpose of the most self-conscious and rigidly definite kind. Again, it never really goes of itself; its action has always to be initiated and at various points regulated by the intervention of conscious intelligence. The most complicated machinery will not work unless it is directly or indirectly set going by the act of a conscious being, nor, if the result is to be that for which the machine is devised, can human regulation be dispensed with. Not to add that where the machine is required for the production of anything, its material has always to be furnished from without by the same kind of conscious purposive action.

Again, in virtue of the definiteness of the ends which determine the structure of the machine, we may call the machine quite the most striking instance of absolutely manifest and transparent purpose the world has to show. In proportion as a machine is properly constructed, its very structure should be of itself a sufficient clue to its purpose. Hence, the comparison of Nature to a machine ought if it is to be apt, to imply that Nature is in all its course dependent on conscious intelligence, and that it is the realization of manifest purpose. The so-called mechanical theory asserts the reverse of all this; it maintains that Nature is the exact antithesis of a machine in every respect which gives the machine its peculiar character.

The case stands thus: Every machine is the product of intelligent devising, and is moreover at every step of its working dependent on intelligent oversight. Intelligent agents, and machines of their fashioning, as subordinate instruments in the execution of their purposes, we know well enough; but what are we to make of a machine of which all we know is that it possesses not one of the specific qualities of the machine? The thing is a plain metaphysical monstrosity, and no waste of words will make it anything else.

What then is the true place of the mechanical in the system of things? Reflection on the character of what we call our own mechanical actions may help us to a conclusion. The mechanical in human action, where its history is traceable, always reveals itself as the level to which purposive action sinks when it has become familiar by habituation, and no longer

Digitized by Google

requires special attention for its due performance. Our secondary mechanical acts are not in any sense opposed in their essential character to our acts of conscious purpose. They begin by being themselves such fully conscious purposive acts,* and even when they have grown habitual, just in proportion as the course of our lives is ordered on a rational plan, they still only occur as an integral but subordinate factor in the performance of acts which are the fulfilment of a higher conscious purpose. Human experience, which is all we have to guide us in our interpretations, definitely suggests that this is the universal function of the so-called mechanical in a rational universe. Thus mechanism itself, when rightly conceived, would have no meaning except as a subordinate aspect of intelligent teleological action. And this is precisely the significance mechanism must have, if there is to be room for the spiritual in the universe. A universe part mechanical and part spiritual, would be, from the very want of an intelligible connection between the two parts, a monstrosity. A universe double-faced, like Janus, with an all-pervading mechanical aspect and another all-pervading spiritual aspect, sounds well enough in theory until you ask which aspect gives us the deeper truth, and, in case both are equally near the truth, why we should trouble to view the facts under two aspects, when one would have served our turn as well. But, if the spiritual aspect of the whole of things gives us the fuller truth, mechanism cannot be equally prominent everywhere. From the lowest level of intelligent action, where it is all but indistinguishable from bare mechanism, upwards, the significance of the mechanical must grow steadily less and less, like the element of passivity in the hierarchy of the Monads with Leibnitz, though, until we take into our purview the whole realm of being regarded as the manifestation of a single spiritual principle, it can never be altogether transcended. This is why I said, at the beginning of this essay that, if any one fact in the universe is merely

*I mean, of course, that they begin as fresh adaptations to a novel element in the environment and thus come originally under the head of what Stout calls "perceptual reaction," not that they necessarily involve an "idea" of the purpose they fulfil.

Digitized by Google

mechanical, in the sense of the current mechanical theories, all facts must be so, and there will be no place in the scheme of things for morality or religion.*

IV.

A word or two may be said, in conclusion, on some results of general interest which would follow from accepting our argument in its leading outlines. It should be observed that we have carefully refrained from raising ultimate metaphysical issues which might lead us too far away from our immediate subject. We have throughout been dealing with the problem from the standpoint of the every-day thought which takes Nature and our self as it finds them, more or less in opposition to one another, and at any rate, as two given objects external to each other. And we have seen that, while still remaining within the limits of this every-day thought, we have reason to regard the world of physical Nature itself as composed of beings of an intelligent and purposive kind, and thus far akin to our own inner life. How we are to conceive of the unity of that universe which includes ourselves and Nature together, as elements in a single totality, it was not to our purpose to inquire. Our result has done nothing towards showing whether it can be the final truth about Reality to regard it as a society or hierarchy of purposive selves, or whether this view itself may not ultimately need to be transcended.† Our ob-

*There is no contradiction between this result and the suggestion previously made that if we could follow natural processes in their individual concreteness we might find none of them ultimately uniform. For, while mere uniformity is inconsistent with individuality, the higher the degree of individuality the more prominent will be the aspect of fresh adaptation, and the less prominent the element of habit in the individual behavior.

†Though it must be remembered that such a view, if transcended at all, must on our principle be *self-transcended*. We may be led, by thinking it out, to the conclusion that reality as a whole must not be called merely purposive, precisely because it differs from our experiences of purposive life in exhibiting eternally realized purpose, whereas our finite lives take their whole coloring from the contrast of aspiration with attainment. This might prevent our acquiescing in the description of Reality as a "kingdom of selves," or "society of persons," but would not impair the force of the contention that such a view is nearer the truth than those which reduce nature to mere mechanism.

Digitized by Google

ject was not to demonstrate the ultimate validity of the categories of personal and social life, but simply to justify their application to the realm of physical Nature. How the whole system of beings our analysis has revealed forms a unity, is a question still left over for Metaphysics. Our present result belongs rather to what we may call the Philosophy of Nature. Within the limits of its applicability it possesses very great significance, of which we can here only indicate the merest fragment.

In principle it will be seen that our result amounts to a vindication of the immediate impression made by the general way in which Nature as a whole comes to us, as felt and interpreted by the poet, against one-sided consequences suggested by the exclusive consideration of the very special aspects of Nature selected for study by the exact sciences. We saw in fact, that if the Nature of the pure student of science appears dead and purposeless, it is because he has himself, by initial assumptions, which are of course perfectly justifiable in so far as they are needed for the solution of particular problems, chosen to make it so. The thinker who complains that Nature is dead or indifferent because she appears so in the investigations of mathematical physics is in the position of the man who refused to believe in the soul because he had never found it in the dissecting room. Our appeal was from the facts of Nature as thus prepared by all sorts of initial alterations and restrictions for the purposes of the specialist to the facts of Nature taken broadly as a whole. Now this appeal from the special assumptions of the various sciences, which all necessarily and rightly involve mutilation of experience, to experience as an as yet unanalyzed whole may be called an appeal to Faith, or a vindication of the claims of Faith to exercise a real and rightful influence upon our intellectual life. It should be observed that, from its character, this appeal to Faith, was eminently not an appeal to the irrational, or to an indefinable something "beyond reason"; it was rather a vigorous expression of our conviction of the fundamental rationality of experience as a whole, and our instinctive confidence that views which left our thought

Digitized by Google

and our deepest ethical aspirations in fundamental antagonism could not represent that experience truly in the end. I should like to suggest that we have in this appeal to experience as a whole against theories based exclusively on its special parts a general definition of legitimate and reasonable Faith in religious as well as in other matters.

If our view of Nature is in principle correct, it will follow that we have the best ground for trusting in that witness of immediate experience which seems, at our times of peaceful insight at least, to assure us that Nature is not indifferent to our ethical aims and struggles. Our confessed inability to say precisely what is our own place in the hierarchy of intelligences we divine as the inner meaning of the physical world should be enough to keep us from perverting this conclusion into an immoral assurance that the scheme of things is under any obligation to make our private purposes its centre. We shall, however, not fail to insist that the vision of an indifferent or immoral Nature, "red in tooth and claw," which haunts and oppresses so many of the best minds of our time, appears in the light of our conclusion no more than a nightmare of the judgment. Our result has proved the justification rather of those greater poets who have found in Nature a principle akin at the heart to all that makes for what is best in man. Perhaps, as we survey the tangled web of physical happening, the phrase which will best express our mingled faith and diffidence will not be much unlike Stevenson's saying: "It is a strange world, but there is a manifest God in it for those who care to look for him."*

I have only time for one other thought. There are telling arguments, familiar to all, which show the essential connection between the social and the moral. Morality seems

*It might be said that to prove Nature purposive is not to prove her ethical; her purposes might be those of the devil. This is, of course, true, so long as we are dealing with mere logical possibilities, but the general effect of human experience, as a whole, when interpreted by the great poets, is to negative the suggestion. In the main, in spite of incidental discords, they have found her on the side of good.

Digitized by Google

impossible apart from relations of a definitely social type.* Yet there are other considerations, to my mind at least equally weighty, which compel us to deny that the whole content of individual morality can be exhausted by relations to the members of any purely human community. To me at least it seems quite manifest that if I am to make my moral being my prime care, I must be allowed to reckon as part of that being relations to Nature, and again perhaps to God, which I do not see how to include in the notion of social duty, if society be taken to mean any merely human institution. But now, if Nature itself may be most truly thought of as a social realm of sentient beings, and if we are, as I have tried to suggest, not entirely cut off from all communion with the non-human social beings around us, but can at least at moments, catch something of the general spirit of the whole, our relations with Nature will themselves, in so far as they have an ethical character, be of a social type, and so our problem, though not abolished, will at any rate be made less acute and difficult by our Philosophy of Nature. The Stoic's "dear City of Zeus," faint as our knowledge of most of our fellow-citizens in it must remain, will be less of a dream to us, and more of a reality. And this in its turn may be not without a furthering influence on our practical attainment of the blessed life.

A. E. Taylor.

The Owens College, Manchester.

*Though the more extreme advocates of this view sometimes seem to confound two very different propositions; (1) it is only through the instrumentality of social life that the individual becomes ethical, (2) the whole content of the individual's ethical life is social.

Digitized by Google

THE PAMPERED CHILDREN OF THE POOR.

AMERICA has long been held up to international condemnation and derision as the habitat of the unlicked cub, the child so pampered and ill-bred as to be a nuisance to all with whom he came in contact. Kipling's "Captains Courageous" introduces a boy of this type and then shows the transformation scene, in which a single knock-down blow, followed by familiar association with a crew of honest, self-respecting fishermen, changes him, as in the twinkling of an eye, into an industrious and tractable lad delighting in the labor and the rude manner of life that he would previously have most heartily loathed.

Now, if the reformation be indeed so easily and quickly effected, the evil is comparatively slight, albeit the comfort of the general public may at times be interfered with by these obstreperous young Americans. But we fear that since the passing of the age of miracles such sudden conversions have been somewhat rare. Fortunately, it is permissible to question whether Harvey Cheyne in his unregenerate state was a truly typical American boy of his class; and, still more skeptically, whether the father's sense of total irresponsibility for the training of his son, beyond the lavishing of unlimited money upon him, is truly characteristic of a clever American business man—self-made, besides, and not blinded by an overweening desire for social distinction.

Even if other influences had not combined to make wealthy Americans realize the exacting responsibilities and the mementous problems that the future is sure to thrust upon their sons, the many accounts recently given to the world of the rigorous training to which royal children and those of noble birth in foreign countries are subjected, would have had their influence in establishing a standard for those claiming to be the aristocracy of America. Similarly, the knowledge that the young children of our financial princes lead carefully regulated and comparatively simple lives has its influence over

Digitized by Google

many aspirants to social honors who would never have evolved so wholesome a system by themselves.

No doubt some of the *nouveaux riches,* dazzled by the glitter of their recent acquisitions, and imitating the follies rather than the virtues of their new and only partially understood associates, continue to lay themselves and their children open to all the old accusations. But on the whole it would seem that, whatever may once have been true, the "pampered children of the rich" are now a decidedly less numerous class than the panegyrists of poverty as a thing good in itself would have us believe.

The independent thinking classes, of course, have had their attention called repeatedly and imperatively to the question of how to direct the education of children in a more rational manner. For a generation no subject has received more careful thought, more earnest and able discussion by tongue and pen; and the discussion has by no means proved fruitless. We are at last learning to interrogate nature and ponder the records of experience in this science as in others, to probe the innate qualities and laws of the child-nature, and modestly to form and frequently to readjust our theories and methods in conformity to them.

The good effects of all this thought and labor have extended beyond those classes of the community that have taken an active part in educational reform. The growing appreciation of the impossibility of much radical change in adult character and habits has inspired most zealous effort in social reformers to bring good influences to bear as early and as effectively as possible upon the children of the masses, whom they seek to uplift. Moved with heartfelt pity by the dreary surroundings and unalleviated misery of the "submerged tenth," they have resolved to count no sacrifice too great that shall bring a gleam of sunshine and happiness to the hearts of the children of the poor.

Hence the establishment and multiplication of such beneficent innovations as the day nursery, the free kindergarten, the light, sunny and attractive schoolroom, the public playgrounds, baths and parks. Hence also the greater gentleness

Digitized by Google

with which children are treated, the sympathy with their feelings and wishes, and the general conviction that little children have an inalienable right to opportunities for healthy development of body and mind, and that it is the duty of all adults to help secure a reasonable degree of happiness to the only portion of the populace whose lives they can hope to brighten to any appreciable extent.

But alas! in the pleasurable glow caused by a species of well-doing so fascinating and apparently so hopeful as work with small children, we are in danger of forgetting our fundamental purpose, to develop in them during their impressionable years the virtues that we found it impossible to graft upon the character of their parents; to inspire in them the qualities that shall make them in turn centres of good influence and valuable members of the community. If it were not for the uncomfortable tendency of children to grow up, we could all devise and carry out systems of education that should be satisfactory and delightful to everybody concerned. To make childhood a happy season we should, of course, cheerfully sacrifice our own wishes and comfort; but that the child should discover the paramount importance of his own happiness and found his infantile philosophy upon that thesis is a serious misfortune to him as well as to his parents and teachers, and a misfortune whose evil effects only increase as the years go by.

While we assert with pardonable pride that any American boy, however lowly his birth, may aspire to, and perhaps receive, the highest honors in the nation's gift, yet the predictions that may not be arbitrarily made with respect to individual cases still hold true when applied to averages. It is useless to deny that the majority of the children of poor and ignorant parents will lead lives of much hardship and meager opportunities. Hence a truly wise system of education for them will not ignore these depressing facts, but will aim to fit such children for making the best of the inevitable conditions and of themselves as hampered by them. Now, for those destined to a life of disillusionment and hardship—and that means the vast majority of us all—the qualities most invaluable, after truthfulness, industry, and respect for law and jus-

Digitized by Google

tice, are perhaps resourcefulness and cheerful courage. If we seek evidences of these qualities among our public school children, if we seriously and without prejudice ask what the schools are doing to cultivate them, the results of our investigations are likely to prove sadly disheartening.

It would seem that most of the triumphs of the new education are confined to the very first steps in the process. Without captious criticism we may call attention to the fact that almost any method of education showing even a tolerable degree of sympathy with the childish point of view may secure highly gratifying results in dealing with children just beginning their school life. At that period they are continually discovering new powers in themselves and new wonders in the outside world, and find exercise of both mind and body delightful for its own sake. But, after a few years, school life loses its novelty and the inevitable discovery is made that work is different from play. At the same time evil germs inherent in the disposition begin to manifest alarming vitality and vigor. The almost invisible stimulus and restraint that sufficed with the kindergarten children becomes ineffective with the more sophisticated older pupils, hardened by the training of the streets and by increasing contact with the outside world. The savage discipline of the pedagogue of former generations would be an impossible anachronism to-day, but the discovery of the right substitute for it is reserved for the future; and the long postponement of that discovery is making of our boasted school system something terribly like a failure.

Not that our elaborate courses of study, or the speeches and writings of optimistic theorists, suggest this haunting word; but the practical workers are beginning to bear an ominous resemblance to the augurs of Rome's decadence—only when they meet it is not smiles that they find difficulty in repressing, but despairing admissions that most of their labor is in vain. When able and conscientious teachers of the older pupils aver that half of the young people under their charge would be receiving a more valuable training of mind and character by work at almost any business or trade, it indicates something intrinsically wrong in the schools as they are.

Digitized by Google

The theorizers and sanguine experimenters can not be expected to point out the elements of danger. Parents, indeed, chant a monotonous chorus of dissatisfaction, but, with the too partial eye of affection, fail to see the innate unteachableness of their own offspring or to realize that they are themselves to blame for much of it. Teachers are weighed down with consciousness of failure and ready to beat their breasts and cry *"Mea culpa,"* but the majority of them lack the courage to ascribe the condition to its actual causes, and the rest know too well that words, however vigorous, will be ineffectual and yet that the times require the inauguration and enforcement of radical changes.

The explicit statements in this essay are based on personal experience in high-school teaching in a great city with a very large foreign population, and on the testimony of others engaged in the same work. Probably most, if not all, of these criticisms would apply equally well to other cities.

Unbridled and unblushing conceit pervades the school atmosphere of to-day. The well-meant efforts of teachers in the lower schools to lead children to express their ideas freely, and the encouragement given to any attempt, however feeble, have established a precedent according to which the pupils demand perpetual tribute of enthusiastic praise. And this supreme self-complacency is accompanied by a total lack of respect for superior ability or more exhaustive knowledge. These girls and boys, fresh from the grammar schools, will airily contradict an expert on his own speciality, while attempts to convince them that such conduct savors of impropriety or presumption fall on unheeding ears. The laws of the scientist or the linguist, questions of taste, or the profoundest problems of philosophy are pronounced upon with equal cocksureness. Counter pleas may indeed be offered, or evidence in rebuttal, but all on a plane of perfect equality. An intimation that on certain subjects they possess neither the data nor the mental power and training for correct judgment lays a teacher open to the charge of eccentricity and rank tyranny. It is perhaps on pedagogical questions that they pronounce with the most unerring inspiration, dogmatizing where

Digitized by Google

competent authorities venture only to suggest, and criticising and reprimanding their teachers with an effrontery that would be laughable if it were less disgraceful.

A moderate amount of this discussion might seem to indicate an admirable independence, a commendable spirit of investigation. But it is speedily evident that there has been no investigation whatever and no weighing of evidence. The so-called arguments, couched in whatever form of speech, when reduced to their lowest terms amount simply to an expression of personal preference.

And just here we touch the root of the disease, in so far as so multiform an evil can be ascribed to a single source. These children are individually the centres of their own universe; and the laws of nature and of man sink into insignificance when in conflict with their good pleasure or convenience. The delusion is so extreme as to be almost a mania, and it permeates and poisons the very essence of their work and character.

The belief that all their lessons should be made pleasant and easy for them is so deeply rooted as to have the authority of an axiom, and whatever controverts it is either reduced to an absurdity or causes consternation and righteous wrath. The custom of the teacher's going over every step of each lesson with the class before they study it at all has become so universal in the grammar schools as to possess the full power and sanctity of tradition. Accordingly, the assignment of any portion of a lesson to be prepared directly from the text-book is as unheeded as the vagaries of a harmless lunatic. If afterwards called to account for this neglect, the pupils whiningly protest the impossibility of such a feat; and further insistence rouses the determined opposition due to an attack on one's most sacred rights and immunities.

All teachers know to their sorrow that writers of text-books often sacrifice simplicity to a fancied necessity for exhibiting their complete mastery of the subject. As a result the instructor must often not only amplify and illustrate the matter of the text-book but translate it, sentence by sentence, into a form intelligible to childish or immature minds. On the other hand, there is occasionally a book—and a sentence or two

Digitized by Google

here and there in almost any book meant for children—that requires no preliminary interpretation. And surely one very important function of the school is that of training its pupils to extract the meaning from a printed sentence without requiring a *viva voce* explanation of it.

The realization that there was formerly a vast amount of unintelligent memorizing of lessons made conscientious teachers resolve that every sentence should be made a transparent medium for thought. But their assumption of the entire burden upon themselves, and the extreme to which the discarding of text-books is now carried, are among the agencies that are making our city children strangers to thoughtful books, readers, at best, of nothing but feeble or exaggerated fiction. Who can estimate the loss incurred by a generation growing up without this means of companionship with the master minds of all the ages, this resource and consolation in many dreary and painful hours? It is equalled only by the misfortune to the state, which must accord the privileges and entrust the duties of citizenship to men unable to grasp the real meaning of what they read, and naturally more likely to hear the talk of fanatics and demagogues than of sound thinkers.

This desuetude into which all but oral instruction has fallen is partly responsible for the inability of our school children to express facts or ideas, however elementary, in correct and clear English. Most of the pupils especially referred to in this article are of foreign parentage, coming from homes where, in many cases, English is not spoken, and where few if any of the children have been trained to regard speech in any language as an instrument of precision. All of them, however, with rare exceptions, being graduates of the public grammar schools, they must have been assiduously drilled in easy English exercises and repeatedly corrected for their most flagrant blunders in every-day talk. Yet they habitually employed the grotesquely ungrammatical expressions that were presented for correction in the grammars of our own childhood, impressing us then as inventions of an exuberant imagination, and never encountered in real life until the period of the experiences herein narrated.

Digitized by Google

After all, however, the most puzzling and disheartening phenomenon about these pupils was not their ignorance, but their imperviousness to advice or correction. The phrase as amended might, indeed, be repeated after the teacher, but with an air of tolerant and temporary concession to a comparatively harmless whim; and scarcely a case is on record of a pupil that overcame any of his confirmed faults of speech or showed a trace of embarrassment at having fallen again into the same error for which he had already been corrected, times without number.

An abstract standard of right and wrong was a thing disregarded in practice and unrecognized in theory—moral right and wrong as well as intellectual, alas! For in matters of conduct and character as well as lessons, the crucial test still was that of personal liking or aversion. A reproof for any species of misconduct was met by a more or less expanded form of the primitive statement, "I wanted to," and seldom indeed was it possible to convince a pupil that this ought not to be accepted as a complete exoneration. It is impossible to resist the conviction that such moral obtuseness and general irresponsibility on the part of these masses of boys and girls is a serious menace to society. The blame for it rests upon both the home and the school.

Probably many parents in this rank of life share with those of more critically trained judgment the conviction that as children they suffered much needless repression and some lack of sympathetic understanding, and that a happy childhood is the best blessing they can possibly bestow upon their own children. Many of them have expatriated themselves in quest of wider opportunities and less of irksome supervision and dictation. Many, having found no more freedom in the New World than in the Old, are filled with resentment and a spirit of revolt. "Liberty" has been made a household word and has fired the imaginations of the children. If these have not at the same time learned by precept and experience that liberty must always be circumscribed by law, their interpretation of the word is, naturally, unrestricted license.

Even in these homes some sort of obedience must be ex-

Digitized by Google

acted, but too often only that of a spasmodic character, forcibly compelled; and so the years bring not more self-control but only more triumphant resistance. The impulses which in the boys take the form of flaunting disobedience, impudence and general rowdyism, manifest themselves in the girls as pertness, frivolousness, and a fancied superiority to irksome obligations.

What these young people most need to learn is the dignity of labor and the fact that self-respect demands obedience to law—in short, the supremacy of duty over personal inclination. What they are learning is to do voluntarily only what they find agreeable and interesting, and to consider the fact that their work is hard or makes them nervous the best of reasons for neglecting it. They see themselves and their moods as the pivot of a complaisant social order—and for this distorted view of life the school system is seriously to blame.

The tremendous influx of the more ignorant and debased or turbulent classes of foreigners upon our shores has nearly swamped the public schools of our great cities with hordes of children whose home influences are on the side of neither culture nor morality, and whose proper training presents a problem before which the boldest educator may well shrink appalled. The children of these immigrants soon acquire a smattering of book lore that makes them, in their own eyes, wiser than their parents, and there the benefits of the school to them too often end. The modesty, the regard for the rights of others, the growing sense of responsibility for the performance of their own duties, that would be of untold value to them as individuals and as law-abiding citizens, their school training does very little to engender.

Too much stress can hardly be laid upon the lamentable effects of this absence of ideals. There is little hope of progress for him that has not something—yes, and somebody—to look up to. Let children be carefully taught to admire and reverence superiority of natural endowment, attainment and character, and the battle is half won. Even superior age is entitled to deference if there is reason to believe that the years have been well spent.

Digitized by Google

Here again the schools fail to perform their duty. Disobedience, impertinence, and total neglect of school duties are condoned because, forsooth, children are not adults. Flattery and weak concessions are so lavishly bestowed that the withholding of them is resented as an unpardonable injury. Principals and teachers unite in shielding their sensitive charges from all unpleasant consequences of indolence or perversity. For, though there are notable exceptions, the average school principal walks warily and deprecatingly, nervously anxious to please all the world—except his subordinates, the teachers, who may safely be ignored. These, in turn, must please their pupils, and thus incidentally the other sovereign powers, while the children fulfill their whole duty by the easy and congenial method of pleasing themselves. The alarming increase in the number of juvenile vagabonds and law-breakers and the kindly reception of anarchistic doctrines among adults are effects to which many causes have contributed, and even the schools, however noble their aims, can hardly regard the fruits of their labor with perfect complacency.

We hear a great deal at present about inculcating patriotism and *esprit de corps* upon school children, and we see much energetic metaphoric waving of the American flag, and hear it triumphantly reiterated that not only is this country the greatest on earth, but the particular school in question is its most wonderful repository and nursery of wisdom and virtue. The value of this form of patriotism is questionable, to put it mildly. Children need to be taught that their school is what they make it—not what they boast of its being—and that every instance of unruliness or slipshod work is a blot upon the lustre of its fame. As matters now stand, the average pupil assumes the superiority of his school and himself as fundamental in the nature of things, entailing no obligation and affording no inspiration, except to self-conceit, which is little in need of stimulus.

Among the pedagogical questions with reference to which sentiment has stifled the verdict of common sense is that of the promotion of pupils deficient in their studies. Let them go on, it is said; they will be sure to assimilate something as they

Digitized by Google

pass from grade to grade, and will be spared the humiliation of a visible failure. Now, if these delinquents were to be only passive hearers in the schoolroom, the injurious effects of so short-sightedly good-natured a policy might be confined chiefly to them. They would flounder along, out of their depth, indeed, but seeing gleams of light through the fog at times, it might be hoped, and felicitating themselves upon illustrating the inspiring truth that all pupils are created free and equal, and remain in that condition regardless of what they do or leave undone.

On the contrary, such children are to receive their due share of individual attention; the teacher must struggle to make clear to them what they are not qualified to understand, and must despairingly labor to remedy their deficiencies—all this at the expense of the class members in good and regular standing, who need the time and attention for their legitimate work, and are rightfully entitled to it. Against this positive loss and injustice the problematical benefit to those whose capacity or indolence has prevented their profiting by previous opportunities need not weigh very heavily.

Though it is necessary to retain in the schools many children whose presence is detrimental to the general good, and for whom the schools can do little, this state of things should not be allowed to continue after the age of compulsory school attendance is passed. Our higher schools should be for those that will profit by them. This by no means implies that pupils naturally dull should be excluded—they should simply be required to advance at a pace suited to their capacity. But the insubordinate and the persistently inattentive should not be allowed to remain where they waste the public money, demoralize the unstable, and get little or no benefit themselves. A rigid enforcement of this principle, without fear or favor, would do much to instill moral purpose into character during its formative period.

Discarding sentimentality, the juster and kinder course would be to tell children that they are not equal mentally, any more than physically, and that one must put forth more effort. or take more time to accomplish a desired result than another.

Digitized by Google

A slight infusion of the Stoic philosophy would greatly ennoble the views of life held by our school children. Tell them plainly that hard tasks simply call for more earnest endeavor; that they are at liberty to dislike certain work as heartily as they please, but that to offer this dislike as an excuse for leaving their work undone is to play a part unworthy of men and women. Even young children are capable of the conception of duty as a powerful dynamic force. If upon pupils of high-school age this conception has not dawned, they are in danger of developing into incompetent whiners at life's tasks, cowards under life's hardships, pitiable egotists, intellectual and moral invertebrates.

Ida M. Metcalf.

Bryn Mawr, Pa.

BOOK REVIEWS.

Momenta of Life. Essays Ethical, Historical and Religious. By James Lindsay, D. D. (Glas.). London: Elliot Stock, 1901. Pp. viii., 146.

This small volume contains essays on subjects of ethical and religious interest. I shall confine myself to those which deal more especially with ethics.

The first paper which deals with "The Development of Ethical Philosophy," discusses the question whether the enrichment of ethical content which the lapse of time has brought, involves also a corresponding development of the methods of ethics. Dr. Lindsay, it seems to me, lays far too much stress upon the relative backwardness of Greek ethics. If instead of taking Socrates (of whose moral standpoint we know with certainty comparatively little) as the type of a Greek ethical teacher, he had taken Plato or Aristotle, the contrast between the poverty of ancient speculation, and the wealth of modern speculation would have lost much of its effect. It is nearer the facts to say with Green: "In the development of that reflective morality which our own consciences inherit, both the fundamental principle and the mode of its articulation have retained the form which they first took in the minds of the Greek philosophers" (Prolegomena to Ethics,"

Digitized by Google

p. 256). This depreciation of ancient ethical thought, is used by Dr. Lindsay to set in higher relief the contributions made to ethics by Christian influences. But it is misleading to say: "The Pagan philosophers had laid the principle of morality in the intelligence: Jesus grounded it in love" (p. 46). Plato emphasizes the emotional side of morals in his characteristic theory of Eros, heavenly love, as the controlling motive of his ideal human being. Aristotle transfers virtue from the realm of pure intelligence to that of practical wisdom. Dr. Lindsay's method, pursued to its conclusion, would come dangerously near excommunicating from the study of ethics, those thinkers who can neither accept the theistic postulates of his first essay, nor the Christian postulates of his second essay. And "the fine modern product which men style liberty of conscience" certainly has not originated under the influence, direct or indirect, of Augustine and Thomas (p. 50), but rather under influences which are specifically not Christian.

Indeed, the method which Dr. Lindsay is championing, namely of taking up into ethical theory, the presuppositions upon which certain parts of ethical content are based, is a fruitful source of confusion. Does the fact that ethics receives its data from antique, mediæval, or scientific sources, justify the student of ethics when he interpolates into his system the special axioms of orthodoxy on the one hand, or of physical science upon the other hand? It is not only "the scientific interest of clearness which demands that the moral end of the individual be set forth first, ere we go on to delineate the characteristics of the perfected Kingdom of God:" there is here a distinction between two modes of thought, ethical and theological (p. 54).

Just as Dr. Lindsay would break down the divisions which separate ethics from theology, so he postulates a correspondence of the natural order with the moral order, and introduces a fresh source of confusion, both into natural science and into ethics. Ethics reasons by reference to final causes; natural science reasons by reference to efficient causes. The ambiguous phrase, "survival of the fittest," has one meaning for natural science, and another meaning for ethics. And when Dr. Lindsay dissolves away the distinction between the natural order and the moral order (p. 118), he also renders meaningless "Huxley's impressive differentiation of the ethical from the cosmic process" (p. 117).

It is not even to the interest of theology to minimize the diverg-

Digitized by Google

ence of its methods from the methods of ethics, and I fail to see how the standpoint which is here criticized can be reconciled with what Dr. Lindsay says (p. 42): "Philosophical ethics has, in respect of method, derived its principles from the essence of reason, whereas Christian ethics has proceeded along the lines of the moral principles positively given in the Christian revelation as an historic revelation." If Christian principles are "positively given," they cannot be exhibited as stages in a continuous development, and nothing more. Then, too, with respect to nature, the Christian tradition very soon ceased to measure moral worth by physical standards. Nature is not sympathetic with, or alien from, moral aspirations, for the simple reason that they transcend her outlook.

Perhaps such criticisms as these may seem too formal and abstract. But I have only tried to apply the canons of method laid down by Aristotle, so long ago, and partially restated by Schopenhauer in his essay upon "The Fourfold Root of the Sufficient Reason." Whatever else the Hegelian logic has done, it certainly has not brought clearness into the current expositions of ethics. And it is possible that I have done Dr. Lindsay an injustice in demanding from him that clearly ordered presentation of material which is a feature, in my eyes, of the philosophical ideal. If I could have left on one side those considerations of method, I should have found almost undiluted enjoyment in the well informed and sometimes eloquent pages of his book.

In conclusion, there is one question of fact in which I find myself seriously at variance with Dr. Lindsay. He criticizes Maeterlinck for failing "to realize how little the life of the soul is an involuntary and irresponsible one" (p. 141). When I read this sentence, I was struck with the vast gulf which must separate my own reading of the facts of the moral life, from the views of Dr. Lindsay. Surely the completely voluntary life of the soul transacts itself, to use Wundt's metaphor, in the luminous central area of consciousness; and outside this area we act at second hand through the mechanicism of habit, or even are moved by the external mechanism of instinct. To me, changing the figure, the life of reasonable will seems like a frail bark riding upon the flood of the senses. I think that Mr. Herbert Spencer once remarked, that if we began arguing from the hypothesis that man is a reasonable being, we should draw some conclusions at variance with fact. Each man is capable of only a limited moral

Digitized by Google

initiative; but his frailty and dependence are compensated by the common heritage of wisdom, goodness, power in which he may share, if only he contribute a little of his own in return.

FRANK GRANGER.

UNIVERSITY COLLEGE, NOTTINGHAM.

THE STUDY OF RELIGION. By Morris Jastrow, Jun., Professor in the University of Pennsylvania. London: Walter Scott, 1901. Pp. 451.

Professor Jastrow's "Study of Religion" is a very carefully and conscientiously written volume on a very difficult subject. It is the work of a man who has not only thought the matter out for himself, but has also taken pains to master what the Germans call the literature of the subject of which he treats. If I may venture on a criticism, it will be to say that it is impossible to deal with such a vast question as the study of religion in the compass of such a small volume. The deep and intimate relation between—say—religion and philosophy cannot be properly elucidated in a brief summary of twenty pages. And the same remark applies to the discussion of the relations between religion and ethics, religion and mythology, religion and history, religion and psychology. The origin, character and historical development of each of these relationships would require a volume to itself, and cannot be adequately discussed in the space allotted to them by Professor Jastrow. If, however, we look at this volume simply as an introduction to the study of these difficult problems, and not as a comprehensive treatment of them, it must be admitted that Professor Jastrow has opened them out in a lucid and satisfactory manner and has shown the student where to go for fuller information. One of the most interesting chapters in this volume is the first, which deals with the history and character of the study of religion. In this preliminary chapter Professor Jastrow indicates the mental attitude and method to be adopted in order to arrive at satisfactory results in the study of religious phenomena. It is only in the nineteenth century that the study of religion has been approached in a scientific attitude of mind. Voltaire and his school were just as far removed from the scientific attitude as the ordinary Christian dogmatists. Both parties were dogmatists. The orthodox camp consisted of theological dogmatists and the Voltairean camp consisted of anti-theological dogmatists. But

Digitized by Google

the standpoint common to both was dogmatism. The anti-theological dogmatist had no historical insight into the genesis and development of the religious consciousness. One of his favorite dogmas was that there was such a thing as natural religion apart from positive religion. Another was that positive religions were a product of priestcraft. Both these dogmas are as unverifiable by an appeal to history as the doctrine of the infallibility of the Pope. In the annals of the human race we find no such thing as natural religion, in the eighteenth century meaning of the term, and, as Professor Jastrow observes, priestcraft so far from being an innovating is by far the most conservative agency in religion. Professor Jastrow considers that the only proper method of studying religion is the historical method. "The fundamental principle of this method," he says, "is the careful and impartial accumulation of facts, and, what is more, the facts of religion everywhere. Starting out without bias or preconceived theory, the historical method aims at determining as accurately as possible what are the beliefs, what the rites, what the aspirations of any particular religion or system of religious thought." Next to the necessity for an accurate accumulation of facts is the interpretation of them. This is one of the greatest difficulties in the path of the inquirer. Renan has said somewhere that before we can act as an accurate interpreter of the contents of a religion we must at one time have believed in it. It is certain that the historical student of religions does not and cannot possess this qualification. A somewhat similar thought was expressed in the Middle Ages by St. Anselm, "Neque enim quaero intelligere ut credam sed credo ut intelligam . . . Nam qui non crediderit, non experietur, et qui expertus non fuerit, non intelliget." If we do not believe in a religion we cannot rightly understand it. A mere intellectual apprehension of the external facts of a religion (and this is all that the historical attitude can give us) is no key to the inner sanctuary of a specified religion. These historical facts are as often as not the husk and not the kernel of a religion. They give us a very imperfect idea of what the religion is to the person who believes in it. The believer is not primarily concerned with the facts of his religion. What is of chief concern is their value to him. The believer says, I am convinced of this not because it can be historically proved or is capable of being defended on grounds of reason but because it is of saving value to my soul. The kernel of ethical religions is the

Digitized by Google

preservation of the believer's moral self. Religious beliefs and practices are only of value to him in so far as they assist him to accomplish this task. But if religious beliefs and practices enable a man to preserve his moral self, or, as a Christian would express it, to save his soul, he believes in these doctrines and practices. He believes in them not in an intellectual or historical or theoretical manner, but on grounds of experience. He believes in them because he has experienced their saving and elevating value in his life. I do not think that Professor Jastrow in his excellent book has taken sufficient account of this aspect of the religious consciousness. If Anselm is right—*credo ut intelligam*—it is impossible for the student of religion, looking at the matter from a merely historical point of view, that is from the outside, to understand what a religion really means to those who accept it. I do not urge this as an insuperable objection to the study of comparative religion on a historical basis, but as a reminder of the limitations of this study.

In his chapter on the definition of religion Professor Jastrow has some acute criticisms to make on the manifold attempts that have been made to define religion by theologians and philosophers. His objection to all existing definitions is that they are not formulated in a way to cover all the essential facts of religion from its lowest to its highest stages. The following is his own definition. "Religion consists of three elements: (1) the natural recognition of a power or powers beyond our control; (2) the feeling of dependence upon this power or powers; (3) entering into relations with this power or powers." This is practically a reproduction of Schleiermacher's famous definition as set forth in his epoch-making "Reden über die Religion." Its chief defect is that it omits to specify the purpose for which man enters into relations with the powers beyond his control. This purpose is one of the essential elements of the religious consciousness. In all forms of religion man seeks relationship with transcendent powers for the purpose of self-conservation. In the lower forms of religion what he seeks is material conservation; in the higher forms he seeks ethical conservation—the conservation of what he feels to be the best elements of his existence, elements which are in perpetual danger of being swallowed up by sensuous and material surroundings without him and within.

It is tempting to make a few observations on Professor Jastrow's brief discussion on the relations between religion and

Digitized by Google

philosophy. It is in this domain that we encounter the great question of the construction of religious dogma. Professor Jastrow's remarks are useful as far as they go. But to be fully appreciated they should be read in connection with such a book as Harnack's "Dogmengeschichte." In all discussions of this kind it is essential to bear in mind that the religious conception of the world is essentially different from the scientific. Religion does not interpret or explain the facts of existence; its function is to appraise their value for human life. Before parting with this really valuable book, it is only right to say that the author has supplied it with an admirable bibliography. Among the periodical publications which he mentions the *Revue de Theologie et de Philosophie,* the *Theologischer Jahresbericht* and the *Zeitschrift für Theologie und Kirche* deserve a place.

W. D. MORRISON.

LONDON.

A SKETCH OF SEMITIC ORIGINS: SOCIAL AND RELIGIOUS. By George Aaron Barton. New York: Macmillan & Co, 1902.

Professor Barton's work may be defined as a courageous, learned and able attempt to solve an insoluble problem. He endeavors to pass beyond the data furnished by the sources for our knowledge of Semitic antiquities and to reconstruct the picture of Semitic society through the interpretation of "survivals." In his method, he shows himself to be a worthy follower of the late Robertson Smith and it is a significant testimony to the value and suggestiveness of the labors of that lamented scholar that he has inspired the present generation of students to follow up the paths in which he was so successful a pioneer. The best method may, however, be carried too far and Professor Barton in his attempt to push back the "origins" puts the method at times to a severe strain. In offering this criticism at the outset of this notice, it must not be supposed that Barton's researches do not represent a decided advance in the grasp of the main problem with which he deals. There is much in his admirably conceived volume that is of permanent value and this value is fortunately independent of the acceptance of his main thesis. The thesis may be summed up as follows. Having shown traces of the existence of polyandry of various types in primitive Semitic society and evidence of

Digitized by Google

the reckoning of descent through the female line—a social condition known as the matriarchate—our author concludes that the religious "origins" must reflect these social conditions and for him the important element in these "origins" consists in the proposition that the worship of goddesses must have preceded the worship of gods or at all events the cult of superior powers conceived as female must have been at one time more of a controlling factor in primitive Semitic religions than the cult of powers conceived as male. He opens his argument by a discussion of the "Cradle of the Semites," but in a work dealing primarily with the difficult and elusive problem of "origins," we should properly expect first a chapter devoted to a definition of the Semites. As a matter of fact, one of the weaknesses of Barton's book, which seriously affects his argument, is the vagueness in his use of the term "Semite." To repeat the generalizations about Semites which are a "survival" of the days of Renan is not to offer a definition and it is somewhat of a surprise to find so careful a scholar as Barton asserting that "intensity of faith of a certain kind, ferocity, exclusiveness and imagination" are "Semitic characteristics" (p. 28). As though such traits, which are partly individualistic and in part concomitant with certain stages of social life, can be regarded as distinguishing one race more than another. "Intensity of faith" is certainly as characteristic of certain classes of Presbyterians living in the United States as of Semites reared in the steppes of Arabia. "Ferocity" marks the savage everywhere; the "exclusiveness" of the Semites is certainly not more pronounced than that of the "400" in New York, and as for "imagination" why a larger share of it should be accorded to the Semites who have put so little of the "imaginary" in the literatures produced by them, is hard to understand. There was some excuse for such glittering generalizations fifty years ago when Renan wrote his "Histoire generale des langues semitiques," for the types of Semitic culture known at that time all appeared to bear the impress of their Arabian origin and it was perhaps justifiable to look upon the Bedouin not only as the genuine but as the original Semite. With the advance of our knowledge, however, regarding the totally unique culture produced in the Euphrates Valley, separating into two branches the Babylonian and Assyrian, of which each has certain distinctive traits, despite the fact that the one is the offshoot of the other, it became necessary to revise our views of Semitic traits and to a certain ex-

Digitized by Google

tent our definition of the term "Semite." To account for the new departure in the Euphrates Valley by the liberal use of the term "Sumero-Akkadian" and to attribute all the distinctive features of the Babylono-Assyrian culture to a supposed non-Semitic ingredient is of course a convenient solution of the difficulty, but also an unjustifiable one. Granting a non-Semitic stratum in the culture of the Euphrates Valley, the objection still holds good that generalizations which apply to the Babylonians do not apply to the Assyrians, who although first cousins of the Babylonians exhibit totally different traits. Again, thanks to the course taken by modern Old Testament researches, we have a much clearer view of the factors involved in the growth and development of the Hebrews and of their religion than was possible in the days of Renan, and certainly the more we study this people, the stronger is the impression gained of the transformation in their character brought about through their unique religious experiences. In short, if we place side by side three such distinctive types as the Babylonians, the Hebrews and the Phoenicians, it becomes evident that generalizations which should apply to all must be so general as to lose their value and would probably be equally applicable to the various types of "Aryan" culture.

This objection apart, the chapter on "The Cradle of the Semites" is to be recommended to all who wish to obtain a satisfactory view of the controversy which has now been waged for some decades among scholars as to the starting-point of Semitic migration. Professor Barton assumes two homes for the Semites, one in Africa before their separation from the Hamites and a second in Arabia where the Semite *par excellence* was reared. This solution has much to commend it and is now supported in a measure by the recent investigations of Grimme, who recognizes in the Ethiopic—the Semite language of ancient Abyssinia—a more primitive type than the Arabic of which the Ethiopic had hitherto been supposed to be an offshoot. It must however be borne in mind that the home of a people is not necessarily the place in which the most permanent traits are impressed upon it, and even if the main thesis of Professor Barton's work applies to the Arabs it does not follow that it must also apply to the Babylonians and to the Hebrews.

The second chapter dealing with "Primitive Semitic Social Life" is an exceedingly valuable discussion of the earliest organization of clan life among the Semites—that is chiefly the ancient

Digitized by Google

Arabs—in which the author has put together the existing evidence for totemism, polyandry and the matriarchate. In regard to totemism some difference of opinion is possible but it may safely be said that the results of Barton's investigations regarding traces of the existence of polyandry and the matriarchate in ancient Semitic society are of a permanent character and represent an advance upon the work done in this field by his predecessors.

With the third chapter, however, on "Semitic Religious Origins," we come to "the parting of the ways." He takes an early opportunity in this chapter to emphasize the importance of the cult of goddesses among Semites in primitive times and from this point on through the remainder of the work, this thought is uppermost in his mind. He successively endeavors to find traces of the influence of Semites on the non-Semitic world which again vivals of the "female" cult among the southern and western Semites, in Babylonia, and finally the theory is applied also to Jahwe. In the eighth and last chapter he furnishes an estimate of the influence of Semites on the non-Semite world which again shows the author at his best and which may be regarded as a good summary of the course taken on the road of culture by the various branches of the Semites. Since, however, the ultimate test of the book rests upon the theory to the elaboration of which he devotes five out of the eight chapters, it will be proper to devote the balance of this review to a consideration of some of the evidence that the author adduces for his ingenuous, though one cannot help adding, untenable theory.

If there is one feature more characteristic than any other in the religions of the various branches of the Semites within historic terms, it is the unimportant position occupied by the goddesses in any Semitic pantheon. In the Babylonian religion, which shows the most developed form of a "Semite," or if you choose, "Semitized" pantheon, the goddesses are for the most part mere shadows of the gods, the consorts attached to the latter as much in human society. The exception is proved by the one great goddess Ishtar, who practically absorbs the qualities of her sister deities. We do not hear of goddesses among Hebrews, Moabites, or Ammonites. The worship of the Canaanites was essentially a "Baal" cult though the female principle was recognized and symbolized. According to Professor Barton, however, this phase of Semitic religions represents a later development and he sees evidence of a transformation in the

Digitized by Google

well-known fact that while Ishtar is a female deity among the Babylonians and Phoenicians, the corresponding form Athtar in southern Arabia is a male deity. To substantiate his view that the female Athtar is the original type, he adduces the evidence furnished by a Sabaean inscription which is dedicated to a deity Umm-Athtar—an expression which following Mordtmann he renders as "Mother Athtar." The evidence is somewhat weakened by the fact that in this inscription, the couple who dedicate the inscription to Umm-Athtar speak of themselves as "his" servants and to account for this, as Barton does, on the assumption that the age of the inscription marks the *transition* from the female to the male Athtar is not plausible. Is it conceivable that a worshiper while in the act of paying his devotion to a deity should address it as both male and female because he was uncertain of the sex to which his deity belonged. Leaving aside the view of other scholars that Umm-Athtar is a new deity, the very addition *Umm* would appear to emphasize the fact that in this way, the consort of Athtar is indicated. On Professor Barton's theory the *Umm* is not satisfactorily accounted for and if any conclusion is warranted it is that Athtar was so generally conceived as a god that those who set up this inscription felt obliged to add an element to the name in order to make clear that it was the female Athtar whom they had in mind. "His" servants would therefore have reference to "Athtar" and if the inscription gives any evidence of a "transition" in beliefs it points to a change of a male "Athtar" into a "female" one. Professor Barton himself points out that the district of southwestern Arabia whence the inscription in question comes, is not suitable for nomadic life and that agricultural communities must have been formed there at a very early time (p. 125). It seems strange therefore that the only part of Arabia which furnishes a possible evidence of a female Athtar should be one which represents the higher culture marked by the advance to agricultural life. Is it not more natural to bring the more plausible transformation of a male into a female Athtar into connection with the significant circumstance that the only female deity who plays a decided part in the Babylonian pantheon is Ishtar who under various names is regarded as the source of fertility among mankind, and hence the goddess of love and passions, as well as the goddess who blesses the fields with plenty—the source of fertility of the earth? The strength and power associated with "fertility" would easily ac-

Digitized by Google

count for another phase of Ishtar that crops out at certain periods in Babylonian history and is particularly prominent in Assyria,—namely, as the goddess of war who aids her followers in the thick of battle. Among the Phoenicians and Canaanites, likewise, the female principle is recognized chiefly in connection with "procreation," so that it is precisely when the agricultural stage is reached that we naturally find the cult of female deities coming forward at the side of the male deities. The prominence of the Ishtar cult in Babylonia (our knowledge of which has been advanced by Barton's former studies of the subject) constitutes, of course, an important element in our author's argument, but on his own theory we should expect to see the "female" cult showing traces of waning power as civilization advances, but not only is there no evidence of the transformation of the female Ishtar into a male deity in Babylonia, but the Ishtar cult retains all of its force down to the latest period of Assyrian history and in part of Babylonian history. The prominence of Ishtar in the old legends and myths, to which Barton properly calls attention, is not more marked than the role assigned to her in the oracles of Esarhaddon or in the annals of as Ashurbanipal.

Turning to another section of the book, Professor Barton is at pains to show that Chemosh the chief deity of the Moabites, known to us chiefly from the Old Testament and from the famous Moabite inscription, was "generically connected with the old Semitic mother goddess" (p. 141). His main argument rests upon the interpretation that he puts upon the name Ashtar-Chemosh which occurs in line seventeen of the inscription just referred to. He takes this combination as a proof that Chemosh was regarded as possessing the qualities proper to Ashtar or Ishtar, but the obvious objection to such a view is that the burden of proof to show that Ashtar is intended as a female deity rests upon Barton and he fails to adduce this proof. The name of the female goddess in Syria and Palestine appears invariably as Ashtarte and the form Ashtar, therefore, in the Moabite inscription is a proof in favor of the assumption that Ashtarte—the t representing the feminine termination—is a formation based upon Ashtar and marks the "transformation" therefore of a male Athtar (or Ashtar) as we find him in southern Arabia, into a female one. It is not, of course, necessary to assume that the philological process as little as the sociological should have been identical among Moabites and Babylonians, any more than that

Digitized by Google

the transition to agricultural life should necessarily have been followed by the rise or greater prominence of the cult of female deities. To the Canaanites, the source of the fertility of their lands remained a masculine "Baal" (though associated with a female" principle) and therefore the Hebrews upon taking the step towards agriculture transferred the qualities of this Baal—to their own "masculine" Jahwe. Professor Barton, however, does not stop short at Jahwe, who also according to him was developed out of the "primitive mother goddess" (p. 280). Examining the seven points that he urges as proof for his theory, it will be found that while some are exceedingly ingenious, none are conclusive. The first two points rest upon the supposed analogy between the development of the Hebrews and that of the Kenites and Moabites respectively and this argument depends furthermore upon the assumption that Barton has proved his case for those two peoples. His third point is the emphasis laid in the cult of Jahwe upon circumcision, but because circumcision is closely associated in some of the Pentateuchal sources with the connubium rite is surely no sufficient reason for concluding that Jahwe was originally a god of fertility and essentially a life-giving power. The wide-spread character of the rite on which Barton himself dwells in an earlier part of his work speaks against an originally close connection between Jahwe and circumcision and argues in favor of the secondary and therefore late character of such association. Still less convincing is Barton's next point that because the Hebrews had an old custom of placing the hand under the thigh in swearing by Jahwe, therefore Jahwe was at one time associated with the reproductive power. Admitting that the "thigh" stands for "the organs of reproduction," which is probable though not certain, the custom can readily be accounted for through the association of life with these organs. Swearing by the "thigh" is thus equivalent to swearing by one's own life, but there is absolutely nothing in the custom which argues for a closer association with Jahwe than any other god. The argument from the nomadic Passover festival which in its original form involved a sheep sacrifice in the spring of the year when the young were born, has somewhat more force, but is far from conclusive. Barton is no doubt right in assuming with most scholars that the festival antedates the settlement in Canaan, but the Hebrews in accepting it would naturally make the sacrifice to Jahwe as the only god to whom they paid their

Digitized by Google

devotion and also because of the association of the Passover with the redemption from Egypt brought about according to tradition by none other than Jahwe himself. It would be equally legitimate to assert that Jahwe was an agricultural deity because the *Matzoth* prepared of the first wheat were dedicated to him. Indeed the association of life with Jahwe, of which Barton also finds a trace in the etymology of the name, would be equally in place in the case of an agricultural deity, as in the case of a god belonging to the earlier nomadic and pastoral stage who is marked according to Barton as a god of general fertility and whose power manifests itself primarily in providing the fruit of the palm tree and in granting offspring to animals. If Jahwe really signifies "He who causes to be, *i. e.*, gives life," such an etymology points to the advanced conception of Jahwe as a "creator" in general and comes close to the role assigned to Elohim in the first verse of Genesis. Barton's last argument rests upon the supposed connection between the Jahwe of the Kenites (from whom according to Barton, the Hebrews borrowed the cult) and the palm trees. But surely because Jericho, "a city of palm trees" was once in the power of the Kenites and because around Sinai and in other spots where Kenites sojourned, palm trees were cultivated furnishes no sufficient reason for regarding Jahwe as a god of fertility. "Palm-tree" districts were naturally coveted because of the sustenance that they furnished and Professor Barton would first have to prove that Jahwe or any other god was regarded as the power behind the tree to which the tree owes its life before drawing his conclusion. Such proof, however, is wanting and in the primitive state of society which he has in mind, the "god" of the palm tree was no doubt supposed to reside in the tree and not on the top of a mountain, which is the earliest dwelling to which the Jahwe of the Kenites can be traced back. It would not be difficult, if space permitted, thus to follow Barton's arguments in other chapters of his book, point for point, and show the rather unstable foundations upon which his theory rests.

In a general way it may be said of all the evidence that he adduces, that it admits in every case of a different interpretation than the one which he puts upon it and that in many cases he forces the evidence beyond legitimate bounds. The strongest point for his theory of the "transformation" of deities is the undoubted existence of "androgynous" powers, but other theories

Digitized by Google

at least equally possible may be adduced to account for such deities, and, even granting "transformation" as a factor, the change from male to female at the agricultural stage in the life of a people when the conception of a great mother goddess would naturally arise, is to say the least more plausible than the transformation from female to male because of the supposed superior position accorded to man in the course of social development. A connection between economic conditions and religious beliefs, with which proposition Barton starts out, undoubtedly exists, but such connection is to be sought in the *forms* of the cult and not in the domain of beliefs themselves which rest rather upon a primitive logic and upon crude methods of speculation as to the relationship of the individual to the powers which manifest themselves on all sides of him. While therefore rejecting Barton's main contention, thanks are due to him for having amassed such valuable material for the study of Semitic antiquities. As already indicated his work is a contribution of decided value to this study and whatever the ultimate solution (if any) will be of the problem upon which he touches, his work will be indispensable to students and is to be warmly recommended as a most suggestive discussion of an important theme.

MORRIS JASTROW, JR.

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA.

THE SOCIAL PROBLEM: LIFE AND WORK. By J. A. Hobson. London: James Nisbet & Co. Pp. x., 295.

This work is divided into two parts. The first deals with "the science of social progress," the second with "the art of social progress." The first part is critical and the second part is constructive.

In the first part the author seems to go out of his way to bring sweeping charges against the economists, the old and the new. To Mr. Hobson the economists are very much like King Charles' head to Mr. Dick. It seems a pity that he should weaken what of interest and importance he has to say by burying it in a mass of unnecessary criticism which most of his readers must regard as extravagant. With Professor Marshall he is very severe. He will not allow him to break up a "social problem" into parts because it is organic—what would the biologists say to this, I wonder!

Digitized by Google

But when our author descends to detail he shows a complete misunderstanding of the nature of the preliminary analysis which Professor Marshall makes. "No doubt 'common sense' and Professor Marshall find it more convenient to break up an organic whole into a number of inorganic (sic!) parts for study. It is so much simpler, so much easier. Let us, then, pretend that man is actuated by one or two strong dominant motives (though we know he is not)" (p. 62). Professor Marshall is apparently charged with postulating the vulgar "economic man" made notorious and contemptible, and largely created, by Ruskin. It is very perverse and unkind of Mr. Hobson to bring this charge after Professor Marshall has taken such pains to explain clearly at the outset of his great work the nature of the abstraction of which he proposes to make use. His standpoint, I should say, ought to be perfectly apparent to anybody who takes the trouble to try to understand his system. It will perhaps be some solace to "the Nestor of economics" that he has not to bear the lash alone. "Like Professor Marshall, Dr. Keynes wants to simplify by falsification" (p. 69). Mr. Hobson objects to Dr. Keynes' distinction between a positive and normative standpoint. He argues that "an ought" is everywhere the highest "aspect or relation of an 'is'" (p. 66), and in this he is right. But it is absurd to suppose that you cannot in any sense separate the ethical and naturalistic points of view: it is like arguing that the chemistry of dyeing is necessarily a branch of æsthetics because colors are beautiful. What our author says of the old Political Economy is enough to make the economists from Adam Smith to Cairnes, Mill and Jevons turn in their graves. They were "bad company" in the extreme, and it is a mercy that their evil communications have not corrupted our good manners more than they have.

On turning to Book II one gets more into sympathy with the author of "The Social Problem" though one may not agree with most of his statements. One feels his intense interest and earnestness, and it cannot be denied that his treatment is stimulating and suggestive. But it leads to very little and one feels that its ineffectiveness is largely due to the restrictions which our author has imposed upon himself by his criticisms in Book I. In Book II, Mr. Hobson sets out to say something helpful on the biggest problem of the age. He discusses important questions in a manner which shows that he feels their importance.

Digitized by Google

Much of Book II is very real and the serious student will gain from examining it.

S. J. CHAPMAN.

THE OWENS COLLEGE, MANCHESTER.

DICTIONARY OF PHILOSOPHY AND PSYCHOLOGY, ETC. Written by many hands and edited by James Mark Baldwin, Ph. D., etc., etc., Stuart Professor in Princeton University, with the co-operation and assistance of an international board of consulting editors; in three volumes, with illustrations and extensive bibliographies. Quarto. Vol. I., pp. xxiv., 643. New York and London: Macmillan, 1901.

The task of making a useful dictionary of philosophy is probably one of the most difficult that an author or a company of authors can undertake. The width of the subject and the indefiniteness of its limits render almost insoluble the problem of rightly selecting the topics and treating them in due proportion. Past experience has also tended to make one sceptical regarding the success of any new attempt; for while most of the previous dictionaries have occasional utility and some peculiar merits, none of them can be implicitly trusted, and all of them, in one way or another, seriously mislead the unwary reader. Many faults of the older dictionaries are, however, due to the fact that each of them is mainly the work of one man. This new book is "written by many hands," and one's expectation is consequently renewed. Yet a perusal of the first volume leaves me with a scepticism shaken, but not removed. It may yet be possible to produce a fairly satisfactory dictionary of philosophy (including metaphysics, logic, ethics and æsthetics), and another fairly satisfactory dictionary of psychology (including various allied sciences). But the present work seems to me to fail in the attempt to combine the two. So far as I am competent to judge, philosophy suffers most. It practically becomes ancillary to psychology and the whole work should be entitled rather "a dictionary of psychology and philosophy" than "a dictionary of philosophy and psychology." To many people this may appear right and proper; but it is a view which I cannot accept. It expresses, however, in another way the statement of the editor in his preface that "it is upon the psychology of this work that most of its lines converge; and it is in its psychology that many of the hopes

Digitized by Google

of its producers centre." Some such criticism as I have indicated is accepted by Professor Baldwin as "inevitable." It might have been unnecessary to make it, had he given the book a different title.

The two main objects of the dictionary are (as it is put in the preface), "first, that of doing something for the thinking of the time in the way of definition, statement, and terminology; and, second, that of serving the cause of education in the subjects treated." As to terminology, the purpose of the writers is not to introduce new terms or new meanings, but to understand and define existing terms and meanings, and at the same time "to interpret the movements of thought through which the meanings thus determined have arisen, with a view to discovering what is really vital in the development of thought and term in one." In the execution of this purpose an attempt is made to secure authority for the definitions of terms and for their equivalents in various languages by obtaining a consensus of opinion from experts in America, England, France, Germany and Italy. This is a most useful feature of the work, and has a special value as regards the psychological and more strictly scientific subjects. Philosophy proper lends itself less easily to such a treatment; because philosophical terms or meanings do not become negligible or of purely historical interest, when they are no longer used, and because philosophical meanings must inevitably vary with individual thinkers, on account of their organic place in particular systems. No consensus of experts can fix them, and nothing short of a full historical statement can be an adequate account of them. Such a historical statement is not attempted in this dictionary. "It would be useless," says Professor Baldwin, "to attempt in any compass, short of an independent work as large as this, to make a dictionary of Greek and Scholastic Philosophy. It should be done; it is much needed; but we have not attempted it." This is true, not merely of Greek and Scholastic Philosophy, but of philosophy as a whole, and while the present dictionary contains accounts (useful so far as they go), of Kantian and Hegelian terminology, it is perhaps on the historical side that it is on the whole most deficient. "This work is not, and does not include, a history of philosophy." But as philosophy is inseparable from its history, the philosophical value of the book is correspondingly small. It might, I think, have been con-

Digitized by Google

siderably greater had the proportions of space allotted to the various subjects been different.

Of the educational value of the dictionary it is not easy to judge. Experience of its use by students is the only adequate test, and for that we must wait. Meanwhile it may be said that it contains a vast mass of useful information, usually, though not always, accurate, and in the main expressed clearly and simply. In this last respect, however, the writers differ considerably. Some of the articles are admirable in their order, lucidity and relevance. Others are careless and even ungrammatical in expression, and some are so far from being educationally valuable that even a reader with some little knowledge of the subject will find them difficult to understand. The references to the literature of the subject are an important educational feature of the book. These, however, vary very much in fulness and accuracy of reference, some being models of what such things should be, while others are so general as to be of comparatively slight use. On the whole it may be said that educationally, as in other respects, the dictionary is valuable mainly for the student of psychology, especially on its physiological side.

As to the proportion of space allotted to the various subjects I have to some extent already indicated my opinion. To be more specific, it seems to me in the first place, that Æsthetics, which gets as large a space as Logic, has been too liberally treated. The article on Art and Art-theories is considerably longer than that on Ethical Theories, and there is a still longer article on Beauty and the Beautiful, which is also concerned mainly with æsthetic theories. While these and similar articles are interesting and useful in themselves, they might well have been shortened in order to make room for a fuller account of the metaphysical systems and their terminology. Again, the space given to the Philosophy of Religion is still more disproportionate. Many of the articles have only the remotest reference to philosophy or psychology: some have no such reference at all. Take for instance the article "Annunciation," which discusses historically the date of Lady-day and which, though it is not very long, is actually longer than the article on Ancestor-worship. If the editor had observed that there is probably no department of human knowledge so well equipped as theology with books of reference (encyclopedias, dictionaries, carefully indexed histories), he might have ruled out a great number of imperfect articles on points of Christian

Digitized by Google

dogma, reduced many others to a line or two of reference and utilized the space that remained for matters of greater philosophical importance. Yet again, the bare little biographies scattered through the volume occupy a good deal of space, and are not of much practical use. Had they included some account of the work of their subjects or their special claim to philosophic or scientific fame, they would have been valuable. Occasionally some such reference is made, but with a curious infelicity the feature remarked upon is usually one of subordinate importance. For instance, the biography of Bayle has no reference to his great Dictionary. Bruno's acceptance of the Copernican theory is the only view of his that is mentioned, Buffon's translation of Newton is recorded, but there is no reference to his own great work, of Gassendi's philosophy we are merely told that "in some respects it resembles Locke's," and so on indefinitely.

These remarks on the general features of the book are not intended to be a condemnation of it as a whole. No reader can fail to be impressed by the amount of work that has been expended upon it and by the excellence of the great mass of its articles. But I have no doubt that its editor and his associates will be more grateful for some suggestions of correction and improvement than for a few vague paragraphs of praise. In proceeding to discuss the book in detail, I must therefore say once for all that the motive of my criticisms is a desire to make the book better and that it appears to me to be both worthy and capable of improvement.

If the biographies are retained, the number of them should be considerably increased. In view of the names already included, those which follow have occurred to me as worthy of a place and the list might no doubt easily be extended, for I have made no attempt to be exhaustive: Alcmaeon, Austin, Bagehot, Balguy, Bodin, Boscovich, DesBosses, Burke, Cardan, Carlyle, Culverwel, Dionysius the Areopagite, Epicharmus, Euler, de la Forge, Foucher, Foucher de Careil, Glanvil, Goethe, Hegesias, Van Helmont, Herschel, Hippocrates, Huet, Huyghens, Lamennais, Laplace, Lardner, Lavater. In the biographies actually given a number of corrections should be made. Albinus is not a part of the name of Alcuin, but a pen-name of his, and the Latin form of his name is Alcuinus, not Alcinus. Anaximines is misprinted for Anaximenes, and Andronicus Rhodus for A. Rhodius. Greek

Digitized by Google

names should be printed either in the customary English form or by a proper transliteration. "Arkesilaus," *e. g.,* should be either Arcesilaus or Arkesilaos. "Kratylus" should be either Cratylus, or Kratylos. "Kritias" should be put under C. if Callisthenes, Carpocrates, etc., are to appear there. In short, some uniform plan should be adopted, and for most readers the English spelling will be the more convenient of the two.

On particular biographies some further notes may be made. Archelaus of Miletus was not "probably" the teacher of Socrates. (v. Zeller, "Socrates and the Socratic Schools," Eng. Trans., p. 66). Baynes was not "professor of logic at Edinburgh, 1851-55." Was the Utilitarian formula first used by Cumberland? If so, some reference should be given, as Hutcheson is usually credited with it. I doubt whether Boetius is an allowable variant of Boethius. In the article on Buffon, for "1835" and "1839" read "1735" and "1739." Butler took orders in 1718. Reference should be made to his "Sermons" as well as to his "Analogy," and his appointment as Preacher at the Rolls is more worthy of note than some of the other posts which are mentioned. About Chrysippus something better might be given than the absurd and improbable story about the ass and the figs. Two biographies of Cratylus are given, one under the heading "Kratylus." Was Democritus called the laughing philosopher "for his cheerful disposition," and not rather because of his ethical precepts? Erigena was not Johannes, but Joannes and his pantheism is not at all "vague." Marsiglio Ficino is in Latin, Marsilius, not Marsiglius. Of Hartley it is said that he "sought to explain mental facts by physiological," but no mention is made of association. Heraclitus was not *born* about 500 B. C., but *floruit* about that time. The title of his work is not known, and it is doubtful whether it had any. If Democritus is mentioned as the "laughing," Heraclitus ought to get his title of "weeping" philosopher. It is more probable that Herbert of Cherbury was born in 1583 than in 1581; and his birthplace was certainly Eyton in Shropshire, and not Montgomery Castle in North Wales. In the same article "Oranien" should be "Orange," "1616" should be "1618" and "1625" should be "1624." Ben Jonson is hardly to be described as "one of the leading thinkers" of Hobbes' day. "The Court of Sessions" should be the "Court of Session," (p. 483b). "Iamblicus" should be "Iamblichus," and "Lasalle" should be "Lassalle."

Digitized by Google

My notes on the other articles may be conveniently given in alphabetical order. The article "Ability and Inability (in theology") is practically duplicated under "Inability," and the quotation (without specific reference), from the Westminster Confession is inaccurately given. Why should ability be derived from "A + habilis" and not from "habilis" simply? "Absolute" is defined as "that which is not relative," while in the next column reference is made to the "relatively absolute." Absolute freedom, again, is not necessarily "undetermined" and Pantheism represents (2) as well as (1) of the "three great connotations" of the absolute. Reference should also be made to "absolute motion" and "absolute position" in the mathematical sense. "Abstract Idea" is good, but historically defective, and reference should be made to Locke. "Acroamatic" is used (*e. g.* by Leibniz and others) not merely with reference to Aristotle. "Adequate" is too vague in its historical references, and the statement about Spinoza is inaccurate. "Adiaphoristic controversy" should be omitted as having nothing to do with the philosophy of religion, and the same may be said regarding the date of advent. "Adoptionism" is much too long (twice as long as "Altruism" in ethics), and the half of "Anabaptists" might be omitted. "A fortiori" is defined in such a way as to omit the important point. An argument a fortiori is not a "more conclusive" argument. Under "Agnosticism (in theology") some reference should have been made to the "negative theology" of early mediæval times. "Alexandrian School" is very vague and inadequate as regards the doctrines of the various writers. Plotinus, *e. g.* is merely mentioned and there is no account of his views or of those of Porphyry. Regarding Iamblichus also we get practically no information, although his biography refers us to this article. And it is surely most inaccurate to say that "Boethius is the last eminent thinker to be affected by" Neo-Platonism. Under "Algorism (and, erroneously, Algorithm)" the use of Algorithm in logic should be explained, and a reason should be given for describing it as "erroneous." Kant's "Analogies of Experience" are twice explained. The first article translates (with a general reference to the "Kritik der reinen Vernunft"!) a phrase chosen by Eisler, which is far from being the best definition that might have been selected. The next sentence is inaccurate; but the fact is correctly stated in the second article. The first article should be omitted and the literature mentioned under it should

Digitized by Google

be added to the second article. The term "Analogon rationis" is not "used by Leibniz" in the passages mentioned by Eisler, to whom the Dictionary article refers us, and I doubt if it is used by him at all. While "Analytic and Synthetic judgment" is on the whole well and clearly done, Professor Baldwin's part of it seems to me to be in various respects unsatisfactory, and here, as in many of the other articles, the distinction between the logical and the psychological aspects of the question is not made sufficiently clear. "Ancestor Worship" is quite inadequate, when compared, *e. g.*, with "Animism" and similar articles. "Animism in philosophy" is much too vague and indefinite. "Anthropology" is on the whole well done; but it contains the curious statement that "the term was used by Aristotle, but somewhat inexactly." The term does not occur in Bonitz's Index, and the only word resembling it is ἀνθρωπολόγος—"one whose conversation is personal." It should be noted also that Kant, in his definition of Anthropology, includes its physiological, as well as its psychological, side. The definition of "Anticipations of experience" is much less clear than it might be, and a meaningless reference is given to "Kritik der reinen Vernunft, 103," no edition being mentioned. The reference seems to have been taken from Eisler, who apparently means to refer to Kehrbach's edition (Reclam) and misprints 103 for 163. This is a very bad case of unverified reference, and it is not the only one in the Dictionary. In matters of this kind a dictionary, if it is to be serviceable, ought to be above suspicion. It is impossible for a reviewer to verify all the references in so large a book, and a few such cases are enough to shake one's confidence in the whole work. In "Apprehension," again p. 63*a*), the references to Aristotle's "Metaph." should be viii., 10, instead of ii., 10, and xi., 7, instead of xii., 7. "Arche," in Aristotle (p. 66*b*) is wrongly defined and ought to have had much fuller treatment. The idea of "Archetype" may be in Plato; but it is not "a Platonic word." "Architectonic" refers us to "Architecture," and "Architecture" refers us again to "Classification of the Fine Arts;" but in neither of these articles is the word "architectonic" used. And no reference is made to the classical usage of the term in Plato and Aristotle. "Art and Art theories" is in many respects a useful article; but its account of Plato's view and of the use of his term "imitation" is very imperfect, and one misses some account of the historical meanings of the term "Art," *e. g.*, the difference between the

Digitized by Google

usage of Plato and Aristotle, and that of modern times. "Asceticism in religion" might be omitted as it does little more than repeat some things which have been said in the excellent general article which precedes it. "Aseitas" should not be defined as if it were an adjective. "Assent" should have had a reference to Newman, or at least a cross reference to "Belief." The "Assistance or Concurrence of God" is not connected merely with the Pre-established Harmony. Its meaning for Descartes, at least, should be mentioned. "Association of ideas" and "Associationism" are brief, but clear so far as they go. There should, however, have been some more definite reference to the "laws of Association." "Atheism" is not defined, unless "pancosmism" is to be taken as a definition of it—*obscurum per obscurius.* And it is surely unfair to the Ritschlians to suggest that they regard God as "a subjective phenomenon" (p. 84*b*). Under "Âtman" reference is made to "the Aristotelian expression, 'Soul is the primary reality of organism.'" If this is intended as a translation of Aristotle's well-known definition, it is in various ways unsatisfactory. "Attribute" is defined as "an essential characteristic of a being," and it is said to be "used in this sense by the scholastics as a translation of the Aristotelian συμβεβηκός." If this is the case, it should certainly be mentioned that Aristotle's συμβεβηκός is not "an essential characteristic." "Authority ought to have included some account of the more important historical discussions of the question. It is strange that in a dictionary of philosophy we should not find some treatment of the history of a question like this, while we have historical references to controversies about the date of an ecclesiastical feast or fast. Under "Automatic and Automatism" (otherwise an excellent article) some reference should be made to the "spiritual automata" of Spinoza and Leibnitz. "Arymites" might be omitted, as having nothing to do with philosophy.

As this review is already a long one, the remainder of my notes must be reserved for a second notice. One can hardly write a useful review of so large a dictionary without going into considerable detail.

R. Latta.

University of Aberdeen.

Digitized by Google

THE CRIMINAL: HIS PERSONNEL AND ENVIRONMENT. A Scientific Study. By August Drähms. With an Introduction by Cesare Lombroso. New York: The Macmillan Co., London: Macmillan & Co., 1900. Pp. 402.

THE SCIENCE OF PENOLOGY: The Defence of Society against Crime. Collated and systematized by Henry M. Boies. New York and London: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1901. Pp. 447.

EXPERIMENTAL SOCIOLOGY, (Delinquents). By Frances A. Kellor. New York: The Macmillan Co., 1901. Pp. 316.

These three books are indicative of the growing interest in penology and form a noteworthy addition to the American literature of the subject. The standpoints and interests of the authors are in the main distinct. Mr. Drähms is the Resident Chaplain of the State Prison at San Quentin, California, and has the theological point of view. Mr. Boies, who will be remembered as the author of "Prisoners and Paupers," is a member of the Board of Public Charities of Pennsylvania, and interested in the prevention of crime and the punishment or reformation of the offender. Miss Kellor, who has been studying the female criminal for some years, has the student's standpoint. Necessarily the books overlap, yet they form complements of each other.

The work of Mr. Drähms is the most comprehensive. The criminal himself is, naturally, his chief concern, and Mr. Drähms has given us the best study yet published in America. He has gathered a mass of information regarding the various types of criminals. The theories, psychological and physical, of crime, objects of punishment, juvenile offenders, sphere of hypnotism, recidivation, etc., and put it in accessible and interesting form. His discussion of the various writers is good, although, unfortunately, he leans too much upon one "eminent authority," who is pretty generally discredited. Lombroso says that Mr. Drähms has given an excellent exposition of his views.

No satisfactory classification of criminals has yet been made and Mr. Drähms has not succeeded better than other writers. He divides them into Instinctive, Habitual and Single Offenders. The Instinctive are the born criminals, who have a predisposing bent toward innate wrong doing, and whose offenses are chiefly against the person. This class shades into the Habitual who are influenced more by environment and who tend toward offences

Digitized by Google

against property. "Heredity is the mother of crime, environment is the father." These classes form about 50 per cent. of the criminals. The single offenders form the balance. "The single offender's fall as a rule, is that of the impromptu offender; his rehabitation is usually permanent." This is an extreme statement for which the proof is not forthcoming and we question its accuracy.

In spite of many excellent features the book has some serious defects. Mr. Drähms has been unable to divert himself of theological preconceptions. He assumes that there is an essential, unchangeable right. He says: "The germs of the religious and criminalistic instincts of man belong to his original nature. Their explanations are theological and are entirely in consonance with facts" (Sic). In line with this is his view that Cain was the first criminal and that homicide was the "typical crime," until modern times, and that sin and crime are the joint inheritance of the race, the one being but the intensified expression of the other. The author asserts that: "The decrease in the use of alcoholic drinks must ever remain the great aim of all anti-criminal legislation as well as of moral and social reform." The statement that on the whole crime is increasing but that female criminality is decreasing needs confirmation. Miss Kellor devotes a chapter to prove an increase of crime among women. There is a tendency to looseness of thought and expression in the book which is objectionable.

Mr. Boies has written to "awaken a wider interest in the necessity for a more rational treatment of the violators of law and assist those who make and execute the law in the discharge of their duties." We may not agree with the author that "Penology is the main trunk of sociology," or "the stem from which all the social sciences branch," but it is a pleasure to admit that he has given us a most interesting and valuable book. The typographical work is so excellent that it is an added pleasure to use the book. Mr. Boies epitomizes his conclusions in numerous "laws." His argument is that the scope of penal legislation must embrace the whole criminal class and aim at reformation. Crime is a social disease to be cured by confining the criminal until reformed, by the elimination of bad and the restoration of normal functions. The criminal needs expert treatment. Fear of punishment does not restrain crime. Penalties to be efficient must be immediate, uniform and certain. Drunkards and prostitutes should be treated as criminals. These are laws of diagnostics.

Digitized by Google

Under therapeutics we learn that punishment must fit the doer, not the crime. Legal penalties are deterrent in proportion to the popular disgrace attached. Every criminal must be confined so long as he is dangerous, if allowed to go at large. Great care must be taken to segregate the criminal insane. Mr. Boies strongly favors a state police.

Under Hygienics it is stated that juveniles must not be allowed to grow up in institutions—away from home life—nor even be confined with adult prisoners. Mr. Boies greatly emphasizes work for children. "Every dollar expended by the state in providing for the necessary development of children before reaching school age, is worth ten spent after that in correction and education and a thousand expended for the protection from crime and in reformation of criminals." There is an excellent chapter on the ethical principles governing trials of criminals which contains some valuable suggestions to criminal lawyers. This is important at a time when those who profess to seek to secure justice often secure its miscarriage.

Mr. Boies is hopeful for the future: "The unintermitted and continual restraint of the incorrigible criminal and the reformation of the curable and the wholesome rearing of every child, constitute the triplicate solution by science of the social problem of criminality." We regret to see that Mr. Boies advocates judicial whipping for juvenile offenders, but aside from a few such defections the author gives a clear and consistent presentation of the principles of modern penology.

Miss Kellor has had excellent training and wide observation. Her book "is not a complete study and is published at the present time in the hope that it may secure the interest and coöperation of the general public and of specialists." "The results are but the beginning and indicate something of the field." The title "Experimental Sociology" is misleading and gives little idea of the contents. Those who object to the omniverous tendencies of certain sociologists will certainly protest when they find that the only sections in any way experimental are the chapters on psychological experiments upon some female convicts, and on Suggestions for Child Study. The justification of the insertion of this last is very dubious, for it is sandwiched in between a chapter on Sociological Data and one on Environment and Crime.

The book is really a series of essays upon criminology with special reference to female convicts. The general reader will not

Digitized by Google

find its chief value in the psychological experiments, interesting as they are, but in the excellent description of existing conditions, North and South, and the valuable criticisms and suggestions. For the first time we have some trustworthy observations of negro (women) convicts. The description of the Southern conditions is the best the reviewer has seen. It is impassioned, gives credit for the progress made, yet vividly indicates the necessity for radical reforms. Miss Kellor has an unusual comprehension of criminology and this book gives promise of better things to come.

In the introductory chapter we are told that "the methods and data of experimental sociology include those of Anthropometry, Psychology, and environment. The purposes of this investigation in criminal sociology is a synthetic study of the causes of crime. The value is that when the causes are understood measures for reformation and prevention become more rational and synthetic." In the chapter on Anthropometrical Measurements it is admitted that no conclusions can yet be drawn. From the psychological tests the author concludes that "criminals are not equipped for functioning so successfully in response to outward forces as are those of more accurate perceptions and judgments." Rarely only does the author make such a transparent discovery as that concerning the letters sent by female convicts: "judged by the tone—many were written to associates of similar social grades." The author quotes many letters and the suggestion is made that such letters are a fruitful field for study. In this suggestion the reviewer heartily concurs. There is a valuable study of the increase of crime among women, the causes being largely traced to the changing conditions of life. The suggestions in the chapter on Criminal Sociology and Jurisprudence are worthy of consideration. The author pleads for specialists and for specialization of institutions—such as juvenile courts. The restriction of prison labor is shown to be of doubtful social value. The temptations of the district attorney, under present conditions, to secure convictions and those of the lawyer to avoid convictions are clearly pointed out.

Among suggestions for the prevention of crime the schools of the department stores, training of institution officials, and kindergartens at the South are mentioned.

In spite of the fragmentary character of the book it is the best study of the female criminal America has produced.

CARL KELSEY.

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA.

Digitized by Google

THE ORIGIN AND SIGNIFICANCE OF HEGEL'S LOGIC: A General Introduction to Hegel's System. By J. B. Baillie, B. A. (Camb.), D. Phil. (Edin.), lecturer in Philosophy at University College, Dundee. London: Macmillan & Co., Ltd.; New York: The Macmillian Co., 1901. 8vo. Pp. xviii., 375.

Dr. Baillie's essay is primarily a contribution to the History of Philosophy. He seeks to describe the actual process of thought whereby Hegel was led on to conceive his Logic. Naturally this cannot be done with more than approximate accuracy. Scattered here and there occur indications of how at various moments of his life Hegel did think. But, when it comes to filling in the gaps so as to present the development as a whole, the historian has perforce to content himself with imagining how Hegel must have thought. Thus it is inevitable that on one page we should find ourselves dealing with the real, and on the next page with a hypothetical, Hegel. It is a great merit of the book, however, that the reader has for the most part no difficulty in determining which is which.

Histories of Philosophy have a way of trying to explain a thinker mainly by reference to his predecessors, as if the mind were a mechanical mixture, as if we were no more than the beef and mutton we eat. Dr. Baillie does not fall into this mistake. He rightly makes it his chief concern to display the inwardness, as it were, of Hegel's mental evolution. His object being to remove the popular impression of the Logic as of something without ascertainable antecedents, something "shot out of a pistol," he seeks to present it as the outcome of a process of thinking having an inner unity corresponding to that of the original and highly self-centred genius that was subject to it. Now to do this well is especially hard in the case of the original thinker who, like Hegel, will not, or can not, put his new wine into old bottles, but on the contrary, affixes the stamp of the inventor to almost every term he uses. For how is the would-be interpreter to change the language without changing the sense? Or if, on the other hand, the commentary but echoes the sacred text, how are those to be illuminated who sit in outer darkness? In respect to this dilemma Dr. Baillie would seem anxious to steer a middle course. He avoids Hegelian catch-words, but does not depart far from what may be described as the language of German metaphysics. The result is successful in as much as, independent and in some sense

Digitized by Google

hostile critic of Hegel's system as his last chapter shows him to be, he has nevertheless contrived an expository manner that is sympathetic enough to make one feel something of what Hegel must have meant to his own nation and generation, and so, approximately at all events, to himself.

Perhaps, however, Dr. Baillie confines himself a bit too exclusively to giving an interior history of the growth of Hegel's thought. The reader he caters for is presumably a man who has more or less of a distaste for "ghostly ballets," whether of categories or of successive intellectual positions. Nor will that reader probably have Rosenkranz at his elbow so as to be able to make explicit for himself the significance of the scanty allusions to dates or changes of residence by the aid of which Hegel the philosopher is brought into relation with Hegel the man. Or again it was advisable, no doubt, not to make too much of Hegel's debt to other thinkers. For instance, considering the state of the evidence, it was probably best to say nothing, or next to nothing, about the influence of Plato on Hegel's mind, remarkable as is the resemblance between the spirit of the "Logic" and that of certain of the Platonic dialogues, more especially the "Sophistes." On the other hand, however, it was of course quite impossible to overlook altogether Hegel's connection with his immediate intellectual environment—with the current philosophies of Kant, Fichte, Jacobi, Schelling. This being so, might not Dr. Baillie, in the interest of the unprofessional reader, have been somewhat more specific and detailed in his account of the relation of Hegel's ideas to theirs? At any rate why make his all-too-brief, but striking, remarks on "the historical setting of Hegel's Logic" retrospective? Why banish them to the penultimate chapter? There are no signs that Dr. Baillie is inclined to be sketchy and superficial. But there *are* signs that he tends to underestimate the difficulties of those for whom he professedly writes. When people are but learning to swim in the sea of abstract argumentation, they like to touch bottom occasionally in the shape of a few hard facts.

This leads us to the question whether Dr. Baillie's book makes good its claim to serve as "a general introduction to Hegel's system." Apart from the objection that his history of Hegel's thought leaves it somewhat self-contained and proportionately hard to follow, it may be doubted whether it is pedagogically sound to cause the student to approach philosophy from the side

Digitized by Google

of the history of philosophy, in whatever way it be written. In philosophy authority and example count for very little, and the inquirer's chief guide must be the spirit that moves within him. The teacher can hope to modify, by methodizing, the train of thought that has fairly started of its own inherent impulse. But to try to make it start at a given point—say, the point at which Hegel started (suppose it were ever really possible to determine what that point was), must, if not wholly ineffectual, but tend to kill the living thinker and put the soulless sectary in his place. On the other hand, though this would not seem to be the function of such a book as Dr. Baillie has written, it is easy to prescribe for it a sufficient use, and one indeed to which its style and method would seem more particularly to adopt it. When the student, already somewhat advanced in philosophy, has come to appreciate Hegel's Logic and Hegel's whole system for its own sake, then, as in the case of some attractive picture, he will naturally seek to learn how it came to be, and this historical interest will presently qualify and enhance the larger and more vital interest that gave it birth.

R. R. MARETT.

EXETER COLLEGE, OXFORD.

CONTEMPORARY SOCIALISM. By John Rae. London: Swan Sonnenschein & Co., 1901. Pp. xii., 556.

The merits of Mr. Rae's "Contemporary Socialism" do not stand in need of any further acknowledgment. The present volume is a reprint of the second edition (1891), with the addition of a new chapter bringing the history of the Socialist Movement up to date. The great feature of the new chapter is a very full and careful account of the "moulting" which the "revolutionary" wing of the Socialist party has undergone since the Erfurt congress of 1891. The history of Social Democracy from 1891 to 1901 is represented as the development of a programme of revolution into a programme of reform. It is to be regretted that Mr. Rae has given less attention to the progress of Socialism outside the "Marxist" tradition, and confined himself to the more popular or militant forms of the movement. The remark that "the Christian Socialists have continued on the hazy tenor of their way without occasioning observation, except when thrown for a moment before the public attention by a vigorous denuncia-

Digitized by Google

tion of them by the German Emperor in 1896," falls somewhat short of the recognition due to the existence of the Christian Social Union. There is no reference, again, to the activity of Fabian Socialism, both in theory and practice, since it ceased to be a "debating club of mixed Socialism . . . . without having any recognized end beyond the discussion" (p. 88); nor again to recent progress in Municipal Socialism. None of these things may be as conspicuous as the proceedings of militant socialists, but the omission of them from consideration constitutes an important limitation to the author's conception of "Contemporary Socialism." We cannot help thinking that some attention might have been given to the evolution of Socialism in the chair which is quite as remarkable and as significant as that of Socialism in the street. Altogether, a student of socialism could scarcely agree that "its present position in 1900 is explained in the new chapter"; but presumably Mr. Rae has more in mind the needs of the general reader, who will find much to interest him in the author's account of the recent history of the Socialist Movement, not only on the continent, but in the Australian colonies. Unfortunately, the book appeared before the "capitulation" of Bernstein at the Congress of Lübeck.

SIDNEY BALL.

ST. JOHN'S COLLEGE, OXFORD.

POVERTY: A STUDY OF TOWN LIFE. By B. Seebohm Rowntree. London: Macmillan & Co., Ltd., 1901.

Mr. Charles Booth's book on "Life and Labour of the People in London" has inspired Mr. Rowntree to undertake a similar investigation into the conditions of life in the City of York. The comparative smallness of the city—the population is about 78,000—has enabled Mr. Rowntree to make a more particular and detailed investigation than was possible for Mr. Booth. The work has evidently been undertaken with the greatest care and the results are presented with admirable clearness. It is a model book. The facts are as depressing as Mr. Booth's. Indeed one of the most striking and interesting results is that the proportionate amount of poverty is nearly the same in York as in London. In York over 43 per cent. of the wage earning classes or about 28 per cent. of the total inhabitants of the city were found to be living in poverty. To determine whether a family is living

Digitized by Google

in poverty or not Mr. Rowntree considers the minimum necessary expenditure for the maintenance of physical health. He chooses the cheapest rations specified by the Local Government Board for the guidance of Boards of Guardians and on this basis calculates that on the average the weekly cost of such a dietary is 3s. 3d. for a man, 2s. 9d. for a woman, and 2s. 3d. for a child, in order to afford the amount of protein which medical authorities state is requisite. Perhaps further scientific investigation may modify some of the views we hold with reference to measuring the necessary amounts of food by reference to protein alone, but these calculations afford the best measure at present available to us. On this basis he calculates the minimum necessary for clothing, fuel and other sundries at £4 11d per week for a family of five. He then determines which families had their total earnings insufficient to obtain the minimum necessaries for the maintenance of merely physical efficiency and calls the poverty experienced by such families "primary poverty." Nearly ten per cent. of the population of York are living in primary poverty. Secondary poverty is that experienced by families whose total earnings would be sufficient for the maintenance of merely physical efficiency were it not that some portion of it is absorbed by other expenditure either careful or wasteful. Nearly 18 per cent. of the population of York are living in secondary poverty. But Mr. Rowntree does much more than merely collect these statistics and make these calculations. He presents us with a very full picture of the different classes of wage earners in the City of York. He describes the conditions of housing, gives specimen family budgets, considers the relation of poverty to health and gives some account of the public houses, schools, trade unions, friendly societies and other institutions in the city. The result is that we have a more complete account of the condition of the wage earning classes in a city than has ever been given before. Would that more public-spirited persons like Mr. Rowntree follow in the footsteps of Mr. Charles Booth.

C. P. SANGER.

LONDON.



Digitized by Google

BOOKS RECEIVED.

THE VARIETIES OF RELIGIOUS EXPERIENCE: A Study in Human Nature, Being the Gifford Lectures on Natural Religion, Delivered at Edinburgh, in 1901-1902. By William James, LL. D. New York and London: Longmans, Green & Co., 1902. Pp. xii., 534.

LEADERS OF RELIGIOUS THOUGHT IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY: Newman, Martineau, Comte, Spencer, Browning. By Sydney Herbert Mellone, M. A. Lond., D. Sc. Edin. Edinburgh and London: William Blackwood & Sons, 1902. Pp. viii., 302.

PHILOSOPHY AND LIFE: and Other Essays. By J. H. Muirhead, M. A., Professor of Mental and Moral Philosophy in the University of Birmingham. London: Swan Sonnenschein & Co., Lim., 1902. Pp. 274. 4s. 6d.

PHILOSOPHY OF CONDUCT: A Treatise of the Facts, Principles, and Ideals of Ethics. By George Trumbull Ladd, Professor of Philosophy in Yale University. London: Longmans, Green & Co., 1902. Pp. xxii., 663. 21s.

A HISTORY OF ENGLISH UTILITARIANISM. By Ernest Albee, Ph. D., Instructor in the Sage School of Philosophy, Cornell University. London: Swan Sonnenschein & Co., Ltd.; New York: The Macmillan Co., 1902. Pp. xvi., 427. 10s. 6d.

STUDIEN ZUR WERTTHEORIE. Von Robert Eisler, Wien. Leipzig: Duneker & Humblot, 1902. Pp. xii., 112. 3 M.

LA SOCIOLOGIE POSITIVISTE: Auguste Comte. Par Maurice Defourny, Docteur en Philosophie. Louvrain: Institut Supérieur le Philosophie; Paris: Félix Alcan, 1902. Pp. ii., 370.

EDUCATION AND EMPIRE: Addresses on Certain Topics of the Day. By Richard Burdon Haldane, M. P., LL. D., K. C. London: John Murray, 1902. Pp. xiv., 198. 5s.

PRINCIPLES OF CLASS TEACHING. By J. J. Findlay, M. A., Wadham College, Oxford; Ph. D. Leipzig; Headmaster of the Cardiff Intermediate School for Boys. (Macmillan's Manuals for Teachers, Edited by Oscar Browning, M. A. and S. S. F. Fletcher, M. A., Ph. D.). London: Macmillan & Co., Ltd., 1902. Pp. xii., 340. 2s. net.

THE MESSAGE OF MAN: A Book of Ethical Scriptures, Gathered from Many Sources and Arranged by Stanton Coit, Ph. D. London: Swan Sonnenschein & Co., Ltd., 1902. Pp. xii., 340. 2s. net.

FACTS AROUT FLOGGING. By Joseph Collinson. (Humanitarian League, Criminal Law and Prison Reform Department). London: William Reeves, 1902. 6d. [Points out the lack of supposed evidence that flogging acts better than other forms of punishment as a deterrent from certain kinds of crime.]

RECENT OBJECT-LESSONS IN PENAL SCIENCE: With a Bibliographical Introduction. By A. R. Whiteway, M. A., Barrister-at-Law, Corresponding Member of the Academy of Legislation of Toulouse. *Third Series.* London: Swan Sonnenschein & Co., Ltd.. 1902. Pp. xii., 216. 3s. 6d. net.

Digitized by Google

PHILOSOPHY: Its Scope and Relations: An Introductory Course of Lectures. By the late Henry Sidgwick, Knightbridge Professor of Moral Philosophy in the University of Cambridge. London: Macmillan & Co., Ltd.; New York: The Macmillan Co., 1902. Pp. xvii., 252. 6s. 6d. net.

PERSONAL IDEALISM: Philosophical Essays by Eight Members of the University of Oxford. Edited by Henry Sturt. London: Macmillan & Co., Ltd.; New York: The Macmillan Co., 1902. Pp. viii., 393. 10s. net.

HUMAN EVOLUTION: An Inductive Study of Man. By G. Rome Hall, M. D. London: Swan Sonnenschein & Co., Ltd., 1902. Pp. xii., 300. 7s. 6d.

THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE CHRISTIAN RELIGION. By A. M. Fairbairn, D. D., LL. D., Principal of Mansfield College, Oxford. London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1902. Pp. xxviii., 583. 12s.

SPIRITUAL HEROES: A Study of Some of the World's Prophets. By David Saville Muzzey. New York: Doubleday, Page & Co., 1902. Pp. ix., 305.

THE FOUNDER OF MORMONISM. By J. Woodbridge Riley, with an Introduction by George Trumbull Ladd. New York: Dodd, Mead & Co., 1902. Pp. xix., 446.

LE DOTTRINE EDONISTICHE ITALIANE DEL SECOLO XVIII. Saggio Storico-Psicologico. Memoria Preusente alla R. Accademia di Scienze Morali e Politiche della Societa Reale di Napoli. Da Michele Losacco. Napoli: Steb. Tip. della R. Universita, 1902. Pp. 125.

Articles by writers in Great Britain should be sent to
Prof. J. S. Mackenzie, 7 Richmond Terrace, Cardiff, Wales.
Books to be reviewed, published in Great Britain, should be sent to
G. E. Moore, M. A., Trinity College, Cambridge, England.

Digitized by Google

INTERNATIONAL

JOURNAL OF ETHICS.

JANUARY, 1903.

THE MORAL ASPECTS OF THE REFERENDUM.

Our subject is the Moral Aspects of the Referendum, and in treating it I shall endeavor first of all to state what the Referendum is, separating it as far as possible from any superfluous connotations of sentiment or prejudice; and then proceed to consider its moral aspects from three points of view; the point of view of the causes which have brought it into existence, the point of view of its effects, and that of its general ethical significance.

In the first place then and prior to all discussion, it should be borne in mind that the "Modern Referendum," which is based upon the idea of popular sovereignty, is not proposed as a substitute for the Representative System but as a modification or corrective of it. And this seems a necessary thing to say because the Referendum is so often opprobriously described by partisan opponents as rule by town meeting or as the practical elimination of representative government. But even so extreme and visionary a sentimentalist as Rousseau expressly declares in his "Contrat Social" that large and populous countries cannot be ruled by town meeting, and frankly admits, moreover, the necessity of representatives. And when we come furthermore to matter of fact we learn that the Modern Referendum, whether in its optional or obligatory form, means nothing more than an appeal, on certain matters of constitu-

Digitized by Google

tional or statute law as the case may be, from the duly authorized legislative representatives to the whole body of constituents who elected them. It does not contemplate the elimination of the Representative System, it rather implies its existence both as antecedent and associate; for although, upon a sufficiently insistent popular demand the Referendum can, in certain places and under certain circumstances, be taken with or without the consent of the Legislature, this is due not to anything in the nature of the Referendum itself but to another device of popular government called the Initiative. The action of the Referendum pure and simple is but the ratification or rejection by a majority vote of laws or measures framed elsewhere by representatives in convention or legislature assembled.

It should also be remembered that the Modern Referendum is not a political instrument of exclusively foreign manufacture—Australian or Swiss—but is also a home product. The Cantons of Switzerland did not begin to submit constitutions to the suffrages of the people before the year 1830, and the custom did not become universal among them until the Federal Constitution of 1848 made it obligatory; whereas the General Court of Massachusetts so long ago as 1778 submitted to popular vote a constitution which was rejected and two years later one that is in force to-day. Likewise in New Hampshire a constitution, which was referred to the electors in 1779 and which was repudiated by them, was followed by another in 1788 which was accepted. Since that time the application of the Referendum to State constitutions has become almost universal in our land. In discussing the Referendum, therefore, we are not dealing with a foreign institution alone but with one that is of domestic origin as well.

Then again it should not be forgotten that the Referendum is not applicable to all laws even in Switzerland itself. It is indeed obligatory within the Confederation for all amendments to the Constitution, but in its optional form the Constitution requires that federal laws shall be submitted for adoption or rejection by the people only upon demand of thirty thousand active citizens or eight Cantons. It also goes on to say that,

Digitized by Google

under these circumstances, the Referendum is to be applied to all federal decrees that are of general application (*portee general*) and which have not the character of urgency. Just what a law or vote of general application really is the Constitution nowhere defines, but M. Droz, a former president of the Confederation, writes in his "Etudes" that, it was solemnly understood and with common accord, at the time of the revision of the Federal Constitution, that the annual budget and international treaties should not fall within the scope of the Referendum. Likewise the Constitution of South Dakota, one of our own Referendum States, after requiring "that any laws which the Legislature may have enacted shall be submitted to a vote of the electors of the State before going into effect" takes pains to add "except such laws as may be necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace, health or safety, support of the State government and its existing public institutions." It is to be noted then that both by practice and by constitutional provision the application of the Referendum has its limits.

Finally, the fact should be emphasized that the Referendum is not a radical or destructive instrument but one that is essentially conservative. It may obstruct beneficent legislation as well as that which is pernicious, but here its power ends. In other words its action is purely negative. It simply pronounces yes or no upon any proposed measure of legislation which is submitted to its vote. If it says "yes" the will of the legislature is carried into effect and becomes a law. If it says "no" the *status quo* is maintained in its integrity; all things remain as before. The Referendum is therefore conservative in character and does away with nothing that exists.

It is to be noticed, however, and this is most important, that in the Referendum vote the people take a direct although limited share in legislation. They do not indeed formulate the law, neither do they debate it except in their public meetings, homes or clubs, but they render through the ballot an ultimate judgment upon it. Under a purely representative system the people delegate the law-making power to their representatives in Congress or Parliament assembled and it is these represen-

Digitized by Google

tatives alone who exercise the power and evolve the law; whereas the Referendum, on the other hand, gives the people, under certain conditions, the right of veto. Law is not Law in other words, wherever the Referendum is legally applicable, until the people ratify it. Hence the Referendum so far as it goes is direct popular participation in the making of the law.

Such being the essential nature of the modern Referendum it becomes our present duty to discuss it in some of its more important moral aspects.

And first of all what is its ethical aspect when regarded from the point of view of the causes which have led up to it? What are these causes? Undoubtedly the chief cause is the manifests defects and corruptions of representative government; but back of this relatively proximate cause is the fixed conviction upon the part of the advocates of the Referendum of the sovereignty of the people and of their right to legislate and rule: the firm assurance, to which as Mr. Bryce says, "all civilized nations have come back," that the ultimate source of law and power resides in the will of the community. It is from the people that the great body of the common law has issued and it is to the people again that we must go for the ultimate arbitration of dispute and the closure of debate. It was the people who legislated in the *Comitia* of ancient Rome, the *Folkmoot* of the English and the *Landesgemeinden* of the Swiss; and wherever they have delegated this sovereign legislative authority of theirs to others, both tyranny and corruption have ensued. Such have been the consequences under the Representative System as well as under the prior dominion of kings and emperors; and therefore, it is urged, the people should claim and exercise their sovereign right to make the law. It is not for the good of the community that the sovereignty of the people should be merely nominal or rest in abeyance. It should be actively employed and make itself felt in the legislation of the land. Such is the fundamental ground on which is based the plea for a direct participation upon the part of the people in legislative acts.

But by far the most potent cause is that which has furnished the practical occasion for this fresh declaration of the doctrine

Digitized by Google

of popular sovereignty, viz.: the defects and corruptions of representative government. It is admitted on all sides that the system of representation as at present constituted does not represent the people at large; for while some classes are represented to an extent out of all proportion to their lawful needs and actual numbers, other classes such as the trades and laborers and artisans are hardly represented at all. It is said of course, that in the United States at least, every man has a vote: but it should be remembered that a vote does not by any means secure representation, whereas a wealthy merchant may obtain the legislation he desires without ever giving himself the trouble of going to the polls.

Quite as glaring, too, as the defects of the Representative System and even more menacing to the public good is the corruption which is rife in almost every representative body as well as the ignorance and low moral tone of many of the representatives. It was expected when the Representative System was inaugurated that it would be a matter of pride as well as of interest with the community to elect its very best men as its spokesmen and leaders. Such an expectation, as we all well know, has not been realized. Our State Legislatures in particular seem to be the greatest disappointment of all in this respect, for it is there that the malign personality of the Boss holds sway and, with the money of wealthy individuals or corporations in his pockets, makes and unmakes laws at will.

The evils of the Representative System are therefore great and grievous. Manifold also are the temptations to which the representative by virtue of his position is exposed. Unlawful usurpation of power individually or in committee, the illegal exertion of administrative pressure for personal or party ends and the demoralizing opportunity to obtain the prize of illegitimate riches, have all combined to impair or debauch the character of many representatives. Great political principles are forgotten or repudiated in the busy game of trafficking in spoils of office, whereas in the mad pursuit of partisan or private aims the people's good and the people's cause are for the most part abandoned.

In such a case it is no wonder that the Representative System

Digitized by Google

has lost its prestige with large numbers of persons and that many of them should have begun to cast about for some more adequate and honest means of achieving the ends of justice and of expressing the popular will. The Referendum is one of the most widely advocated of these means; and it is the ineffectiveness and corruption of representative governments which have in large part produced the desire to give it a trial. "Distrust of the representative and the delegate—or the middlemen of politics as the advocates of the Referendum prefer to call them —seems to be at the bottom of the present movement," says a correspondent of the *Evening Post* in speaking of the Referendum agitation in the West. And what is happening in this country is also happening elsewhere. "Wherever in Europe, west of the German Empire," writes Oberholtzer, "representative government has already established itself the next step seems to be the Referendum as a corrective of evils which have developed in the Representative System." "If good legislatures are unattainable," adds Mr. Bryce, " . . . then the system of direct popular action may be justified as a salutary effort of the forces which make for good government, opening for themselves a new channel." Thus it is that the evils of the Representative System have evoked over a wide area the demand for the Referendum.

One other cause which has contributed to the rise and spread of the Referendum doctrine deserves to be mentioned. It is its earnest advocacy by a small minority of high-minded men who have at heart the political education of the people. "The sovereign must be educated! The sovereign must be educated!" reiterates M. Numa Droz more than once in his invaluable Political Studies. "The deputies of the people should resign themselves," continues the former President of the Swiss Confederation, "to be no more than Counselors and should devote themselves to their political education." "Never defy the people," says M. Herr, another prominent Swiss, "go to them on the contrary with trustfulness, discuss with them, take account of their objections and antipathies, seek to conquer them by the sole force of persuasion and you will see that it is easier and better to govern with

Digitized by Google

the people than with the parliamentary groups." "Democracies do not admit that legislatures such as we see them are the last thing they have to try," wrote the late Mr. Godkin. . . . . "There are signs of a strong disposition, which the Swiss have done much to stimulate, to try the Referendum. . . . Inasmuch as all important matters devised by the Convention are submitted to the people with eminent success there is no reason why all grave measures of ordinary legislation should not be submitted also."

Such then are three prominent causes which have led to the advocacy of the Referendum and its introduction into many places; and they present the Referendum in a threefold ethical aspect: the aspect of a measure to make the sovereignty of the people morally effective, the aspect of a measure which is to mitigate the evils of the present system of representative government, and the aspect of a measure which shall afford the electors of a country an opportunity for education in the judgments and activities of political justice.

Turn now to the ethical aspects of the Referendum when regarded from the standpoint of its effects. What these effects are may best be gathered from the political experience of the Swiss since it is only among them that the Referendum, as applied to ordinary statute law, has been in operation for a sufficient length of time to produce unmistakable consequences; consequences from which any legitimate inductions may be drawn. As one would naturally expect the results have been both favorable and unfavorable. Let us glance first at the unfavorable effects as well as those failures of the Referendum to induce the good results that were expected of it.

In the first place, it may be said that it has been a matter of keen regret to many of the more ardent believers in the Referendum that it has failed to excite that widespread interest in political matters which was hoped, if not expected of it. In Berne, for example, to quote Mr. Lowell, a majority of the citizens have taken part only in thirteen out of the ninety-seven referenda, and up to 1888 one law alone received the affirmative votes of half the qualified voters in the Canton. Even at national referenda, which excite a greater interest, the average

Digitized by Google

proportion of the voters in the Confederation who go to the polls is less than sixty per cent., and no law has ever been ratified by a majority of the qualified voters. Thus the apathy or indifference of almost one-half of the sovereign people to its royal right to legislate has been one of the disappointments of the referendum experiment; although it should in all fairness be said on the other side that to have evoked the interest of more than fifty per cent. of the community in purely legislative measures is no mean achievement in the direction of political education.

Then again, there can be no doubt that the Referendum has acted in many cases as an obstruction to progressive legislation. In Zurich, for example, a law proposed by the legislature which gave the daughters the same inheritance as sons in the parental estates was vetoed by a large majority; while many measures looking towards the improvement of the condition of the working man, the protection of female labor in the factories and the increase of the amount of education required in the public schools have suffered a like fate. In palliation of this seemingly inexplicable action upon the part of the people, and especially the workingmen among them, it should be added, however, that many of these legislative proposals which were at first rejected have subsequently been passed into law, and that the delay in the enactment of the law has effected a better understanding as well as a heartier endorsement of it in the end. In other words when the law was at last placed upon the statute book it had become the expression of a convinced and enlightened public opinion rather than the voice or conviction of a few trained experts and reformers.

It has also been alleged against the Referendum device that it has weakened the sense of political responsibility among the Representatives themselves, and that they devote less conscientious care to the study and elaboration of legislative measures which they know must be submitted to the people than they would if the results of their labors were final and beyond appeal. In reply to this, M. Droz admits that there is nothing perfect under the sun and that no political instrument can be devised which shall compel from every man the full discharge

Digitized by Google

of his responsibilities to the State. On the whole, however, while admitting that the charge is not without foundation in a few scattered cases, he denies that the effect of the Referendum has been to weaken the character of the Representative.

What he does admit, however, as an unfortunate effect of the Referendum is its tendency to develop politicians of a purely negative type of mind—the *"Neinsager"* as he calls them—"men who have at their head those misunderstood geniuses who only dream of sowing broadcast the discontent of their own hearts." That the Referendum has been used as a basis of demagogy M. Droz also concedes; and yet, in spite of everything that may be urged against it, it is a noteworthy fact that no party in Switzerland to-day would vote to give it up: not the Radicals because they regard the Referendum as a necessary feature of true Democracy: not the Conservatives because they believe it to be a salutary check to hasty and revolutionary legislation.

And this brings us to the good effects which may be fairly attributed to the action of the Referendum. Above everything else it has ameliorated the evil effects of party spirit and has assisted to a great extent in maintaining the integrity of the parties themselves. Undoubtedly the Referendum is not the only cause which has contributed to these results, and yet it can easily be seen that an instrument which gives the people the right to vote on each proposed bit of legislation must of necessity diminish the significance of party programmes and soften the asperities of party strife. The people may elect a representative and then reject any legislative proposal of his which is not to their liking. As a matter of fact they have done this ever and over again and the remarkable spectacle is herewith presented of a people retaining in public office men of whose political measures or opinions they not infrequently disapprove. The State, they say should not be deprived of the services of a valuable servant because he and his constituents are not agreed upon every point. Hence the Referendum has contributed on all hands to independence of judgment and intellectual honesty. Legislators are not deterred from expressing their real convictions through fear of losing office, and the

Digitized by Google

people are helped to that independent attitude of mind which the exigencies of strong party feeling are sure to weaken if not altogether to destroy.

Then, too, the Referendum has served to keep men mindful of principles and to enhance the importance of measures rather than of men. In countries where party spirit runs high the political leaders are apt to enjoy the blind devotion of their followers as well as the equally blind distrust or hatred of the rank and file of their opponents. Principles are forgotten in personal admirations or dislikes. "I wonder what that damned rascal Gladstone is about now," said a Tory squire once in my hearing as he unfolded the morning *Times* in the smoking room of a London hotel. For such a "good old Tory," as he is proverbially styled in England, hatred of the Liberal leader is of the very fibre of his party allegiance. And yet, however, he may commend himself to his political brethren by such ingenuous expressions of enmity towards the common foe, his state of mind can hardly be looked upon as one which is favorable to a dispassionate consideration of important public questions. So blind is it, in fact, to the real nature of such questions that it is able to revile and repudiate a Gladstonian Reform Bill at one session of Parliament and then, without the slightest suspicion of intellectual stultification, accept an almost identical measure from the hands of Disraeli at the next. So it is that in partisan politics the figure of the leader bulks big in the public view, and in the heat of the enthusiasm or hostility which he excites his measures are as unthinkingly supported as opposed.

In Switzerland on the other hand, "there may almost be said to be no party leaders," says Mr. A. Lawrence Lowell. In Switzerland, too, there are, for the nomination of candidates, no such national conventions as grace and illuminate our favored land—no conventions where the delegates feel themselves at liberty to renounce all rational functions in the decorous pastime of screaming themselves into a fool frenzy for a name. On the contrary, it is the measure that is emphasized in Switzerland rather than the man, and it is good government rather than party victory on which the great majority of the

Digitized by Google

electors are seriously bent. Parties indeed exist, but they may for the most part be characterized as associations of individuals who hold certain political principles in common rather than as rival organizations who struggle for the mastery or scramble for the spoils. In the production of this most enviable result the Referendum, because of the prominence it gives to measures and because of the opportunity it constantly affords for considering them and acting upon them, may be said to have had no inconsiderable share. It has helped to enlighten public opinion, has kept the representative and his constituents in closer touch than is possible under the purely representative system, and has led to the enactment of laws which, even if they do sometimes fail in realizing the perfection desired by the specialist, honestly express the will of the community. And such laws, despite their theoretic delinquencies, are the most effective ones after all; for they are, because of the backing of the people, sure of execution and, in the light of the defects which they may subsequently reveal, they are also certain of amendment.

Besides all this the Referendum acts, according to the competent testimony of M. Droz, as a valuable safety-valve. If trouble arises through the unpopular triumph of some parliamentary group the Referendum removes it. It serves to disengage the political atmosphere of the electricity with which for the moment it happens to be charged. By giving the people the last word it takes the sting out of parliamentary defeat and affords the minority a chance of explaining and defending its position before the public at large. If it is the people on the other hand who are discontented the Referendum presents them with an opportunity of expressing their displeasure at the way in which their affairs have been conducted and of rejecting the measures that are not to their taste. The deputies, for their part, take due note of the condition of the public mind and place their legislative proposals once more upon the stocks for revision or amendment. Thus nothing in the Confederation is compromised, dangerous explosions which often result in revolutions are avoided and the peace of the land is preserved and strengthened.

Digitized by Google

On the whole, then, and to sum up, it may be said with positive assurance that the Referendum in Switzerland, despite its manifest shortcomings and defects, has been a marked success. It is true that it has not realized the roseate anticipations of its more ardent advocates, but neither has it justified the gloomy forebodings of its bitterer opponents. In the main, however, it has accomplished the result for which it was orginally introduced. It has contributed to the enlightenment of public opinion and helped it to express itself; it has promoted intellectual integrity among both representatives and people and encouraged a better understanding between them; to the surprise of Radical and Catholics alike it has been conservative in its effects instead of revolutionary; and above everything else it has furthered the spread and maintenance of peace and justice. With such results as these to be in part set down to its credit the Referendum cannot but present a favorable aspect to the moral eye. Judged by its fruits it has done but comparatively little harm and aided in the achievement of much undoubted good.

It does not follow, however, as many authorities unite in reminding us, that because of its successes in Switzerland the Referendum in its Swiss form could be introduced with advantage into other countries. In social environments which were unprepared for it by usage and tradition it would no doubt produce more harm than good, while in the hands of a strongly partisan community it would be almost sure to be an instrument of evil. Neither is it true, on the other hand, that because of its success in Switzerland the Referendum can be fairly regarded as the only or even the chief means to be employed in correcting the evils of the Representative System. Large numbers of people, particularly in the Western States of our own Union, seem to have become possessed of the idea that if the Referendum and Initiative be but universally adopted and the people obtain the right of legislating for themselves the chief political evils of the day will be removed. But such a conclusion is far from being justified by the facts. Not only is the Referendum, even in Switzerland itself, an imperfect and fallible expedient, but something more than a mere

Digitized by Google

yes-and-no vote upon proposed legislation is required if the ends of political justice are to be subserved. M. Charles Benoist, for example, has proposed, as a means of meeting the present crisis, a more thorough and comprehensive organization of the national life. It is in short a juster and more adequate system of representation on which he rests his hope of political progress and security. Now that there is a crying need for the reorganization of the Representative System upon some fairer principle than the one in vogue at present there can be no smallest doubt. Certain sections of the community are unduly represented in House or Parliament while others fail almost altogether of any representation at all. But this is a problem the Referendum does not touch and cannot solve. Too much must not, therefore, be asked or expected of the Referendum. Not only have we no right to presume that because of its good results in one country it will be equally beneficial elsewhere, but we are also without warrant for the assumption that it is above all others the one thing needed to make our legislation what it ought to be.

We are not at present concerned with the expediency or inexpediency of introducing into this or any other country the Swiss form of Referendum. Neither are we primarily concerned with its political efficacy anywhere, but with its moral significance. The Referendum, or a measure for affording the people direct participation in the making of the law, has appeared in our modern world. In its more extreme form of application to the ordinary statute law it has operated successfully for a few brief decades and within the limits of a very small land. What then is the ethical significance of this political phenomenon? What is its moral meaning? Such is the ultimate question whose answer forms the conclusion of our present task.

And in beginning this answer it is to be noticed at once that the ethical significance of the Referendum is not to be measured by the sum of its small successes or by the size of the area within which it has been worked. It is universally admitted that Nazareth has had an ethical significance for the human race wholly out of proportion to its physical bulk or civic im-

Digitized by Google

portance. The same may be affirmed of the Referendum. In itself it is but an imperfect measure whose span of life has been short and whose sphere of operation small; but young as it is and few as have been its activities it is the sign or symptom of a momentous movement which both outgoes and dwarfs its own more modest proportions. And this movement, what is it? It is composed of those great spiritual forces which make for self-government, political justice and moral progress; the forces which are opening up into the consciousness of the sacredness of human life and its right to a political education: the consciousness of the responsibility of citizenship and its need of a juster judgment and more active participation in civic functions: the consciousness that as are the people so is the State, and hence that law and justice are not matters of moment to rulers and legislators alone but to the whole political body: the consciousness that law and justice are of the very essence of the spiritual life and that they issue in the last resort, not from the thunderous summit of some Sinai or from the lips of some favored lawgiver, but from the very depths of that common moral nature which is the possession and prerogative of man: the consciousness that if law and justice are ever to prevail and society redeem its moral promise, it can never be through the evolution of a few gifted experts alone but by the development of that common intelligence and conscience in which all people share. Of this great movement the Referendum is significantly symptomatic and its ethical importance subsists in the fact that it calls our attention to it. It brings our thoughts back to the people and insists upon the need of their political education. It is not enough that the people shall be governed and taught to obey. It is not enough that they be permitted to elect their own representatives who shall in all political matters act for them and in their stead. The political education of the people demands that they shall function themselves and take an active part in the construction of that great home of justice in which they and their descendants are to dwell.

There is much indeed that they must delegate to others, but there are certain functions they dare not renounce, just as there are certain moral impulses they dare not permit to perish. In

Digitized by Google

the interest of social progress I may delegate to my tailor the task of making my clothes and to my shoemaker the problem of fitting my stubborn foot. I consent to let the tailor and the shoemaker within me die in order that the statesman or the clergyman may live. And this I may do without impairing my effectiveness as a citizen or my character as a man. But there are also functions I cannot resign to others except at the cost of moral degeneration or enfeeblement. I dare not entrust my conscience to the keeping of the priest nor delegate my sense of justice to a representative. I dare not delegate to others my interest in the public weal or my responsibility as citizen to State and native land. All men are not born physicists or poets but all men are by nature, as Aristotle reminded us centuries ago, political animals. Law is not primarily a command impressed upon mankind from without, but a principle inherent in the very structure of the mind; and government plays an important role among the anarchies and tumults of the personal spirit as well as among the dissensions and disturbances of social groups. While, therefore, I may renounce my dreams of poesy or science without impairing character or manhood, I cannot delegate away my natural political functions without an injury to both. They are part and parcel of my very being and to grant a commission to others to discharge them in my stead is to become a slave or a recluse.

The more specific duties of certain political offices I must indeed assign to my more competent fellows; for not every man is called to be a policeman or a President any more than he is born to be a physicist or a poet. As a citizen of the State therefore I may assist in the delegation of official functions to my more highly gifted neighbors: the public acts of government I may in company with others require of the few. The official embodiment and expression of the common political life may then be entrusted to the delegates but not the life itself, for that life is the common birthright of us all. When therefore I have cast my vote for the required number of delegates, I have no right to bury myself in the bosom of my family or the details of my business and say to myself that now the polling is over it is the delegate's business to look after the State. The life of the State is every man's business because every man is

Digitized by Google

by nature a political being of whom, to be a man, a political life is required. That life, in the interests of the individual and State alike, demands development; its experience needs to be enriched, its judgment matured, its convictions ripened, its moral fibre strengthened, its activities increased. Its vigilance dares not be relaxed for a moment, for in that moment the public treasury is impoverished and the liberties of the people are curtailed or lost. The delegate is therefore a necessary feature of political government, but because he has ever been tempted to play the tyrant or the robber, he needs to be forever reminded of his responsibility to an intelligent and high minded people whose political life it is his duty to develop, not destroy. While therefore it is true that no man can do everything, it is equally true that there are certain common political duties which are required of us all, and which no one can forego without a personal injury to himself and a detriment to the nation at large. Hence it is that the political education of the people is essential to the welfare both of the individual and the State, and the Referendum is of great ethical significance in that it reminds us of it.

Furthermore it must be said that as the delegate or representative is an essential feature of the modern State, so is it also essential to her stability and health that the best and fittest of her citizens be chosen to fulfill her governmental duties. All men are not endowed with equal talents and abilities, while some are peculiarly qualified by technical knowledge and experience to occupy specific posts. It is also for the advantage of the whole body politic that these posts be theirs. In other words, in the highly differentiated structure of the modern State the services of the trained expert are urgently required.

Now it has been argued as against the Referendum that it would do away with the expert or the specialist. It has been said "this is the age of specialists and expert witnesses. The Referendum idea rests on the theory that all men are specialists in everything." In reply to this it may be flatly affirmed that the Referendum idea rests on nothing of the kind, but on the theory of the sovereignty of the people, and that its aim is not the silly and futile one of trying to turn all men into specialists but an effort, more or less rational as the case may be, to

Digitized by Google

effect the coöperation of the people with the specialist in the making of the law. Such a coöperation of the expert and the people is already to be found in the well-known institution of trial by jury; and just as the judge and the lawyers on the one hand and the jurymen on the other are expected to work together to the intent that justice may be done, so the Referendum contemplates the coöperation of constituents and representatives in legislative acts. Not then to abolish the well recognized differences in human ability nor to dispense with the inestimable services of the specialist is the Referendum proposed, but as a means of bringing both specialist and layman together for the promotion of social justice and the extension of political education. The people need the guidance and enlightenment which the knowledge of the experts can bestow, and the experts in their turn need to have their more highly technical wisdom corrected or modified by the oftentimes saner and more practical judgments of the people.

The need of coöperation, in matters political, between the people and the specialist is manifest moreover in many other ways; for the expert in theology or politics, be it remarked, bears a different relation to the people than the expert in surgery or navigation. The passengers upon an ocean liner have no advice to give the Captain that is worthy of his consideration, neither is the Captain called upon for his part to hold a public meeting in the cabin in order to ascertain the will and opinion of the passengers as to the navigation of the ship. And the rational ground for the divorce of the expert from the people in this particular instance is the fact that seamanship is the Captain's affair alone. The people on board have no part or lot in it. They do not share with the Captain either the seaman's life or the seaman's experience. There is no reason in the nature of things, therefore, why the passengers should cooperate in the navigation of the ship, for the blood of the navigator is not in their veins nor the eye of the navigator in their heads.

In matters of State on the other hand, as also in matters of religion, such is not the situation of affairs. Man is not a seaman by nature, but he is by nature a religious and political being. In these respects the people share with their leaders

OXFORD UNION SOCIETY
Digitized by Google

a common life: common interests, common problems, common tasks. The welfare of the State, as the welfare of the Church, is not the leaders' affair alone but the affair of the people as well; and if the people abdicate their political functions or the leaders usurp an illegitimate power the safety of political life and institutions is in peril. It is therefore because political life, as religious life, is a common possession and a common duty that the coöperation of expert and people is required in affairs of State. The failure to coöperate is a menace to the public weal. The safety of an ocean liner demands that the passengers shall place themselves without reserve in the keeping of the Captain and trust implicitly in his experience and skill. There can from the nature of the case be no coöperation whatever between him and them in navigation. In such a case the expert must reign supreme and absolute, for there is no forum of common experience in which they can meet and function.

But such a separation of expert and people in matters political or religious is fraught with peril and leads in the end to anarchy or death. In political as in religious life the expert and the people must coöperate, because it is a common task they have in hand and a common life they have to develop. The divorce of the one from the other has over and over again in the history of the world produced political disaster or disease. The expert suffers and the people suffer by their isolation from each other. The corruptest periods of the Church have been those in which the theological expert reigned supreme and arrogated to himself the proud assumption that religion was wholly or chiefly his concern; whereas the leaders who have done most for human development have been those who, in company with the people, have fought for the common cause of religious and political freedom. The divorce of expert and people in matters political as in matters religious works therefore harm to both. It works harm to the expert by developing all those haughty and corrupt affections which lead to tyranny, luxury and greed. It works harm to the people by depriving them of those inherent rights of function whose loss means moral and political enfeeblement. From 1620 to 1768 the Jesuits held sway in the Middle Parana region of the coun-

Digitized by Google

try of Paraguay. Here they gathered together within their little realm as many as a hundred and forty thousand souls. Their form of Government was a divine paternalism, and in accordance with its principles they dispensed to a submissive folk the treasures of the Gospel and the Law. In 1768 these Jesuits were expelled, and the people whom they had governed after the manner of the expert lapsed into savagery. A century and a half of benevolent paternalism had left these people still children in political and religious life. They had been taught to obey but not to function as free and responsible beings, and so, with the removal of their trusted leaders, they reverted to their primitive estate. The land, too, that was once so populous and cultivated is now "a silent wilderness, where the solitary traveler occasionally stumbles upon the picturesque ruins of some Christian Church."

Such is the practical as well as the logical consequence of expert rule. Hence the experts dare not govern alone and the people dare not let them. "In this country of ours," said President Roosevelt the other day, "the average citizen has got to devote a good deal of thought and time to the affairs of the State as a whole or those affairs are going to go backward." So does our Chief Executive express the expert's need of popular coöperation in political affairs. And it is a need the people ought to feel and strive to satisfy, for man is by nature a political being: political life is his birthright, and he dare not be so indifferent to its wondrous worth as to barter it away to any political Jacob for a poor mess of pottage and benevolent fraternalism.

The source of all law is the mind of man and the public weal is every man's concern. Therefore is the education of the mind in the evolution of law and of the will in the fulfilment of it a paramount and pressing duty. So is it once more apparent that the political education of the people is essential to the welfare of individual and State, and the Referendum is of profound ethical significance in that it reminds us of it.

LANGDON C. STEWARDSON.

LEHIGH UNIVERSITY.

Digitized by Google

SOME CONSIDERATIONS RELATING TO HUMAN IMMORTALITY.

I DO not propose in this paper to offer any arguments in favor of the positive assertion that men are immortal. I believe that such arguments exist, and that, in spite of the difficulty and obscurity of the subject, they are of sufficient strength to justify a belief in our immortality.* But to expound these arguments would require an elaborate and bulky treatise of technical metaphysics, for they could only be based on a demonstration of some idealist theory of the fundamental nature of reality. My present design is merely to consider some arguments against immortality, which have been based on certain facts of ordinary observation, and certain results of physical science. I shall endeavor to show that these are invalid, and that the presumption against immortality, which they have produced in many people, should be discarded.

It is better to speak of the immortality of the self, or of man, than of the immortality of the soul. The latter phrase suggests untenable views. For, in speaking of the identity of a man during different periods of his bodily life, we do not usually say that he is the same soul, but the same self, or the same man. And to use a different word when we are discussing the prolongation of that identity after death, calls up the idea of an identity less perfect than that which lasts through a bodily life. The form in which the question is put thus implies that the answer is to be in some degree negative—that a man is not *as much* himself after death, as he is before it, even if something escapes from complete destruction.

Moreover, it is unfortunately customary to say that a man *has* a soul, not that he *is* one. Now if our question is put in the form, "has man an immortal soul?" an affirmative answer would be absurd. So far as it would mean anything, it would mean that the man himself was the body, or something which died with the body,—at any rate was not immortal,—and that

Cf. My "Studies in Hegelian Cosmology," chap. ii.

Digitized by Google

something, not himself, which he owned during life, was set free at his death to continue existing on its own account. For these reasons it seems better not to use the word soul, and to put our question in the form "are men immortal?"

What reasons have we for supposing that our existence is only temporary? I see around me bodies which behave so like my own that I conclude that they are related to other conscious selves in the same way that my body is related to myself. But from time to time I see one of these bodies cease to behave in this way, and become motionless, unless moved from outside. Shortly afterwards this body dissolves into its constituent parts. Its form and identity as a body are completely destroyed. My own experience, and that of others, in the past, leads me to the conclusion that the same thing will happen in the future to every body now existing, including my own.

How does this affect the question of my existence? It is clear that if I am a mere effect of my body—a form of its activity—I shall cease when the body ceases. And it is also clear that, if I could not exist without this particular body, then the destruction of the body will be a sign that I have ceased to exist.

But, besides death, there is another characteristic of nature which tends to make us doubt our immortality. Of all the things around us, from a pebble to a solar system, science tells us that they are transitory. Each of them arose out of something else, each of them will pass away into something else. What is a man that he should be exempt from this universal law?

Thus we have three questions to consider. (1) Is my self an activity of my body? (2) Is my present body an essential condition of the existence of my self? (3) Is there any reason to suppose that my self does not share the transitory character which I recognize in all the material objects around me?

With regard to the first of these questions, it is certain, to begin with, that my body influences my self much and constantly. A large part of my mental life is made up of sensations. Sensations are continually being produced in me as a result of changes in the sense-organs of my body, and, as far as we know, they are never produced in me in any other way.

Digitized by Google

And the course of my thoughts and emotions can be profoundly affected by the state of my body. If my body gets no food for twenty-four hours, they will be affected one way. If I introduce whiskey or opium into it, they will be affected another way. If my body is very fatigued, the ordinary current of my mental life will be entirely suspended in profound sleep, or completely broken by dreams. If any of these processes is carried far enough, my body dies, and I cease to have any relation to it for the future, which is certainly an important event for me, whether I survive it or not.

The world has long been certain that the body acts on the mind. The knowledge must be, at least, as old as drunkenness. But it is equally certain that the mind acts on the body. My limbs, on many occasions, move according to my will. And the normal course of the body can be altered by the mind, as much as the normal course of the mind can be altered by the body. Grief, or fear, or anger can produce bodily illness, and even death.

Now each of these groups of phenomena—the effects of body on mind and of mind on body—could be explained on the hypothesis that the self and the body were two separate realities, neither of which was the mere product of the other, though each affected the other and caused changes in it. And it might be thought that this would be the most natural conclusion to come to, since the action appears to be reciprocal—mind acting on body as much as body acts on mind.

There is always, however, a very strong tendency to adopt the view that the self is a mere activity of the body—or at any rate to hold that the only escape from this view lies in believing some form of Revealed Religion which denies it. The cause of this tendency is, in the first place, the incomplete nature of the explanation which would be furnished by the recognition of the self and its body as independent realities.* All ultimate explanation endeavors to reduce the universe to a unity. The self is spirit, the body is matter. Spirit and matter, taken as

*By "independent" I do not mean here isolated, or unconnected realities, but such as stand on an equal footing, so that, though each is connected with the other, neither is subordinated to the other.

Digitized by Google

two independent realities, are quite heterogeneous in their nature, and to take them thus divides the universe into two parts which have no real unity with one another, and whose connection can only be taken as an unsolved problem, or a miracle. Such a connection as this is not the reasoned and systematic unity which satisfies our desire for explanation, and we therefore endeavor to find a point of view from which we may regard spirit and matter as essentially the same.

This is a metaphysical inquiry, and demands that we should go beneath the surface. In particular it demands that we should not only consider the content of our knowledge, but should also ask what knowledge is, and what is involved in our having it at all. If we neglect this, and only consider the knowledge presented to us in science and common-sense, without going deeper, we are very naturally led to the conclusion that matter is the only reality, and that what we have called spirit is nothing more than one of the activities which characterize matter when it is in the special form of a human body. (It is immaterial for our present purpose whether the adherents of this view suppose matter to exist as a substance, to which these activities belong, or whether they say that the activities *are* the matter. The essential point is that the spiritual is in either case reduced to a temporary form of an activity whose fundamental nature is non-spiritual. Indeed the two alternatives really mean the same, although the second is sometimes put forward as a great improvement on the first.)

There are several reasons why a mind that does not reflect deeply should give this preference to matter. One of the facts which is impressed most deeply on every man is that the nature of matter does not depend on his will. I cannot, by my mere choice, make the stone which I see and touch into bread. Nay, however passionately I may desire that it should be bread, however serious the consequences to myself and others of its remaining a stone, a stone it remains. The nature of matter does not depend on my will. And from this it is an easy step to the assertion that the existence of matter is independent of myself. But the two propositions are not really identical, and, as we shall see further on, the second is not true.

Digitized by Google

Moreover, if we regarded matter and spirit as two separate realities, matter would appear far the stronger. Spirit we only know in the form of separate individuals, set in the world of matter. No one human spirit has ever, as far as we know, been open to observation for much more than a hundred years, and the lower animals only slightly exceed this limit. Matter forms one vast system. History assures us it has existed for thousands of years. Science extends the period to millions. Man can move matter, but we know that he cannot destroy it. On the other hand, a very slight change in matter will, at any rate, banish any spirit from the sphere in which we can observe it. The gradual cooling of the earth, an absurdly trivial episode in astronomy, will put an end to the only conditions under which, as far as our observation goes, it is possible for spirits to exist. Since spirit, then, appears so much weaker than matter when they are taken separately, is it strange that, when an attempt is made to reduce one to the other, it is spirit that is called on to give way?

If spirit is to be conceived as a product of matter, that is equivalent to saying that what we have supposed to be a separate reality called spirit is nothing more than one particular form of the activity of matter,—in other words, a way in which matter behaves under certain circumstances. This view is rendered more plausible by the fact that the activity of matter does take many different forms. The same energy, science informs us, which sometimes shows itself as heat, at other times shows itself as motion, or, again, as electricity. And this same energy, it is asserted, transforms itself under other circumstances,—when it is found in a human body—into thought, will, and emotion. Certainly, it is admitted, thought, will and emotion are not very like heat, motion and electricity. But then, heat, motion and electricity are not very like one another. And, if they can all be reduced to this common unity, why should not the forms of consciousness share the same fate?

All these considerations rest, it will be seen, on the proposition that matter can exist independently of spirit. For if this were not so, it would obviously be absurd to explain away the separate reality of spirit by making it one of the temporary

Digitized by Google

forms which the activity of matter takes. Now rather deeper inquiry will, I think, show us that matter is not independent of spirit, that, on the contrary, matter is a product of which the mind which observes it is one of the causes, and which, therefore, has no meaning except in relation to spirit. If this is the case it will be impossible to consider the self as an activity of its body.

If we inquire into our conception of matter, we shall find that one element in it is made up of some of our sensations. The sensations of hearing, taste, and smell do not form part of our conception of matter. Sounds, tastes, and odors we hold to be caused in us by matter, but not to exist in the matter itself. And the same position is assigned to sensations of color. But the shapes and movements which we perceive by sight and touch, and the resistances which we perceive by touch,* are attributed to the matter itself. We say that all matter is solid, and offers resistance to any other matter which attempts to penetrate it. And we say that matter is grouped into material objects which have definite sizes and shapes, and which move at different rates in different directions.

Our conception of matter, then, contains sensations of sight and touch. But what are sensations? Can they be qualities of matter? Certainly not. A sensation is an act of consciousness. To talk of an unconscious being as seeing or feeling anything is absurd. Sensations, therefore, cannot be constituents of matter, if matter is something which can exist independently of consciousness.

"But," it may be answered, "no one asserted that the sensations were constituents of matter. The truth is that matter has these qualities, which are known to us in our sensations, but which exist in the matter as qualities which are not sensations." This can be said, but does it mean anything? Do extension,

*This statement is not strictly accurate as it stands. The *mere* sensations of sight and touch, taken by themselves, would not make us aware of shapes, movements and resistances. But it would take us too far out of our way to consider how far such perceptions involve ideas as well as sensations. And it is sufficient for our present purpose that the sensations also are involved—that without the sense of sight and touch we could never know extension, motion, or solidity.

Digitized by Google

motion, solidity, mean anything if we consider them without reference to the sensations of some conscious being? Have we any conception of solidity which does not involve our sensation of resistance? Or can we imagine what a triangular body, or a spiral movement would be like, if we eliminated all consideration of how they would look or feel to a conscious being who could touch them? These questions must be answered in the negative. We have nothing to go on but the sensation, and in it the two sides—what is felt and the fact that it is felt—are indissolubly united. It is only a confusion of thought which makes us imagine that they can be separated, and suppose that a thing can have the qualities independent of our perception of them.

If this is the case spirit cannot be a mere activity of matter. For, if it were a mere activity of matter, it could be explained in terms of matter. Matter would explain both itself and spirit. But so far is this from being the case that we can only explain matter in terms of spirit. Matter apart from spirit is meaningless.

This result is sometimes obscured to us by the apparently passive character of sensations. Our will can make no direct alteration in them. We can only receive them as they come. And this suggests that we are merely passive in sensation, and that our minds, like a mirror, only reflect a reality outside them. It requires a more careful analysis to enable us to perceive that the qualities asserted to be reflected are such as are meaningless apart from the mirror, and cannot, therefore, exist in outside realities.

It is sometimes said, that matter exists, apart from our perception of it, as the potentiality of such perception. But to exist in potentiality means not to exist in reality. When we say that anything now exists potentially, we mean that it does *not* exist now, but that it will or might exist in the future, under certain circumstances. And to say that matter can exist apart from consciousness, as the potentiality of conscious perceptions, is just to say that it does not exist apart from consciousness, and that, if it does exist, it will be in relation to consciousness. If, therefore, we say that matter apart from spirit

Digitized by Google

is a potentiality it is impossible that spirit should be a transitory result of matter. For spirit can only be a result of something real, and if matter apart from spirit is only a potentiality, then it is not real.

Sensations alone, however, do not make up our conception of matter. There is another element which may be detected by analysis in it, and this element also, we shall see, is meaningless except in relation to spirit. This element is ideas or relations.

This element is as essential as the other. Indeed neither can exist without the other. For we could not be conscious of our sensations at all, if they were not joined into some sort of system by ideas. A consciousness composed of unrelated sensations would not only be chaotic, but non-existent. But we need not trouble about this now. For, even if we could be conscious of sensations without ideas, it is quite certain that sensations without ideas could never give us the conception of matter which we have in science, and which, if spirit were the result of matter, would be the fundamental conception of the whole of reality.

The ideas which are contained in the conception of matter are numerous. It will be sufficient to take two, Substantiality and Causality.

When I observe an orange, I am conscious, perhaps, of its shape by sight, of its hardness by touch, and of its odor by smell. I say all these qualities belong to the *same* orange. That is to say, I say that it has the shape and solidity, and that it causes the smell in me. Or, again, I have these sensations now, I walk away and do not have them, I return and have them again, and I say that I see the *same* orange now that I saw five minutes ago.

How does this sameness come in? Is it a sensation? Certainly not. For it tells us of a certain identity between three sensations of different senses,—namely, that they are all referred to the same matter. And no sensation could tell us this, since it has no reference to any sense but its own. How could we see, touch or smell the identity of the matter to which the shape, the solidity and the odor are to be referred? Or

Digitized by Google

could we hear it or taste it? And the sameness in the second case is, with equal certainty, not a sensation. For in this case we say that past sensations, which no longer exist, are to be referred to the same object as our present sensations. Now sensations only tell us of the present. They cannot tell us of a relation between the present and the past. How could we see or touch a relation between present sights and feelings and other sights and feelings which have ceased to exist?

Substantiality, then, is not due to sensation. It is an idea, springing not from the senses but from the reason. It is due, therefore, to the activity of the mind. And, at the same time, it forms an essential part of the conception of matter. For that conception gives matter qualities which are perceived by two separate senses, and gives it also the power to awake in us the sensations of the other senses. It therefore involves the reference of different sensations to the same matter. And, again, the conception of a world of matter involves some identity of the matter through time. We have to be able to say, for example, that matter can remain the same though its form be changed. And this, too, involves Substantiality, since we have to refer successive sensations to the same matter.

Let us now consider Causality. This cannot, any more than substantiality, be a sensation. Our senses, no doubt, can give us two sensations in succession, though it does not follow that the senses alone would render us conscious that they were in succession. But causality involves not only that B follows A, but that B is there *because* A was there before it, and that B would not have been there without A. Now this is not a matter for the senses. Can we *see* that the smoke which is before us would not be there if there had been no fire? We see what is, but we cannot see what is not, or what might have been. If we saw causality, then causality like all other objects of sight, must be an extended and colored surface, which it is not. Nor would it be more possible to hear, or touch, or smell, or taste it.

Causality, then, like substantiality, is not a sensation but an idea. Whenever we say that A is the cause of B, the mind makes a judgment, and it is only through such judgment that

Digitized by Google

we get the idea of causality at all. If the mind confined itself to receiving what the sensations bring it, causality would be unknown to it. And the conception of matter would be meaningless if causality were withdrawn. If the movement of one piece of matter did not cause the movement of another, if matter did not cause sensations in us, the whole of science would be upset. And with it would go all our reasons for believing in matter, since the justification of our belief in matter is the success of science in explaining the world by means of it. In particular, the attempt to explain spirit as a form of the activity of matter clearly implies causality. For it explains the transformation of activity into the form of consciousness as due to the particular conditions which it meets with in the human body, and thus makes those circumstances the cause of the transformation.

It is sufficient for our object to have pointed out that these two ideas are involved in the conception of matter. They do not stand alone. Kant and Hegel have shown how many ideas are involved in even the simplest experience, and how meaningless sensation becomes, if we endeavor to take it in abstraction from all ideas. Without going further, we have done enough to prove that matter cannot exist independently of spirit. For of the two elements into which our conception of matter can be analyzed, one—our sensations—has no meaning for us apart from a perceiving mind, and the other—our ideas—is produced by an act of the mind.

And we have thus, I think, proved our original contention that the self cannot be one of the activities of its own body. If the self was, as this theory would require it to be, merely a way in which matter behaved under certain circumstances, it would be possible to explain the self satisfactorily in terms of matter. And it would be possible to imagine a state of things in which those circumstances, which determine the activity of matter to take the form of spirit, occurred nowhere in the universe, which would then be a universe of matter without any consciousness. But so far is this from being the case that we can, as we now see, only explain matter in terms of a conscious self, and to talk of matter existing without consciousness

Digitized by Google

is simply unmeaning. So far is matter from being the sole reality, of which the self is only a form, that, taken by itself, it is not a reality at all. It is something which is known by the self, and which is meaningless apart from the self's knowledge of it.

This may be put in another way. If my self is one of the activities of my body, then, as my body only exists in the knowledge of some conscious being, my self must be a product of some piece of knowledge. It is clearly absurd to suppose that I am the product of my body, as my body is known to myself, for then I should be the product of an event in my own history. But it is equally impossible that any self should be one of the activities of its own body as perceived by another self. For in that case the self A would be the product of an event in the history of another self B. But how about B? By the same rule it also will have to be the product of an event in the history of another self. If this self is A, the absurdity recurs in an aggravated form. For then A would be the product of an event which happened in a self which was itself the product of A. But if we make B the product of an event in the history of a third self C, the same question will arise about C, and so on without end. If a self could only be explained as the activity of its body, and the body only as what is known by a self, there could be no reality anywhere—not in selves, which are only transitory actions of their bodies, nor in bodies which are only a part of the content of a self. And so we are brought back to the conclusion that the self cannot be an activity of its body.

I may be thought to have dwelt unnecessarily on this last point. Surely, it may be said, the theory that the self is an activity of the body stands and falls with the theory of the independent existence of matter. Surely no one would maintain for a moment that the body only existed for spirit, and at the same time that spirit was an activity of the body. Yet both of these propositions have been maintained at once by writers whose metaphysics consisted in a misapplication of the results of science. Men of great ability have maintained that what we call matter is nothing but our thoughts and sensations, and.

Digitized by Google

at the same time, that our thoughts and sensations are nothing but an activity of our brains. Since my brains are part of the world of matter, this amounts to an assertion that some of my sensations are the causes of themselves and of all the other sensations. And, since the cause is prior to the effect, the brain must exist before it can cause sensations. From which again it would follow that some of my sensations (namely the brain) existed before any of them did. But it is unnecessary to pursue this contradiction further.

Before passing on, it is to be noticed that, when I say that the world of matter I know is nothing but a piece of my knowledge, of which my mind is one of the causes, I do not say that it is merely capricious and only personal. On the contrary it is regular, self-consistent, and independent of my choice, so that it is to be considered as real in my knowledge, though not as real apart from my knowledge of it.

Nor do I wish to suggest that analysis of my conception of matter would bring me to the belief that I was the only reality in the universe. On the contrary, while matter is meaningless if it is attempted to give it an existence independent of myself, it would, on the other hand, be impossible to account for its nature if I were the only reality in the universe. I have every reason to believe that there is other reality besides myself. Only, what ever this reality is, it is *not* the matter which I observe in every-day life, and which science deals with.

Now the existence of reality outside me does not affect our conclusions. The fact that I am not alone in the universe does not give the slightest presumption against our immortality. The supposed independent existence of matter side by side with me *did* give a certain presumption against my immortality. For, taking matter as independent of me, there was some *prima facie* reason to suspect that I was only an activity of my body, and in that case I should certainly cease when it died. But my body is only matter. And neither my body nor its death can exist except as events in some mind. And this, as we have seen, makes it impossible that I should be an activity of my body, and removes one reason for supposing that I should be destroyed by its death.

Digitized by Google

We must now pass on to our second question. My self cannot be a form of the activity of my body. But it is still possible that the nature of my self makes the possession of my present body essential to it. Granted that the body could not exist except for knowledge, it may be that the knowledge of my body, by my self or other selves, is a necessary condition of the existence of myself. In that case it would be an inevitable inference that when my body dissolves, and ceases to be known as a body at all, my self must have ceased also. If A, whenever it exists, is inevitably accomplished by B, then the cessation of B is a sure sign that A must have ceased also.

What evidence is there in favor of this view? In the first place, while we have plenty of experience of selves who possess bodies, we have no trustworthy experience of selves who exist without bodies, or after their bodies have ceased to exist. (The significance of ghost-stories in this respect will be considered later.) Besides this, the existence of a self seems to involve the experience of sensations. Without them, the self would have no material for thought, will or feeling, and it is only in thought, will and feeling that the self exists. Now there seems good reason to suppose that sensations never occur in the mind without some corresponding modification of the body. This is certainly the case with normal sensations. And even if the evidence for clairvoyance and thought-transference were beyond dispute, it could never prove the possibility of sensation without bodily accompaniments. For it could not exclude—indeed, it seems rather to suggest—the existence of bodily accompaniments of an obscure and unusual sort.

But, after all, these considerations would, at the most, go to show that *some* body was necessary to my self, and not that its present body was necessary. Have we *now* any reason to suppose that the death of the body would indicate anything more than that the self had transferred its manifestations to a new body, and had, therefore, passed from the knowledge of the survivors, who had only known it through the old body? The apparent improbability of this lies, I think, simply in our instinctive recurrence to the theory that the self is an activity of the body. In that case, no doubt, it would be impossible that

Digitized by Google

it should successively be connected with two bodies. But that theory we have seen to be untenable. The most that a body can be is an essential accompaniment of the self. And then the supposition that the self has found another body would fit the facts quite as well, as the supposition that the self has ceased to exist.

There seems no reason why such a change should not be instantaneous. But even if it were not so, no additional difficulty would be created. No doubt, if a body is essential to the action of a self, the self would be in a state of suspended animation in the interval between its possession of its two bodies —a state which we might almost call one of temporary non-existence. But this is nothing more than what happens, as far as we can observe, in every case of dreamless sleep. During such a sleep the self, so far as we know, is unconscious,—as unconscious as it could be without a body. And yet this does not prevent its being the same man who went to sleep and woke up again. Why should the difficulty be greater in a change of bodies?

And, after all, have we any reason to suppose that a body is essential to a self? If we consider more closely, we shall, I think, see that the facts before us only support a very different proposition—namely, that, *while a self has a body,* that body is essentially connected with the self's mental life.

For example, no self can be conceived as conscious unless we conceive it as with sufficient *data* for its mental activity. The work of the mind is to combine and connect, and for these activities some material is required. This material is only given, as far as our observation can go, in the form of sensations, and sensations again, as far as our observation goes, seem invariably connected with changes in a body. But it does not follow, because a self which has a body cannot get its *data* except in connection with that body, that it would be impossible for a self without a body to get *data* in some other way. It may be just the existence of the body which makes these other ways impossible at present. If a man is shut up in a house, the transparency of the windows is an essential condition of his seeing the sky. But it would not be prudent to infer

Digitized by Google

that, if he walked out of the house, he could not see the sky because there was no longer any glass through which he might see it.

With regard to the connection of the brain with thought, the chief evidence for it appears to be that diseases or mutilations of the brain affect the course of thought. But this does not prove that, even while a man has a brain, his thoughts are directly connected with it. Many things are capable of disturbing thought, which are not essential to its existence. For example, a sufficiently severe attack of tooth-ache or gout may render all consecutive abstract thought impossible. But if the tooth was extracted, or the toe amputated, we should still be able to think. And, in the same way, the fact that an abnormal state of the brain may affect our thoughts, does not prove that the normal states of the brain are necessary for thought.

And, even if the brain is essential to thought while we have bodies, it would not follow that, when we ceased to have brains we could not think without them. The same argument applies here as with the organs of sense. It would be quite possible that a self which ceased to have a body would be able to think without one, and that its present inability to think except in connection with the body was a limitation which the presence of the body itself imposed.

We have now considered the two arguments against the immortality of the self which spring from the death of the body. But we have said nothing on the evidence, or asserted evidence, which is offered by stories of the ghosts of the dead. Such stories, however numerous and well-authenticated, could never give us any positive evidence that the self was eternal. At the most they could prove that it survived its body for a few centuries. But indirectly the evidence might be of considerable weight. For they might possibly prove that the self survived the death of its body. Now the death of its body is by far the strongest reason that we have for doubting the self's immortality. And if the appearances of ghosts could prove that this reason had no weight, they would undoubtedly have greatly strengthened, though only indirectly, the theory that the self is immortal.

Digitized by Google

Much of the evidence offered on this subject is doubtless utterly untrustworthy. But there is a good deal which investigation has failed to break down. And there is much to be said in support of the view that after all deductions have been made for fraud, error, and coincidence, there is still a sufficient residuum to justify a belief in apparitions of the dead.

But, even if this were admitted, I do not think that we should be much nearer to a belief in immortality. The most that the evidence could ever make us do, it appears to me, would be to admit that there was some causal connection between the dead person and the apparition which was experienced after his death. But this would not prove that he existed after his death. A chain of effects may exist long after its original cause is destroyed. Chatham may be one of the chief causes of the pride which England excites in an Englishman to-day, but this proves nothing as to Chatham's present existence. And, as far as I know, all stories of apparitions would be equally explained by the theory that a man might before his death initiate a chain of circumstances which would cause his apparition to appear, after his death, under certain conditions, to men still alive.

This theory may appear strained. But when we consider the enormous weight of negative evidence which would have to be met by any attempt to prove, on experimental grounds, that the self could survive its body, we may doubt if it is as improbable as the alternative theory that the apparitions prove the existence of man after death. The fact is that, if we once admit the independent existence of matter, the presumption that the self is a form of the activity of its body is almost overwhelming, and almost any hypothesis which is compatible with this becomes more probable than any hypothesis which contradicts it. On the other hand, if we deny the independent existence of matter, the proof of immortality from apparitions is less antecedently improbable. But it is still not very strong. And it is now unimportant. For, as we saw above, the presumption that the death of the body destroys the self vanishes with the idea of the independent existence of matter. And it is only this presumption which apparitions could, in any case, remove.

Digitized by Google

We come now to the third question. Is there any reason to suppose that my self does not share the transitory character which I recognize in all the material objects around me?

What exactly is this transitory character? When science says that a material object—a planet, or a human body—ceases to exist, what does it mean? Does it mean that anything is annihilated? No, that is exactly what it does not mean. It means that units, which were combined in a certain way, are now combined otherwise. The form has changed. But everything which was there before is there now.

The material universe can be reduced, according to science, to atoms and energy—according to some views to energy alone. Everything else is only some combination or form of these primal realities. Now science does not tell us of the destruction of atoms. They are asserted on the contrary, to be permanent, and all change is accounted for by changes in their combinations. And the foundation of all arguments about energy is that the amount of energy remains the same, however varying may be its forms.

We need not inquire whether this distinction between an unchanging matter and a changing form can have more than practical and approximate correctness. It is sufficient to notice that the analogy of science—whatever weight may be attached to it,—only gives us reason to suppose combinations transitory. Units, on the contrary, which are not themselves combinations, science treats as permanent.

Is the self a combination? It certainly resembles a combination in one respect, for it is differentiated, and contains a plurality. At the same moment, to take simple instances, we can see a table and a chair; we can desire simultaneously food and revenge; and we can experience simultaneously anger and vanity. But it does not follow from this that a self is a combination. For if a whole is a combination it means that it is built up of parts which could exist without being combined in that way, while the combination could not exist without them. If the bricks of a wall, for instance, were destroyed, the wall would be destroyed too. But the wall might be destroyed by being taken to pieces, and the bricks would remain unchanged.

Digitized by Google

In this way science reduces all objects to atoms or energy in various forms. The objects depend on the atoms or energy, but this is not reciprocal. For the atoms and energy are regarded as still existing when the objects are broken up.

Do the parts of the self stand in this relation to it? Can I conceive my thoughts, my volitions, my emotions, existing isolated, or in new combinations when my self had ceased to exist? The words are unmeaning. We cannot conceive a thought, a volition, or an emotion existing outside of self. Nor is there any meaning in saying that the same thought which was once part of my mind could afterwards be part of somebody else's. The self, we must say, is complex, but not a compound. It has parts, but it is not built up out of them. For, while it depends on them, they just as much depend on it. It could not exist apart from them, but, on the other hand, it is quite as impossible for them to exist apart from it.

The self, therefore, cannot cease by the separation of its parts. For its parts only exist as united in it, and therefore could not separate from it. If it did cease to exist, it could only be by annihilation. It is not only that the form would have changed, but the form and content alike would have perished.

Now there is no analogy in science to suggest the probability of this. For science, as we have seen, while treating all combinations as changeable, assumes as fundamental the persistence of the units of those combinations. This, indeed, does not give us any safe analogy for the persistence of the self. In the first place there is reason to doubt the absolute validity of the distinction between matter and form, which science finds it convenient to make. And, in the second place, the difference between an atom and a self is too great for an analogy from one to the other ever to be very conclusive. But at any rate science gives no analogy against us. For it treats nothing but combinations as perishable, and a self is not a combination.

All this, as I said at the beginning of this paper, still leaves us very far from a positive assertion of immortality. Granting that the death of the body is no argument for the destruction of the self, and granting that the self cannot be decom-

Digitized by Google

posed into its constituents, it is still quite possible that the self should not be immortal. And this view has been held in many systems of idealism. It may, for example, be held that finite individuals only exist to carry out some divine purpose, and that when no longer required for this, their existence may cease. This was Lotze's view. Or again, it may be maintained that there is something contradictory in the idea of a self, which prevents us from regarding it as an adequate expression of reality, and that therefore there is no reason to suppose that any particular self shares the eternity which is characteristic of true reality.

To meet such doubts as these it would be necessary to construct a complete metaphysical system. We should have to determine what was the general nature of all reality, and whether that nature involved the existence of finite selves. And if in this way we reached the conclusion that the existence of finite selves was eternally necessary, the question would arise whether each self was eternal, or whether, on the other hand, there was an unending succession of transitory selves. All that I have endeavored to do here has been to show that the more obvious arguments against immortality—those which have most weight with most people—have no validity.

In spite of all arguments however, the idea that the self cannot be immortal continually returns to us. Reflection may drive it away, but in unreflective moments it establishes itself again. For the purposes of ordinary life we are compelled to take matter as an independent reality. Whenever we forget that this is only a practically convenient inaccuracy, and take it as an absolute truth, the suggestion that the self is only an activity of matter appears almost irresistible. And we are so accustomed, when dealing with matter, to treat every complex as a dissoluble compound, that we are continually falling back on the supposition that the self also must be a compound, since it is complex.

The opinion that a belief in immortality is logically indefensible gains strength, paradoxical as it may seem, from the very fact that most of the western world desire that the belief may be true. It is certain that many people do believe it only

Digitized by Google

because they wish it to be true, their desires misleading their judgment. And there is a tendency, illogical but not unnatural, to conclude from this that there can be no reasons which would resist a more impartial scrutiny. And, on a similar principle, the almost unanimous acquiescence of Revealed Religions in the belief has discredited it in the eyes of many of those who hold none of those religions. The only way to escape from these negative presumptions seems to lie in metaphysical considerations. Nor is it, perhaps, very surprising that no other method should be adequate for the determination of a question so strictly metaphysical.

J. Ellis McTaggart.

Trinity College, Cambridge.

MARRIAGE AS AN ECONOMIC INSTITUTION.

Commercial views of marriage are justly deprecated nowadays in opinion, if not in practice, by the majority of thoughtful men. Yet there is a sense in which these views would give rise to greater mental refinement and higher moral standards than we derive from the idea that marriages are made in heaven. That this idea is a false one, the Bible, by which many of us wish to be guided, explicitly teaches us. The founder of the most spiritual religion which has ever educated the world, expressly states that marriage is earthly, both in its origin and its work. There ought not to be anything in this teaching which shocks or disgusts or disappoints us. We shall only, indeed, have to examine it closely, and we shall find that our high-soaring visions of marriage imply not a little mistaken sentiment, while the doctrine of our great wholesome-minded Teacher is both sound and sublime. The greatest merit of this, as of all his doctrines, is, that it is adapted to the needs of men, as on the one hand material, and on the other spiritual, beings. It allows for the fact that so long as spiritual beings are upon the earth, they have not progressed beyond the material stage of their existence and that the conditions of the school of the senses present natural educational opportunities, of which every

Digitized by Google

man must avail himself if he would develop normally and continuously. If we do not grasp this healthy doctrine, we are in great danger of cultivating a premature spirituality which takes the form of sentimentalism and which, therefore, involves much that is unpractical and even unwholesome.

When we come to consider how our views of marriage may be brought into line with the working ideals which guide our actions day by day, we find that all worldly transactions are made in accordance with a law of demand and supply and that marriage is no exception to the rule. Roughly and honestly speaking, it is a matter of buying and selling. We have grown so squeamish and superfine that we have come to think that marriage treated as a commercial transaction ought to be ranked among the customs of savages. But if we will be honest with ourselves, we shall see that these customs have a sound basis of principle which civilized men must appropriate and develop, rather than despise and neglect, if they would make marriage quite satisfactory as an economic institution.

The problem as to how the rights of the purchaser in this civic transaction are to be secured, centres round that of the position and training of women. Their duties as wives are two in number—the making of a home and the rearing of citizens for the State. The economic problem now resolves itself into a question of the training of housewives and mothers. The topic is a hackneyed one, for it is now fifty years since Mr. Herbert Spencer did the work of a voice crying in the wilderness for this culpably neglected branch of education and declared it to be of such great importance, not only for domestic, but also for national life, that it might be considered as no mere department of education, but as all-inclusive and supreme, in the sense that it marks out the goal of human training and to a certain extent shadows forth the principles on which that training should proceed. But those who have hitherto attacked the question have gone to work in too narrow and materialistic a spirit. The consequence is that very few steps have been taken towards a practical solution of its difficulties, and those movements and institutions which have been started for the purpose have attracted sympathizers whose numbers are ridi-

Digitized by Google

culously small, considering the universality of the interests which are involved. Before any such schemes will be successful, our people will have to possess education much higher and culture much broader than the present conditions of society allow them to enjoy. In England at least, we have advanced to the dangerous and misty borderland which divides a people unconsciously taught by nature from one which is civilized by the elaborately wrought creations of art. The crisis is regarded as very serious by many thinkers, one of whom sets forth the situation thus—"Divided from the healthy influences of nature and of a simple economy, nothing can reclaim us now but machinery, organization, definite interaction, common effort, directed not merely to force expansion at the extremes, but to check corruption at the core—not solely to accumulate means of living, but to restore a value to life." That one of the dangers which form part of what this writer calls "The White Peril," is the estimation in which marriage is held, no one can doubt who has studied the various prophecies which have lately been uttered in certain quarters, to the effect that monogamy may in the future be no longer an honored institution among us. Evidently marriage must come to be the result of conviction and of high purpose, rather than of necessity or social convention, if it is to make for progress in the time to come. Custom and instinct must not be our guides in this matter. We must be cultured enough to make the interests of civilization our interests, and then we shall cease to be animals even though we lead an earthly life, and shall be capable of forming those ancient ideals of civic virtue and national zeal, which in artistic Athens subordinated the individual to the state without suppressing his individuality. The motives which lead men to marry in the present day are much too personal. We have derived our views of love between the sexes from the half-penny paper and the six-shilling novel, not from the broad-minded and human-hearted prophet of whom Lowell was the representative when he said,

> "That love for one from which there doth not spring
> Wide love for all, is but a worthless thing."

The evil of the narrower view is that marriage comes to be

Digitized by Google

considered as an end rather than a beginning. If once the larger view became predominant, the yet vexed question of the place of woman in society would assume quite a new aspect. Women would be expected to have much higher and broader qualifications than they at present possess, and the purchaser in matrimonial negotiations would demand far more than coquettish ways or a fine person, which the popular literature of the latter years of the nineteenth century taught the masses to admire more than any other gifts and graces. A man who hoped to take a woman into partnership with him in his life work, would not wish to treat his wife as a toy or a child, who is to be addressed in terms of endearment and who is not expected to have much dignity. He would want a companion who could see truly both the gay and the tragic sides of life and who could meet all the responsibilities of her position with ability and cheerfulness. A new woman of this kind would not exactly be the cold and stately English dame of bygone days. She would have the courage and the liveliness which the higher education undoubtedly imparts to women, joined to the modesty and repose in which the woman of to-day is woefully lacking.

A practical treatment of the training of wives precludes the discussion of the vexed problem of University education for women. Perhaps it is not yet possible to decide whether very advanced intellectual training best fits a woman for home duties. Perhaps our home-life would have to be considerably modified by women who have received special education of a more severely practical type, before the more highly intellectual women will find in it their appropriate sphere. If, however, our nation as a whole were more intellectual, there is little doubt that those women who have gone through a college course would be considered worthy above others to become wives and to bring up children, because a University education gives the mind breadth and repose. It suppresses the emotionalism to which women are prone and gives them not only balance of mind, but also public spirit, without which home life cannot make for progress. The writer who speaks of "The White Peril," would probably think the same, for he says, in reference to the urgent educational problem of the day—"The hu-

Digitized by Google

manist education alone can save the world from barbarism of taste and materialism of spirit, more truly to be dreaded than anything from which man suffered when he lived on the bosom of nature, even in the most despised ages of faith, fable and imagination. The relation that luxury bears to the higher efforts of mind and spirit is inverse." Now there is no doubt that England is in danger of declining into luxury and into apathy in relation to "the things that are more excellent." It is to be hoped, therefore, that we shall expect the mothers of our nation to possess the highest culture in addition to technical knowledge of their duties in the time to come. It would be wise, however, to let this ideal alone for the present and see how under existing conditions a practical improvement might be made in the education of women.

The enquiry is rather discouraging, for after all no special scheme, and certainly no legal system, can be worked out until public opinion has been educated to admit the necessity of such a scheme, and public opinion can only be led up to this point by means of the general branches and methods of education which are now in vogue, and among which modern developments of women's general education play an important and useful part. It is not unreasonable to suppose that, had general education gone far enough and that had English speaking people more loyalty and less of the shopkeeper spirit which makes money-grubbing the aim of living and writes on all men's hearts the motto that man lives by bread alone, there might arise among fathers in their midst, a custom of giving a dowry of a sound training for marriage to every one of their daughters who became engaged and who was therefore destined to undertake the keeping of a home and the education of children. There is no reason why such a custom should not be as universal and as binding in this country as social opinion makes the giving of a pecuniary dowry in some other nations or the capturing of a bride by force in certain savage tribes. Indeed, there is every reason why it should become so important among a highly cultured people as to be neglected only at the price of creating public scandal or courting the interference of the law. The principle involved in the custom would be, of course, that since a man is

Digitized by Google

bound to maintain his wife, that wife is bound to perform certain definite duties for her husband. But no doubt the opinions which many advanced thinkers and men of science hold on the subject of marriage would have to be supported by a very large number of followers, before they could be made the basis of a new social system or of legal enactment.

As, however, it is not absurd to suppose that the State might one day become interested in the rearing of its sons and daughters and in the moralizing and beautifying of its cities, rather than in the acquiring of territory outside its jurisdiction, it is worth while to make a few suggestions as to what the new training might be. A course of training might be arranged to cover one or two or three years, according to the circumstances of the students. Some part of that time might be devoted to housewifery and the rest to learning the theory and practice of education. Those who are so poor that they are bound to give all their time to wage-earning labor, might receive this technical training in State schools, the curricula of which were adapted to the probable requirements of their future homes, while women whose fathers could afford to give them a dowry might be sent to higher schools with longer and more elaborate curricula. Of course there would be great difficulty in drawing up a scheme of sufficient elasticity to suit all cases. Different arrangements, for instance, would have to be made and different grades of schools established, respectively, for women of independent means and for middle class women and for women who are destined to fill a very high place in society. Moreover, the issues involved would be of the greatest moment. Engagements, for example, would become almost as important as marriage and the breach of promise and divorce laws would have to be modified.

Tremendous difficulties of another kind, also, would make the very attempt to scheme out a workable plan appear almost ridiculous. One of these would be the inability of many parents to settle even a small sum of money on each of their daughters in view of a possible future marriage, considering that women often marry late in life and most fathers are obliged nowadays to give their girls a training quite early in life for

Digitized by Google

remunerative work other than that of the married woman. Perhaps the homes of women of the dowried class would be well regulated enough to supply a domestic education which would form a qualification for the passing of a simple examination in household craft and economy without special training, so that only the mastery of the rudiments of educational discipline would be wanting as a preparation for marriage. Then, of course, the expense would be trifling. In the case of the poorer classes, the greatest difficulty would probably be the intellectual attainments and the culture of the students, which would not, perhaps, be such as to render the acquirement of so much as the simplest educational truths at all profitable. Perhaps, too, this incompetence would be aggravated by the justifiable refusal of the ratepayers to accept the technical instruction of their poorer sisters as an additional pecuniary burden and by a consequent curtailing of the earlier primary education to provide funds for the probable future training. But the difficulties, moral, social and intellectual, would not be insuperable and even granting that they will be insuperable for many a long year, surely the ideal of attaching the highest responsibility to parenthood is great enough to warrant the crudest suggestions as to how that ideal is to be realized.

For national progress it is of the greatest moment that we should work towards this ideal, for present marriage laws and customs give women an inferior position in society, and it is a truism that the progress which a nation has achieved may be measured by the respect in which the women who share it are held. It is the confusion which at present exists in people's minds as to the work which a married woman is expected to do, which puts her in a position of inferiority. The woman's work is not looked upon as having a money value and thus marriage practically becomes, on the side of the man, a purchase of a slave, not of certain services rendered by a human co-worker who is a servant of the community. For this reason, self respecting and independent-minded women, who make the best wives and mothers, do not care to marry nowadays. In spite of recent legislation in her favor, the married woman still has no economic rights, nor will her position ever be any better

Digitized by Google

until it becomes a generally recognized thing that she is bound to render certain definite services for which the husband is bound to pay. Of course all such proposals as have been made from time to time in America, with the object of compelling husband and wife to enter into a legal agreement about money matters before marriage, must always be considered premature and one-sided and even ridiculous, so long as women do not receive special training for wifehood. Before they can do their just part both to men and to themselves, we shall have to create a society the ideals of which are so lofty and patriotic, that no self-respecting woman can wish to receive pay at the hands of her husband without knowing her duties thoroughly, any more than she can wish in the present state of public opinion to have money doled out to her at irregular intervals and frequently in a grudging spirit, according to the practice of many husbands who think they respect their wives. In justice, however, it must be said, that under present conditions this method of managing household affairs is a wise one, although its necessity is the fault of the purchaser in the matrimonial contract. As a rule he does not demand in his wife qualities which are worth paying for and he has to keep the money in his own hands to prevent it from being squandered, thus arrogating to himself a power which he has every temptation to abuse.

The use of business language in treating of marriage would jar on many people who want to be able to breathe in their homes that restful kind of atmosphere, which after all no training can give any woman the power to create,

> "In this world of worldlings, where
> Souls rust in apathy, and ne'er
> A great emotion shakes the air."

But this notion is based on a false conception of love, the maker of homes. Our views of love and marriage are cheap and commonplace like almost everything else in our present-day city life, which has become so vulgar and restless and ugly. Love between the sexes is not a practical, working love to us,

Digitized by Google

"A thing to walk with, hand in hand,
Through the every-dayness of this work day world,
Baring its tender feet to every flint,
Yet letting not one heart-beat go astray
From beauty's law of plainness and content."

To many of us it is a gaudy, useless, music-hall nothing, and to many, again, it soars,

"High floating o'er earth's clouds on faëry wings."

We should lose none of the finer and higher qualities which are without money and without price, if we treated love as a practical worker making use of earthly tools. Indeed, we should only be building up a firm foundation for the cultivation of that which is priceless, if we considered love as no idle thing and secured to our daughters and perhaps to our sons also, a sound education of the senses and of the mind for the guidance of love. And after all, it is only prejudice that makes the ideal of a trained wifehood seem unpractical, or detrimental to men's highest interests. Prejudice, to be sure, is a stubborn fact to deal with, but why do we boast of our higher education if prejudice is to be our conqueror in the end?

Deeper considerations, however, will reveal the fact that the objections of the prejudiced in this matter do not altogether lack weight, though they cannot be said to establish any case whatever against training for motherhood. Those among the objections which are just, simply go to prove, indeed, not that marriage as an economic institution is incompatible with high and lofty spiritual attainments, but only that marriage under any circumstances is incompatible with the highest life of which man is capable in rare moments of exaltation, which he reaches by painful effort or long sustained devotion. This truth need not lead us to suppose, however, that the plainer views of marriage would rob life of much of its poetry, or would bring down an institution which has been the centre of romance throughout man's history to the level of the commonplace work-a-day interests which are too familiar to call forth heroic energy or lofty enthusiasm; for poetry is spiritual, and we make a mistake if we suppose that the time of life at which men and women marry is the most poetical time of their lives,

Digitized by Google

and that the imagination is most vivid and active in youth. Even if we concede that the imagination works with greater energy in youth than at a later time, we must also acknowledge that it is not so fine in quality as mellower years can make it, although, of course, the man who allows himself to be materialized and to get soiled in the strife of existence and who fails, therefore, to follow the natural course of human development, inevitably loses or impairs his imaginative power. The imagination of a very young man is strongly tinged, as a rule, with the colors of the material world. It is only in exceptional cases that it is purely spiritual, and it is, therefore, only towards the end of life that imagination proper can as a rule be considered natural and healthy. No doubt Wordsworth is right in ascribing very lofty imagination to little children. But children have no heavy responsibilities to answer. Their spirituality is only an earnest of the time of which the prophet was thinking when he said—"It doth not yet appear what we shall be." The processes of education must wake them up to weigh and measure and reason, before they can be made into worthy citizens. We cannot have dreamers in business and politics, and they are anomalies even in education and religion.

Good citizenship is the price which Nature has assigned for the privilege of developing spiritual power. The preliminary discipline is necessary, as a means of establishing a firm basis for the superstructure which every man ought to begin to build up into his life, as the links which connect him with the present world-order begin to dissolve. The poet Waller was right, therefore, in saying that,

> "The soul's dark cottage, battered and decayed,
> Lets in new light through chinks that time hath made."

It is a significant fact that the poet uttered this sentiment when he was on the brink of death. It is the natural and characteristic utterance of an aged man who has great powers of imagination. But we cannot help being sorry that Waller did not utter such words earlier in his career. It was only when the world in which he had dissipated his finest energies was fading away from him, that the worn-out courtier at last allowed his imagination to have its way with him and wrote—

Digitized by Google

"The soul, with nobler resolutions decked,
The body stooping, does herself erect.
No mortal parts are requisite to raise
Her that unbodied can her Master praise.
The seas are quiet, when the winds give o'er,
So calm are we, when passions are no more;
For then we know how vain it was to boast
Of fleeting things so certain to be lost."

If, then, lofty imagination is only possible in a very limited degree to men and women who are in the thick of life's responsibilities, it is obvious that none of the poetry of life would be lost, were we to take the common sense and almost commonplace view of marriage.

On the contrary, we should become much more poetical and imaginative, because healthy ideas on the subject would make it possible for men to comply with the conditions of spiritual birth and growth. Moreover such ideas would obviate the disillusionment which marriage so very often means. Many people have a curious notion that the creations of the imagination are bound to fade away before the hard necessities of daily work. This notion is characteristic of the faithless, prosaic philistinism of our materialistic age, which makes it hard for us to realize that our inner world is just as much a region of fact as the outer world. If we want to describe anything as unreal, we call it imaginary. We cannot realize that, as Emerson tells us, Poetry also is Science, and that the only reason why we do not accept the creations of the imagination, is that they are facts which belong to our future rather than to the present.

If we could believe in the life of the imagination, marriage would not be an all-important institution to us. It is all important to us at present because we think that in marriage "the greatest thing in the world" has its fullest and most characteristic expression. But love is spiritual, not sexual, and after all we make far too much of sex. After all it does not mark out a fundamental difference between the minds and spirits of men and women. Yet we persist in giving it a higher place than it deserves, and thus we fail to make it useful to us in its proper sphere. Sex has little to do with love, for its work is

Digitized by Google

that of dividing, not that of uniting. So long as we live in a society founded on and maintained by sexual relations, so long will it be necessary that modesty on the one hand and chivalry on the other, should keep men and women at a distance from one another.

> "A God, a God their severance ruled!
> And bade betwixt their shores to be
> The unplumb'd, salt, estranging sea."

The dividing work of sex becomes very obvious in places of education where men and women learn together, and where we are often forced to observe, perhaps with a certain bitterness which can with difficulty be prevented from developing into cynicism, that dual education is not altogether a success. It is very seldom that the tone and spirit of a college is such, that any real bonds of friendship can arise between the men and women. The observation almost inclines one to think with Schopenhauer, that when we act in accordance with the dispositions to which we are bound and limited by sex, we are the dupes and toys of Nature. At any rate it may be said that sex need not play nearly so important a part in society as it actually takes in our present civilization. If we would escape the sour views of Schopenhauer, we must also recognize clearly that sex is the basis of marriage, but not of love, for which reason we must disassociate the conception of sex from that of the very loftiest thoughts and emotions which the most highly developed human beings are capable of knowing. We need not sourly and weakly scorn sex because we recognize its temporal character and its humble uses. A bold, sensible acknowledgment of its limits need only free our manhood from the silliness which corrupts society by making conjugal relations a kind of wicked secret and casts a glamor round marriage which actual experience of the life which it inaugurates almost invariably dispels. We want to have homes built up on sound economic principles, and then we shall be able to soar into the regions whither love and imagination lead.

At the same time we ought to be careful lest we make too much of domestic life, as the Germans do. This ideal retards progress and is harmful to the highest interests of a nation, be-

Digitized by Google

cause it gives far too little freedom to women, both married and unmarried. To serve those highest interests, indeed, a nation must have a large unselfish aim and an ideal that points beyond its own existence and therefore gives marriage, to which, of course, the maintenance and advancement of the State is due, a non-essential place in human affairs. We have forgotten in these days that asceticism, though it is always rare, is both natural and necessary to the life of a nation, and that if our social arrangements crush this form of high thinking and plain living out of existence, our morality and spirituality will suffer. But if in modern times we recover the monastic ideal which seems to be so fast breaking down, it will find expression in forms very different from any in which it has shown itself before. Probably it will take a Tolstoian form, though it is to be hoped that it will not cause men to revel in the world's passions in the earlier part of their career and then preach doctrines of consecration in the latter part. It is not cloistered ascetics whom the world of to-day awaits, but men and women who will do its intellectual and spiritual work in perfect outward freedom, who are shut out from no society, and who are bound by no necessity but that which the ideal of the self enforces. It is chiefly women who would benefit by the restoration of asceticism to an honored place among the ideals of the modern world; for the unthroning of marriage from the place which it now holds as the chief generative factor in civilization, would bring about a better division of employments among women. There would be room for the Marys of society who do not wish to undertake the duties of housekeeping or of motherhood, and who are capable of making their lives warm and intense and human by purely spiritual friendship; and we should appreciate their work, although we should not necessarily think that they had chosen the better part.

The view that he whose life work is purely spiritual does the work of a man, no less than he who brings up sons and daughters, can, of course, only be held ultimately by believers in the immortality of the soul. There seems to be little prospect that it will be adopted as a national principle in England, for although so many modern thinkers treat the immortality of the

Digitized by Google

soul as an indisputably established fact, and although the State is still founded nominally upon religion, we appear to have very little spiritual life of any sort to-day. Yet the believers are many and those many cannot be without hope that the near future will find us capable of realizing that the function of the State as a whole is the highest life-making. The natural result of a materialistic reading of Nature is a belief in polygamy, free love, temporary marriage and other animal institutions. That we are now threatened by these horrors is a fact which ought to awaken us to the necessity of getting just and balanced views of both the material and spiritual duties of man. The material side of his obligations we seem to know well enough. In fact our knowledge of these is almost morbid. We need now to learn that the spiritual is natural. A great physician of the materialistic nineteenth century has vividly brought out this truth by saying—"Life is so far from being the sum of the functions that resist death, that it is a constant part of the history of life that its exercise leads naturally to decay, and through decay to death." Here he expresses the material side of man's life. In another passage he expresses the doctrine of the resurrection in the words—"Other portions of the human mind are the reason and the conscience . . . . by which there is established between man and the brutes a great difference, not in degree alone, but in kind. The spirit differs from all the faculties in its independence of our organization, for it is exercised best in complete abstraction from all that is sensible, it is wholly independent of the organization of the brain, wholly independent also of the education of the understanding." The life of man is, therefore, a natural progress from the material to the spiritual. For this natural tendency the education and general laws of society ought to provide. Perhaps the most important part of this provision should consist in giving marriage its proper place. At any rate there ought to be no such thing in civilized society as marriage, the permanent bonds of which seem intolerable to both men and women as soon as they begin to think and to question the usefulness of this institution, sanctified as it is merely by custom and by religious practice. And if

Digitized by Google

we have any spiritual sense or any great hopes for the future of the nations, we ought to realize that Tennyson's way of letting the ape and tiger die, as expressed in the epithalamium with which he closes his "In Memoriam," is by no means the shortest way. The simpler and the swifter way in modern times, would be that of making room for nature's monks. Some of us may still embrace the doctrine of the great nineteenth century poet, who was all too sensitive to the materialism of his age. Some of us may still feel that the submissive animal within us is yet so strong, that the best things cannot be realities to us. But we ought to remember that the wisest Teacher whom the world has ever known said—"In the resurrection they neither marry, nor are given in marriage, but are as the angels of God in heaven. He that is able to receive it, let him receive it."

M. E. ROBINSON.

LONDON.

WHAT IS RELIGION?

THE divergent and contradictory uses of the word religion are due, one feels, not only to the difficulty of comprehending the nature of religion but also to the disposition of those who have written upon the subject to further an ulterior purpose by the definitions they propose. The Evangelical controversialist, for instance, seems bent on excluding by his definition what he calls the superstitions of man, or of sharply distinguishing between the so-called natural religions and revealed religion. The moralist seeks apparently to disparage the reputed influence of religion on conduct, and the thorough-going secularist to put religion in the way of inevitable extinction. When the subject is approached, as at present, with a purely scientific interest, all such purposes of doctrinal and philosophical strategy must of course be relinquished. We cannot concern ourselves, either with the relative superiority of a particular form of religion or even with the fate of religion itself. Our only legitimate purpose is to ascertain and express the truth.

Although there cannot be two opinions with regard to the

Digitized by Google

motive which ought to prompt an inquiry into the nature of religion, it may be said that, owing to the incompleteness of the sciences dealing with the subject, the time has not yet come when an attempt to formulate a definition of religion should be made, or, indeed, can be made with a fair prospect of success. This is true so far as a final scientific definition of religion is concerned. We must, indeed, await further progress in ethnographical and psychological knowledge before we may hope to condense the quintessence of religion into a final definition. Certainly the present writer has a far less ambitious purpose. The need of a more exact definition of religion than is commonly given is not confined, however, to sociology, ethnology, psychology or the philosophy of religion. The greatest demand is in the field of popular discussion, where the utmost confusion reigns in regard to the question of the stability and permanence of religion, and its relation to science and morality. Now that the church statistics of the census of 1900 are made public, the regular decennial debate upon the question of the growth or the decadence of religious interest will doubtless begin. The slightest improvement on current definitions of religion may therefore prove to be of some immediate popular value.

The first step toward a clear understanding of religion is to distinguish carefully between religion and religions. Religion is the root, the source, the parent of religions. It bears about the same relation to the various religions as a genus to its species. A definition which applies only to one religion is no more a definition of religion than the definition of a particular person is a definition of the *genus homo*. This is so obvious that it is hard to understand why so many definitions are presented which apply to nothing but Christianity. There is no religion which can be absolutely separated from all others, and a definition that is worth anything at all must apply to all forms of religion from the lowest to the highest.

Current definitions of religion, especially those of a theological character, are usually expressed in terms of belief. Occasionally religion is defined in terms of feeling, and sometimes in terms of conduct or conation, but the popular idea is that re-

Digitized by Google

ligion and belief are identical. The prevalence of this idea is chiefly due to the definitions presented in the writings of a few philosophers and theologians. James Martineau, for instance, defined religion as the "belief in an ever-living God, that is, a Divine mind and will ruling the universe and holding moral relations with mankind;"* Bishop Butler, as the belief in one God or Creator and Moral Governor of the world and in a future state of retribution implying immortality;† and many writers, among whom is the philosopher Immanuel Kant, have made the belief in immortality the sole basis of religion.‡ The demand of the church for belief, and the constant association in the New Testament of belief with salvation, and unbelief with its opposite, encourage popular acceptance of these definitions.

Theology, however, is not the only science which identifies religion with belief. When we turn to those writers who have approached the subject from the ethnographical side we find the same mistaken conception. De Quatrefages Letourneau, Topinard, Sir John Lubbock and Prof. E. B. Tylor, to mention only a few of these writers, all define religion in terms of belief. Even Mr. Herbert Spencer, who calls it "an *a priori* theory of the universe," bases religion upon the intellectual element.§

Now, we may readily admit that knowledge or belief is an element in religion, as a more or less specific belief is an element in all religions; but when we define religion as specific belief,—for instance, the belief in God, in immortality, or in spiritual beings,—we not only recognize an intellectual element in religion but we make religion synonymous with a particular

---

*"Study of Religion," Vol. 1, p. 1.

†Ward, "Dynamic Sociology," Vol. 2, p. 160.

‡"Kritik der reinen Vernunft," S. 271, cited by Ward in "Dynamic Sociology," Vol. 2, p. 252.

§See Quatrefages, "L'espece Humaine," p. 356; Letourneau, "L'Evolution Religieuse dans les Diverses Races Humanes," p. 4; Topinard, "Science and Faith," p. 246; Sir John Lubbock, "Prehistoric Times," p. 574; Tylor, "Primitive Culture," Vol. 1, p. 424; Spencer, "First Principles," p. 43; also Crozier, "Civilization and Progress," p. 257, where religion is defined as "the philosophy of the masses."

Digitized by Google

form of belief. This narrows the scope of religion, and in an age of uncompromising criticism, stakes its life upon the accuracy of an intellectual formula. For, considering the present state of knowledge, what formulated belief can be said to be absolutely permanent? None. To base religion upon belief, therefore, is to build the house of religion upon the sand, and when the rain descends, and the floods come, and the winds blow and beat upon it, what assurance can we have that it will not fall?

To say of current definitions of religion, however, that they present it as an unstable and vanishing phenomenon is not necessarily to offer against them a fatal objection. The end or purpose of a definition, like that ascribed by Hamlet to playing, is "to hold, as 'twere, the mirror up to Nature." If the truth is reflected, that is all we can demand, whatever be the fate of the thing defined. But the quickest way, perhaps, to show that an error is involved in considering religion as a matter of belief is to point out some of the consequences of accepting the common definition. If we accept the definition, for instance, that religion is belief in one all-wise personal Being, we commit ourselves to the view that the great majority of the human race have lived without religion. For nothing is clearer to those who have any familiarity with the religious ideas of mankind than that the belief in many gods has been far more prevalent than the belief in one. Monotheism is a comparatively recent development in the history of religious thought. It is sometimes said, to be sure, that "all human beings have the idea of God,"* but this is a pleasant fiction invented for theological purposes. "There is no evidence," says Darwin, "that man was aboriginally endowed with the ennobling belief in the existence of an Omnipotent God. On the contrary there is ample evidence, derived not from hasty travelers, but from men who have long resided with savages, that numerous races have existed, and still exist, who have no idea of one or more gods, and who have no words in their languages to express such an idea."† Again, Sir John Lubbock, after citing a score or more

**Outlook,* December, 1900, p. 919.

†"Descent of Man" (Humboldt Library), p. 51.

Digitized by Google

of illustrations to prove the point, says that "those who assert that even the lowest savages believe in a supreme Deity, affirm that which is entirely contrary to the evidence."* This is a different question, of course, from that of the universality of religion, with which we are not at present concerned. All we are now trying to show is that by defining religion as the belief in a Supreme Being we exclude from the category of religious the vast majority of the human race. Not only do primitive religions fall outside of the definition, but also one of the world's great religions, namely Buddhism, which numbers more adherents than any other. Sir Monier Monier-Williams, the learned professor of Sanscrit at Oxford, does indeed declare that Buddhism is not a religion; but this surprising opinion must be due to his desire to be consistent, for he holds that "a religion, in the proper sense of the word, must postulate the existence of one living and true God of infinite power, wisdom and love, the Creator and Designer and Preserver of all things visible and invisible," and that it "must take for granted the immortality of man's soul or spirit." "Christianity," he asserts, "is a religion, whereas Buddhism, at least in its earliest and truest form, is no religion at all."† If Buddhism is not a religion, pray what is it? Of what value is a definition of religion which includes only Christianity? However convenient it may be for controversial purposes, it does not satisfy the requirements of science.

If, instead of the belief in a Supreme Being, we accept the view that belief in immortality is identical with religion, we are confronted by the same difficulty. The idea of an unending future existence "does not belong to the lower forms of religion, but is a comparatively recent extension of the early idea of a future life."‡ Mr. John Fiske in the book entitled *"Through Nature to God,"* does indeed assert that "belief in the Unseen world in which human beings continue to exist after death," is an indispensable element of religion, and he

*"Prehistoric Times," p. 579.

†Quoted by Dr. Carus, "Buddhism and its Christian Critics," p. 290.

‡Prof. Lester F. Ward "Dynamic Sociology," Vol. 2, p. 280.

Digitized by Google

seems to identify this belief with immortality. Dr. Brinton, also, maintains that the mind of primitive man was so filled with visions of universal and immortal life, that to many there was no such thing as death;* but Prof. Tylor, than whom there is no better authority, positively asserts that "far from a life after death being held by all men as the destiny of all men, whole classes are formally excluded from it," and that "even among races who distinctly accept the doctrine of a surviving soul, this acceptance is not unanimous." "The soul," he says, "as recognized in the philosophy of the lower races, may be defined as an ethereal surviving being, conceptions of which preceded and led up to the more transcendental theory of the immaterial and immortal soul, which forms part of the theology of the higher nations."† Passing over the numerous illustrations from primitive life cited by Prof. Tylor, we may mention the Greeks, among whom the idea of immortality was very vague, and call to mind the fact that it is by no means generally accepted among us to-day. What has the conception of immortality to do with the religious philosophy of those who hold with the late Prof. Huxley, that religion is "reverence and love for the ethical ideal, and the desire to realize that ideal in life?‡ Or with that of the followers of Herbart who considered sympathy with the universal dependence of men as the essential natural principle of religion.¶

We see, then, that a definition of religion in terms of the higher and derived beliefs is not inclusive. There is involved, however, a more serious consequence.

If religion is identified with a form of belief, the fate of religion is made to depend upon the permanence of that belief. Thus the very existence of religion may seem to be jeopardized, for, as was said before, no belief may be regarded as perfectly secure against the advancing tide of critical thought. Some may reply that the belief in a personal Creator is absolutely

*"Religion of Primitive Peoples," p. 69.
†"Primitive Culture," Vol. 2, pp. 22 and 24.
‡"Christianity and Agnosticism," (Humboldt Library), p. 25.
¶"Science of Education," English Translation, p. 171.

Digitized by Google

permanent. But many of the greatest thinkers have abandoned this conception.*

If the belief in immortality is suggested as one that is unlikely to pass away, we are confronted by the fact that some profound thinkers have ceased to hold it. Prof. Haeckel, for instance, in his recent book on "The Riddle of the Universe," dismisses this dogma as hopelessly inconsistent with the most solid truths of science. When Giordano Bruno, whose love for the truth brought him to the stake three hundred years ago, faced his accusers, he was unsupported by either the belief in a personal deity or the belief in immortality. Must we say, then, that this martyr to the truth was an irreligious man? Such must be our conclusion if we accept the idea that belief in immortality is essential to religion. A writer in the *Contemporary Review* said, some years ago, "If for any reason, mankind does, at any time cease to believe in its own immortality, then religion will also have ceased to exist as a part of the consciousness of humanity."† There is no need, however, for linking the fate of religion to belief in immortality or to any other specific belief.

Whatever religion may be, no unprejudiced student of the subject will contend that it may properly be identified with the higher and derived beliefs, like the belief in a personal God or the belief in immortality. The necessity of some more general conception will at once be recognized. We find, therefore, that the ethnographer, while defining religion as belief, seeks the rudimentary and common form of belief from which all others may be derived, and identifies religion with that belief. We shall see, however, that the lower we descend among beliefs for an inclusive definition of religion, the more precarious the situation of religion becomes.

The broadest definition of religion that has ever been given in terms of belief is that of Prof. Tylor, that is, the belief in

*"Dieu," says De Greef, to quote but a single author, "est un personnage historique, susceptible de naissance, de croissance et de mort, comme les dieux, les fétiches et les esprits en général."—Introduction a la Sociologie, Tome 2, p. 218.

†Rev. T. W. Fowle, quoted by Professor Ward, "Dynamic Sociology," II, 253.

Digitized by Google

Spiritual Beings. "The first requisite in a systematic study of the religions of the lower races," he says, "is to lay down a rudimentary definition of religion. By requiring in this definition the belief in a Supreme Deity or judgment after death, the adoration of idols or the practice of sacrifice, or other partially diffused doctrines or rites, no doubt many tribes may be excluded from the category of religious. But such narrow definition has the fault of identifying religion rather with particular developments than with the deeper motive which underlies them. It seems best to fall back at once on this essential source, and simply to claim as a minimum definition of religion, the belief in Spiritual Beings." This belief is supposed to be universal. "So far as I can judge from the immense mass of accessible evidence," says Prof. Tylor, "we have to admit that the belief in Spiritual Beings appears among all low races with whom we have attained a thoroughly intimate acquaintance; whereas the assertion of absence of such belief must apply either to ancient tribes or to more or less imperfectly described modern ones."* Prof. Tylor's definition leaves nothing to be desired, then, so far as inclusiveness is concerned. Like other definitions of religion in terms of a specific belief, however, it is fatal to the claim that religion is a permanent reality. To realize the truth of this we have only to consider the evolution of modern religious beliefs.

The study of the evolution of modern religious conceptions teaches plainly that they are the natural outgrowth of the primitive conception of Spiritual Beings. The montheistic conception of to-day, for instance, is logically related to polytheism, and is the result of a gradual integration of the God-conception, as science has progressed toward the idea of a unitary cause. The orthodox theory of inspiration, to use another illustration, is the natural product of the primitive idea of souls and possession. Hence religion, if it means primarily a belief, whether high or low, must stand or fall with the belief in Spiritual Beings. Let us examine the validity of this belief.

The belief in Spiritual Beings is derived from two sources.

*"Primitive Culture," Vol. I, pp. 424, 425.

Digitized by Google

It is a deduction either from such phenomena as dreams, swoons, apoplexy, shadows, and reflections in water, which were satisfactorily explained to the primitive mind by the assumption of a double self, or a soul and body, normally but not continuously united; or from the phenomena of objective nature,—the thunder, the lightning, wind, rain, the movements of the clouds, etc.,—of which the assumption of invisible beings analogous to men was to the primitive man a sufficient explanation. The genesis of the idea of another self, or soul, capable of entering and leaving the body, which is the subjective basis of the belief in Spiritual Beings, is thus accounted for by Prof. Tylor: "When the sleeper awakens from a dream," (he is speaking of primitive man) "he believes he has somehow been away, or that other people have come to him. As it is well known by experience that men's bodies do not go off on these excursions, the natural explanation is that every man's living self, or soul, is his phantom or image, which can go out of his body and see and be seen itself in dreams. Even waking men in broad daylight sometimes see these human phantoms in what are called visions or hallucinations. They are further led to believe that the soul does not die with the body, but lives on after quitting it, for although a man may be dead and buried, his phantom-figure continues to appear to the survivors in dreams and visions. That men have such unsubstantial images belonging to them is familiar in other ways to the savage philosopher who has watched their reflections in still water of their shadows following them about, fading out of sight to reappear presently somewhere else, while sometimes for a moment he has seen their living breath as a faint cloud, vanishing, though one can feel that it is still there."* From this subjective source Mr. Spencer derives ancestor worship, which he claims is the parent form of all religions.

The second method by which the idea of invisible beings may have been derived is quite as simple. Conscious of himself as a cause, the primitive man would by analogy attribute some form of life to anything that manifested power or movement.

*"Anthropology," pp, 343. 344.

Digitized by Google

Indeed, it is even now contended that by the very nature of our intelligence we are bound to represent the cause of things in terms of ourselves.* Darwin, in opposition to Mr. Spencer, thought that this personification of the causes of nature preceded the belief in a double.† Here, then, are the two bases which support the belief in Spiritual Beings. Remove these and religion, as defined by Mr. Tylor, falls to the ground.

We have only to consider for a moment the effect of modern science upon these two ideas which support the belief in question, to appreciate the precarious condition of religion when it is regarded as the belief in Spiritual Beings. No modern psychologist, for instance, would accept the idea of a double to explain the phenomena of dreams, swoons, apoplexy, etc., nor does anyone now believe that the forces of nature may properly be interpreted as invisible personal agencies. Prof. Ward in dismissing the idea of the first, or subjective, view of the origin of the belief in question, says, "Does the reflection of a man's face in a pool really indicate that the man possesses two faces, a bodily and a spiritual face? Does the shadow that he casts, or the echo of his voice, really prove that he has an immaterial double? Does a dream or a trance, in which an alibi is proved to the mind of the ignorant savage really demonstrate that his other self exists and has been wandering about, while all his friends declare that his proper self has remained in the same place? Is there any fallacy by which, on this view, the fundamental conception of religion has been arrived at? All will, of course, admit that the premises are utterly false in all these cases. If even the very root of the tree consists wholly of error, is it not reasonable to suppose that the branches and the fruit will partake of the same nature?" And the same writer ends his inquiry in regard to the second or objective view, as follows: "Is the wind really an immaterial spirit? Are the sun, moon and stars actual verities? Is the rainbow a goddess or a bridge connecting earth and heaven, or was it placed in the heavens by a Deity as a covenant between him and man? Are meteors 'excrements of dirty little star gods'?

*See Crozier, "Civilization and Progress," p. 232.

†"Descent of Man," (Humboldt Library), p. 51, footnote.

Digitized by Google

Or is an eclipse a result of the defecation of the divine orb of day? Does the plant grow, or the tide ebb or flow, or rain descend or the lightning flash, in obedience to spiritual powers above, and outside of nature, having distinct personalities? All these phenomena are now satisfactorily explained on strictly natural principles. Among peoples acquainted with science, all such supernatural beings have been dispensed with, and the belief in them is declared to be false, and to always have been false."* Thus we see that Prof. Ward rejects the two ideas upon which the belief in Spiritual Beings is based, and it hardly will be denied that both are erroneous, and under the influence of scientific criticism have gradually crumbled away. What then becomes of religion as defined by Mr. Tylor? Obviously it is left without a support. Mr. Spencer does indeed try to save it by his favorite method of finding a "soul of truth in things erroneous." Like Prof. Ward, he discards both the idea of a double and the idea of invisible personal agencies in nature, but "at the outset," he says, "a germ of truth was contained in the primitive conception—the truth, namely, that the power that manifests itself in consciousness is but a differently conditioned form of the power that manifests itself beyond consciousness."† As he does not interpret this power in terms of personality, however, he does not save religion as the belief in Spiritual Beings.

Incidentally we may remark that in the idea that religion is a form of belief we have an explanation of the supposed conflict between science and religion, and of the confidence expressed by some writers in the present decay and final disappearance of religion. Regarding religion as belief, and witnessing the destructive effects of scientific criticism in every department of knowledge, many thinkers have regretfully, or gleefully, acknowledged that religion must decrease as science increases, and that there will come a time when religion will have entirely disappeared. "The progress of religion," says De Greef, "is in the reduction of religion to an absurdity."‡

*"Dynamic Sociology," Vol. 2, pp. 266, 268-9.
†"Principles of Sociology," Vol. 3, pp. 170-1.
‡"Introduction a la Sociologie," Tome 2, p. 208.

Digitized by Google

and a distinguished socialist says, "Religion expires when belief in Supernatural Beings or Supernatural Ruling Powers ceases to exist."* Obviously this is true if the idea of religion entertained by these writers is correct. If, however, they are mistaken it only shows that there is a strategical blunder in defining religion as the belief in Spiritual Beings, or as any other specific belief.

What has been said thus far is not conclusive, of course, in regard to the expediency of setting aside current definitions of religion. As was said before, a true definition of religion is not concerned with the fate of religion, and it is not our purpose to shield religion from criticism or to force it to present an aspect of permanence. The only legitimate purpose of a definition is accurately to mark off the thing defined from every other phenomenon. We must try, therefore, to find a more valid objection than those to which we have already referred.

In the preceding discussion we have shown that we must look beyond all specific forms of religious belief, and *a fortiori* beyond all forms of religion to find religion itself. It does not follow, however, that we can eliminate from religion the element of belief. A religion is in one aspect a complex of beliefs. Buddhism, Christianity, or any organized form of religion, hinges on a system of beliefs, a body of doctrine. But if we proceed downward through any of the various religions until we come to the common and simplest form of belief out of which all others have sprung, we shall have, not religion itself but always a manifestation and consequence of religion. In this aspect there is no difference between the crude belief of the savage and the highest religious conception of modern Chrsitianity. Both are alike manifestations of religion. Now, below the lowest and simplest form of religious belief, that is, the belief in Spiritual Beings, and giving rise to it, there must be a vague recognition or perception of a power or powers which the primitive man regards as outside of himself and responsible for certain puzzling phenomena. "There is one fact," says Prof. Ward, "which all races and peoples, however

*Bebel, "Woman, Past, Present and Future," p. 178. For a similar opinion, see also Loria, "Economic Foundations of Society," p. 24.

Digitized by Google

primitive, and all mankind, however enlightened, have universally recognized. This fact is that there is a power outside of themselves which is beyond their control. Rude peoples, living as they always do, in direct contact with nature, are constantly brought into relationship with this power and made to feel much more strongly than do civilized races their complete subjection to it." To the primitive man, therefore, the world is full of mysteries. He perceives that there is something beyond himself which acts as a cause. He believes, therefore, in the existence of a powerful and mysterious *something*. What this something is he knows not, but that is one of the first questions for which he sought an answer. The earliest philosopher provided him with a theory, and that theory was the existence of invisible, humanlike agencies. This interpretation, however, was not religion but philosophy. Religion was the antecedent phenomenon. Thus, man was religious prior to the formulation of a specific belief in Spiritual Beings. He recognized vaguely and indefinitely a mysterious power in nature before any definite theory was formulated concerning it.

Beyond this vague recognition or perception of a mysterious power in the world, it is impossible to trace religious belief. The element of belief, or perception, then, is at the beginning of religion, as a specific belief in Spiritual Beings is at the beginning of theology. The final element in an analysis of religious beliefs, whether of the individual or of the race, is a perception in the individual consciousness of an unknown power or powers operating in nature.

Are those writers correct, then, who define religion, not as a specific belief, but as a mere perception of the Infinite, or the "perception of man's relation to the principles of the universe"?* We do not think so. Perception is not the only element in religion. Let us proceed to inquire what other elements are revealed by an analysis of religion.

It will generally be admitted, perhaps, that the very word

*Among those who have defined religion as perception are Max Müller and Jevons. Shelley, in his notes to "Queen Mab," defined it as "perception of the relation in which we stand to the principle of the universe."

Digitized by Google

religion implies restraint upon conduct, and the direction of individual activities. A religious man must be to some extent guided by his religion. He must needs have "scruples." This is illustrated in all religions, from the primitive forms which induce sacrifices and obedience to the will of the gods, to Christianity, which authoritatively declares, for instance, that "If any man thinketh himself to be religious, while he bridleth not his tongue but deceiveth his heart, this man's religion is vain."* And it is illustrated as well in the individual, for who could properly be called religious who does not act to some extent in accordance with the principles of his religion? Prof, Lester F. Ward, in a profound article on the "Essential Nature of Religion,"† and Mr. Henry Rutgers Marshall, in his book on "Instinct and Reason," which is mainly devoted to religion, bring out with great clearness and power this feature of religion and pronounce it its characteristic element.

Prof. Ward's thesis is that "religion is a substitute in the rational world for instinct in the subrational world." "Instinct," he says, "may be looked upon as a device of nature to make the organism desire to perform acts that subserve function, but which would not otherwise be desired." So religion is a device to restrain the individual from activities harmful to the race and to direct him to the performance of safe ones. In tracing the development of organisms from the lowest forms to man, he finds that there have been, at least, three critical periods when the existence of organisms was threatened. "The first of these was when plastic organisms were created, endowed with locomotion, and dependent for subsistence upon organic matter, the condition to the existence of which was feeling . . . . This was the origin of mind. The second ordeal was when the will had so strongly asserted itself that existence was put in jeopardy. This was remedied by the development of instincts. Passing over minor ones, we come at last to an ordeal still more severe than any of the previous ones. In the natural upward march of the psychic faculty feeling became at length so potent and its demands so impera-

*Jas. 1: 26.

†International Journal of Ethics, January, 1898.

Digitized by Google

tive that the direct efforts hitherto employed in its satisfaction no longer sufficed, and a new device was gradually elaborated that should secure the ends of the creature with far greater success. This was the 'indirect method of conation,' and to the affective faculty was now added the perceptive faculty. The intellect was developed as an aid to the will . . . . But with this immense gain from the standpoint of the individual almost immediately commenced a destruction of the race of beings to which this faculty had been committed. It was now easy to secure the satisfaction of desire, and desires had grown so manifold and so vehement, and a larger and larger proportion of them not being adapted to function, many, indeed being directly opposed to it, that obviously, if, under this new dispensation, everything were allowed to go on without restraint, the race of rational beings must quickly run its course and come to naught. Fortunately, however, this very perceptive faculty which was being so freely employed in the interest of feeling regardless of function, was also capable of dimly and intuitively perceiving the dangers to which it was leading. Along with the individual mind working thus egoistically for the individual end, keenly pointing out the ways in which pain could be thwarted and pleasure assured, there was also working broadly, deeply, and sub-consciously, what may properly be called a collective or social mind, solemnly warning against the dangers and authoritatively inhibiting all race-destroying actions. A new device, analogous in may respects to instinct on the lower plane, was gradually developed and perfected *pari passu* with the reason on the higher plane. This device was *religion.*"

This profound analysis is correct as far as it goes, but it will be observed, that Prof. Ward is chiefly concerned with the social function of religion, and describes its genesis as a social instrument for restraining individual action. Our investigation carries us back one step further and inquires into the origin of religion as it manifests itself in the individual, and which by and by is laid hold of by the social group as a means of restraining its members.

What has just been said of Prof. Ward's article applies also

Digitized by Google

to the treatment of religion in Mr. Marshall's book. After a long but inconclusive argument to show that religion is instinctive, he concludes by defining religion as a suppression of our fallible wills to what we conceive of as a higher will. "Under my view," he says, "what is here called the suppression of our will to the higher will, may be expressed in psychological terms as the restraint of the individualistic impulses to racial ones; that such restraint has effect upon the moral character being, of course, granted. This restraint seems to me to be of the very essence of religion. The belief in the Deity, as usually found being from the psychological view an attachment to, rather than of the essence of, the religious feeling; and this, whether as metaphysicians we may or may not be compelled to the belief in this Absolute Deity."* In another passage he speaks of this restraint as "the very core and essence of religious functioning."

Undoubtedly both Prof. Ward and Mr. Marshall are correct in assigning to religion the element of restraint, or, viewed positively, a directive power in human action; but in the final analysis this element is merely restraint and not social restraint. Social restraint does not appear until the social group, or its leader, becomes conscious of the value of religion as an instrument of restraint and a means of securing from the individual socially beneficial activities. It is, therefore, highly probable from the available evidence that religion arose not as a social, but as a psychological necessity. As a spontaneous variation in the character of the individual it may not have been an advantage to him, but the incipient social mind soon perceived its possibilities as a social instrument and preserved it as such. If the primitive individual, thrown into an environment of manifestations of a mysterious power, perceives the existence of such a power, and realizes his dependence upon it, and strives to propitiate it, he becomes religious whether the activities following from his religion are socially beneficial or not. Probably many individuals and many groups were extinguished by their undirected religious activities before a consciousness of the social value of religion arose. Natural selection of indi-

*"Insinct and Reason," p. 329.

Digitized by Google

viduals and of social groups would alone in time adapt religious functioning to social survival. But it is doubtless true, as Prof. Ward suggests, that religion as a social phenomenon was the product of both natural selection and reason. The point to be noticed here, however, is that the origin of religion is independent of its social value. Its appearance in the world is an individual phnomenon; its persistence, a social one.

Religion, then, cannot be correctly defined as a particular form of restraint, any more than it can be correctly defined as a particular form of belief. It is not "being good and doing good," as Dr. Chalmers asserted, nor "loving obedience to God's commandments," as Dr. Deems used to say, nor "morality touched with emotion," as Matthew Arnold defined it. Religion and morality are two genetically distinct phenomena. "Religion," says Mr. John Fiske, "views the individual in his relations to the Infinite Power manifested in a universe of casually connected phenomena, as Morality views him in his relation to his fellow-creatures."* Prof. Tylor tells us that "The relation of morality to religion is one that only belongs in its rudiments, or not at all, to rudimentary civilization." And again he says, "One great element of religion, the moral element, which among the higher nations forms its most vital part, is indeed little represented in the religion of the lower races."† And Mr. J. Deniker in his "Races of Man," (p. 220) declares that "Animistic religion is destitute of a moral element, which many persons consider inseparable from religion."‡ Morality implies not merely restraint, but social and conventional restraint, and may be based upon pubilc opinion and social conventions as well as upon religious beliefs. As Mr. John Fiske somewhere says, the reason why religion and moral-

*Cosmic Philosophy," Vol. 2, p. 357.

†"Primitive Culture, Vol. 2, pp. 326-427.

‡The separate origin of religion and morality is, of course, not generally admitted. Pfleiderer, for instance, denies that they stood originally in no connection with each other. "It is an incontrovertible fact," he says, "that the primitive morality stands in very close connection with the primitive religion."—"Philosophy and Development of Religion," Vol. 1, Chap. 2. On a question of this kind, however, the opinion of an ethnographer is more valuable than that of a theologian.

Digitized by Google

ity are so often identified is that in the higher religions they are practically co-extensive. We are thus brought to the conclusion that a definition of religion in terms of a special form of action or conduct is as erroneous as a definition in terms of belief, and yet we must admit that action like belief is an element in religion.

Wherever an individual or racial phenomenon is manifested in belief or action, there is always present also another element, namely, feeling. It is not strange, then, that the religious feeling, or the feeling of impotence which the human mind experiences before the forces of nature, and out of which all religious idea, however elaborate or complex, are derived, has been fixed upon by some writers as the essence of, or the essential element in religion. Schleiermacher's definition of religion as "a feeling of absolute dependence" at once comes to mind. Mr. John Fiske declares that the feeling of dependence is the essential element in the theistic idea;* and Prof. Ward says, "It is this sense of helplessness before the majesty of the environment, which if it is not religion itself is the foundation upon which all religion is built."† But even those who define religion in terms of feeling do not pretend that a mere feeling is sufficient to constitute religion. Neither Schleiermacher nor Pfleiderer, who emphasize this element, contend that religion is identical with feeling. In every religious act, says the latter philosopher, the whole personality is present. Why then should we define religion in terms of feeling, when feeling, like belief and action, is merely an element in religion?

The result of our discussion thus far may be summed up in the following proposition: Religion manifests itself in belief, feeling and action, and these three elements are present whether we consider it ethnographically as a social device or psychologically as a phenomenon of the individual consciousness. A correct definition of religion must then depend upon the relation and relative importance of these three elements.

Now the relation in the individual consciousness, and the relative importance of perception, feeling and the conative im-

*"The Idea of God," p. 62.

†International Journal of Ethics, January, 1898.

Digitized by Google

pulse, are questions of psychology. It is to this science, and not to theology or ethnology, therefore, that we must look for a final definition of religion. The final word, however, on the nature of consciousness has not been said. But there seems to be a consensus of opinion among the later psychologists on one point, namely, that it is impossible to break up the individual consciousness into the two or three wholly separate processes of knowing, feeling and willing. "The psychic life," says Ribot, "is a continuity beginning with sensation and ending with movement,"* and this assertion is the working hypothesis and keynote of the new psychology. From sensation to perception, perception to the higher phases of knowledge, and knowledge to action there is no break, and feeling is an inevitable accompaniment of all. If this is true, if it is true that the religious consciousness is a unity embracing knowledge, feeling and the tendency to act, it does not seem that we ought to identify religion with any one of these mental phenomena. "To speak of any whole manifestation of life," says Prof. Leuba, "as being in its 'essential' nature intellectual or affective or volitional, is to misconstrue the facts, for, although it is admitted that any expression of conscious life can be analyzed into its successive moments (sensation, reflective ideation, desires, impulses, will's determination, etc.,) and that one or the other of these constituents can be at times preponderantly present to the subject's consciousness, it does by no means follow that that particular pulse of life is an idea, or a volition, or a feeling, or that one or the other of these part-processes can properly be looked upon as the essential nature of the whole. A time sequence may exist, and as a matter of fact, does exist: volition follows upon sensation and ideation. But this fact does not constitute volition the essence of psychic life."†

Psychology thus seems to estop us from identifying religion with the perceptive, the affective or the conative element, and to demand a form of definition which will include them all. Such a demand may be met, perhaps, by defining religion in

*"German Psychology of To-day," p. 7.

†"Introduction to a Psychological Study of Religion," *The Monist*, January, 1901.

Digitized by Google

terms of desire. Desire plainly implies both perception and feeling, and where these are present, action follows, for all mental states produce bodily activity of some sort. If it is considered that there might be a religious desire the influence of which would fall short of producing what is usually regarded as religious activity, the defect may possibly be remedied by the use of the word effective. A desire which produces religious activity may be called an effective desire. Religion, then, may be defined in terms of effective desire. But desire for what?

We have, already, referred to the universal perception of a power not ourselves, which perception lies at the basis of all specific religious beliefs. This power is the objective factor in religion.

The conscious recognition of this objective factor, the feeling of dependence upon it and the resultant activity are the indispensable elements of religion. What this objective factor or power is called is not of primary importance. That is a matter of intellectual interpretation. To the primitive man it is ghosts, to the modern theologian it is a personal God, and to the evolutionary philosopher it is "an Infinite and Eternal Energy." All philosophy from the crude explanations of the savage to the profoundest *Welt-anschauung* of the modern *savant* is but a series of partial interpretations, and no one can say what the final world-conception or God-idea will be. A definition of religion, therefore, should offer no interpretation of this universal power.

Given the perception of a power manifesting itself in the world, and a feeling of dependence upon it, an inevitable result will be the desire of the individual to be in right or personally advantageous relations to that power. Conscious religious activity is always in obedience to this desire. What is sacrifice, fasting, prayer, and all the other forms of propitiation, but the effort of men to put themselves in right relation to the power which they apprehend, but do not comprehend? The desire of religion, therefore, is a desire for rightness, for adjustment to the universal order, for harmonious relations with a power objectively conceived.

Digitized by Google

We may suggest, then, as a tentative definition of religion, the following: *Religion is the effective desire to be in right relations to the power manifesting itself in the universe.*

While this definition of religion is not put forward as final, the writer making no pretensions to expert psychological knowledge, it may be affirmed that no narrower definition will include all manifestations of religious life.

If the definition here given is approximately correct, it may be observed that, while it is not framed for that purpose, it is of tactical advantage to those who argue that religion is a permanent reality. For, in the first place, religion is at once removed from all danger of science. Science may attack and destroy particular forms of belief, but religion is unassailable. It is conceivable that the scythe of scientific criticism, as it sweeps over the field of religious thought, may cut down all modern theological conceptions, but the roots of religion, embedded in the soil of man's nature, will not be touched, and soon new beliefs will spring up to take the place of the old. Science can no more destroy religion than it can destroy love. Nothing can affect religion but a demonstration that no mysterious power in the world exists, and there need be no fear of that. Under this interpretation it is eminently true that only the fool hath said in his heart, There is no God.

In the second place, it is clear that if religion may be correctly defined in terms of desire, more people are religious than are usually so regarded. It sounds paradoxical to speak of a religious agnostic, or a religious atheist. And yet, a man who recognizes, and desires to be in right relations to, "an Infinite and Eternal Energy from which all things proceed," without claiming to know the ultimate nature of that energy, is religious; and as atheism, as usually understood, is merely the denial of a particular interpretation of this energy, it is not inconsistent with religion. The Buddhist, for instance, is a religious atheist.

It does not follow from our definition of religion, however, that *all* men are religious. It is conceivable that the recognition of a mysterious power in the world, apparently outside of ourselves, may not be followed by an effective desire to be in

Digitized by Google

right relations with that power. Probably at every stage of belief there have been those who have maintained toward what they themselves believed to be the source of supreme authority an attitude of indifference or defiance. Such an attitude, however, is surely the exception and not the rule. Unwillingness to accept the beliefs of an age may be an indication of superior intelligence, but the same cannot be said of an irreligious nature. Classic literature furnishes us an impressive picture of Ajax defying the lightning, but it is not written that for this procedure Ajax exalted his reputation for common-sense.

Finally, if religion has been correctly defined, it is not something that has been revealed to one people and withheld from another. It springs up naturally as an element in the nature of man. It is not dependent upon the accuracy of his thought. It appears in the dawn of intelligence in the savage, who sees God in the clouds and hears him in the wind, and manifests itself in every age and amongst every people,—in the philosopher who seeks to harmonize his life with what he regards as the eternal and unchanging principle of the universe, as well as in the saint, who looks upon the Lord as a very present help in time of trouble. Science is its handmaid, winnowing the chaff from the beliefs it has produced. The present demand is for recognition of the stability of religion, and the fearless and unsparing criticism of prevailing theological conceptions.

Ira W. Howerth.

The University of Chicago.

Digitized by Google

HAPPINESS.

I. The Revival of Eudaemonism and Hedonism. 1. Those who like the present writer defend what may, for want of a recognized title, be called a spiritual theory of morals are confronted just now by a revival of Eudaemonism and Hedonism. In the high day of Green's influence men talked as if such views were permanently refuted. It is not so now. My experience as a teacher may be exceptional, but it is noticeable that a considerable number of pupils incline to interpret morality by happiness or by pleasure. While among masters who are quite free from the materialism and naturalism which have so long been associated with self-regarding theories, Mr. McTaggart is noticeable in his adherence to pleasure as a moral criterion.

2. There are certain general causes or influences which will always favor Eudaemonism and Hedonism is this country. Happiness and pleasure are solid things, or at least have an appearance of solidity. They appeal to the self-assertive, hard-headed, slightly cynical English character, which no one would wish to see transformed. They appeal to our scientific spirit by an illusory promise of a *Pou Sto* or definite criterion or scientific explanation of morality; and the promise will always allure till that distant date when everybody will see that the moral consciousness is self-subsistent, self-judged and self-explaining.

But, apart from these general causes, special causes have contributed from time to time to strengthen self-regarding views. Through the 19th century we had the desire for an objective criterion to justify legal and political reform, sensational psychology, and the rush of biological discoveries. The influence of these is past or waning; but now special causes have arisen in their place which may be enumerated as follows:

3. (a) Many of the current "refutations" of Hedonism do not carry the same conviction as of old. Not a few people who dislike Hedonism will yet see this growing incredulity without regret. The refutations are far too ontological. They will not permanently influence any mind which does not think that

Digitized by Google

we can settle the problems of metaphysic before we need settle the problems of moral philosophy. To this I will recur presently. (II.)

4. (b) There seems to be a conviction, more or less obscurely thought, that the opponents of Hedonism have not done justice to some fundamental characteristics of our personal life. However morality be explained it must be felt by personal minds, and, felt in some particular period of time. It must be in some here and now to the individual soul or it can be nowhere and never. But it is characteristic of the Neo-Hegelian moralist to melt the individual person into society and the individual here-and-now into the everywhere-and-eternity. The "specious present," like sensation and all the lower part of our nature, is mentioned by him only to be explained away. Thus some who see clearly that the specious present is the basis of experience are tempted to connect its moral aspect, which Hegelianism interprets so strangely, with that other aspect which it ignores, the feeling tone of momentary experience. Some such consideration as this influenced, I suppose, Dr. Hodder when he said, "The unit of ethics is, within the limits of a single moment of a single self, the least appreciable welcomeness,"* i. e. pleasure.

5. (c) But not only is the recoil from the Absolute driving its opponents into Hedonism; the Absolutist himself by a process of self-diremption (if that is the proper term) is recoiling or swinging round into his own antithesis. That is how we must account for the hedonism of Mr. McTaggart. The change may seem odd, but the explanation of it seems to be as follows: The fundamental fact in our moral experience is the difference we feel between moral good and evil. Morality is based upon the moral valuation. Now the objects which are valued are human actions and characters. These each man arranges in scale according to his personal interpretation of the difference between good and evil. On Hegelian views the perfection from which, in principle, we should start is Absolute Perfection, the perfection of the Absolute Spirit. But, then, when we

*"Adversaries of the Sceptic," p. 325.

Digitized by Google

come to details, we find we are deprived of a criterion altogether. For, after all is said and done, no one is acquainted immediately with Absolute Perfection, or can describe it, save in the most empty, formal terms. But some sort of criterion the moralist must have, if he takes morality seriously, which all moralists do not. So recourse is had to something very primitive, such as pleasure; and ethical speculation is back to the days of its infancy. The latest Absolute Idealist shakes hands with the first Utilitarian.

6. Thus the time seems not inappropriate for a critical analysis of the conception of Happiness which lies at the centre of Eudaemonism. Hedonism, as such, lies outside the inquiry. To some moralists, perhaps it might seem that the two inquiries are not to be separated, and that eudaemonism and hedonism are the same thing. I admit that a rigid boundary can not be drawn between them; but still I think that a substantial distinction can be made and that the present tendency of calling every happiness-theory of morals hedonism is to be resisted. For, in the first place, the two are, as a historical fact, not coincident. Aristotle's theory is a kind of eudaemonism, but it is certainly not hedonism. Secondly, even when a moralist tells us that happiness in his doctrine is equivalent to pleasure, we should note that his doctrine gains advantage from the fact that he does use the word happiness. Such is the case with J. S. Mill and Henry Sidgwick. The higher associations connected with happiness gives their ethical doctrine a very different color from that of the Cyrenaics or the cruder French hedonists of the 18th century. But all this needs clearing up so much that I will make it the first point in my analysis.

For the convenience of the readerI will indicate now the main results I hope to reach. (a) Happiness must be distinguished from pleasure or a sum of pleasures; (b) it can neither be an end or aim of moral conduct; (c) nor its usual criterion. (d) It is the normal result of virtuous activity.

II. Happiness and Pleasure. 7. The other day in a public discussion I heard a young student lay it down that "Happiness is an elementary feeling which we share with the brutes." Let us start our analysis from this remark which obviously chal-

Digitized by Google

lenges comment. One of the higher brutes, a dog for example, may be termed happy without much violence to language. But could the term be used of one of the lower animals? Is it good, serious English to call a snail happy? Surely the expression would raise a smile. Used of a pet snail we should detect in the word a quaint overestimation of the creature's consciousness. Happiness, we feel, is not something which we share with the brutes, or, at least, not with all of them.

8. Let us now investigate the grounds of our instinctive dissent from my young disputant's remark. Is it true, as he asserted, that happiness is an elementary feeling? Compared with feelings which are admittedly elementary, happiness shows two striking differences.

Firstly it involves a synopsis or survey. When we study such elementary feelings as warmth, or pressure upon the skin, or toothache, or redness, we see that they are non-synoptic. In experiencing them we feel that we are "close up" to them. On the other hand there are others in which we are not "close up," but taking a survey. As such may be mentioned literary vanity, the feeling of having good sport, regret for lost opportunities. Now happiness is a feeling even more synoptic than those last mentioned. A single elementary pleasure, or two simultaneous elementary pleasures will not make a man happy. A young man lounging in an arm-chair before a warm fire, digesting his dinner, might say on the strength of those elementary experiences: "I am feeling remarkably happy;" but it would be only for the sake of an implied jeer at his friend close by who is painfully struggling with Aristotle for an examination. So far from being one separate, definite individual thing, happiness is a sentiment as diffused and all pervasive as sunlight. If survey be thought too reflective a term let us say that it is the general impression resulting from innumerable continuous agreeable experiences.

9. Secondly happiness implies a world of objects—something to be happy about, in common phrase. But what a contrast in this respect to an elementary feeling! Elementary feelings tell us nothing or next to nothing about the objects which cause them. Some of them, such as hunger, may affect

Digitized by Google

our mind, e. g., make us cross and miserable without our noticing their existence, let alone referring them to an objective cause. A feeling like literary vanity, on the other hand, implies a world of objects to which the agent stands in a definite relation. Still more is this so with happiness. A man who said that he was very happy indeed, but, why, he knew not, would either be suspected of having fallen in love, or at least awaken grave anxiety in the mind of his medical adviser. In some cases, truly, the objective reference is not explicit. We remember the lines in Wordsworth's *Expostulation and Reply*:

> One morning thus, by Esthwaite lake,
> When life was sweet, *I knew not why.*

Inspection shows that the poet's happiness was not the mere vital exuberance of the child or the savage, but a deep sentiment based ultimately on a judgment of the quality of the universe and his place in it, which for the time he was content not to analyze but to experience simply in its resultant emotion.

10. Happiness then is not an elementary feeling. And the same reasons prove that it is not an elementary pleasure. For a simple pleasure is merely the pleasure-tone of an elementary feeling, and as non-synoptic and non-objective as the feeling itself. Nor can happiness be a sum or series of simple pleasures. For by adding simple pleasure to simple pleasure you still get no nearer to synopsis and objective reference.

It now becomes plain why only the higher animals can be termed happy, if indeed the term is appropriate even to them. A well-kept house-dog has, or at least is often thought by his friends to have, a continuous system of interests which make him happy. Not merely is he housed, groomed and fed, petted and taken for exercise; he also lives with people who are fond of him and suppose that he reciprocates their affection. But the snail, so far as we can imagine its consciousness, does not live thus. The performance of its simple bodily functions doubtless gives it a round of pleasurable states of consciousness; but that is not enough. For a creature to be happy in the human sense there must, in psychological phrase, be a self which surveys its experiences so that it can call its enjoyments its own. And there must be for it a world of objects to which those

Digitized by Google

enjoyments are correlative. Many people doubt if these conditions are fulfilled by any creature lower than man.

11. Now let us leave the plane of animal or merely sentient life and consider whether happiness is definable as a sum or series of ordinary human pleasures. I hold that it should not be thus defined and here agree with the majority of moral idealists. But I think that many of the arguments used to support this conclusion are, to put it plainly, quite chimerical. And I will instance two or three of them to show how my point of view differs from theirs:

"Pleasures cannot be summed because they perish as soon as enjoyed." But surely nobody expects to make a sum or collection of enduring pleasures in the way that he makes a collection of postage stamps. It is an old story that no one can both eat his cake and also have it. You cannot have an enduring sum of good dinners; but you can have a series of them which the mind can look back over and survey with satisfaction, as the gluttonous old custom-house superintendent did in the introduction of Hawthorne's "Scarlet Letter."

Again: "Pleasures cannot be summed because they are not homogeneous." Why not? At some particular good dinner we may have listened to much brilliant conversation. And the viands and the talk may combine quite naturally in our total remembrance of the meal.

Again: "To attempt to realize a sum of pleasures commits us to the impossible task of realizing an infinite series." But nobody wants to realize an infinite series. The inveterate diner-out wants to live to be 80 and have good teeth and digestion to the last. He is not so foolish as to aspire to eat an infinite number of dinners; 29,200 (or 36×80) dinners are enough for him.

The short objection to arguments of this type is that they are entirely up in the air, and have no reference to the facts of human life and character. The reason why happiness is not definable as a sum of pleasures is that a mere sum or series of pleasures does not suffice to make man happy.

12. I am not saying that a man cannot aim at achieving the greatest possible sum of pleasures. The ordinary decent citi-

Digitized by Google

zen never dreams of such a thing; but the attempt is constantly made by people who do not deserve that term. Such people never enter on anything unless they see the prospect of pleasure in it; and never stick to anything longer than it furnishes them with pleasure. Experience, however, shows that it is the rarest possible case for such people to make themselves happy. Even if remorse and satiety can be kept at bay, such conduct, being highly destructive to the social fabric, is universally detested, and the consistent hedonist sinks finally under the execrations of his alienated friends.

13. The fact is that the happy man must not only have objects to be happy about, but these objects must furthermore form a system. In the case of an ordinary man who has been happy for a year, it is inconceivable that he should have been happy for one reason in January, happy for quite another reason in February, and so on. A year-long experience would imply that he went through a steady system of enjoyable experiences due to his being able to satisfy his interest in a system of objects; and the failure of his happiness would be accounted for by the impairment of some vital element or condition of that system, as that his wife became an invalid, or that he had lost a considerable sum of money. The life of the consistent hedonist, as described in the preceding paragraph is the direct negation of such a system.

14. In spite of my deep respect for the ethical genius of J. S. Mill and Henry Sidgwick, I think that their views on the connection of happiness and pleasure are far less philosophical than what we find suggested in so old a book as Aristotle's "Ethics." "By happiness," says Mill, "is intended pleasure and the absence of pain.* "By greatest possible happiness," says Sidgwick, "we understand the greatest possible surplus of pleasure over pain."† I do not think that Sidgwick would have adopted this quantitative method of statement, so entirely foreign to any actual experience we have of happiness, except from a mistaken idea of making the idea of it precise and so fit-

*"Utilitarianism," p. 10.

†"Methods of Ethics," 6th edition, p. 120.

Digitized by Google

ting it "for the purpose of scientific discussion." The view we find in Aristotle is that, though happiness requires as its condition material comfort and brings with it a pleasure of its own, it lies essentially in the successful activity of the highest part of the soul. There are grave objections to be made to various points in Aristotle's view, but I think he was right in suggesting that pleasure accompanies a happy life, but is not an ultimate element into which happiness can be resolved.

15. The relation of pleasure to happiness is made clearer by the fact that there are cases, not perhaps numerous, but still very important, where the two are separated. I refer to such cases as those in which men have lived to realize a great idea, not without success, but with constant toil, suffering and partial disappointment. One can imagine the Apostle Paul saying at his death, "My life has been happy," but he would hardly have said, "My life has been pleasant." No doubt Carlyle was thinking of this distinction when he contrasted happiness with blessedness. Pleasure is very important to happiness, but is not the essential thing in it.

III. Happiness and the End. 16. To establish the second main contention of my paper that happiness cannot be made an end or aim of conduct, we have only to carry our analysis a stage farther. We have seen that happiness, to put it briefly, is the result of work, using the term "work" in the widest sense. Is this result so definite and substantive that we can make it an end or aim? To this question a great many people, eminent thinkers among them, would answer, Yes. "Try to be happy yourself and to make others happy," is a popular formula for the conduct of life. Let us see if it can be justified.

17. As used with reference to one's own life happiness is for the most part a retrospective term. "I was very happy when I lived in London." It is used less often of the future: "I expect I shall be very happy in London." And still less often of the present: "I am very happy in London." In reference to the future and still more in reference to the present we expect to hear some term less vague than happiness. "I like my work in London very much," and "I expect I shall like my work," are more natural phrases. This points to the fact that

Digitized by Google

happiness is not so much a substantial result as a general impression. The definite, substantial things in life for me are the interests which claim my energies and time. If this be so, it is evident why the retrospective use of the term is more appropriate. I no longer live in London; my work there, whatever it was, is over. Its interests have dropped into the background; new ones have come in their place. A general impression is what I am most conscious of in looking back over them. In its impressional character the term happiness is very like the term success. Relatively to the outward results achieved I call my London career successful; relatively to its effect on my personal satisfaction I call it happy. But when used of the future and still more of the present the impressional term is needlessly vague. The statement, "I am very happy in London," would only be made to a stranger who could not be expected to know precisely what the speaker's work was and where its interest lay, but would like to know that, whatever it was, he found his satisfaction therein. Spoken to a colleague the phrase, "I am happy in this work," would sound very odd. We should expect to hear, "I like this work." No one who knew the circumstances intimately would ever ask a man if he was happy in the work. If a man likes the work and can do it he is assumed to be happy in it as a matter of course.

18. There is the further difficulty about aiming at happiness that it is got by activities of infinitely various kinds. To illustrate this we may recur to the parallel conception, already mentioned, of "success." It is not uncommon for a man to say, or think, at the beginning of his career that, in any case, he means to be successful. Taken quite literally, this is an absurd resolution. Success in burglary is a totally different thing from success in poetry. What the young man really means is that he will choose some honorable career and apply all his faculties to winning an honorable position in it. It is still less common, for obvious reasons, to hear a young man declare that he means to be happy. But supposing that he did, the resolution would be impossible because of its vagueness. The objection which Aristotle makes to Plato's Ideal Good is relevant

Digitized by Google

to the happiness-seeker. He is in pursuit of a blank form which leaves him wholly without direction.

19. These considerations lead to the somewhat startling conclusion that no one makes it his direct and primary aim to be happy. I do not mean to say that in conduct there is no reference to happiness; that is a point which will be touched on in the fifth division of my essay. But neither at the time of action, nor afterwards when the agent is thinking his action over, does happiness appear as the end or aim which the action is directed to achieve.

But what of the consistent hedonist? if we may ask. Does he not aim at happiness? I should doubt if he did, speaking with psychological strictness. The philosophic gentleman who was "willing for the purposes of science to devote himself to a life of absolute egoism"* did not seek happiness, but a series of pleasures. For, as we have seen, happiness is different from pleasure, which, especially in its more immediate and physical forms, can certainly be made an aim of action. It is true that the distinction between happiness and pleasure must not be drawn too sharply. Both are feeling-tone concomitants of the successful exercise of function. But with happiness the feeling-tone is so highly generalized, so purely adjectival to the activities which cause it, that it cannot be made the aim of action.

20. It may be asked: What then is the end of conduct, if it be not pleasure or happiness? This question I cannot do justice to; not because it is insoluble, but because it takes us too far afield. Moreover it assumes that we can speak legitimately of a Summum Bonum or Supreme End of life, which I think exceedingly disputable. It implies that all our activities and interests are subordinate to something beyond them; whereas I should argue that they are self-justified. However, if the conception of a Supreme End is still to be used, it should be interpreted as the totality of a man's higher activities, morality, knowledge and art. The pursuit of these organized interests in infinitely various ways by the individual agent would constitute his "end;" and happiness would be his grateful feeling of the end's attainment.

*See *Mind*, December, 1901, p. 142.

Digitized by Google

21. The objections against the possibility of aiming at happiness for one's self hold good in strictness against aiming at the happiness of other people. Their happiness is no less a blank adjective than one's own. But, speaking loosely, we often say that we aim at the happiness of others; and a certain valid sense can be attached to this. We have seen that "happiness," like "chance," is largely a convenient term for covering a field in which details are unknown. "So-and-so is very happy in London"—such a phrase saves us the trouble of specifying what So-and-so's interests are and how far exactly he manages to satisfy them. In speaking of others we can with propriety use vague phrases which would be absurd about ourselves. If I said, "I mean to be happy," some judicious friend would be sure to remark: "You had much better interest yourself in the duties of your station." But the same rebuke could not be made so forcibly to the declaration, "I mean to make my children happy." For I may not know precisely what my children's interests and opportunities are going to be. But if I had that knowledge my friend might fairly say: "I shouldn't waste time over good resolutions. See that the children have a good education." What the father really wants for his children is their moral welfare; this will consist mainly in the pursuit of certain objective interests, which, again, with moderate good fortune, will result in happiness. Every man of true worldly wisdom knows that we cannot "make people happy." We can only give them our love and sympathy, and put them in a way whereby they may make themselves happy.

IV. Happiness and the Moral Criterion. 22. The third point of my essay is that happiness is not the usual moral criterion.* Before proceeding to it let us try for greater definiteness by considering the relation between the aim or end of conduct and the criterion. The essential fact in moral experience; if we were fortunate enough to get a positive knowledge of it, would be at the same time motive, end and criterion of con-

*The following sections traverse some of the arguments of Mr. McTaggart's chapter on "The Supreme Good and the Moral Criterion" in his "Studies in Hegelian Cosmology."

Digitized by Google

duct. Suppose we concluded that some sort of benevolent sentiment was the essence of morality, and that it could be positively known; then of any particular act we could say that benevolent sentiment was its motive, the manifestation of benevolence its aim, and the perfect type of benevolence its criterion. But it might happen that the principle we fix on as the essence of morality is not one which can be positively known. In Mr. McTaggart's view, Perfection is the supreme fact in morals. Perfection, however, cannot be positively known and therefore cannot be used as a criterion. Therefore we must fall back on pleasure. Such a theory illustrates the possible divergence between the end and the criterion.

23. Moral criterion has two ways of application; it may be used to determine the goodness of the agent's will, or the expediency of his action; in other words, it may be a criterion of moral value or of moral expediency. Let us take the two ways in order.

(a). There is one interpretation of the happiness-criterion which is now given up on all hands. No one argues now, as Bentham and James Mill did, that the moral goodness of a man's will is to be measured by the total amount of happiness which he actually causes. It is seen to be the merest pedantry to insist on judging a man by the results of his action instead of by the intrinsic quality of his will.

But there is another sense of the formula which is not so far discredited. Many people hold that a man's will is good according as he aims at the happiness of others. This, I think, is not true; but it will be gathered from the preceding part of this essay that I do not think it violently false. I have said that it is impossible to aim at the happiness of others, if we use strict language. At the same time I should not hold it false to say that men are moral in so far as they are benevolent towards others. The difference between feeling benevolent towards others and aiming at their happiness may in some cases be rather fine; but I think that it is real.

24 (b). Let us pass to moral expediency. In such cases a man is supposed to have chosen the right, but not to be certain what course will give effect to it. It is not a question of a

Digitized by Google

good will, but of good judgment. To find out which of two or more suggested courses will give the best moral results the man has to embark on a computation of consequences. Now is this usually a computation of happiness? I think not. When, having only two boarding-schools to choose from, a boy's parents decide upon the school where he will learn manliness with a chance of picking up bad language, instead of the one where speech is carefully regulated but snobbishness prevails, they are consulting not the boy's happiness primarily, but his moral welfare; though it may be true that they regard moral welfare as a prime contributory to happiness. The parents do not need to take happiness into account, because they know facts which are more essential, *i. e.*, the character and circumstances of the boy and the probable effect of the school-tone upon them.

25. Where, however, the facts essential to a sound casuistical decision are not fully known we tend more and more to speak of happiness. A man who had made a certain provision in his will which will affect his descendants would probably justify himself by saying that he had acted with a view to their happiness.

Thus it is natural that in questions of political expediency (using expediency in the higher sense) we should speak much more of happiness than of moral welfare. And yet it would be a grave mistake to forget that the aim of political and public action is primarily moral. An advocate of a Sunday Closing Bill may throw his argument into the form that it would increase the happiness of the people. But he usually means that it would improve their moral condition by diminishing the opportunities of temptation.

26. Happiness then may be employed as a criterion; but it is not the usual criterion. And when it is employed, there is always a reference to moral improvement, explicit or latent. It is not a moral act to enhance enjoyment as such. This is true even where the area of enjoyment is very wide, as in the case of the enjoyment of a whole community. No one would take the moral credit to himself for increasing the enjoyment of Sodom and Gomorrah. But as a rule it is assumed that cities are more good than evil; for we believe that societies flour-

Digitized by Google

ish mainly in virtue of their moral qualities. Thus we approve without hesitation of a man who gives a park to a town. The act evinces, on the one hand, a spirit of appreciative benevolence towards men; and, on the other, by providing opportunities for harmless pleasure, it lightens the burdens of life for men who on the whole are using life well. Our approval does not show that we are using a simple happiness-criterion.

V. Virtue, Happiness and Individuality. 27. "But," the eudaemonist reader will exclaim, "where then does happiness come in? You say it is not the end or criterion of morality. Do you mean that it is not an element of the moral life at all?" I reply: "Certainly it is"; and no misunderstanding on the subject could have arisen, but for a prevalence of the ascetic interpretation of morality. As soon as we realize that morality is not in its essence repression and subjection but a positive activity of our nature, we see that enjoyment must accompany it, unless special hindrances intervene. This is the true meaning of the adage that virtue brings happiness. And the enjoyment of moral activity not only colors our view of the fact and heightens our zest for the present; it also influences our plans for the future. There would be no serious inaccuracy in saying that the virtuous man aims at *virtuous* happiness, so long as the main emphasis is kept upon the adjective.

28. And we must remember that our moral activity is an activity of individuals. There is no such thing as morality-in-general; there are only the lives of moral men. Hence the element of self-assertion and individuality in conduct. It is relevant to mention this element here, because I think that the claim to be happy is really in many cases the claim to live one's own life. Not only have we to strive for material goods and resist encroaching forces; we choose the mode in which we are to live the moral life and ourselves enjoy it with a feeling into which no one can directly enter. On the higher planes of life we embrace our mode of moral living (for the modes are many) with a personal affirmation; and however devoted our life may be the devotion is ours alone, and ours alone the sweetness and bitterness of it.

Digitized by Google

VI. Summary. 29. Let us conclude by summarizing the results of the essay. It does not profess to have refuted eudaemonism. No refutation is worth much but that which supplants a bad theory by a better, which I do not profess to have done. But I think that what has been said brings out the main difficulties of eudaemonism.

Hedonism I have not attacked directly. It has a good deal to say for itself on sociological and biological grounds. But it is important that it should not be allowed to strengthen its position by drawing to itself the associations of the honored term Happiness. And, on the other side, it is not fair that eudaemonism should have the support, such as it is, which is given to it under the belief that it is a mere pleasure-theory. The issues are made much plainer by restoring the classical distinction between the two great self-regarding interpretations of morality.

The analysis of the third and fourth divisions of the essay is meant to show that we cannot rest in eudaemonism. Happiness is an infinitely important result of moral conduct and every moralist must take most serious account of it in framing his theory. But if we neither aim at it nor judge by it, it cannot be the essential feature of moral experience. There must be some principle more central; and I have hinted that this is a form of Benevolence.

The fifth division indicates very slightly the true place in moral experience of happiness and of that principal of individuality which is so closely bound up with it.

But whether or not my analysis of happiness be thought successful I am sure that the analytic method is wanted just now. Philosophic discussion is full of uncritical and uncriticised ethical concepts which sceptics seem the most ready to take for granted. It is the business of the analyist to translate them back into the facts which they symbolize and hide from us. Not till the facts are clear before us can we have that constructive work which is so much needed in moral philosophy.

HENRY STURT.

OXFORD.

Digitized by Google

THE ETHICS OF ST. AUGUSTINE.

No other philosopher has exerted so deep and so abiding an influence upon popular thought as has St. Augustine. From his day to our own orthodox theology has been based upon his teachings. All the evangelical denominations borrow their views of God and of morals (though with some modifications) directly from St. Augustine. What he thought, therefore, on the vital question of right and wrong, in God and in man, and the influences which led him to his conclusions, are subjects of real importance even to-day.

Philosophy in St. Augustine's time, was divided into three heads: the moral, the logical, and the physical; and God, according to Augustine, is the principle of all three. He is the Good, the Truth, and the Absolutely Beautiful.

Perhaps by saying God is good I do not represent Augustine's teaching so well as I should if I reversed the expression and said Good is God. God eternally is what He is, and that is good which is in accordance with God's will. All the moral attributes we mortals acknowledge—justice, mercy, holiness, and the like—God has in absolute perfection; yet God so transcends our comprehension that His goodness is as different from our goodness as the heavens are high above the earth. All good things are good because they partake in Good—*i. e.* in God. And, "discarding these derived goods, conceive, if you can, the good in itself, and it is God which you conceive."

God is righteousness itself; that which He does is right and that is right which He does. Obedience to His will, moreover, is the criterion of right for all His creatures. But Augustine does not stop here as so many theologians do. He adds, It is our duty to do the will of God because His will is our deepest will too. No moral law forced on us entirely from without and foreign to our nature could be morally binding on us. "Departure from God would be no vice unless in a nature whose property it was to abide in God." (De Civitate Dei.) Even the arch fiend can be called sinful only because it was originally his deepest will to abide in God, and he disobeyed

Digitized by Google

the commands of his own nature; "for if sin be natural it is not sin at all."

What then is sin? This brings us to the great problem of evil, the central point in Augustine's philosophy.

The Manichæans taught that evil was a substance, a component part of the world, a second and independent principle opposed to God. The Platonists said that matter was evil and that it was eternal and uncreated. Neither of these dualistic views could Augustine accept. Nothing but God could be independent and self existent, for all things were created by Him. But, the Manichæans maintained, if God made all things He must have made evil, and so He cannot be good. No, responded Augustine, that does not follow. God made all things yet He did not make evil; and this because evil is not a thing. Evil is entirely negative. It is not a substance but the corruption of substance, the privation of being. "All nature in so far as it is nature is good. For if it is incorruptible it is better than a corruptible nature; and if it is corruptible, since in corruption it becomes less good, it without doubt is good. But all nature is corruptible or incorruptible. Consequently all nature is good." ("De Libero Arbitrio.") Augustine would say "Whatever is is right", and would probably add, Whatever is not is wrong. All being is good, and since God made only that which is, not that which is not, He cannot be held responsible for evil.

But to be more explicit: evil is a turning away from God, the source of all being—who alone in the fullest sense is—to something which has less of reality, and this turning away is due not to God but to the free will of man. The Manichæans had said the will was not free, and against this Augustine vehemently protested, as, only by making the will free could the existence of evil, even in this negative form, be regarded as compatible with the goodness of God. Free will is a good and the good God must have given it to the angels and to Adam at creation. And if one objects that the angels who were to fall were given a will such that they would turn from God and that God therefore is responsible, Augustine answers, No! a free will is a free will. That is, it is an efficient, un-

Digitized by Google

caused cause. For if you persist in demanding a cause for the will you only go back to another will, and as there is as much need for asking the reason for this will you are driven backward in an endless regress and never reach a resting place. The free evil will is therefore an uncaused cause.

Moreover the very existence of evil depends on the freedom of the will; "without it there could be neither good nor bad action." "Whatever be the cause of the will, if one cannot resist it, one yields to it without sin." ("De Lib. Ar.") The whole system of Christian theology stands or falls with freedom. "Punishment is unjust and recompense becomes nonsense if man has not a free will." ("De Lib. Ar.")

It is the will, therefore, and the will alone, that is essentially evil. The thing toward which the evil will turns is neither evil nor good. Nothing is evil but the evil will.

We have seen that the Manichæan doctrine of necessity drove Augustine to elaborate and fortify the doctrine of freedom on which his ethical system was founded. Now no sooner had he finished with the Manichæans than he found himself in trouble with the Pelagians. The Pelagians made freedom the central point of their doctrines and carried it out to its logical and extreme conclusions—conclusions which Augustine thought subversive to all sound doctrine.

It is possible that when Augustine took up the cudgels in behalf of freedom against the Manichæans he did not foresee the logical end of the struggle. For if the will is free to choose good or evil then it is possible for us to be good in our own strength, grace is not essential, the redemption was not absolutely necessary, and the power of the church is materially decreased and its sacraments are no longer indispensable. Pelagius and his coadjutor Celestius had the hardihood to follow out this doctrine of freedom even to these lengths; and Augustine felt that here was greater danger to the true faith then even from Manichæism, and that it was his duty to destroy this new heresy in the germ. Yet a decided difficulty confronted him; for if he admitted freedom how could he consistently avoid the conclusions of the Pelagians? How could freedom and saving grace both be retained

Digitized by Google

Briefly it was done in this way: God, said Augustine, gave Adam perfect freedom to choose both good and evil. Adam chose evil and was justly punished by the corruption of his nature and the consequent loss of freedom to choose the good. Now Adam was the representative of the race and all his descendants sinned in him and justly inherited from him his corrupted nature and his inability to choose the right. Therefore, as all men are necessarily sinners, it would only be just if all were eternally damned. But, God out of his mercy has provided for some a way of escape by sending His Son, the Second Person in the Trinity, to offer Himself as an atoning sacrifice and so to satisfy divine justice. As a result of this, God is enabled by the application of grace and of the water of baptism to save certain members of this corrupted and undeserving race whom from all eternity he foreknew and elected unto life. Nor are the elect chosen from any merit of their own, but purely by the will of God. The rest, the great majority of the race, are to receive throughout eternity the punishment which all deserved.

This question of freedom and grace Augustine made, especially in his later years, the vital point of his philosophy. And we ought to consider it somewhat in detail.

And first as to Adam's fall. How was it possible, the Pelagians asked, that we all sinned in Adam? To this Augustine responded that just how we sinned in him was a mystery; but that we did so was proved by many passages of Scripture, such as "In Adam all die" etc. Moreover it was only natural that he, being the representative and progenitor of the race, should transmit his corrupted nature to his descendants. If Augustine had held the generation of souls, the inheritance of original sin would have been much simpler; but at any rate our bodies were descended from Adam, and as he was the first of the race he stood for it and the results of his action were inherited along with our bodies and our animal natures. "God, in fact, the Author of natures and not of vices, created man pure, but man corrupted by his own nature and justly condemned, engendered children corrupted and condemned like himself. We were truly all in him. We had not yet received our indi-

Digitized by Google

vidual essence, but the germ from which we were to come already was, and as it already was, and as it was corrupted by sin and bound by a just condemnation, man being born of man could not be born in any other condition." ("De. Civ. Dei.") "For nothing else could be born from them (Adam and Eve) than that which they themselves had been." ("De Civ. Dei.") "Thus from the bad use of freedom there originated the whole train of evil" which leads to eternal damnation,—"those only being excepted who are freed by the grace of God." ("De. Civ. Dei.")

Both Pelagius and Augustine appealed to facts to support their doctrines. Consciousness showed, Pelagius maintained, that we had the freedom of choice; this was the fundamental presupposition of a large part of our thinking. Augustine, on the other hand, pointed out the universality of sin and argued from this that it was not an accident but a fundamental part of human nature. The will was thoroughly corrupted; man of his own strength could not be perfect. No absolutely sinless person could be found. Truly there was a law in our members warring against the law of our mind and bringing us into captivity to the law of sin. Moreover we can see plainly that the sins of the fathers are visited upon the children. The laws of heredity, as we would call them, are like the laws of Fate. You can never escape them and you know it. The consciousness of every man bears witness to the corruption of his nature. The blighting, damning effect of original sin is terribly inevitable.

Augustine would never admit that he had entirely given up free will; for he himself in his controversy with the Manichæans had founded his doctrine of evil upon it. The will was still free, he maintained, but "the will makes use of its freedom only for evil and could not do the good without the help of grace." ("De Civ.") Freedom, he says, consists in the power to do as we will. But what we will is determined. We cannot have the power of choice, for that would give too much power to our nature and make good and evil actions spring from the same root. The choice must have a cause and the two real causes are original sin and grace. Man is nevertheless re-

Digitized by Google

sponsible for his actions because he does what he does with his will and not against it.

The Pelagians pressed the matter still further and maintained that what Augustine described as freedom was not freedom at all and that a man must be free to choose either good or evil, or he could not be called either good or bad. To this Augustine responded that good and evil were not conditioned by any such form of freedom. For if that were the only sort of freedom, God and the saints could not be considered free, since they were above the possibility of evil. Free will is not the power of choice; it is, to be exact, "a movement of the soul which without outward constraint bears itself toward something it does not wish to lose or wishes to attain." There are three kinds of freedom: that of God, the good angels, and the saints, who are free to do right but not to do wrong; that of Adam before the fall, who was free to do either right or wrong; that of unregenerated men after the fall, who are free to do wrong but not to do right.

But "as in Adam all die so in Christ shall all be made alive."

The salvation made possible through the Redemption is applied by means of grace which is given to the elect and to the elect only; and those to whom this grace is not given, cannot do right. "To turn toward God, that is for us impossible without His excitation and without His help." ("De Peccatorum Meritis et Remissione.") The most perfect man without grace cannot do right any more than the most perfect eye can see without light.

Those to whom grace is to be given were from all eternity foreknown and predestinated by God. Their number is definite and cannot be increased or diminished. Those who are elected and predestined to salvation will be saved; the rest will be damned. If there are some who obey but who are elected to death, they will find themselves destitute of the strength necessary to obey, in order that they may cease to obey. The eternal decrees of God are not to be altered by the actions of any mortals. "The human race is so apportioned that in some is displayed the efficacy of merciful

Digitized by Google

grace, in the rest the efficacy of just retribution. For both could not be displayed in all; for if all had remained under punishment of just condemnation there would have been seen in no one the mercy of redeeming grace. And on the other hand, if all had been transferred from darkness to light the severity of retribution would have been manifest in none. But many more are left under punishment than are delivered from it, in order that it may thus be shown what was due to all." ("De Civ.")

Those who are elected unto life are no more worthy than those who are elected unto death. It is not for our merits we are chosen; the only basis of choice is the will of God. "Otherwise grace would not be Grace; for Grace is thus called because it is given freely." "It is, then, not in virtue of their merits nor by free will that men are restored, but by grace. The good will comes from God. Repentance itself is the gift of God." ("Encheiridion.") "Within the number of the elect, even those who have led the worst lives are by the goodness of God led to repentance." "The first desire of the good is inspired by God in such a manner that man absolutely does not commence to turn from evil to good if it is not brought about in him by the spontaneous and gratuitous pity of God." ("Contra duas Epistolas Pelagianorum.") "God in fact operates in the hearts of men to incline their wills where He pleases, either to good according to His mercy, or to evil according to their merits." ("De Gratia et Libero Arbitrio.") "None would be exempt from punishment which he merits if he were not delivered by a grace he does not merit, and such is the division of men that one sees in some free pity, in the rest just vengeance." ("De Civ.")

The elect, moreover, cannot possibly fail of salvation. No man, to be sure, need accept grace if he does not want to; but the power of God is so great that he will want to. Grace in short is "insurmountable." "The faith of the elect which worketh by love either never faileth, or, if it does, is repaired before life is ended; and, all intervening iniquity blotted out, perseverance unto the end is imparted to them." ("De Corruptione.") God makes men to persevere in good." "God makes

Digitized by Google

whom He will religious." "Man never does good things which God does not make him do."

But while the elect are to be saved by receiving the grace of God they can receive it only through the sacraments of the church, especially through baptism. In this act the nature is purified, the corruption of the will is done away, and the ability to do right is restored. Of course none of those predestined to life will fail of it for lack of baptism, and God brings it about that all the elect shall be baptized. And so one can say with assurance that outside the church there is no possibility of salvation. There is only one exception to this. If a man die unbaptized but confessing Christ this confession is of the same efficacy for pardon as if he had been baptized. But this is an extreme case, and if there is an opportunity for baptism mere confession will not save. And good works without baptism of course will not save; for only baptism can, in a mysterious manner, purge the nature and remove the curse of original sin.

To say that none outside of the church are saved is not the same thing as saying that all within the church are saved. On the contrary, a large proportion of those who have received the sacraments are elected unto death. And no one, not even the holiest, can tell whether or not he is among God's chosen few; for if he knew it, the knowledge might make him proud and sinful. This uncertainty, of course, extends only to those within the church; it is easy enough to tell where all others belong. And inasmuch as within the church alone is there any sort of safety, it behooves all those without it to be baptized and received within the Catholic faith.

All those whom God has not predestined unto life will receive the due reward of their guilty natures and be eternally punished. "Those who are not delivered by grace, either because they could not yet hear, or because they did not wish to obey, or because their age did not permit them to hear; these, not having received the baptism of regeneration which they might have received in order to be saved, are justly condemned." ("De Natura et Gratia.") "But for the rest (those not elected unto life) where are they but in that mass of perdi-

Digitized by Google

tion where the Divine Justice most justly leaves them?—where the Tyrians are and the Sidonians are, who would have been able to believe if they had seen the miracles of Christ; but who, inasmuch as faith was not destined for them, were denied the means of faith as well." ("De Dono Perseverantia.")

The punishment of the damned will be eternal. It must be measured not by the time of their acts but by the nature of their wills. And as they would have wished to enjoy pleasure eternally it is just that they should be punished eternally. And still the condemned soul ought to be grateful to God, for it exists, and existence in any form is better than non-existence.

There may perhaps be degrees in punishment; the infant who dies at birth will not suffer so much as the criminal. Still "for heathen unbaptized children there is no hope in the world to come of ever seeing God. Their punishment may be a thing of degrees, but it will be endless." ("De Civ.") It is only right that infants should be punished, for it is evident that they take the nature of their parents; and as their parents' nature is corrupt, theirs must be. The same may be said of the heathen. To be sure, Augustine says in one striking passage, "All those who having believed in God since the foundation of the world and having had some knowledge of Him have lived in piety and justice, keeping the Commandments, have without doubt been saved by Him." ("Epistolæ.") Yet this does not refer to the heathen. For however virtuous they may have seemed, such as Fabius, Scipio, Pythagoras, and Plato, their virtues were but "splendid vices," without justice, since justice is impossible without faith. For justice means belief in God—not in any God, but in the one true God—and gratitude to Him. And as these men never heard of the true God they cannot have had faith, and so cannot have been just. "The heathen who have not had the faith of Christ are not just and do not please God, to whom it is impossible to be pleasing without faith. Fabricius will be punished less than Catiline not because he was good but because Catiline was bad; and if Fabricius was less impious than Catiline it is not because he had any real virtues, but because he

Digitized by Google

was not so far removed from the real virtues." ("Contra Julianum Pelagianorum.")

If now one says, as the Pelagians did, that it is not just that the heathen and unbaptized children should be punished, Augustine replies that it would be only just if the whole race were condemned to eternal punishment, and that it is only through the infinite mercy of God that any are saved. But if one presses the question and says that it cannot be just to punish a man whose will is not free, Augustine falls back on the answer that it is a mystery. God's ways are not our ways, neither are His thoughts our thoughts. God's justice is incomprehensible, it is not like our justice and cannot be measured by human standards. We only know that somehow or other His will is perfectly just. And we must stop there.

This in short is Augustine's teaching as to the basis of Right, Sin, and Punishment.

Augustine's doctrine of Right he did not get from the church but apparently worked it out by himself, combining in it the best of Greek and Christian ethics. It is in my opinion not only one of the best things in Augustine's philosophy but also the soundest ethical theory that I know. I will briefly give my reasons for prizing it so highly.

What, then, is the basis of right? The average theologian of Augustine's day and of our own would respond, Obedience to the will of God. But why obey the will of God? Because He is mighty and will punish disobedience? If you say Yes you have shifted your basis of right from God's will either to might or to the avoidance of suffering, and you tacitly admit that if the devil were the mightiest we ought to obey him. But you may respond No, we ought to obey God because He is good. And again you have shifted your ground; for in saying this you have admitted a criterion outside of God's will by which His will is judged good. The real basis and criterion of right must evidently be sought elsewhere.

If you say that the criterion of right must be the fulfillment of the demands of the greatest number I ask why ought I to fulfill these demands? And if you respond, Because they will bring about the greatest good to the whole, I ask again, Why

Digitized by Google

is it my duty to seek any one's good but my own? And you cannot answer me without retreating to some new criterion.

In like manner hedonism will never be able to show why pleasure as such should be the chief object of endeavor; nor can the Christian doctrine of gratitude to God answer our persistent "Why?" And the same criticism, I maintain, holds of every system of ethics. However logical they may pretend to be, when you have traced them back as far as they will go, there is always an unanswered *Why* staring you in the face. As Mr. Arthur Balfour says, "If a proposition announcing obligation requires proof at all, one term of that proof must always be a proposition announcing obligation which itself requires no proof." "If we have a moral system at all there must be contained in it at least one ethical proposition of which no proof can be given or required."

If, therefore, we are to have any basis for our ethics it must be in a region where no answer to the eternal Why is required. And this region can be found nowhere but in the will of the individual. This is, of course, to take refuge in the autonomy of the will and in the ethics of Aristotle. Why ought I to live consistently with my own deepest nature? Why do I like one thing rather than another? Why do I seek for good at all? There is no answer to any of these questions; but the questions themselves are impertinent. We have reached here an ultimate fact which we must merely accept; we can never get beyond our deepest instinctive nature.

Nothing is good apart from the will. Everything is good so far as it satisfies the will. And the highest good for each man is that which most fully satisfies his most fundamental will. If it is not really my inmost will to obey God there is no sense in which it can be said to be my duty to obey Him. Duty is not a thing that can be forced on me from without. The fundamental basis for all right for me must be found in my own nature.

Perhaps I have read into Augustine more than he really thought, but if I am not mistaken this is what he meant when he said: "Departure from God would be no vice unless in a nature whose property it was to abide in God," and, "If sin be natural it is not sin at all."

Digitized by Google

But if we accept this view we must not be blind to its logical consequences. If consistency with one's nature be the criterion of right, then it will follow that each man is the measure of morality to himself, and that to a man whose nature was fundamentally impure, impurity would be right and purity wrong. There is no escaping this admission. And I see no way of reconciling the autonomy of the will with the universality of any ethical law except the way that Augustine took; namely, to postulate that, while the basis of right for each man is his own nature, the natures of all men are fundamentally the same; that while we differ in innumerable particulars, the deepest will in us all is identical. Thus the applicability of ethical laws is made universal. But something more than this is needed to give morality the authority which it should have, and this Augustine gives by saying that we are fundamentally alike because we are all made in the image of our Creator; that the deepest will in us is also the will of God. And so a divine sanction is given to our moral convictions, and the deepest thing in the universe becomes the distinction between right and wrong as we know right and wrong.

I cannot close this essay without saying something on Augustine's doctrine of freedom and grace, although the criticisms to which it is open must be obvious to every one. The metaphysical question of freedom I will not discuss. It is very possible that we are not free; the majority of philosophers have agreed with Augustine on this point. It is the ethical aspect of freedom that is of importance in considering Augustine's philosophy, and we must consider it here.

And first of all, Is goodness possible without freedom of choice? The natural answer is the one which the Pelagians gave, namely, that goodness depends entirely upon freedom. It seems to me that in this answer goodness has been confused with merit. Goodness, in my opinion, does not depend on free will. It is easy to conceive of perfect goodness, without any real possibility of evil. God is good but it is inconceivable that He should do wrong. A man who loved good so thoroughly that evil could have no attraction for him, but would be to him absolutely and always as disagreeable and repulsive

Digitized by Google

as pain, one who had even no theoretic ability to do wrong, such a man would still be thoroughly good. And a man who loved evil so that he could not possibly do right, the law of whose members perpetually conquered the law of his mind with absolutely irresistible force, a man who had even theoretically no power to avoid evil, such a man would still be thoroughly bad.

And yet neither of these men would have any merit or demerit. Good as the former might be, it would be as absurd to praise or reward him for his goodness as it would be to praise or reward a normal human being for not killing his mother. So, too, while we call God good we cannot say He is meritorious. In like manner we could not blame the bad man. There seem, therefore, to be two ethical standards, one of goodness and one of merit; and while merit is impossible without freedom, goodness is independent of freedom.

Augustine, therefore, was not inconsistent when he said that we were wicked in spite of the fact that we could not do right. But he was wrong when he said that though we were not free still our sins were our own fault and that we would justly be punished for them. Punishment under such circumstances would be as unjust as punishment of the innocent. For if we cannot but do evil the blame does not belong to us but to Him who made us as we are.

If, therefore, we are not free to choose the right, God is responsible for our sin. No juggling with Adam's fall and inherited guilt can change the fact. If God sends us into the world so corrupted that we cannot help sinning, it is not our fault but His.—And this whether our corrupted natures are given us without reason or as a punishment for the sin of our progenitor. And to punish us for such sins is injustice if anything is. In another connection Augustine himself says: "Punishment is unjust and recompense becomes nonsense if man has not a free will." Nor can Augustine avoid this plain result by appealing to a mystery. To say that God's justice is incomprehensible is to say nothing; to say it is different from ours is to say it is not justice at all.

See, then, how Augustine, to uphold the power of his

Digitized by Google

church, has painted the character of God. Before all eternity He determined to create a world of free human beings. He foresaw that the first pair would make use of their freedom to sin and that He would punish the sin by taking away freedom both from them and from their descendants. Out of His infinite mercy He then chose by caprice certain individuals whom He would save by "irresistible" grace and by the application of the waters of baptism. All others He foreordained should be unable to do right. Foreknowing all this, He created His world. The race fell and all men sinned as He knew they would. And against all but those few whom He had chosen, His righteous vengeance was kindled—against some because their natures, corrupted as a punishment for their ancestor's sin, led them into evil, against others because He had denied them an opportunity of believing in Him, against others because they died in infancy before being baptized. All these three classes of persons, therefore, constituting the great bulk of the race, will be eternally damned in hell for their infinite guilt—even as God from all eternity foreordained.

The necessity of grace and the consequent loss of freedom by man, Augustine deliberately made the crucial, pivotal doctrine in his religious philosophy. And it has poisoned all the rest. If he had been frankly and avowedly a determinist throughout, his system would at least have been consistent. But desire to keep both freedom and determinism has filled it with self contradictions. We are free and yet not free, like the Trinity who are one yet not one. The elect are above all possibility of sin, yet cannot know they are elected or they would sin. Evil is founded on freedom, yet there is no freedom. Sin cannot be natural, yet it is natural. Religious effort is necessary, yet it is not necessary, since everything is determined from all eternity, and we cannot change the result. God is merciful, yet He condemns to eternal punishment innocent babes for the lack of a few drops of water. He is just, yet He damns multitudes of men because He has "inclined their wills to evil."

JAMES BISSETT PRATT.

ELMIRA, N. Y.

Digitized by Google

BOOK REVIEWS.

Professor William James's Philosophy of Religion.

The Varieties of Religious Experience. A Story in Human Nature. The Gifford Lectures, delivered in Edinburgh, 1901-1902. By William James, LL. D. New York and London: Longmans, Green & Co. Pp. xii, 534.

The Psychology of Religion receives a notable addition in this volume for which we have to thank Professor William James's appointment to the Gifford Lectureship in Edinburgh for the session of 1901-02. It was a happy thought on the part of the lecturer to celebrate the occasion by bringing together records and reflections upon various forms of religious experience. It was especially happy to decide to set aside the dull traditions of theological lecture rooms and to deal directly with the living facts as we find them in the "pattern-setters," the men and women in whom religion has been no flaccid habit of response to conventional symbols, but an acute fever of all-absorbing emotion. We are I suppose bound to take Professor James at his word when he disowns for himself the "leaky" form of consciousness which in his view is indicated by the more startling phenomena of religious experience. In other respects, by sympathy, erudition, psychological address and analytical insight it may safely be said that no living writer was better qualified for such a task. That he has performed it in a masterly way need hardly be said. Unfortunately he found himself called upon by his role of lecturer in Natural Theology to add to his programme a philosophical estimate of the value of the phenomena as proofs of our spiritual affinities and of a Divine order in the world and here we cannot think that he has been equally successful.

Accepting the logical distinction between essential and appreciative or spiritual judgments Professor James divides his subject into two branches. 1. The facts of religious experience. 2. The question of their philosophical significance. The first of these occupies the larger portion of the volume before us.

After a skilfully conveyed warning against the fallacy of taking

Digitized by Google

the origins and physiological accompaniments of our higher experiences as the measure of their value and an equally skilful justification of his preference for the more extravagant and even morbid examples, Professor James proceeds to the definition or "Circumscription" of religion as the total reaction of the individual man—his feelings, acts and experiences—in the presence of that which is primary and enveloping. Premising that this reaction must be serious and purgatorial as contrasted with the raillery of a Voltaire or the railing of a Carlyle, he shows that it may be of all degrees of intensity from the graceful or the condescending acquiescence of a Locker-Sampson or Margaret Fuller to the enthusiasm of the Christian or the Stoic, admirably distinguishing the Christian from the Pagan variety as agreement *with* rather than *to* the scheme of the universe. This gives us the function and with it the only definition of religion that is possible. Religion is that which puts an end to the attitude of struggle and dissent, adds a new dimension to life and spreads out a new reach of freedom making "easy and felicitous what in any case is necessary."

Next follows a chapter which seems to belong of right rather to the second part of the subject. It aims at showing that the sense of the reality of the object of the deeper religious emotions bears no proportion to the extent to which it can be rationalized. Theology has the *prestige* because it has the loquacity; but the unreasoned and immediate assurance is the deep thing in us, the reasoned argument that moves on the loquacious level being mere surface play. The statement introduces us to what we feel in the second part of the book to be a fundamental ambiguity in the writer's doctrine. Does he mean that the unseen and transcendent reality which is the object of religious feeling is in the last resort without rational justification? Or does he mean merely that feeling and religious emotion are one thing, the philosophy of religion another? Leaving this meantime we may follow a little further the attractive path of his religious psychology.

The succeeding chapters deal with "The Religion of Healthy-mindedness," "The Sick Soul," "The Divided Self." In the first of these the writer's sympathetic treatment of the ideas underlying the new Mind-cure movement in America and his suggestion that it may possess a key of its own to the treasure-house of the world as useful as that of physical science itself are especially interesting to readers in England, where the movement is as yet in its infancy. Contrasted with the religion of healthy-mindedness that

Digitized by Google

of soul-sickness stands for the reality of pain and evil. It comes as a gospel of deliverance to the "twice-born" and is thus of a deeper and more universal application. The treatment of the divided self leads up to an admirable account of "Conversion," the phenomena of which, the "uprushes and automatisms" that made our flesh creep in the religious biographies of our childhood, are explained, as we might expect, in terms of the subconscious. Such explanation, it need not be said, does not exclude in Professor James's view the idea of penetration of a higher power. On the contrary suggestibility and marginal leakage may be the conditions of the operation of higher spiritual agencies.

We thus come to the centre of the book in the five chapters on Saintliness. It is impossible in a review like this to do justice to the splendid treatment of this section. I shall not attempt it, but merely say that it seems to me a model of all that a psychological discussion engaged, as Aristotle would say, with the highest object should be: full, sympathetic, sane, convincing, abounding in practical suggestiveness.

Hardly less completely satisfying are the following chapters upon "Mysticism," which conclude the first portion of the discussion.

Hitherto the author has been dealing in existential judgments. From these he turns to the question of value, distinguishing the subjective from the objective, the utility of religious emotion to the individual from the logical value of the intellectual content. The discussion of the former he has been at no great pains to keep separate from the psychological account and the main results have been already anticipated in the admirable "Critique of Pure Saintliness," which occupies chapters XIV and XV. He here treats of the fruits of Saintliness under the four heads of Devoutness, Purity, Charity and Asceticism. In respect to the first two Saintliness is shown to have had its vagaries in the fanaticism of the Crusaders and the imbecility of a Blessed Margaret Alacoque or a St. Theresa. Similarly, Purity and Simplicity have had their extravagancies in their "militant" form in ecclesiastical persecutions, in their "fugient" form in the loathsome chastity of saints of the type of Saint Louis of Gonzaga. But *Charity* covers a multitude of sins, even the sins of excessive virtue, and Professor James sees in the non-resistant, indiscriminating and all-conquering charity of the Saints a much needed counteractive to the preva-

Digitized by Google

lent mood. So taken, the Saints are the great torch-bearers, the tip of the wedge, the cleavers of the darkness. "Like the single drops which sparkle in the sun as they are flung far ahead of the advancing edge of a wave-crest or of flood they show the way and are the forerunners. The world is not yet with them so they often seem in the midst of the world's affairs to be preposterous. Yet they are impregnators of the world, vivifiers and animators of potentialities of goodness which but for them would lie dormant. It is not possible to be quite as mean as we naturally are when they have passed before us. One fire kindles another; and without that over-trust in human worth which they show the rest of us would lie in spiritual stagnacy." The drift of Professor James's views on Asceticism may be gathered from his suggestive remark that the problem of modern ethics in this regard is to discover the moral equivalent of War.

To most men the practical value of their religion is the evidence of its objective truth, or rather its utility and its truth are one and the same. As Professor Leuba has put it, "God is not known, He is not understood; He is used. If He proves Himself useful, the religious consciousness asks for no more than that." But the philosopher (and all men are philosophers at times) must go beyond subjective utility and so we come in the end to the question of the intellectual justification of religious beliefs. This last part of his subject Professor James deals with specifically in two of the later lectures followed by a "Postscript." His readers will welcome the prospect he holds out of expanding on a subsequent occasion the statement therein contained into a more systematic treatment of the Philosophy of Religion. Meanwhile he gives us an instalment in a criticism of the answers of Dogmatic Theology and "Modern Idealism," followed by a statement of the lines along which he believes that light is to be sought.

Dogmatic theology, he tells us, fails to prove either the being or the attributes of God, the chief argument on which it relies, viz., the argument from design having to be transformed beyond recognition in the presence of Darwinism on the one hand and the now generally accepted provisional character of our classifications and explanations on the other.

Equally unsatisfactory is the contention of idealist philosophy working from the logical implications of our moral and theoretic judgments and seeking to establish upon this basis the existence of a Universal Consciousness. With this programme Professor

Digitized by Google

James holds it has made no progress. In spite of the labors of a century it has ended in simply "reaffirming the individual's experiences in a more generalized vocabulary" (p. 453). In proof of its bankruptcy we have the fact that it has been rejected by the majority of the scholars of to-day. But even though its reasonings were more satisfactory than they are religion would have nothing to hope for from such a conceptual treatment. "Conceptual processes can clear facts, define them, interpret them; but they do not produce them nor can they reproduce their individuality." In place of these pretentious combinations what is wanted is a "science of religion" which shall devote itself to collating the concrete facts of various forms of religious consciousness and thence proceeding to the elimination of all that is merely local and accidental may thereafter attempt to arrive at "a residuum of conceptions" which may be generally accepted as scientifically established. It is admitted (p. 490) that past attempts in this way to reach the germ of religious consciousness have not been conspicuously successful in fortifying fundamental religious beliefs, showing on the contrary a marked tendency to undermine them. But this is partly because investigators have started with a prejudice in favor of a mechanical interpretation of phenomena leading them to reject the primaeval religious attitude as "animistic," partly because they have systematically neglected the evidence which psychical research has brought in favor of an order of facts which have an important bearing on religious beliefs. The ultimate fact, the bedrock of religion is belief in the saving efficacy of a higher power, a "something more of the same quality with ourselves which is operative in the universe outside of us and which we can keep in working touch with." The guarantee of the reality of such a something more we have in the fact established or on the way to be established that "the conscious person is conscious with a wider self through which its saving experiences come."

Professor James claims for his book that it is a crumb-like contribution to "the psychological individual types of character." It is impossible to exaggerate the brilliance of his performance in this respect. He has given us not only crumbs but a substantial loaf. But many who, like the present writer, are most fully conscious of its striking merits as a contribution to psychology will find themselves compelled to admit its hardly less striking defects as a contribution to philosophy. Leaving Dogmatic Theology to defend

Digitized by Google

itself we may divide the question raised by the preceding argument into two: 1. What does Idealist Philosophy in its widest sense claim to do in the field of religion and what has it achieved? 2. On the assumption that it has failed is the science of religion as conceived by Professor James able to supply its supposed deficiencies?

1. In reference to the first we may set aside at once Professor James's interpretation of the idealistic philosophy of religion as an attempt "to construct religious objects out of the resources of logical reason or of logical reason drawing rigorous inferences from non-subjective facts." It may safely be said that no representative writer, certainly not any of those that are here quoted has ever put forward so preposterous a claim. After all that has been said by such writers as Wallace and Mr. Bradley as to the relation of philosophy to concrete experience it is somewhat surprising to meet this form of misunderstanding in Professor James's pages. We need not, however, dwell upon it as he elsewhere shows that he is in complete harmony with the latter writer in interpreting philosophy in a truer sense as "the endeavour to find arguments for our convictions, for indeed it has to find them." He further shows himself alive to the general drift of the argument on which idealist philosophy mainly relies when he finds it in the implications of our existential judgments (p. 449). Yet it is impossible to avoid the suspicion that he nevertheless fails to appreciate or even to understand wherein specifically the idealist contention as to the implications of experience consists. Only on such a supposition can we explain how so circumspect a writer can airily set aside the work of a whole generation of the most strenuous philosophical scholars in England and America with the above quoted remark that they simply reaffirm individual experience in a more generalized vocabulary, and that it is unnecessary to prove the point technically seeing that their work has failed to commend itself to a majority of scholars in Germany.

In a writer who lays so much stress on the Will to believe and is so resolute in insisting on the pragmatic sanction of our beliefs, the reader will be inclined to suspect some practical ground for so apparently unreasoned an antipathy to recent philosophy. Perhaps he will find it in the remarkable passage in which Professor James accuses "the refined supernaturalism to which most philosophers at the present day belong" of excluding ideal influences from "the forces that casually determine the real world's details" and thus rendering prayer and religious aspiration

Digitized by Google

comparatively nugatory (p. 521). But such a line of criticism cannot be said to affect idealism. Its withers are unwrung; for if it refuses to admit the interpolation of the ideal "piecemeal between distinct portions of nature" this is because of its contention that nature is already suffused with the ideal and that man's mission alike in science, in art and in conduct is to realize this ideality by turning the world if not upside down at least inside out. Whether and in what way, he may be furthered in his task by the communion of saints with one another or with the animating spirit of the whole is a matter for experience to decide. The Higher Pantheism declares its belief on this head with no uncertain voice in the lines:

> "Speak to him then, for he hears, and spirit with spirit can meet;
> Closer is he than breathing, and nearer than hands and feet."

and idealists in general have been content with this mode of formulating it.*

It is the more remarkable that Professor James should scout the aid of conceptual philosophy, seeing that in at least one important passage he has shown to what effective use he can put its leading principle. In criticising the "survival theory" of the religious consciousness he meets the claim of "sectarian scientists" to explain all phenomena in terms of mechanism, by pointing out in a series of admirable paragraphs the abstract character of the "object" of the physical sciences as compared with the fullness of the facts of concrete personal experience. And lest it be supposed that this criticism is an appeal from all thought and concept to the momentary thrill of feeling, he adds that by fact he means a "full fact, a conscious field *plus* its object as felt or thought, *plus* an attitude towards the object, *plus* the sense of a self to whom the attitude belongs." What is this but an appeal from the part to the whole, from the abstract and incomplete to the relatively complete and self-contained which is the pivot of the whole Idealist contention? If taken seriously and consistently applied there is no halting place between this admission and the idealist position. It is interesting to notice in this connection the resemblance between Professor James's argument and the central contention of Professor Royce's recently published Volumes upon the World and the Individual. The point is somewhat hastily stated by Professor James and thus has an air of dogmatism which it loses in Professor Royce's fuller statement. But it is at bottom the same

*See Green's Works, III., p. 273.

Digitized by Google

contention and contains in germ precisely such a philosophy of religion as the previous lecture has endeavored to discredit. It will be interesting to see how Professor James, in the promised work to which we all look forward, will reconcile acceptance of Professor Royce's major premise with the rejection of his conclusions.

2. Experience rests on, and implies the consciousness of the larger life which is the object of ethical and religious faith. This, in a word, is the contention of Idealism. The implications of concrete experience has been the "new way of ideas" since Kant. This principle, we have seen, Professor James makes the head of the corner in constructing an argument against his enemies on the side of science. Yet he rejects it in the final appeal and has recourse instead to an attempt in the first place to reach the common residuum, the prairie value so to speak of the religious consciousness, and in the second place to discover what science itself has to say as to the grounds for religious beliefs. The former procedure bears, it must be confessed, a suspicious resemblance to the old conceptualist attempt to reach the universal by the omission of all that is characteristic of the individual—now little better than a philosophical curiosity. If this is what Professor James means he has more than idealist philosophy to reckon with, *inter alia* the doctrine of universals in the "Principles of Psychology" as I at least understand it. But we are prepared to hear on a fuller statement of his position that he is alive to the pitfalls of the "abstract universal." How he proposes to avoid them without having recourse to a "philosophy" as opposed to a "science of religion" he has yet to explain.

The second part of the above programme as at present explained to us leaves an equally chilling impression. There are two fundamental reasons why the reader of this book who comes to the question fortified with Professor James's own teaching should protest against the attempt to rest his religious faith on the results of psychical research:—

(a.) It does not give him what he seeks. We require for religion, as Professor James himself expresses it, an extension of our own consciousness in "something of the same quality," individual concrete, self-contained. Religion is the aspiration of the soul towards a larger life of the same quality as the present only more fully satisfying—fuller knowledge, more perfect volition, intenser, more extended, more reciprocated feeling, in a word a richer and more varied and, at the same time, a more unified form of con-

Digitized by Google

scious experience. Instead of offering us a form of Being possessed itself of these attributes and ready to impart them to those whose life is hid within it the argument refers us to evidence for the existence of a form of consciousness which, as compared with our own, is in all accounts represented as relatively undifferentiated, involuntary and irresponsive. With the Subliminal we have of course no quarrel. We accept it as Margaret Fuller accepted the Universe. But we refuse on the evidence before us to accept it as a substitute for the Sublime. And our reason is that it seems to lack precisely the element which the Sublime on Professor James's own teaching must be conceived of possessing—the quality of primariness and embraciveness. It gives us so far as the evidence seems to go rather consciousness in the making, the raw material, rather than the completion of conscious experience. Professor James claims that this is the region in which "our ideal impulses originate," but the phrase is in the last degree ambiguous and may mean no more than that our ideals soak into us unconsciously in our ordinary contact with the world where also they again manifest themselves in the fulness of time. This with qualifications derived from the inner character of the soul itself we should admit. On the other hand we see no reason to deny the continuity of this subliminal form of consciousness beyond the individual perhaps throughout the universe. Our ordinary fully developed consciousness carries us beyond the merely individual uniting us with other individuals and in the judgment of most idealists with a wider form of experience in which the society of individuals finds its completion, and analogy seems to point to a similar continuity in the embryo. What we contend is that twilight, semi-conscious experience of the kind revealed by psychical research, seems to bear no real relation to the object of religious adoration; nor is it easy to see what light can be thrown upon the reality of the latter by the proof that human consciousness seems to spring from and contains to the end within itself a matrix of the former. "It weakens religion to hear it argued on such a basis."

Professor James, indeed, appeals to our sympathy in his humorous comparison of himself to a man who throws himself into any opening that offers into the infinite, when all the doors about him are being one by one closed in his face. But it is still a question whither the door he has his foot against really leads; some contend it is only to the cellars. Perhaps there is no need for such a

Digitized by Google

door at all, the enclosure being only apparent and the room itself the portal of the infinite.

(b.) So far from strengthening his position against the mechanical philosophers (his only real enemies) Professor James by appealing to science against philosophy exposes his case anew to their attack. What so easy as to reply that the subconscious is one of the weapons in their own armory? It offers a simple explanation of much that has hitherto seemed inexplicable in normal consciousness (*e. g.*, the supposed freedom of the will) and itself courts a mechanical explanation. In reply to such an objection Professor James would appeal presumably to his former distinction between the abstract and the concrete, thereby recalling the assistance of philosophy. But by his own act he has removed the argument from the region of "full" concrete experience; and the distinction having lost its edge might refuse to work.

These doubts as to the tenableness of his position can hardly but be confirmed by the odd sense of incompleteness and even incoherence with which the student reads Professor James's own confession of faith in the closing lecture and the Postscript. In the former passage, after indicating his belief that investigations into the subliminal put us in touch with deeper strata of consciousness, he proceeds to interpret the subliminal, first as "a larger power which is friendly to man and his ideals," next as God, and finally as "the guarantee of an ideal order that shall be permanently preserved" if not in this perishing world then elsewhere in his universe. Inquiring for the justification of these over-beliefs we are frankly referred not to the warrant of facts but to our subjective needs. God, we are told, "requires to enter into wider cosmic relations in order to justify the subject's absolute confidence and peace." We are familiar with this appeal to the working power of belief as the test of its validity in the writings of a recent school. Though ambiguously expressed in the usual form of statement we are willing to accept it on one condition, viz., that we interpret the "work" it has to do in the widest sense. The belief that "works" is true but it must work all round. It must satisfy our needs but it must satisfy them all, the needs of the reason not less than those of the will and emotions (if indeed they are different) our demand for harmony in our intellectual as well as for harmony in our moral world. In any interpretation of "pragmatism" that falls short of this we are on dangerous ground. Do the above over-beliefs meet this test and if not what becomes of them? These surely are

Digitized by Google

vital questions that are not answered merely by showing that other people's philosophy has failed to throw light upon them.

To tell the truth, in the present exposition Professor James seems to lay little stress upon the above statement of the needs that these over-beliefs are meant to satisfy. On finding himself removed from the vigilant eyes of an exacting Presbyterian audience he seems to have discovered that far less was really forthcoming than was needed to satisfy them. Hence the method he adopts in his interesting Postscript of trying to square the "needs and experiences of religion" with the evidences of fact. All that we really require, we are here told, is that the "power should be other and larger than our conscious selves." "Anything larger will do so long as it be large enough to trust for the next step." Surely this depends on the length of the step. "It need not be infinite," he continues, "it need not be solitary. A final philosophy may have to consider the pluralistic hypothesis much more seriously than it has hitherto done." This is cutting our coat according to our cloth with a vengeance, as most readers will probably think, even those who ere they have reached the Postscript have reduced their expectations to the necessary dimensions and are prepared to accept the off chance of a God. For ourselves we are willing to consider anything, but before we reduce our intellectual demands upon the universe to the level that is here required, we may be excused if we demand to be assured by more convincing methods than Professor James has employed that there is no other and better way of approaching the question of the foundations of belief.

J. H. Muirhead.

University, Birmingham.

Personal Idealism. Philosophical Essays by Eight Members of the University of Oxford. Edited by Henry Sturt. London: Macmillan & Co. Pp. x., 393.

This volume opens with an essay by Dr. Stout on "Error," of which it is impossible to speak too highly, and which forms a most important addition to Epistemology. Speaking of the definition of error as the agreement of thought with reality, Dr. Stout points out that it "omits to state that reality with which thought is to agree or disagree must itself be thought of, and that the thinker must intend to think of it as it is.

Digitized by Google

Otherwise there can be neither truth nor error" (p. 4.) "Cognitive process," he continues, "involves a transition or attempted transition from ignorance to knowledge, and where we are trying to make this transition there may be an intermediate state which is neither knowledge, nor ignorance, nor error. In what way then do we think of anything before we know it or appear to know it? I reply that it is an object of interrogative or quasi-interrogative consciousness. It is thought of as being one and only a *certain* one of a series or group of alternatives, though which it is we leave undecided" (p. 6.) "The content of thought is perpetually being used with perplexing vagueness. I propose to restrict its application. We cannot, without doing violence to language, say that the indeterminate as such is part of the content of thought. For it is precisely what the thought does not contain, but only intends to contain. On the contrary we can say with perfect propriety that it belongs to the *intent* of the thought. It is what the conscious subject intends when its selective interest singles out this or that object" (p. 9.)

We are thus conducted to a definition of error as "directly or indirectly a discrepancy between the intent and content of cognitive consciousness" (p. 10.) Again, "so far as the error is merely theoretical, what we mean to do is to think of a certain thing as it is, and what we actually do is to think of it as it is not" (p. 11.)

Since all error consists in taking for real what is mere appearance, we require a distinction between appearance and reality. "The imaginary object is only one case of mere appearance. It is the case in which the nature of what is presented to consciousness is determined merely by the psychical process of subjective selection. But there is always mere appearance when and so far as the nature of a presented object is determined merely by the psychological condition of its presentation, whatsoever these may be. There is always mere appearance when and so far as a presented object has features due merely to the special conditions of the flow of individual consciousness as one particular existence among others, connected with a particular organism and affected by varying circumstances of time and place" (p. 15.) At the same time the appearance is a qualification of the object and not of the percipient. "Mere appearance is in no sense an adjective of the cognitive subject. The person to whom a straight staff appears as bent when it is partially dipped in a pool is not him-

Digitized by Google

self apparently bent on that account either bodily or mentally . . . . The existence of mere appearance is not that of a psychical fact or event, except in the special case where the real object thought of happens to be itself of a psychical nature" (p. 18.)

From these considerations we may draw the conclusion that there is no pure error. "However much we may be deceived, the total object of our thinking or perceiving consciousness cannot be entirely illusory" (p. 32.). Again, error is only possible when we think of some reality which is capable of being conceived without the qualification said to be erroneous. "Now there are cases in which no such reality is assignable, and it is consequently meaningless to speak of error. I believe in the totality of being, and it is nonsense to say that I may be deceived. For there is no more comprehensive reality of which the totality of being can be conceived as a partial feature or aspect. Whatever point there may be in the ontological argument for the existence of God lies in this" (p. 35). And on analogous grounds, the belief in my own consciousness cannot be illusory.

The essay closes with an important criticism of Mr. Bradley's view that propositions which deal with anything except the absolute must be more or less erroneous. Dr. Stout's argument on this subject will not bear condensation and deserves the most careful study.

Mr. F. C. S. Schiller contributes in the second essay, "Axioms as Postulates," an exposition of a theory to which, following Dr. James, he gives the title of Pragmatism. "The world is constructed by experiment" (p. 57), but the conception of experiment is to be taken very widely. And "we never experiment *in vacuo;* we always start from, and are limited by, conditions of some sort" (p. 59). In our experiments we are to assume that complete success will be reached." "It is a *methodological necessity* to assume that the world is *wholly plastic,* i. e. *to act as though* we believed this, and will yield us what we want, if we persevere in wanting it" (p. 61). On this subject, we are further told, "a mechanically law-abiding universe does conform to some of our demands, and is so far intelligible. We must assume, therefore, that this conformity will extend further, that if we try sincerely and pertinaciously and ingeniously enough, we can force nature to reveal itself as wholly conformable to our nature and our demands" (p. 120).

Digitized by Google

As an illustration of this position, a detailed exposition is given of the proposition that "the conception of ideality is a free creation of a postulating intelligence which goes beyond its experience to demand the satisfaction of its desires" (p. 98).

Mr. Schiller desires to uphold the unity of human nature (p. 84). This he does by asserting that "thought must be conceived as an outgrowth of action, knowledge of life, intelligence of will, while the brain which has become an instrument of intellectual contemplation, must be regarded as the subtlest, latest, and most potent organ for effecting adaptation to the needs of life" (p. 85). And again, "in the last resort it is our practical activity that gives the real clue to the nature of things, while the world as it appears to the theoretic reason is secondary—a view taken from an artificial, abstract and restricted standpoint, itself dictated by the practical reason and devised for the satisfaction of its ends" (p. 90).

The third essay, by Mr. W. R. Boyce Gibson, is entitled "The Problem of Freedom in its Relation to Psychology." The author first discusses the contention that only matter in motion can be a determinant of material changes. He rejects, together with this view, the indeterminism of Dr. James. He suggests that there should be two psychologies in future, distinguished by the fact "that whilst the science of free agency accepts the capacity for real freedom as its fundamental fact, the inductive psychology unreservedly accepts the deterministic assumption as its only possible working postulate" (p. 169). The former can be genuinely explanatory, the latter is only descriptive (p. 185). Both are scientific and neither metaphysical by reason of their assumptions (p. 162). But the science of free agency stands in an especially close connection with metaphysics (p. 191).

Mr. G. E. Underhill considers the "Limits of Evolution." He sums up his results by saying that evolution can never deal with origins, and that it must assume the existence of unchanging laws of evolution, which, again, are indistinguishable from permanent qualities in the evolving things. Finally, in all scientific discoveries "the human mind discovers itself and its own intelligible relations" (p. 218).

Mr. R. R. Marett, dealing with "Origin and Validity in Ethics," separates the virtues into two groups, those which subserve on the whole, the "natural" end of race preservation, (the domestic and national), and those which subserve, on the whole, "spiritual" self-perfection (the personal and transcendental.) The

Digitized by Google

international virtues occupy an intermediate position (p. 259). He maintains that, "as empirical matter of fact" the normal individual of to-day is enjoined by his moral consciousness to prefer spiritual to natural principles" (p. 270). "The intuitional promptings" by which this is effected are considered by the author to be more trustworthy than discursive thought.

Mr. H. Sturt writes on "Art and Personality." He is of opinion that art is best understood by studying the artist, rather than the percipient of beauty. Also that "the supreme artistic interest, the mainspring of artistic creation, is an affectionate admiration for human persons" (p. 290). He considers enthusiasm to be indispensable to art.

Dr. Bussell deals with the "Future of Ethics." He points out that the majority of the inhabitants of Europe and America have not been mystics in the past, and are not likely to be mystics in the future.

The volume closes with a deeply interesting essay by Dr. Rashdall on "Personality, Human and Divine." The author "assumes that we have followed and accepted the line of argument which goes to prove that there is no such thing as matter apart from mind" (p. 370). He then determines the "differentia of a person" and finds the most essential of all attributes of personality is the fact that "the person is not merely a feeling but a willing or originating consciousness" (p. 372).

It is then pointed out that even the most perfect human beings are known to us—Socrates for example—are not perfect selves. From this Dr. Rashdall, if I understand him rightly, infers that no human being *can* be a perfect self, and that, if such a perfect self is to be found at all, it can only be found in God.

Is there, then, a personal God? Dr. Rashdall argues that since science asserts the existence of matter under circumstances in which no human being could perceive it, and since matter can only exist as experienced by some consciousness, we must conclude for the existence of a Universal Thinker. "And analogy would lead us to believe that we must attribute to the Universal Thinker in perfection all those characteristics which are implied by personality, and which yet no human person ever completely satisfied" (p. 376).

One person, Dr. Rashdall holds, cannot possibly be a part of another. What then is the relation between God and ourselves? Are we and God alike eternal and uncreated? Against this view

Digitized by Google

Dr. Rashdall has "no *a prori* objection." He rejects it, however, on the ground that it fails to account for the unity of the world, that it is incompatible with the correspondence of the state of the soul with the states of the God-created body, and that "the whole contrast between the known limits of human knowledge and the eternal omniscience of God prepares us by analogy for a corresponding contrast between an eternal or unoriginated mind and minds which are originated and dependent" (p. 381). The human mind then is derived from the one Supreme Mind, and the best phrase to use is to say that God creates it.

And when the finite souls are in being, they remain distinct from God. To suppose that they can be parts of God is to fall into a fallacy "that what constitutes existence for others is the same as what constitutes existence for self" (p. 382). To be in earnest with the personality of God compels us to think of him as feeling pleasure and pain "or something like pain," as loving persons and hating evil. "Do you say that all this makes God finite? Be it so if you will. Everything that is real is in that sense finite. God is certainly limited by all other beings in the universe, that is to say, by other selves, in so far as He is not those selves . . . . He is limited by his own eternal, if you like 'necessary' nature—a nature which wills eternally the best which that nature has it in it to create" (p. 390).

J. Ellis McTaggart.

Trinity College, Cambridge.

The Methods of Ethics. By Henry Sidgwick, Sometime Knightsbridge Professor of Moral Philosophy in the University of Cambridge. Sixth Edition. London: Macmillan & Co., Limited. New York: The Macmillan Co., 1901.

When a book of philosophy has reached its sixth edition, its reviewer may well be excused from any lengthy survey of its merits. Especially is this the case when the book is by a contemporary writer, and when each successive edition has faithfully revealed the successive stages in the development of the mind of its author. More than the usual interest, however, attaches to the present edition of The Methods of Ethics: in it the book receives its last touch from its author's hand; in it we receive a

Digitized by Google

last message from a mind singularly dispassionate, singularly limpid and single in its search after truth. Professor Henry Sidgwick began the revision for the present edition and carried it through up to page 276. Then, at his lamented death, the remainder of the book was by his wish seen through the press by Miss E. E. C. Jones. The chief changes in this edition occur in chapters i., v. and ix. of Book i. and in chapters iii. and vi. of Book II. There is an Appendix on "The Kantian Conception of Free Will" (re-printed with some omissions from *Mind,* 1888, Vol. XIII., No. 51). There is also—and to many this will constitute the chief interest in this edition of "The Methods"—a brief history of the development of Professor Sidgwick's ethical thought. This autobiographical fragment was found among Prof. Sidgwick's papers in the form of Notes for a lecture. Though slight and incomplete it will be full of interest for students of the "Methods," and is characterized by the charming frankness and humor familiar to all those who have enjoyed the privilege of hearing Prof. Sidgwick speak.

He tells us how his "first adhesion to a definite ethical system was to the Utilitarianism of Mill." . . . . "The two elements of Mill's view which I am accustomed to distinguish as Psychological Hedonism [that each man does seek his own Happiness] and Ethical Hedonism [that each man ought to seek the general happiness] both attracted me, and I did not at first perceive their incoherence." . . . . "If a doubt assailed me as to the coincidence of private and general happiness, I was inclined to hold that it ought to be cast to the winds by a generous resolution. But a sense grew upon me that this method of dealing with the conflict between Interest and Duty though perhaps proper for practice could not be final for philosophy." . . . . "I therefore set myself to examine methodically the relation of Interest and Duty." . . . . "The result was that I concluded that no complete solution of the conflict between my happiness and the general happiness was possible on the basis of mundane experience." . . . . "Thus in spite of my early aversion to Intuitional Ethics" . . . . "I was forced to recognize the need of a fundamental ethical intuition." . . . . "In this state of mind I read Kant's Ethics again." . . . . "What commended itself to me, in short, was Kant's ethical principle rather than its metaphysical basis." . . . . "But the fundamental principle seemed to me inadequate for the construction of a system of duties; and the more I reflected on it the more inade-

Digitized by Google

quate it appeared." . . . . "On reflection it did not seem to me really to meet the difficulty that had led me from Mill to Kant: it did not settle finally the subordination of Self-Interest to Duty." . . . . "It was at this point then that the influence of Butler came in." . . . . "I found in him with pleasure and surprise a view very similar to that which had developed itself in my own mind in struggling to assimilate Mill and Kant." . . . . "That is, he recognized a 'Dualism of the Governing Faculty'—or, as I prefer to say, 'Dualism of the Practical Reason.'" . . . . "But the effect of his influence carried me a further step away from Mill: for I was led by it to abandon the doctrine of Psychological Hedonism, and to recognize the existence of 'disinterested' or 'extra-regarding' impulses to action." . . . . "And this led me to reconsider my relation to Intuitional Ethics." "I had become . . . . an Intuitionist to a certain extent, for the supreme rule of aiming at the general happiness, as I had come to see, must rest on a fundamental moral intuition, if I was to recognize it as binding at all." . . . . "In this state of mind I had to read Aristotle again." . . . . "He gave us . . . . the Common Sense Morality of Greece, reduced to consistency by careful comparison." . . . . "Might I not imitate this: do the same for our morality here and now?" . . . . "This was the part of my book first written (Book III., chaps. i., xi.)." . . . . "I was then a Utilitarian again, but on an Intuitional basis."

This very interesting autobiographical sketch—of which the above quotations are meant merely to give some indication of the trend—should be read in conjunction with an article by the same hand on "The Philosophy of T. H. Green," which appeared in *Mind* for January, 1901. Taken together these throw a strong light on Professor Sidgwick's mind and method. With an extraordinarily detached and dispassionate mind he analyzes the matter in hand, whatever it may be, and exhibits his own failures and shortcomings—whether conscious or unconscious—with the same engaging frankness with which he lays bare the shortcomings and failures of the thought he is examining. The reflection is irresistibly suggested, both by the autobiographical sketch and by the article in question, that the degree of validity and permanence of any system of ethics, depends most absolutely on the degree of validity and permanence which characterize the metaphysic (whether conscious or unconscious) and psychology of the author of that system. Professor Sidgwick in the preface

Digitized by Google

to the first edition of the Method of Ethics tells us its "plan and purpose is not in the main metaphysical or psychological." Yet in the sketch now given of the development of the thought of which this book is the expression, we find him constantly faced by problems as to the nature of the Self and problems as to the relation of the Self to the Universe. He was not able to escape them. So far as he fails—and the sketch seems a confession of failure—to reach a unity in his thought, the failure occurs just here. "Psychological Hedonism" he is led to "abandon," but "the Conflict between Interest and Duty" remained for him insoluble; he accepts a "Dualism of the Practical Reason."

The service rendered by Sidgwick to Ethics will perhaps be found analogous to the service rendered by Mill to Logic. In each case the method is so transparent, the difficulties that are unsurmounted are presented with so much frankness, that the final failure is more instructive than are many successes. Neither piece of work will need to be done again.

MARY GILLILAND HUSBAND.

LONDON.

CRIME IN ITS RELATION TO SOCIAL PROGRESS. By Arthur Cleveland Hall, Ph. D., Fellow in Sociology, Columbia, 1894-95. New York: The Columbia University Press, The Macmillan Company, agents. London: P. S. King and Son. 1902.

Dr. Hall's book, as Professor Giddings of Columbia University says in his introduction, is "a positive contribution to our present knowledge of this immensely important subject." It is as its name indicates, an attempt to study some of the relations of crime to social progress. It is occupied chiefly with two great phases of the subject, namely, the evolutionary function of crime and punishment; and crime as a social product increasing with the increase of social prohibitions.

Dr. Hall does not take up the physiological and psychological aspect of the study of criminology in which attention is focused on the individual and his relation to certain types of organization; nor does he discuss the problems or principles of practical penology in their relation to criminal codes, prison administration, or preventive or corrective influences. His large book of four hundred pages and all the material he has gathered are devoted to the

Digitized by Google

illustration and proof of the single idea that crime is in large part a social product, increasing with the growth of knowledge, intelligence, and social morality—increasing because of this growth. At first sight it seems a curious proposition upon which to support the broadly optimistic conclusions of the author. His position could easily be misunderstood and we should certainly misunderstand him if we suppose that one must "do evil that good may come," a doctrine which was long ago condemned as irrational and immoral. The word "Crime" is so broad and varied in its application that we must find out just what Dr. Hall means by it. Professor Giddings in his introduction makes the position of the author clear. "While it would be absurd to say that civilization is promoted by an increase of crime, if by 'increase,' we mean a multiplication of evil deeds (the legal definition and the punishment of crime remaining the same), it is yet perfectly true to say that civilization in the long run is promoted by that 'increase' of crime which is caused by *an extension of the category* of acts branded by society as criminal, the total number of evil deeds remaining unchanged."

> "The creation of a new crime (that is, the branding by society of some form of conduct as criminal), always implies social punishment—a punishment enforced to raise the community to a higher plane of life, nearer approach to the social idea. A new form of crime means either a step forward or a step backward for the nations using it. Wisely chosen, it is an active force driving men upward to a better, more truly social state of civilization; but the nation that persists in choosing its crimes wrongly is on the high road to degeneration and decay."

It is in this sense that the author confidently makes what otherwise would be a paradoxical declaration, that "the most civilized and progressive States have the most crime."

In the illustration of this proposition Dr. Hall surveys the whole field of the history of civilization. In the desire to get down to the very root of social organization he even devotes a chapter on social punishment among animals. But about all that can be shown in this field is that the spirit of individual vengeance which still so largely dominates in the criminal codes of civilized people has a parallel in the crude law of reprisal found in the animal and rooted in the necessity of self defense.

In the large space given to the savage races, while impressed with the industry and wide reading of the author, we are not impressed with the scientific character of a large number of the facts quoted from authors dealing with savage tribes. The observations

Digitized by Google

of casual travelers or even of missionaries of long residence among savage tribes are too apt to be superficial and unscientific. It would be an interesting and important contribution to the history of criminal law if the more prominent savage tribes could be thoroughly studied and their categories of offenses, procedure and punishment carefully noted, but doubtless here we should find as much variety in legal and local standards as exists in the forty-five States of our own Union.

We are not quite as badly off as to data for making comparisons among civilized nations, but the want of a uniform system of compiling criminal statistics either in this country or abroad renders comparisons on many lines of absolutely no value. Thus the author allows himself to make comparisons between the different States of the Union based upon their prison population, a method as untrustworthy as basing comparisons on the number of arrests; for in the first case we have the variability in laws and in judges to deal with, and in the second case the comparative vigilance of the police. Thus the reduction in the population of various prisons is largely due to the abolition of the system of feeing sheriffs and to a better application of the law suspending sentence.

In spite of the difficulty in making satisfactory comparisons in the realm of statistics a great number of facts are here brought together whose significance cannot be disputed, and which go to establish the author's general proposition. While American statistics are contradictory and our penal codes are confused and conflicting, the whole trend of American legislation well illustrates the central thought of Dr. Hall's book. In no country are laws made so rapidly and abundantly as in the United States. Some of these statutes represent reactions in social progress. Some are intolerant and unjust, but the great majority with the penalties attached to them represent and register new conceptions of social duty and progress. The category of offenses is greatly multiplied and in most cases in the interest of a higher standard of civilization. The absurd laws passed by some of our legislatures, though contributions to the curiosities of legislation, do not materially affect the general truth of the statement.

Dr. Hall's book is an interesting and valuable contribution to the history of social evolution and may be commended to those who, deploring the increase of crime, fail to make the distinctions which Dr. Hall has shown are so important.

S. J. Barrows.

New York.

Digitized by Google

THE OUTLINES OF METAPHYSICS, by John S. Mackenzie. London: Macmillan & Co.

This book is intended primarily for those who are just beginning to study philosophy; but it would seem that Professor Mackenzie also intended to state his views for others than beginners. As an elementary text-book, the book is useful; it raises most of the problems of metaphysics and give some account of their connection; but it suffers from not containing enough discussion of the views of those who disagree with its author, and is consequently unsatisfactory both for the beginner and for the more advanced student. The latter would feel from time to time annoyed at the manner in which the author discusses debateable points, and also by his frequent complete ignoring of the arguments for the other side. But this, though a defect, is, from another point of view, a thing of some usefulness, because it tends to excite a spirit of criticism, none the worse for its antagonism to Professor Mackenzie's views.

The book has also another defect. Perhaps vagueness is inseparable from such an elementary text book, but there are different kinds of vagueness. When dealing with an emotionally interesting subject, Professor Mackenzie's phraseology is vague—whether intentionally or not it is hard to say—for vague phrases often possess the capacity of arousing an emotional interest in the subject discussed: but there is always a danger that such vagueness may depress rather than stimulate the reader, unless the author is especially careful to suit his language very aptly to his subject and his own feelings; a restrained enthusiasm often tends to an expression which appears too nice; and often it is suggestive of a personal pedantry. This last, however, is only a fault of style.

It would have been better if Professor Mackenzie had developed more arguments. His chapter on "Sensation" is especially open to criticism; for therein little or nothing is said of his view which all beginners are almost bound to hold. Professor Mackenzie may believe, and no doubt has reasons for believing, that realism is wrong; but it is a view deserving more attention than he has given it in his book. The naïve realist is dismayed, and dissatisfied; the crude realist is annoyed. The chapter on the various philosophic systems also seems to suffer from the same lack of arguments. Dualism is hardly to be dismissed by an appeal to

Digitized by Google

common sense, which holds that mind and matter interact. Dualism demands further discussion than this. Again of Materialism he says, that "anyone who has ever realized the fundamental antithesis between matter and thought, can hardly hold the view that thought can be regarded as a mode of matter, in the sense in which matter is contrasted with thought." What exactly does mode here mean? Anyhow, Professor Mackenzie gives no argument against the view that consciousness is an Epiphenomenon, save the little which he has already said against Dualism. It is, of course, impossible to say everything about all the systems of philosophy in so small a book; and we cannot rightly accuse Professor Mackenzie of unfairness because he has not said more than he has; but the scantiness of the sketch deprives this chapter of all value.

Professor Mackenzie goes on to deal with his own method, the genetic method. And here it is hard to follow him. It is hard to understand what he means exactly by "the process of the development of our experience." He assumes that men do construct their own experiences, and then, assuming this, goes on to show how they construct it. Experience for Professor Mackenzie, seems to mean something actually put together, a construction. So things, objects, are not only logically analyzable into simpler elements, but also somehow actually pieced together out of those elements. He distinguishes three main stages of conscious experience, sensation, perception and conception. But he admits that a purely sensational level of consciousness is impossible. But if there is no such thing as a purely sensational level of consciousness, surely what has been called sensation is nothing other than perception. Is not the sensation of a color really always a perception of a color, *i. e.*, a judgment that this color is related to this piece of space? And if there is no purely sensational level of consciousness, can we in any sense be said to construct our sensations? Can a consciousness be said to construct anything of which it is not conscious?

Though Professor Mackenzie gives no reason for holding any other view than that we know the world directly, that is that it is just what we perceive, he asserts that each individual constructs his own experience. "The world of matter and the world of thought," he says, "are both ideal constructions." Yet he says that experience is objective. This is difficult to follow. "It is emphatically one world that we know." But how does Professor

Digitized by Google

Mackenzie pass from this plural, experiences, to the singular experience? What reason has he, on his own principles, for believing there are any other experiences? Each man makes a construction differing numerically if not qualitatively from the construction of each other man. How then, except by blind faith, can Professor Mackenzie assert that it is one world that we know?

In summing up the results of his genetic survey, Professor Mackenzie says, "we now see that the world of matter and the world of thought, in the only sense in which these two can be set in opposition to one another, are both ideal constructions." But this is just an assertion. Professor Mackenzie has not proved that each mind constructs its world. He has not even demonstrated the plausibility of such a view. And further, such a view leads to great difficulties; it is difficult to see how Professor Mackenzie can avoid a solipsistic conclusion. "Our genetic survey" has put us in a position "to view the various elements of our experience in relation to the whole of our experience," he says; and this it may have done, but it has not shown that mind and matter are aspects of reality in the sense in which aspect is to be distinguished from part.

The last part of the book contains a discussion of various "constructions," perceptual, scientific, ethical, æsthetic, religious, and speculative, and also criticises these "constructions." There is much interesting reading in these last chapters; but one's estimate of the book will depend largely on one's agreement or disagreement with Professor Mackenzie with regard to the subject dealt with in Part II. that is "his genetic method." The book might have been more convincing if there had been more argument. As here set forth Professor Mackenzie's philosophy does not convey conviction; but, then, conviction is too much to expect from any philosopher.

A. R. Ainsworth.

King's College, Cambridge.

Principles of Class Teaching. By J. J. Findlay, M. A. London: Macmillan & Co., 1902. Pp. xx, 442.

There are several reasons why we should look forward with interest to a volume from the pen of Dr. Findlay. He has had experience of more than one type of public school. His knowledge of the literature of pedagogy is of the widest, and he

Digitized by Google

has had the singular advantage of studying the subject in Germany, in an environment sympathetic, stimulating, and scientific. As for teachers, he knows the article in the rough as well as the finished product. And finally, he has had an almost unique opportunity in the position he occupies at present, as the Head Master of what is in some respects a new type of school—the intermediate school of Wales. He started with a clean sheet. He had not to struggle with the inertia of a staff trained in other ways, and with those vested interests which hamper the reformer in his attempts at reconstruction. He had a fair field for putting his principles to the test of experiment, and one result, at any rate, is the present volume, which is thus "the work of craftsmen who are carrying on school business under the ordinary conditions."

The book is not one to be dipped into. The author's scope is so wide, the conception of his task so homogeneous, and his treatment so elaborate in its detail, that it can only be described by one of his own technical terms as a *Methodische Einheit.* It is a great deal more than a text-book for the neophyte. It is the reasoned work of a man who is saturated with the literature of his subject, who has retained an open mind, who has embodied the results of mature experience and reflection in a volume which, in its final form, will narrowly approach being a classic.

The book has its defects, of course, but they are not defects in form. They are mainly due to the hurried preparation of the work for the press, for which the author makes a somewhat inadequate apology in the preface—"it has necessarily been put together in spare moments!" If within the next two years Dr. Findlay will bring out a second edition, his readers will pardon him. But, alas, they will not so readily condone the unhallowed outrage of such a misquotation from the *"In Memoriam,"* as *"Let knowledge grow from hour to hour."* It is as the concertina for shepherd's pipe of oaten straw. It is a far worse slip than *"Le Contrat Sociale,"* on p. 36. For which we condole with the author.

Readers of this JOURNAL will be interested to hear what is the attitude of Dr. Findlay towards the question of the teaching of Ethics in schools. He groups togother "Logic, Psychology, Ethics, Theology, and above all, Philosophy," and forbids their intrusion within the precincts of the school, "for they can only be apprehended by the adult mind." "Civics and Economics . . . . are

Digitized by Google

forced on the pupil's mind in defiance of psychology. . . . . Let the terms be what you will—labor and capital, or bribery and corruption—if the learner has no experience or analogous apperceiving concept to rely upon, he is deluding himself with idle words." Let us see, then, what part is played by Bible lessons in the child's life. "The Bible lesson is expressly intended as a supplement to the more personal and private influence of the Church and the home; for the public school of the present day, being composed of pupils of immature development and of all variety of domestic upbringing, cannot venture to deal with the hidden life of the child; and where it ventures so to intrude, it pays the penalty. The Scriptures, as taught in an English institution for public education, ought to be limited to giving the pupils a proper acquaintance with the main thread of the story of the Old and New Testaments." Here we must join issue with the author. If this be the ideal, it means the perpetuation of the reign of the "handbook;" it means inevitably a continued devotion to the system which is aptly typified by the cryptic lines:—

> 'Miss Ramoth-Gilead,' take Jehoiakim,
> Let Abner by and spot Melchizedek.

Apparently, then, the author is content to leave the child's moral training to that elusive but potent element—the tone of the school, "The personal *immediate* influence of the teacher," who is restricted, however by being forbidden "to deal with the hidden life of the child." The Bible is not even to be taught as literature (p. 69) although (p. 68) one of the branches of the time-table is "Lessons in the Bible which is at once History and Literature." As for the other subjects which are swept away with ruthless hand, we hope that some day, Dr. Findlay, who has a pretty taste for dialogue, will support his exclusion of Philosophy and Ethics from the curriculum of secondary schools, by a dialogue between himself and, shall we say, Mr. T. W. Dunn. The latter must, however, be drawn with more virility than the feeble creature who figures as "Old School" on pp. 303-308. As for civics, the difficulty of teaching this subject, except to older children, is acknowledged even by the much abused Board of Education. But that is hardly a reason for its exclusion. We cannot see that there is much in Dr. Findlay's objection that there is no basis of experience. A boy's school life, if well-ordered and healthy, should teach him the meaning of "all for each" and "each for

Digitized by Google

all." Loyalty to the home, to the school, to the city, lead naturally to the larger patriotism. Surely the author's objections apply equally to history as a school subject. In fact, I cannot see how history can be taught without introducing the child to the fundamental principles which underlie the idea of the State. The school is a period of preparation for life in society and in the State. The boy must be prepared to be a citizen, though, of course, as far as the school is concerned, his instruction in civic duties need only be of an elementary character. We cannot afford to turn out into the world a boy who is ignorant of the meaning attached to such expressions as:—The supremacy of the law, nationality. Nor need we. The materials are ready to hand. The one is illustrated by the government of the school. The other cannot be eliminated from history, if faithfully taught.

There are many points on which Dr. Findlay speaks out boldly enough to please the most radical of reformers. While one agrees with what he says about the educational work of Bain, one cannot help feeling that there was no necessity for the author to have been quite so splenetic. With regard to the time at which the child should begin the study of Latin, we are glad to see that he postpones it to the age of thirteen. We note with unmixed pleasure the support he gives to the system which he calls the "intensive plan" of continuous study at a single branch of work. The Time-Tables in the volumes will show to those who are initiated that the author is a past-master of a very difficult part of his professional labors. Finally we must warn the reader that Dr. Findlay is not writing with the fear of examinations before his eyes. He is writing for masters who wish to *educate* the children committed to their care.

W. J. Greenstreet.

Stroud, Gloucestershire.

The Ethical Philosophy of Sidgwick. Nine Essays, Critical and Expository. By F. H. Hayward, M. A., B. Sc. (Lond.) B. A. (Cantab.) Fellow of the College of Preceptors. London: Swan Sonnenschein & Co., Ltd., 1901.

Mr. Hayward is a Fellow of the College of Preceptors and his book is doubtless intended primarily for the use of students who are obliged to carry on their philosophical studies remote from lectures and classrooms. The book seems admirably suited to be a handbook to such study.

Digitized by Google

Mr. Hayward is, as becomes an interpreter, very sympathetic to his subject. His object is to "assess Sidgwick's ethical system as a whole." To that end he does not follow the plan of the "Methods," expounding as he goes, but he draws up "a summary of the positive doctrines of the 'Methods,'" "to prevent the elementary student losing his way," and proceeds to expound these doctrines with constant and copious reference to Sidgwick's own words. This is followed by an endeavor to show wherein Sidgwick was influenced by Mill, Kant and Butler; influence continually acknowledged by Sidgwick himself. A chapter is devoted to Sidgwick's attitude towards the doctrine of evolution, and a chapter to his treatment of the "Freewill Problem." Then follows a chapter on "The Incorrigibility of Egoism," and this is probably the best in the book, from the point of view of exposition. It does not seem to the present reviewer to be satisfactory, regarded as an ultimate criticism of Sidgwick's position.

Mr. Hayward makes good his contention that Egoism is "triumphant," "powerfully entrenched," in Sidgwick's philosophy. He finds no bridge from his Egoism to his Utilitarianism. "Here then is dualism." His conclusion is that "the 'Methods of Ethics' is more dangerous to hedonism than any hostile work has ever been." In a chapter headed "Sidgwick and the Idealists," the relation is considered of the *"Methods"* to "the Idealistic, Transcendental, Hegelian or Neo-Kantian School." "All these adjectives," adds Mr. Hayward, in a note, "are more or less unsatisfactory." "The views of Green and Bradley," he says, "are virtually identical but in the following exposition of the relations between Sidgwick's system and that of the idealists, Green will be taken as the conciliatory and Bradley as the bellicose representative of the latter."

Elsewhere Mr. Hayward speaks of "the ponderous verbosity of the Prolegemena," and "the scintillating epigrams of 'Ethical Studies.'" He is evidently not in sympathy with either writer, and it is perhaps not inferring too much from the internal evidence afforded by the book before us to hazard the surmise that Mr. Hayward has not devoted the extended and sympathetic study to "the Idealists" that he evidently has given to "the ethical Philosophy of Sidgwick."

But though in these matters our author seems to betray his limitations, the book is characterized throughout by a strikingly frank and unprejudiced presentation of his subject matter, by the

Digitized by Google

constant aim of putting his readers in possession of the real position of each writer referred to, and by the copiousness of reference and quotation by which students are helped to form their own judgments.

MARY GILLILAND HUSBAND.

LONDON.

THE TRAINING OF TEACHERS AND METHODS OF INSTRUCTION; Selected papers by S. S. Laurie, Professor of Education in the University of Edinburgh. Cambridge University Press, 1901.

Professor Laurie has long been known as an independent thinker in philosophy, and, among teachers acquainted with Scottish education, he has been regarded as a safe guide in the exposition of educational theory. He offers in these pages a selection from volumes published in earlier days, "treating of subjects of permanent interest." About one-third of the space is occupied with topics relating to the professional study of education, and this portion of the volume ought to be read with care in English universities and colleges just now, for the recent order in Privy Council will give a great stimulus to the whole movement for the higher training of teachers. Professor Laurie always handles his subject with sturdy common sense, combined with a lofty ideal of the function of the teacher and of the university, and his views have come now to be accepted by all, except the most reactionary of university tutors.

Another series of papers deals with administrative problems,—especially with those centering round the functions of various types of school, and here his contributions are a little out of date. Most of them were written before 1890, and he has added here and there a footnote, showing that many of the doctrines he proclaims have been finally accepted by government. Hence this portion of his book has its special value as throwing light on the history of educational ideas in Great Britain since 1870; incidentally they illustrate the service which Professor Laurie has rendered in the promotion of reform during the same period. Finally, we have three or four papers on special branches of instruction, History, Geography, Religious Teaching. Here we find the same firm hold of principles, based on a lofty conception of man's duty, together with a practical workmanlike

Digitized by Google

appreciation of the conditions under which the teacher performs his office. To the present writer, familiar rather with German than with Scottish "pedagogy," it is interesting to observe the many points in which Laurie's exposition agrees with the principles underlying the work of Herbart. Space will scarcely permit of any detailed criticism: we trust Professor Laurie has not yet laid aside his pen: some of his papers, such as the last, on "Authority in Relation to Discipline" offer a most suggestive outline on topics which merit fuller treatment.

J. J. FINDLAY.

CARDIFF.

PRINCIPLES OF POLITICAL ECONOMY. By J. S. Nicholson, M. A., D. Sc. Vol. III.

The publication of the third volume of Professor Nicholson's Principles of Political Economy is an occasion of interest to all economists. The present volume is also of interest to the student of ethics in so far as it deals with those subjects which are on the border line between the two sciences.

From the point of view of the ethicist the most interesting part of the subject will be the early chapters of Book V, in which Dr. Nicholson examines certain "Economic Ideals." The point on which the author most insists would seem to be that life is something much wider than the pursuit of wealth in any but the very broadest sense. Hence the insufficiency of mere economic hypothesis to explain social life, and the futility of seeking any one principle as the ideal of economic conduct. To enforce this point a brief examination is made of the two opposing principles of "minimum interference" and of "maximum utility."

It is argued that Adam Smith himself was fully conscious that the principle of natural liberty must always be limited by that of natural justice. Dr. Nicholson himself appears to hold that natural liberty must be controlled by a principle of self-realization achieved in "the voluntary imitation of Christ."

In the consideration of the opposite doctrine of "maximum utility," a deduction from the general system of utilitarianism, he questions Sidgwick's contention that individualism tends to increasing inequality of income and also that such inequality is condemned by "the common sense of mankind" (a phrase which we agree to be a "very respectable, but a very empty expression").

Digitized by Google

Dr. Nicholson's chief objection to utilitarianism seems however to be the old one that it is a counsel of perfection we cannot attain unto and that it lends itself to a casuistry which destroys its usefulness. We have said that Dr. Nicholson seems to find his true economic ideal in a somewhat esoteric Christianity. In the last chapter of the book he gives a confession of faith—a practice which appears to be becoming quite common with writers on the various sciences. For many this chapter setting forth in brief form what is really evangelicalism tinged with rationalism and evolutionism will be of much interest. We cannot but feel that whatever its intrinsic merit or interest it is out of place. It is unnecessary to say that the whole volume maintains the literary style and force which are associated with Dr. Nicholson's writing.

C. I. Hamilton.

University College, Cardiff.

The Hand of God in American History. By Robert Ellis Thompson, S. T. D. New York: Thomas Y. Crowell & Co.

We feel that if it were not for what Dr. Thompson would probably regard the chief virtue of his book, namely the preaching, his sketch of the development of our great nation from the early Colonial days to the end of the war with Spain would be very satisfactory. There is nothing more easy, and nothing less convincing, than to show how Providence does things. One simply chooses those points in which we have prospered to illustrate "His" (Dr. Thompson slips once, and refers to Providence as "It") fostering care; and those points in which we have been afflicted to illustrate His just chastisement. The whole method is unscientific in the extreme; and it is all the more deplorable in a man who has confessed (p. 57) that "it is not permitted for any one to play privy councillor to the Almighty."

Barring this fundamental dissatisfaction with Dr. Thompson's book, then, we may recognize the careful, lucid, patriotic sketch of American history which he has written. Especially good, it seems to us, are his account of the estrangement between the colonies and the mother country following on the Restoration of the Stuarts, and his emphasis on the contributions of the earlier immigrant to our national unity.

Besides occasional infelicities of style, there are one or two

Digitized by Google

pieces of carelessness in the book. On page 60, for example, the author classes Gates with Burgoyne, Howe, and Carleton, as a British general—our hero of Saratoga! And twice on page 183 he speaks of the war with Spain as coming "in the summer of 1899."

DAVID SAVILLE MUZZEY.

NEW YORK.

BOOKS RECEIVED.

LECTURES ON THE ETHICS OF T. H. GREEN, Herbert Spencer and J. Martineau. By Henry Sidgwick, sometime Knightbridge Professor of Moral Philosophy in the University of Cambridge. London: Macmillan & Co., Ltd. New York: The Macmillan Co., 1902. Pp. xli., 374. 8s. 6d. net.

THE STRENGTH OF THE PEOPLE: A Study in Social Economics. By Helen Bosanquet. London: Macmillan & Co., Ltd. New York: The Macmillan Co., 1902. Pp. xii., 345. 8s. 6d. net.

DEVELOPMENT AND EVOLUTION: Including Psycho-physical Evolution, Evolution by Orthoplany, and the Theory of Genetic Modes. By James Mark Baldwin, Ph. D., Princeton; Hon. D. L. Oxon, LL. D., Glasgow; Stuart Professor in Princeton University. New York: The Macmillan Co. London: Macmillan & Co., Ltd., 1902. Pp. xvi., 395. 10s. 6d. net.

SHELLEY AS A PIONEER OF HUMANITARIANISM. By Henry S. Salt. London: Humanitarian League, 53 Chancery Lane, 1902. 4d.

LIFE IN MIND AND CONDUCT: Studies of Organic in Human Nature. By Henry Maudsley, M. D. London: Macmillan & Co., Ltd. New York: The Macmillan Co., 1902. Pp. xv., 444. 10s. 6d. net.

SHAKESPEARE'S PORTRAYAL OF THE MORAL LIFE. By Frank Chapman Sharp, Ph. D., Assistant Professor of Philosophy in the University of Wisconsin. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1902. Pp. xiii., 232.

RICH AND POOR IN THE NEW TESTAMENT: A Study of the Primitive Christian Doctrine of Earthly Possessions. By Orello Cone, D. D. New York: The Macmillan Company. London: Adam & Charles Black, 1902. Pp. 245.

RELIGION AS A CREDIBLE DOCTRINE: A Study of the Fundamental Difficulty. By W. H. Mallock. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1902. Pp. 286.

LA RELIGIONE MORALE DELL' UMANITA. Di Giovanni Casca. Bologna: Ditta Nicola Zanichelli, 1902. Pp. 584.

A BOOK OF MEDITATIONS. By Edward Howard Griggs, Author of "The New Humanism." New York: B. W. Huebsch, 1902. Pp. 226.

THE ECONOMIC INTERPRETATION OF HISTORY. By Edwin R. A. Seligman, Professor of Political Economy and Finance, Columbia University, New York; President of the American Economic Association. New York:

Digitized by Google

The Columbia University Press, The Macmillan Company, Agents, New York and London, 1902. Pp. 166.

HEGEL'S LOGIC: An Essay in Interpretation. By John Grier Hibben, Ph. D., Stuart Professor of Logic in Princeton University. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1902. Pp. 313.

THE HISTORY AND POWER OF MIND. By Richard Ingalese. New York: The Occult Book Concern, 1902. Pp. 287.

VARIOUS VIEWS. By William Morton Payne. Chicago: A. C. McClurg & Co., 1902. Pp. 281.

TOLSTOI AS MAN AND ARTIST: With an Essay on Dostoievski. By Dmitri Merejkowski New York and London: G. W. Putnam's Sons, 1902.

THE SMOKE AND THE FLAME: A Study in the Development of Religion. By Charles F. Dole. Boston: American Unitarian Association, 1902. Pp. xviii., 206.

Articles by writers in Great Britain should be sent to
Prof. J. S. Mackenzie, 7 Richmond Terrace, Cardiff, Wales.
Books to be reviewed, published in Great Britain, should be sent to
G. E. Moore, M. A., Trinity College, Cambridge, England.

Digitized by Google

INTERNATIONAL

JOURNAL OF ETHICS.

APRIL, 1903.

THE RELIGIOUS TRAINING OF CHILDREN BY AGNOSTICS.

THOUGH the title of this paper is pompous its aim is simple. It is an attempt to consider how those who believe in no creed or dogma can help those who are starting life, and for whom they are responsible, in a vital matter of human life, namely, religion.

It may be thought that an Agnostic has no right to make such use of the word religion; that religion—the principle of spiritual life—cannot be dissociated from belief. Certainly the history of religion would include the history of the beliefs of mankind. But, however that may be, in the individual they can be quite distinct: a strong spiritual and religious life can exist with no belief, and a strong belief can exist with a starved and undeveloped spiritual life: and so I use the word religious in speaking of that training, which has to do with what one may call "the habits of the soul." It is possible to have no view as to whence the soul came and whither it is going, to be able to accept honestly no creed or dogma, to feel the truth of no theory of the universe, and yet to have the strongest instinct that in human life it is the "one thing needful." The Greeks spoke of it as "that whereby we live," and it is the Christian religion that has put into words a fundamental principle of human life: "It profiteth a man nothing if he gain the whole world and lose his own soul."

Digitized by Google

To those who look to possess their souls sustained and guided by no conviction of the truth, life is harder and more complicated. I do not wish, even if I could, to apologize for or to justify the position of those who can accept no religious belief. The fact is so. The world has always been inclined to have a good word for those whose conscience would not let them do what they thought to be wrong, but it has always had great difficulty in recognizing the right to exist of those who cannot believe what it holds to be the truth. For this reason it has stained the pages of its history with blood and crime and has multiplied by thousands not only its martyrs but its hypocrites. Now at last the civilized world leaves the unbeliever in peace. Danger to himself and his belongings comes not from it, but from himself. It lies in a certain tendency to torpor of soul—not so much, perhaps, a danger to himself, as to his succeeding generation—because in a bewilderment of responsibility, and a desire to be above all things honest, he may cause them to suffer, as it were a spiritual blight, by cutting them off from the spiritual life and traditions of mankind.

There are two ways in which parents who are unbelievers act. Feeling the intense importance of a faith which shall sustain and guide, and their own inability to teach this, they may abdicate in favor of a teacher who believes. Abdication, more or less complete, in favor of nurses, governesses and schoolmasters is a favorite plan with English parents, pursued often in that blind obedience to custom, which is only another name for laziness; but also heavily supported by all those weighty arguments which show the wisdom of doing as other people do. But here, abdication would be purely conscientious, and it must be complete to be successful, so complete as to be practically impossible. All that moral and spiritual side of the child's life which is not merely a dim background to every day existence, but which is constantly made prominent by all the problems of life even by the elementary ones of the nursery and the schoolroom, must be absolutely closed to the parent. The fact that their parents in whose absolute wisdom they have at an early age a complete and touching

Digitized by Google

confidence, stand aside and practically say "I cannot talk to you about this: you must believe what so and so says,—though I cannot:" would shake in children the foundations of belief, and start doubt of a most penetrating and disastrous kind. And to bring up your children to consider you as wrong on the most important points of life, which you must do, if you wish them to believe that others are right, is a self-repression so unnatural that it cannot be wholesome.

The second plan pursued seems to me to be the only possible one. It consists in accepting the personal attitude of doubt and unbelief—in trying to make its sincerity and its spirit realizable: but at the same time it considers as an aim, the understanding of what belief and faith are, and the creeds and dogmas that spring from them. It considers as a terrible evil that dreary negative frame of mind which, because it fears its superstitions, cuts itself off from the spiritual life of mankind and would guard a child from hearing the name of God, from taking part in religious service or ritual, because the ideas connected with them have by some minds been abused and degraded into superstition and cant. Although you cannot teach and explain to your children a creed, practically saying "this is what I feel to be the truth, try to understand and believe it as such, let it be your inspiration, your guide, your consolation":—yet you can explain it in a spirit which says "this is what many people believe to be the truth: to them it is sacred: try to understand the power belief has been and can be, how it has had and still has its martyrs and its heroes; and while your whole soul may go out to what they have done and suffered and hoped, never for a moment think that your admiration and reverence for them obliges you to believe what they believe. But a world is shut to you if you do not make the effort to understand and feel the beliefs of mankind. Without any effort a few years of life will make you understand the intolerance, the prejudice, the hypocrisy, the superstition of men, but unless you have insight into what lies behind,—into their higher spiritual life often so repellant and distorted on the surface—the best part of life is closed to you. It would be better not to have lived than to go through the world never

Digitized by Google

penetrating below its crust, with eyes fixed on its dreariness and superstition and mistakes."

In the first stage of training, I should think that the same plan would be followed both by the orthodox and by unbelievers. The morality of little children is determined for them, by the authority of the people who surround them, and who have the care of them: and its inspiration is the faith, love and admiration that these beings inspire. All questions of conduct, honor, self-control, justice, the claims of others and the consideration due to them—the latter points very dim and difficult at this early age to children, who have no very clear sense of anybody with rights and claims being in the world beside themselves,—are determined for them not so much by the conscious teaching and exhortations as by the unconscious life and actions of these people. In them the morality, the spiritual life of the whole world is summed up for the child, and their influence for good or evil depends not on what they consciously say or teach, but on the quality of their natures, the atmosphere of their souls, for which we have but the lame word personality. Thus it is the selection of those whom we place near our children that is all-important in early years.

I should have thought it impossible for small immature minds to take in the great ideas of religion. All great ideas require for their understanding a certain mental power of generalization, and a certain emotional experience, which is beyond the range of small children. The stories and incidents which occur in the course of orthodox religious training, perhaps illustrate this point best. The piquancy of these stories partly arises from their tendency to border on the profane, but they possess another kind of interest as showing the absolute failure to make very young children realize the great ideas of religion. It is the desperate endeavor to realize abstract ideas such as the nature of God, the power of faith and prayer, that gives rise to these stories: children try to understand by promptly bringing these ideas within the range of their experience and emotions, and the result is something very like profanity. But they themselves are neither irreverent nor profane. The child who in the endeavor to make real to itself the idea of

Digitized by Google

God, questions as to the arrangement of that part of life which is most important to itself, viz., meals, and on receiving the answer *no* to its questions, has God any breakfast? has God any dinner? comes triumphantly to the conclusion that he must have an egg for his tea,—the child who will have it, that because angels have wings, they must also have beaks—the child who wishing to test the efficacy of prayer and faith prays for eyes at the back of his head, and states that he cannot wait any longer than ten days—have no profanity or irreverence in their souls, they are only desperately endeavoring to realize ideas that they see their elders think very important, and to do so, they must reduce them to the measure of their lives and experience. The child who was taken to see Doré's picture of the Christian martyrs in the Coliseum and came back full of pity for the poor lion who had no Christian, was simply true to his own instincts and limited sympathy. Being a healthy little animal, he had naturally small sympathy with martyrdom which he could not understand, and great sympathy with an animal having no fun, which he could perfectly understand. As a rule children become silent on these subjects, when they find that their attempts to realize them in their own way or to give any solution to the problem of the universe according to their lights, are received with embarrassment and answered without common sense.

I was much interested in the experiences of the wife of Charles Lloyd, the friend of Charles Lamb, who records in a diary the questions of her children, whom she instructed on religious subjects and "encouraged not *taught* to think." The questions are what one would expect from intelligent children at ease with their teacher, but not yet old enough to realize impersonal ideas. Mrs. Lloyd herself finds in them an illustration of how the constant necessity of explanation "by the analogies of ordinary and infinitely inferior concerns keeps in the minds of children a constant idea of the comparative dignity of the Deity and His operations;" but impartial onlookers will, I think, rather feel that the necessities of the children's minds pulled down dangerously low the Deity and his operations and will wonder what mental elevation could possibly result.

Digitized by Google

"How tired God must be after making all things. Could God kill himself and how would he do it if he wanted to? What shape is he?—if he is everywhere he must be all shapes. Now suppose I dig a round hole, if God is there, he must be round, and if there was a very long place, and he was all about there, then he must be long. I cannot think how it is." I think questons of this sort show, however a fond mother may interpret them, that the teaching has simply failed. But Mrs. Lloyd recalls one question of her little boy's, which hints at a real danger in beginning too early to make children think on certain subjects. If they are encouraged to ponder on the great problems of religion they naturally try to settle them according to their little ideas of justice, of honor and of kindness; and the bewilderment that ensues either lands them in apathy and indifference, or encourages a critical and bitter spirit, which is fatal to the growth of the soul, when it comes before the power to understand and imagine. "Mamma, would it not be as easy for God to stop us before we do wrong things, as to punish us for them afterwards?" "If we were very wicked in this world, would God make us suffer more than Jesus did when he was crucified?" These are but the very early and crude workings of that perplexity and wonder, which might develop in the soul a bitterness fatal to some temperaments. No teacher would wish to start enquiries of this nature. They show a connection which no orthodox parent would welcome between the early workings of their child's mind and that of the Persian poet eight hundred years ago.

> "O Thou, Who man of baser earth didst make,
> And even with Paradise devise the Snake:
> For all the sin wherewith the face of man
> Is blackened—Man's forgiveness give—and take."

I do not mean to say that some dim foreshadowing of the great ideas of the spiritual world—some understanding of the greatness of things outside their own lives and experiences could not be given to quite small children: but this must be according as these ideas are reflected in the minds of those who have the care of them, and this communication is unconscious and not necessarily connected with what they con-

Digitized by Google

sciously teach. For instance, the story of the life of Christ taught by a nurse or governess or parent who is by nature selfish and intolerant, has no meaning for a child. And those who have lived among savages say that the success of the work of missionaries is determined by their character and personality alone. The realization by the uncivilized of the great ideas of Christianity, their progress in honor, justice and self-control depend not at all on the doctrines they learn, for these they could turn and twist and lower to fit their savage instincts, but on the unconscious influence of the character and personality of the men who work among them.

The second stage would begin when children are old enough to enter into the spirit of thoughts and feelings which have no direct and obvious connection with their actual daily lives: when their imagination is sufficiently mature to go out to meet ideas, instead of dragging them down to the level of their limited experience. How soon one stage succeeds another must be a matter of temperament, though it is probable that all normal minds go through the same phases of development about the same time. In any case it is most important not to anticipate the capacity for understanding impersonal ideas. Most of us probably know what it is to go through a greater part of life with a distasteful or a dreary atmosphere hanging round certain ideas with which our minds have been battered in youth, and which have appeared to us grotesque or unpleasant or merely trivial according to the tone of our mind.

In anticipating in children the growth of imagination by insisting that they should think about things that they cannot possibly understand, you harden and stultify their souls and profane and desecrate the ideas. For instance, to put too early before a childish mind, great ideas like those of the Atonement, the Incarnation, the Trinity, which it seems to me require a high poetic and imaginative faculty for their full understanding, degrades both the mind and the idea and is a fruitful source in after years of profanity and indifference.

But when a child is able to understand impersonal ideas, it is most important that it should be encouraged to understand the great simple ideas common to most religions, the ideas of God,

Digitized by Google

of worship, of prayer, of faith. Most people are connected, either by bringing up or through family or friends, with some church or sect with the beliefs and observances of which they are more or less familiar. It is to these beliefs and observances they must turn as those which they are best fitted to explain with understanding and above all sympathy. If they themselves happen to have thrown them off with defiance and repulsion, if they have suffered from the presence of a creed forced on them from outside which has roused no response in their souls, they must forget that at one time circumstances perhaps caused them to passionately dwell on its shortcomings, its superstition, its insufficiency. But when the spirit of rebellion and defiance is laid to rest, their lives must have been very narrow and empty of opportunity, if they have had no chance of realizing what it meant of beauty and truth to others. The first duty to children is in all things to show the great and beautiful side, not to narrow down and belittle the world by dwelling on its inconsistencies, its superstitions, its hypocrisies. If an idea to you has neither truth or beauty, you must seek its interpretation through the medium of a soul you love and understand.

It is perhaps through the human element that children will first come to realize the nature of religious ideas. It is the human element in the story of Christ that has first touched many souls into the understanding of what Christianity means. The cry on the cross: "Father, forgive them, for they know not what they do," has done more than many sermons on the Atonement, to bring home to little minds the idea of Christ as Mediator and Saviour. And faith and prayer can never be mere names to a child who has felt a glow over the story of Joan of Arc, a peasant girl who was happy in a simple life of humble tasks, but who led armies and reversed the fate of nations, and met disgrace, contempt, and a cruel death, through the strength of the inward vision—the sustaining force of prayer and faith. To read the story of Father Damian and his life on the leper-island is to realize the nature of the renunciation and self-sacrifice that Christianity teaches. All through life it is the capacity for hero-worship that makes the difficult

Digitized by Google

morality of life easy. It is, in itself, a great power: for it is not only pity and terror that purify the soul, but the glow of admiration and of love that banishes all lower feelings, before a worshipped person or deed. And it is only in quite the early stages of development that hero-worship means actual imitation of the hero. For instance, the thought of Nelson has been known to nerve a boy for the torments of the dentist's chair: in which one would imagine there was small scope for direct imitation.

The third stage, which can be said to last throughout life, begins when a child is old enough to understand that there is more than one ideal in life,—that man's highest life has been, and is, inspired by widely differing beliefs,—and that our spiritual life is a combination of many ideals, thoughts, feelings: that out of these countless number of "voices in the world all of them significant," each soul has to make its own harmony. And in this stage as in every other, it is of the utmost importance to approach every phase of thought from its best and most beautiful side. As a rule the fact that there are different ideals in the world is revealed to the young chiefly through the sense of their "blows, clashing and entanglements"—in the moral problems that beset them even in the nursery,—in the clashing of impulses, in the problem of duty and happiness. At some period of life these things must puzzle the young, more or less of course according to their temperaments and circumstances. Girls are left to themselves, and each harmonizes in her own way the ideal of the nursery and the schoolroom—that to be good is the most important thing in life,—with her personal experiences of social life and the ballroom.

But with boys, the plan seems to have been to puzzle them systematically, quite early in life, by confronting them with the two great conflicting spiritual ideals of the world. At a comparatively early age boys were, as a rule, and still are to a certain extent, plunged into a course of strictly classical education. This, if it has any result at all must familiarize them with the Greek and pagan view of life, and one would imagine, would cause a certain bewilderment in a small mind that is being trained in religious matters on orthodox Christian lines.

Digitized by Google

And the curious thing is, that it is the pagan view of life that is taught to them most attractively, through the means of the most beautiful literature in the world, and the Christian view of life, much less attractive naturally to the young, is taught didactically as truth, by dogma, doctrine, sermons, compulsory chapel, etc. I am told, however, that the ordinary schoolboy never attains to that advanced mental condition when he realizes anything enough to be consciously bewildered: yet I cannot help thinking that the very fact of being let loose thus early among conflicting ideals of life, if it does not produce conscious perplexity, does seriously conduce to that torpor in the higher regions of thought, frequently observed in the normal English boy after passing through the mental discipline of a sound classical education. To insist that they shall always be concerned with ideas that they cannot or do not want to understand; and that appear not only to have no connection with each other but to have no connection with life as they understand it, is a fruitful source of the disposition to view all things, "in disconnection dull and spiritless." In any case this torpor is fatal to spiritual development of any kind on orthodox lines, or otherwise.

In this, the third stage, when it has dawned upon a child that there is more than one ideal of truth and morality in the world, the path of the orthodox and agnostic distinctly diverges. The aim of the orthodox is to concentrate the soul on one faith, one belief as absolutely true: whatever knowledge and insight into other faiths may come to it by the way, is partial and relative. The aim of the agnostic on the contrary is to acquire as much understanding as possible of the faiths, beliefs, ideals that sway mankind and have swayed them in the past.

And here we must leave them, or rather they have arrived at the same stage in which we are: and we can do no more for them. Life must do the rest. Training of any kind can only sharpen certain perceptions and help to give a point of view. But to start life with a sensitive soul, quick to understand and to feel generously and justly, is no small thing. The soul that

Digitized by Google

can deal thus with the facts of life and of knowledge will climb more than a little way to the "vantage ground of truth."

This then, roughly indicated, is the religious training an agnostic can give. And as in all training the aim is to give a habit of the mind, so in this training, the aim is to give a habit of the soul. And this habit of the soul consists in a sort of justice in fixing on what is beautiful and noble in the beliefs and opinions and motives of men; instead of staying on the surface and dwelling on the inconsistency, the intolerance, the cruelty, the sordidness and the triviality that crush and hide them: and in cultivating this habit, the soul grows through contemplation of what is great and beautiful in life; and its enthusiasm for this is its inspiration.

But such a training will not make life simple. As it cannot teach that truth is found in any one belief, or right in any one line of action: but teaches that truth and right are found in infinite varieties and infinite disguises: so it increases, as it were, the complications of life and its responsibilities. It can give no theory that will beforehand settle the problems that in life come crowding one after the other; it teaches that each one as it arises must be decided afresh; and that these decisions which make the moral life of man, depend on the breadth and depth of his spiritual life, on the vigor and vitality, the true perceptions of his soul—that "one thing needful,"—"that whereby we live."

ELLEN DARWIN.

CAMBRIDGE, ENGLAND.

Digitized by Google

WHAT SHOULD BE THE ATTITUDE OF TEACHERS OF PHILOSOPHY TOWARDS RELIGION?*

The proper attitude of the teacher of philosophy towards Religion depends, I think, for its justification, as for its definition, upon two or three very simple principles.

The first principle is that Religion, in its higher sense, constitutes the most important business of the human being, and by Religion, in its higher sense, I mean the consciousness of practical relations to a real but at present unseen spiritual order, whose authority as furnishing the rule for our conduct is conceived as absolute, and whose worth and dignity we recognize as above every other worth and dignity known to us. This higher sense of the term Religion appears, in history, only since the attainment of somewhat advanced states of civilization, and since the rise of the more universal moral ideals. We are not concerned at present with the forms of religious faith. I expressly define the general term so that Buddhism and Christianity, the so-called Ethical Religions of some modern teachers, and the more positive creeds of tradition, equally fall within the scope of my definition. What I consider essential to the definition of any higher form of Religion is, that it is a kind of consciousness, whose object is an unseen and spiritual order, and whose content includes a view of our practical relations to that order, while this spiritual order itself is conceived as having, for us, a maximum of worth, of dignity, and of moral authority.

Now Religion, as thus defined, constitutes the most important business of man, just because man's present and worldly life, as experience shows it to us, is, even in the most fortunate cases, a comparatively petty affair, whose passing joys and sorrows can be viewed as of serious and permanent importance only in case this life means what it at present never empirically presents to us, namely a task and a destiny that have,

*A paper read before the American Philosophical Association, at Washington, D. C.

Digitized by Google

from some higher point of view, an absolute value. The goal of our life, if our life has a goal, is never attained, or even made clear to us, by means of any of our present mortal experiences or successes. The worth of our life, if it has any absolute worth, is behind the veil of sense, and of our present fortunes. Religious wisdom, if such wisdom is attainable, therefore has to do with the discovery of that which makes our whole present life worth living. Hence it is that I assign, in agreement, as I doubt not with many of you, the highest worth to Religion amongst the interests of humanity.

But now, as my second principle, I have to add that, in human history, Religion in proportion to its importance, characteristically appears as amongst the worst managed, if not the very worst managed, of all of humanity's undertakings. I call this fact characteristic. I need not pause to explain it. Humanity's important business has generally been mismanaged in proportion to its significance. I remark merely that this holds true in the case of the highest of all humanity's interests. My proof is in the best known facts of history. The variety of contending faiths, the cruel mutual misunderstandings that the followers of opposing faiths have cherished towards one another, the religious wars, the multiplication of sects, the confusion of the essential with the trivial in religious life, the substitution of conventionality in religious practice for spirituality in religious experience, the enormous waste of energy over confused thinking about religious matters,—these are a few of the evidences of the truth of my principle. Religion has fared, in even comparatively recent history, far worse than the cause of human liberty, far worse than philanthropy, incomparably worse than the care of physical health. Nothing has man treated worse than his own and his brother's chances of spiritual salvation. Nowadays, to be sure, the religious situation is much improved. The religious wars have almost ceased. But many evils remain.

There follows from these two principles a third:—The task of improving the conduct of so great and so mismanaged a cause as that of religion is so complex and difficult an undertaking as to demand a division of labor, and a very great and

Digitized by Google

varied division of labor. Reformer and prophet, man of common sense and philosopher, the worker and the thinker, the devout soul and the critic,—all such are needed for the task. There is room, in the further evolution of the religious consciousness, for the greatest diversity of gifts to be applied to the service of the one spirit, and all this division of labor is required for the sake of humanity's loftiest interests.

Well, the teacher of philosophy, whose task is indeed a very humble one, has something that he ought to contribute to the cause of the gradual improvement of the religious consciousness of humanity. His personal efforts will be of slight avail. But the harvest is so plenteous, the laborers are so few, and yet so many kind of laborers are needed, that the teacher of philosophy is indeed called upon to do his share. Now there are two things, and two only, that the philosopher, as philosopher, can hope to contribute towards training humanity to do better its work of striving after a sound religious consciousness. These things are:—(1) Clearness of thought about religious issues; and (2) a judicial spirit in the comparison, in the historical estimate, and in the formation of religious opinions. I repeat, clearness of thought, and the judicial spirit, are the philosopher's peculiar tasks. He ought to strive after them, to express them in his teaching, and to do what he can to get his fellows to share them, and this is what he can contribute to the gradual improvement of the religious life.

The philosopher, as a religious inquirer, is extremely fallible. Now in this defect he is not alone amongst men. It is just that defect, as it exists amongst men, which has filled religious history with such misery. But it is the philosopher's precious privilege to make the consciousness of his own fallibility one of the principal topics and aims of his research. Other men estimate their fellows in terms of the convictions that these fellows chance to hold or to profess. The philosopher estimates his fellow students in terms of the care that they display in their methods of testing their convictions. He wishes to be tested himself by the same standard. Other men may cast out heretics. The philosopher knows of no heresies in doctrine, but only of defects in care regarding the investigation of doctrine,

Digitized by Google

and of failures in devotion to the considerate pursuit of truth. Other men cry, "Lo here and lo there; we have found the truth, believe us or perish." The philosopher asks: "How did you find out the way to discover your truth?" As to perishing,—the philosopher had rather assume, as an inquirer, the risk of perishing with one clear insight in his possession, than obtain the reward of living forever in a heaven of confused impressions.

Now in these, his characteristic interests, the philosopher, like any other man, shows himself to be one-sided. There are in life many good ideals besides the ideal of clearness. That some men are prophets, and that some men born to lead sects or nations, and that God may also have chosen the weak, with their gracious instinctive devotion, frequently to confound the wise,—all this the philosopher may well recognize. He knows that his is not the only task. But he knows that it is his task. And all his guidance of young minds must emphasize and express this his own peculiar office.

What are the consequences that flow from all this as to what the proper attitude of the philosophical teacher shall be towards religion? I answer: First, the philosophical teacher, in appealing to elementary students, must begin by cultivating in them the judicial rather than the merely dogmatic attitude towards religious problems. He can best do this by means of a teaching of the history of thought. The historical method of approaching religious issues is the great antidote for the counteracting of the sectarian spirit, and the great encourager of the spirit of patience, calm, and earnestness in the facing of humanity's deepest problems. The proper study of the history of thought shows us the human spirit profiting by its very narrowness and by means even of its imperfections, in case it is only patient enough "to reach a hand through time to snatch the far off interest of its own errors." History teaches us to unite tolerance with seriousness, and criticism with reverence. To find out how long the world has had to wait to obtain its full returns from the treasures that ancient thought stored up for it, is to render ourselves more willing to tolerate even much that we fail as yet to justify in the spiritual efforts of to-day.

Digitized by Google

The philosopher should so teach the history of thought as to cultivate the spirit of piety towards all serious thinking. Just such piety is what I mean by the judicial spirit.

Secondly, in guiding his more advanced pupils, the teacher of philosophy should seek to help every one of them to become clearer in mind as to what his own personal religious interests and problems mean. The philosopher's attitude towards the earnest young inquirer, whether he be a doubter or a believer, can properly be expressed, in the form of an appeal to the individual thus: "It is not my office to propagate my faith; but to help you to understand the meaning of your faith, or of your doubt, as it has pleased God to show you the matters that concern His truth at the present point of your development. In the end, you must be saved, if at all, then in your own way, which indeed will then also be God's way, but which will doubtless be for that very reason your own individual way. It is my office to help you towards finding your own soul. I do not want to convert you, but to help you to the attainment of your own inner light. The wind bloweth where it listeth. I am to teach you only to distinguish for yourself, whence the wind comes to you, when it comes. I am to help you to grasp your own meaning. If you want authority, to tell you from without what you must believe, you must look elsewhere. If you want some one to help you to define the promptings of your own spirit, it is my duty to try to give such aid."

Thirdly, in dealing with his more advanced students, it is the office of the philosopher to help them to profit by one another's religious queries, doubts, strivings, and varieties of religious opinion and experience. In this aspect of his work the philosophical teacher is a mediator rather than an appellate judge. He expresses, indeed, his own convictions, but he contributes them only as one more product of human experience, and of the effort to attain truth, and not as a decisive dogma. He holds all questions open for serious discussion, just because the decision of all such questions is the privilege of the individual, and it is not the prerogative of the philosophical teacher to save other men from the responsibility of making their own choices.

Finally, as to the attitude that the philosophical teacher as-

Digitized by Google

sumes in presence of the general public, regarding religious problems, that attitude should be as frank as it is conciliatory, as judicially critical as it is reverently earnest, as free from dogmatic presumption as it is from indifference. Since he stands for clearness of thinking, he should shun no inquiry that he is duly called upon to undertake. He should never hide his opinions, however unconventional they may be, when he is rightfully asked, on a fitting occasion, to express them. On the other hand, it is not his business to feed the multitude when the multitude is not hungry. He is no propagandist. He is sent to those who desire wisdom, an d not to those who hate light. Moreover, he seeks no occasion to occasion scandal to the little ones. He appeals to those to whom the spirit of truth has already spoken. For the rest, I myself am glad when, under the conditions as they exist to-day, the philosophical teacher's convictions are such that he sees his way to avoid all connection with any sect or form of the visible church. I say, I am glad of this result, when it occurs, because, first, I am persuaded that a personal relation to the visible church has to-day a value which concerns chiefly the man engaged in certain practical philanthropic tasks. These tasks are indeed of the utmost social importance, but they form no part of the philosopher's peculiar and special social function,—a function that I have already characterized. I like to see the philosopher devoted to his own business. And secondly, as I hold, the philosopher, by holding aloof from the visible church, helps himself to maintain in himself and to display to his students, that judicial spirit which I have insisted upon as his especial possession. The mass of mankind cannot cultivate this judicial spirit except as a mere incident of their practical life. The philosopher has to make it his professional business, and I think therefore that he gains by an avoidance of relation to the visible church, just as a judge gains by declining to be a party man. To the invisible church the philosopher, if loyal to his task, inevitably belongs, whatever be his opinions. And it is to the invisible church of all the faithful his loyalty is due.

JOSIAH ROYCE.

HARVARD UNIVERSITY.

Digitized by Google

CHRISTIANITY AND THE NATURAL VIRTUES.

In the four cardinal virtues—Justice, Temperance, Fortitude and Prudence,*—Christian theology presents us with an articulated scheme and summary of ethical perfection. Like so much else in the Christian religion, this has been borrowed from the deposit of the Socratic schools of philosophy. It represented originally perhaps the highest ideal of character attainable, apart from revelation, summing up, as it did, the duties of a perfect citizen in as perfect a State or Commonwealth as was then conceivable. We may readily admit that, independently of Christianity, man's horizon would, in due time, and according to the laws of spiritual progress, have been extended, and his conception of citizenship and of personality would have been deepened, far beyond what Socrates or his disciples ever dreamt of; but the full thought of the City of God, and of the liberty of the Sons of God, could never have become "current coin" had not God Himself answered for us the great question of all time: "Who is my neighbor?"

To the Greek, "my neighbor" meant "my fellow-Greek" to the exclusion of the slave and the barbarian; yet within the limits of so narrow a "neighborhood" his ideas of social and political virtue were sufficiently correct to serve as a model whereon Christianity might shape an ampler scheme of duties entailed by the extension of "neighborhood" from the boundaries of Greece or Athens to the uttermost limit of heaven and earth. To speak of the Cardinal Virtues as "social or political virtues" sounds strange, if we forget that the idea of the self-sufficing individual, apart from society, and using society as a means to his own independent well-being—as a medium or environment or soil from which he is to draw his separate subsistence—is comparatively modern. In some sense the history of ethical progress is the history of the discovery of the in-

*We may for convenience adhere to the common rendering; though Righteousness, Self-restraint, Courage and Practical Judgment might convey the ideas more exactly in current English.

Digitized by Google

dividual. In the pre-philosophic stage of thought he is so merged and lost in the tribe that the distinction of one from the other and their true relationship is neither observed nor discussed. The first effort of rational reflection breaks the tribe into units and artificially reconstructs it as a mere sum of such units—a mechanical aggregate; but as the part must be sacrificed for the whole, so the unit has no rights against the State. Then a keener rationalism inverts the relationship and makes the individual's self-interest his highest duty. Finally, Christ announces that the individualist who seeks his life shall lose it by self-defeat; whereas he who freely loses his life and devotes it to his neighbor, shall save it and realize the fullest development of his own personality. Thus it may be said that the individual has been discovered only to be lost again—to be remerged consciously and voluntarily by the force of love, as he was formerly merged, passively and unconsciously, by force of necessity.

In the zig-zag course of this progress, philosophy seems ever to oscillate between two vicious extremes. At one time led away by the over-driven analogy between society and a mechanism, or even an organism, it subordinates the unit to the multiude, as a means to an end—as though the collective good were something distinct from the good of the several parts, and in no way constituted thereby: at another, revolting against the tyranny of such a "Leviathan," it regards society as the result of an imaginary free contract between persons naturally independent and self-sufficing. This crude individualism had not dawned upon the Greek mind, whose error lay in the contrary direction; the man as a personality apart from the State was not so much repudiated as unthought of; while the "right order," the perfect organization of the multitude seems to have been regarded too much as an end in itself, and not merely as a means to some higher good, namely, to the greatest possible fulness of life in the greatest possible number of persons. This was an inevitable fallacy when States were perpetually at war with their neighbors, and had largely to put on the character of armies. For an army exists, not directly, for the personal well-being of its component members, but for the de-

Digitized by Google

struction of enemies; for an extrinsic end to which the soldier's separate happiness is subordinated even to the sacrifice of life itself. Where political philosophy had not yet altogether shaken off this military idea, the common good was more apt to be understood as external to, and separate from, that of the units severally, whose particular advantage was viewed as, at best, a means to that higher and general good—not as essentially constitutive of it. By a natural fallacy, which never quite dies, the abstract idea, or "form" of the State was hypostatised and spoken of as a distinct entity with aims and interests apart from, and at times opposed to those of its constituent atoms. Thus with the Greek, citizenship swallowd up the whole man viewed as a moral agent; his duties as a citizen and as a man, were practically coextensive and identical; the non-citizen and the serf were almost non-human; stript of all rights, their action was presumptively governed by coercion, not by any sense of duty. Politics, as a science, was architectonic with respect to economics and ethics; that is to say, what was right for the State, determined what was right for the family; and this, what was right for the units; for these units had no proper distinctness and personality compared with that of the State. This conception, in a slightly modified form, has been adapted in modern times by those who seek the rationale of the ethical code in considerations of public utility. But in present-day individualism all this is reversed—the family is for the sake of the individual, and the State for the sake of the family; civic life is not the whole, but only one element, of individual life, which comprehends that and a great deal more beside. The State, however its origin be explained, is treated and spoken of as if it were begotten by a free contract between previously independent persons, acting from self-interested motives, seeking each the common good only in order to get as large a share of it as possible for himself; caring each as little about the gain of others as though they were all enemies temporarily combined to resist some common foe.* Hence to us who are more

*Our nature being essentially social, such selfishly-motived combinations will almost inevitably put on a nobler character as the members come to

Digitized by Google

familiar with this individualist form of thought, the duties of a man include, but they also exceed, those of a citizen; citizenship is only a part of our lives, and that, a subordinate part.

And this is undoubtedly true of citizenship in the narrower sense, and in reference to the modern State, which aims merely at securing for all, some of the lower and more general conditions of life in such a way as to interfere as little as possible with their free disposal of themselves; but it is not true of that citizenship in the City of God whose duties are coextensive and identical with those of our whole moral being. In that universal brotherhood of the Kingdom of God on earth—the ideal towards which Christianity is making—the good of the individual is not so much subordinate to, as identified with, the general good of which it is a constituent part—which depends upon it, and upon which it depends. There we find no conflict, but perfect harmony, between universal and particular interests; there, what is best for each is best for all and conversely. This conception is plainly more akin to the ancient than to the modern conception of a Commonwealth, and hence it is that we Christians can adapt to our scheme of "the whole duty of man" those Greek notions of virtue, which were based on so false and narrow a conception of the State, of the unit, and of their mutual relations. We can transfer them to an order of things wherein alone they are valid; wherein the duties of the individual and of the citizen are truly identified; wherein whosoever plays his part perfectly as a man is also perfect as a son of God and a citizen of the Kingdom of Heaven and earth. But in this process of transfer and adaptation we have not only to

---

know and to care for one another, to develop common interests, to share the same hopes and fears, joys and sorrows; nor could a purely selfish and "lupine" society hold together very long—selfishness being *per se* a disintegrating force, and integrating only *per accidens*. The fact that many associations and communities may, or might have been, selfish in their origin is, however, no justification for explaining the social instinct, subsequently developed, as a disguised selfishness. In all evolution lower needs call higher and hitherto dormant faculties into play, and thus awaken the consciousness of still higher needs. Man is not an embryo because he is from and through an embryo, nor is the higher life the lower, because it is from and through the lower.

Digitized by Google

expand and enrich the Greek ideas of Justice, Fortitude, Temperance and Prudence, but we have to take them up into a higher system and synthesis, together with the "theological" virtues of Faith, Hope and Charity; for from the blending of these seven colors, the pure light of the Christian ideal is begotten.

And here it is well to mark that the analysis of moral goodness into a sum-total of separate virtues is, at best, a useful artifice of thought; that these elements are but as a series of points by which the course of a line or curve is indicated, and therefore fall infinitely short of that simple, concrete reality which we call a "character" and which no explanation or description can ever exhaust. Yet for the service of thought and intercourse such artificial analyses are convenient and necessary; nor, however endless the aspects under which character might be dissected and classified, may such analyses be purely arbitrary and void of objective justification. Though each character and type of character is, in the concrete, simple and *sui generis;* though its last difference and distinctive element pervades and changes the nature of those other common elements to which we, for convenience of thought, regard it as added like a stone to a heap; yet in so far as this simple, indivisible character, shows its effects in different organs and functions of our bodily frame, or in relations to persons and things around us, we can split it up mentally into sections and departments. Nor is such analysis anything but helpful until we proceed to conceive character as a mere bundle of these mental elements, which is as though we were to mistake the re-assembled parts of a dissected corpse for a living man. Unlike the physical and mental nature which is determined for us in our birth, our character is almost entirely of our own construction, whatever may be the limits formed for us by the sort and quantity of material we have to build with and the conditions under which we work. Hour by hour, each choice of our will is as a drop of some new chemical, added to those already collected, and changing the entire nature of the vessel's contents and their mode of reaction in regard to future additions. Hence however uniform human na-

Digitized by Google

ture may be, human character is so infinitely various as never to be specifically twice the same, even in the same individual on different occasions. Still a time, or a nation, may have a character of its own—a sort of rough framework on which individuals build or are expected to build; and if that of the Greek civilization was conceived as a synthesis of the four Cardinal Virtues, taken somewhat narrowly, that of Christianity adds an infusion of Faith, Hope and Charity to these, and gets for the result that new simple ideal of character whereof Christ is the archetype. Having split up this ideal, artificially, though not irrationally or without high authority, into seven components or aspects, let us for a moment see how this skeleton may be joined together in some form useful to our intelligence and to our need of unity.

We have said that in giving the word "neighbor" an infinitely wider sweep than that afforded it within the narrow compass of a particular tribe or State; in revealing to us the notion of a divine and universal State wherein what is best for all conduces no less to the highest and fullest life of each in particular, Christ has given a certain truth to what were else a false confusion of social and individual virtue; and has brought even the secret thoughts of a man's heart within the sphere of his public duties as a member of the City of God. The highest interests of the part and of the whole being thus identified, there is no further practical question as to which branch of moral science is to give the law to the other; the Christian's duty to himself, to his family, his country, his race, are all aspects of that one duty which he owes to God or rather to the Kingdom of God.

In some sense we may say that the whole range of duty is covered by the single virtue which renders to every one his due,—honor or tribute or service or worship; which consists in a practical recognition of our place and function as members of the social organism: and bids us find our ultimate good and the object of our dominant desire, in that general good whereof our separate welfare is but a constitutive, though essential and indispensable, part. Prior in its claim on our immediate care and attention, our own interest must, in our

Digitized by Google

intention, be directed to, and ruled by, the universal interest, which though last in the order of realization, is first in the order of purpose and motive. Justice therefore is simply the love of reason in the realm of conduct—reason being the faculty of right order, which seeks disinterestedly to realize it where it is not, and rejoices in it where it finds it already realized—just as the eye rejoices in the light or the ear in melody. It is in virtue of reason that we are as instruments in the hand of the universal and subsistent Reason—God Himself—and obey an impulse that is in us, but not of us, or from us; and that we work, almost instinctively, for an end and interest that exceeds our comprehension,—much as the prophet is supposed to be blindly and fatally instrumental to ends which at times he would even fain resist. No utilitarian sophistications can wholly crush in us this disinterested love of the right, the reasonable, the divine. In its wider sense Justice regulates our conduct in reference to the whole social organism and to all its component parts—to ourslves and to others, whether our equals, superiors, or inferiors.

But such an attitude of subordination and disinterested devotion to the general good and to the interests of reason and right order, is imperilled when those self-seeking, self-asserting instincts of the soul, which are destined by nature to be used in the service of Justice, and to secure easily and effectually that just and reasonable self-care which is part of our duty to others, are allowed wholly or in part to seize the reins of supreme government; that is, when our personal likings and dislikings are set before the claims of order and reason. Against such outbreaks of egotism, whereby the member revolts from its subordination to the whole, and seeks the headship for itself, Justice can be safeguarded and established in the soul only as long as Temperance and Fortitude stand as sentries at the gate—the one to restrain our disorderly likings, the other to conquer our unreasonable dislikings. Finally, because Justice in conduct supposes justice in judgment, and a sound and reasonable estimate of what is due in each case to ourselves and others; and because our practical reason is so largely under the control and bias of our affections and desires, we need another

Digitized by Google

moral virtue to watch over our mind in these matters and to guard it from the undue influence of passion; and this virtue is called Prudence or Practical Judgment. Hence it may be said that Prudence, Temperance and Fortitude are not so much distinct generic virtues, as they are subsidiary conditions of Justice in that wider sense in which it is the *summum genus* of all natural virtues, so that these four Cardinal Virtues are rather to be regarded as four elements or principles of Moral Goodness in the most general sense of the term.

Christ's answer to the question: Who is my neighbor? has not only given us a conception of Justice as much wider than the Socratic, as Heaven and earth is wider than Athens, but it has determined for us more exactly what kind of life and happiness it is that we must first learn to value for ourselves, before we can be enthusiastic about securing it for others in due measure. It is more than possible to be clear as to the supremacy of the State-good over every private good, and as to the need of giving each man his due, and yet to be wholly vague as to the precise nature of the public good, and as to what is, in fact, due from man to man. Even in our own day we observe among those who have abandoned the Christian solution an astonishing zeal for the happiness and the rights of all, coexisting with a dense mistiness as to the meaning of the terms in question.

The life which Christ declares to be man's highest form of energy and His inalienable right is an end at once individualistic and social. It is a function of the individual, but just so far as he is, and acts as a member and instrument of that universal organism, wherein we are all brought together under God and governed by that indwelling Reason whose impulse we obey in every act of disinterested and universal love. It is a sharing in a common possession, a common love, a common progress and attainment, not as we each share the same sunshine, or the same atmosphere, which we enjoy neither more nor less for its being shared by the rest of us; but rather as I share the joy of my friend because it is his and he is mine; and his joy is greater because it is shared by me, and mine is greater because it is shared by him. Christ's "Enter thou into the joy of the

Digitized by Google

Lord" well formulates the whole conception of man's blessedness as an entering into that Divine and general life, which also can be said to enter into him so far as he breaks through the chrysalis-wall of his egoism and embryonic pre-moral life, and enters into the possession of his full personality and conscious participation in the general life of Reason. It is not strange that the ever-progressive development of such a character in each one of us should be spoken of as "Eternal Life"—"Life" in that it is a process of continual self-perfection and greater adaptation to the reality and truth of things; and "Eternal" in that it perfects that part of us which acts and moves in the spiritual and divine order of being. Nor is it a mere poetical fancy, but rather a profound philosophic and religious truth which defines him to be the best

> "Who loveth best
> All things both great and small;"

and others to be better just in the measure that they approximate to this divine ideal; nor will any utilitarian analysis upset the general conviction that the power and exercise of disinterested love is the shortest road to that personal happiness on which it turns its back. In declaring man's perfection and blessedness to consist in this expansive effort whereby the mind and heart seek endlessly to compass God and all things, Christ has implicitly determined the inalienable right of every man to all that is needed for the building-up of this character within him.

But it will be observed that, into this wider conception of man's due, love and affection have entered and have merged the territories of Justice and Charity. Taken more narrowly, Justice is distinct from personal affection, if not actually opposed to it; it is an ardent love, not of persons, but of abstract right and order in human conduct. It renders what is due, to friends and to enemies indifferently; and it even glories in a sort of cold-blooded impartiality and is a more easy virtue for less affectionate characters. He is not just, of course, who pays his dues to others only under compulsion; he must at least love justice and delight in it with his mind; yet this is the love of a thing, of an idea, rather than of a person; it is zeal for the

Digitized by Google

social order and organization, rather than for the units and parts so organized—a cold spiritual motive that appeals feebly to all but a few, until it is taken up and warmed into life by the affection of charity and personal attachment.

As soon as Justice is seen, or even vaguely felt, to be no mere abstraction but the living will, of that personal subsistent Justice and Reason whose name is God, it begins forthwith to soften the harsher lines of its countenance and to put on the gentler aspect of Charity—of that sympathetic personal love of the several living members of God's Kingdom, which renders them not only their due but a generous overplus; which does not contravene but includes and passess beyond mere Justice so far, at least, as Justice forgets that love is the supreme debt of man to man.

But this vastly extended notion of our debts and dues, involves a degree of self-sacrifice and self-repression—a measure of endurance and abstinence, far beyond what was covered by the Greek conception of Fortitude and Temperance; and indeed sets forth an ideal infinitely beyond the weakness of man in the solitude and helplessness of his natural egoism. The Spirit of disinterested Love must of its own free choice enter into him by some action analogous to that whereby it transforms dead matter into living, the senseless into the sentient, the irrational into the reasonable. All true growth and progress is wrought in us and through us, but not by us; it is ours to accept and, perhaps, to condition, but not to cause; the less is not sufficient reason for the greater. Without Hope by which man, sensible of his insufficiency, relies on God's supernatural help and expresses his reliance by recourse to prayer and appointed means of grace, the Fortitude and Abstinence demanded by Christian Justice and Charity are impossible; self-love like an ill-weed must inevitably spring up and strangle unselfishness and the love of others.

Lastly our whole conception of this transfigured Justice absorbed into Charity, our belief in the union of all men, through Christ, in the participation of the same Eternal Life, rests upon data which are revealed to us, not from without by flesh and

Digitized by Google

blood, but from within and by the Father; and with regard to which the grasp of reason is too feeble to be of any practical service, unless it be supplemented by the will-force of that Faith which holds to those dark utterances that come up from the very depths of our whole spiritual nature, in preference to those surface reverberations that represent the understanding alone.

Thus we have Faith perfecting our Prudence or Practical Judgment by a knowledge of the true end of human life—namely, Justice transfigured into Charity;—whence, a correct knowledge of the means may be determined; and we have Hope, making possible that Temperance and Fortitude whereby alone such an ideal can be realized. We must not then look upon these three Theological Virtues as added mechanically to the four Cardinal Virtues—as it were three more beads threaded on the same string—and as making with them a summary of Christian duty, whereof one part is natural and the other supernatural. The Christian character is no such centaur or monstrosity. Indeed it is not correct to contrast these groups as natural and supernatural in the Christian, since in him, being but facets of one simple perfection, they are all natural on that empirical side which falls under the observation of ethics and psychology. Let us rather speak of them as religious and civil virtues, respectively. Under this their empirical aspect, they are closely woven into one texture, the latter being permeated, quickned and transfigured by the former. And as it is the higher which explains the lower, and not conversely, so it is the religious virtues which alone complement and finish-off the frayed and ragged conceptions of the civil virtues by showing them with the context from which they are but torn. Although from no inspection of Prudence, Justice, Fortitude and Temperance could we clearly divine what exactly is lacking to their fulness and coherence as a conception of character (sc. Faith, Hope and Charity) yet, that something is lacking, is an irresistible impression. It were a starved soul that went clad so thinly. From an endeavor to do with so little, man can gain, at least, a conviction of his insufficiency—of his inherent inability to "realize" himself. He may learn that he

Digitized by Google

is lost, though not where the right way lies; that he is in darkness though not where he may look for light; that he is weak, though not where strength can be found.

Such then is the inter-relation of these seven elements into which, for purposes of thought and language, Christian ethics has resolved its ideal of character. Needless to say that countless other justifiable analyses are conceivable and that neither this nor any other pretends to exhaust the concrete reality, any more than any possible number of descriptions of a flower or an insect could say all that is to be said about it. Races whose forms of thought and language differ from our own, beyond hope of translation, will not only speak but think differently; yet what they speak and think of will be the same; and who shall say that Christianity is tied inseparably to Graeco-Judaic modes of conception?

GEORGE TYRRELL, S. J.

RICHMOND, YORKS, ENGLAND.

THE POLITICAL BABEL.

FOR some time after the South African War entered upon its final stage we heard a great deal about "lessons of the war." Since then the nation has been told on the strength of this war's experience almost everything relating to attacks, cover, arms, ammunition, horses, how to finish this struggle and prevent its recurring in the future, besides a number of other things. These lessons may or may not be of much practical value to Commanders and Politicians. But there is another experience which we may call a lesson, not indeed of this war alone, though perhaps on no previous occasion has the fact I am referring to manifested itself in such marked manner as on this last one. I am alluding to the striking conflict of opinions and political convictions which this war has aroused. There have been, it is true, worse differences between political parties in all countries which even led to civil wars, but the fact which we must bear in mind is, that the differences I am speaking of have not originated in the internal

Digitized by Google

affairs of the country, but represent the clashing opinions of two great parties on the treatment of a foreign nation. Speaking of two great parties I am well aware that one of them represents a large numerical majority and the other a corresponding minority; but in endeavoring to treat the phenomenon before us from a psychological point of view we have only to consider one view as against the other, however large a majority there be on one side and small a minority on the other, provided only that that minority is sufficiently considerable to compel us to take it into account. Apart from this I shall have an opportunity of justifying my disregard for numbers later on.

To the average man, to the man in the street, the question of this conflict of opinions will seem very unimportant and its solution extremely simple: he will promptly settle it to his own satisfaction by looking upon those who hold the opposite view either as a kind of better class robbers and thieves, or as fools and traitors, according to the party to which he happens to belong. He will blandly declare that he simply cannot understand their reasoning! But to the foreigner living in this country and uninfluenced by any preconceived like or dislike for either party, if he be at all given to contemplation, this phenomenon is exceedingly interesting from a psychological point of view. For is it not the result of the natural and spontaneous development of the mind of a people enjoying the highest degree of liberty of thought and speech? We must admit that it is. Only a free exercise of this right of men can make the unrestrained expression of political opinions possible. And this is, generally speaking, a decided advantage and a sign of progress. But looking at this particular phenomenon we ask ourselves: "Is it natural and to the advantage of the nation that a divergence of opinions on the question of a war waged by this country should develop into that almost passionate animosity between political opponents which we observed on this last occasion?" Assuredly not! There is something sad and alarming in seeing an intellectually particularly healthy race split into factions which will go to such extremes as to freely accuse each other of the basest things.

We must therefore modify the first question we have asked

Digitized by Google

ourselves and put it in this form: "Is this phenomenon the *necessary* result of independence of thought?" This is a question of the greatest importance, because if we have to answer it in the affirmative, it would mean that freedom of thought and speech, which we have been accustomed to look upon as an achievement worthy of the most advanced nation, is a failure and ought to be suppressed. But happily we shall be able to find a different answer which will be something like this: It is only the necessary result *under the particular circumstances which at present exist* though it is likely to become worse in proportion as such independence of thought and speech continues to manifest itself,—unless those particular circumstances be altered.

Let us inquire into this matter. But before entering on this task I should like to lay stress on two things: First, that this essay is not intended to be any criticism whatsoever of the war just finished, and second, that my remarks are not meant to apply to any one particular nation. I wish to emphasize these two points particularly in order to avoid misunderstandings. My observations apply to the politics of all civilized countries alike, and if I shall endeavor to take my examples and illustrations chiefly from the late war, my reason for doing so is that it happens to afford the most recent instance and all circumstances connected with it are fresh in everybody's mind.

The circumstance which will strike the observer from the first, and which must have become apparent to everybody, is the fact that discussions on politics—whether home or foreign politics—scarcely ever end by either of the disputants being converted to the other's views. Let two men of ever so high an intellectual standard, but belonging to opposite political parties, discuss the difference in their views, and unless they are particularly good tempered they are more likely to part worse friends than they were before, than—in spite of the best arguments brought forward on either side—to agree on one single point. In fact it seems easier to explain to a blind man what red is like than to convince a political opponent.

Now, there is something very strange in this which requires explanation. Why do we not observe the same in any of the


SOCIETY
Digitized by Google

other many topics of discussion? Surely it cannot be maintained that the reason is to be found in the abstract nature of the subject, because there are many equally abstract subjects with which the same is not the case. Take for instance the administration of justice, which is essentially an abstract matter and one which concerns the individual quite as much, and even more immediately than, say, foreign politics; and yet we scarcely ever find two people getting heated over it. The only controversies which can be said to present any resemblance to the political ones were those on religion in former times, when the passions aroused on both sides led to the cruellest wars since the age of barbarism. Yet the similarity is far from perfect. Religion is essentially a matter of individual belief, and the faith professed by one person scarcely affects the interests, or interferes with the rights of anybody else. We have therefore come to be tolerant in religious matters and generally refrain from discussing them. The probability is that those former convulsions were really due to the encroachment of politics on religious questions.

But we cannot afford to look upon the different political convictions of our fellow subjects with the same equanimity wherever the single individual is an active part of a governing body, *i. e.* wherever there is a self-governing people, because every single vote has its significance and a certain effect on the nation's interests and well-being. It follows that a nation will be the sounder the more united its component parts are.

Whenever during the last few years,—that is since the present war has made political discussions more passionate—I assisted at a controversy on this subject, I somehow could not help comparing the antagonists (I apologize to them for the comparison) to two men nearly coming to blows over the question whose carpet is larger. It appears that *A* has a square carpet and *B* a round one. "How can you say that your carpet is larger," says *A,* spreading it over his own, "can you not see the four corners of mine projecting ever so far?" "How can you deny that mine is the larger," retorts *B,* in turn placing *A's* carpet over his, "if a child can see that mine protrudes on all four sides?" And maybe they will come to blows yet.

Digitized by Google

This seems to me to be very nearly what happens in all political disputes. Each of the opponents has his own particular way of looking at things, and there seems to be no common ground. The dispute may be protracted ad infinitum but without the slightest result. Truly a political Babel, where each section speaks in a language unintelligible to the others!

Again we ask: "Why is this? Are politics really so very different from all other sciences, and is there no room for logic, the great settler of disputes between cultured men?" I cannot for a moment accept that off-hand judgment with which so many people of either party are so ready to set their own minds at rest on this problem, by attributing the contrary views of other people either to a certain inexplicable perversity of character or to a special kind of mental aberration, as I myself have known men of the highest moral and intellectual standard, yet belonging to opposite parties. We must therefore look for some other explanation.

In our investigation of the causes of this phenomenon we shall do well to distinguish between political controversies within and without the Houses of Parliament. I do not mean to imply by this that the two are of an entirely different character, though undoubtedly there is a good deal of difference between them. But by treating them separately we shall be able to simplify our investigation by avoiding certain objections.

I, for one, do not doubt that at least the majority of the Members of Parliament are originally sincere in their course of action, *i. e.* they begin by joining the party which to the best of their knowledge and conscience is the right one. But from that moment it seems as if their personal convictions had been relegated to a back seat to make room for something else; that something else is *Party*. So in the instance before us, the question of the war: The Opposition party was perfectly entitled to approve or to disapprove of the war according to their own views. Rightly or wrongly they disapproved, and so far this is fair and legitimate criticism. But if we see men who represent sections of the English nation apparently eager to seize on every favorable opportunity to publicly accuse their country of waging war by unfair means,—and that in most cases on quite unreliable informa-

Digitized by Google

tion can we believe that they are still acting up to their convictions? No, something else speaks through their mouths, and that something else is *Party*. And how about the governing party? True, they have not gone to extremes to the same extent, probably because of the consciousness of their own strength and easy victory. But did they give that originally fair and legitimate criticism quite a fair treatment? Are they not to a certain extent responsible for the extremes to which the Opposition has gone by holding that party up to the nation's contempt from the very outset? Surely something must have prompted them that was not all honest conviction; that something was *Party*.

There seems to me to be a certain appropriateness to what we observe at present in the words of Herr Bluntschli quoted in Mr. Lilly's "First Principles of Politics," if we make the necessary deduction from his somewhat strong expressions. He says:

> "If party zeal and party passion become so overmastering that parties would rather tear the country to pieces than join hands for its delivery and welfare, if a party abuses the public authority of which it has gained possession, unjustly to oppress and persecute those who do not hold with it, if parties combine with a foreign enemy against their own country and the nation to which they belong—then so unpatriotic a course expels the essential idea of a political party, and the party becomes a faction."

Mr. Lilly in the same book refers to a speech made by Mr. Chamberlain at Oxford in May, 1890, in which that gentleman concludes a favorable criticism of the party system with the admission: "When great national interests are at stake, when the safety of the commonwealth is involved, the party system breaks down." But what do we see? Great national interests were at stake, the safety of the Empire, or at least part of it, according to the statements of those politicians themselves, was involved, but the differences between the parties, so far from disappearing, have become accentuated to an almost alarming degree. The fact is that every party is liable sooner or later to degenerate into a faction, if for no other reason simply by virtue of that tendency so common in men to fly to extremes when strongly and successfully opposed. But how much more must this be the case under a party system as it

Digitized by Google

exists now in most European countries, where successfully supporting the Government on one side and successfully opposing it on the other, no matter on what question, means remaining in power for the one, or coming into power for the other.

The object of this inquiry is merely to establish on psychological grounds the causes of the observed irreconcilableness of political opinions, and from this point of view the party system undoubtedly does a great deal of harm. But even from a merely political and constitutional standpoint it is difficult to see what the advantage of it is, and high authorities on political philosophy have strongly denounced it. The chief argument in its support is that it ensures an effective and organized opposition and thereby a more thorough discussion of all matters before Parliament. But surely there should be no need for such incentive for the representatives of the nation to take an interest in, and discuss, the affairs of their country, particularly for such dangerous incentive. Without it, we cannot doubt that an equally effective criticism would be ensured which, being disinterested and conscientious, though it may not be organized, would be of immensely greater value than the present one, and more in harmony with the original idea of Representative Government, such idea being that the votes of the majority, given by each Member to the best of his knowledge and conscience, should decide. It is obvious that Ministers in power often have an interest in the maintenance of the party system because their position is practically unassailable while the Cabinet as a whole stands; but even this is a distinct drawback because the case may often arise when the country will hesitate to overthrow a Ministry the generality of whose members are inefficient because this may involve the sacrifice of, say, one particularly capable man who happens to fill an important post—for instance that of Colonial Secretary —to the greatest satisfaction of the nation.

We may now pass on to the second part of our inquiry *viz.* that dealing with the divergence of political opinions outside Parliament. This part of the investigation will prove to be by far the more difficult and complicated of the two, as the causes are not as obvious as in the first. It is of course not

Digitized by Google

possible to draw a distinct line of demarcation between political convictions (or whatever passes for that) of Members of Parliament and those of private persons, and to consider them two things entirely different from each other. There is a certain intermingling of the two round the line which we have drawn for the sake of simplification, as there are no doubt Members of Parliament who still hold their own political opinions in the same way as they would as private persons, and on the other hand there are a great number of the latter who in some way or other have a material interest in either of the parties which will tend to make them partial. But the great majority of private persons take at the most a purely sentimental interest in one of the parties, which—the self-interest being absent—cannot in any way be compared to the party zeal of politicians. This is the great difference which we have here to consider.

Now, self-interest being absent, we have to find out why political views of private citizens are found to be almost as irreconcilable as those of the political parties in Parliament.

If I may be permitted to revert for one moment to the simile of the carpets it will be noticed that *A* and *B* base their contentions on facts; on palpable undeniable facts. And yet their conclusions are diametrically opposed to each other. Quite the same may be observed in political discussions, each side using "facts" for their arguments and,—being perfectly convinced that a conclusion based on facts cannot possibly be wrong,—they do not see the necessity of using their minds any further, but, pleased with their own wisdom and logic, put their opponents down as "narrow minded" and "ignorant."

Now, if facts may be used by both sides with such different results, there must be a fallacy somewhere, and in my opinion it is to be found in this: Facts, as such, do not enter in political philosophy. By "fact" we mean either an occurrence or a circumstance which is known to be true, it is something that really exists or existed, and as such cannot be used in political philosophy, which is an abstract science, any more than in mathematics we can add or subtract two quantities of an entirely heterogeneous character. To use them for the purpose

Digitized by Google

of forming our theories a process of assimilation must first take place, and this process is the *interpretation* of facts. It is this interpretation of facts which forms the basis of our judgment and not the facts themselves. Some may call this making a distinction without a difference, but to me it appears to be really the clue to the explanation of the phenomenon I am dealing with. There are very few things, if any, which are not liable to be interpreted in at least two very different ways. A man who is wont always to carry out whatever he has set himself to, may be called firm by his friends and obstinate or headstrong by his enemies; and who will undertake to say exactly where the one ends and the other begins? And as to historical facts we have only to read the various accounts of the deeds and characters of famous men.

Once we have made this clear to ourselves that it is not the facts but their interpretation which forms the real basis of our political ideas, the problem before us seems less complicated. In fact to arrive at its solution we have now only to find an explanation for these great differences in the interpretation of facts.

I will here for the last time refer to our friends *A* and *B*, to show now the one difference between their case and that of political opponents. Of course it may be said that they must be fools, as the use of such a simple thing as a clothyard would speedily settle their quarrel. Exactly so, but the possibility of resorting to that means is just where the two cases differ. Where is that intellectual clothyard which we could apply to our political ideas and thereby settle our disputes? With the facts as the raw material at our disposal, the process of turning out the finished article, judgment, consists in the interpretation of these various facts and fitting them together. But we cannot interpret, that is call a thing morally good or bad, without applying a certain standard measure to it. If somebody steals another man's property we do not hesitate to call this a bad action, but we are only enabled to arrive at this judgment by applying to the case,—though through habit this may be done unconsciously—the principle laid down in the eighth Commandment. And since this principle is generally accepted the

Digitized by Google

verdict will be unanimous. In the same way a judge trying a case measures, as it were, the offence by certain well defined and generally acknowledged principles, *i. e.* the law, and passes sentence according to the result. As a matter of fact it would be impossible to arrive at any judgment in any matter if we had no such standard to refer the case to. Let anybody with a very active imagination try to picture to himself the state of affairs that would exist, were all those fundamental principles which form the basis of our civil law non-existent, and everybody left to judge as he feels inclined! Well, to a certain extent that state of affairs exists in politics where there is a sad lack of such universally acknowledged principles, and a perfect chaos is only averted because even in politics we cannot,—or at least not openly—quite dissociate ourselves from the ethical rules which we have been taught to apply to our private life.

I have previously ventured to compare religion to politics, and there is no doubt a limited resemblance between the two. Every creed has of course a well defined standard of ethics of its own, but there is no such common standard between the different religions; hence the violence of former controversies. In politics even that standard for each section is missing and is supplanted by a set of general propositions, but these are very far from being well defined, and even to their own adherents they present a very shadowy and nebulous appearance. What were for instance these propositions of the pro-war and anti-war parties with respect to the South African War? Let us consider them fairly and dispassionately in turn.

The adherents of the Pro-War party maintained:

That since the Government of a foreign country refused to adopt such measures as were demanded by their own Government for the remedy of certain grievances of a very numerous English community in that country, the English Government was entitled to take such steps, and to bring such pressure to bear on the other side as ultimately led to war;

That by a sort of plebiscite it appeared that a large majority of the nation supported the Government's action, and that such majority being on their side it proved that the war was right and just;

Digitized by Google

That in the face of this it was an unpatriotic course for the other party to persist in their opposition, the only course left to a patriotic man being to take the part of his own Government in any dispute with a foreign country.

Now, if we can refer all these propositions to one standard, *i. e.* to one generally accepted principle or doctrine, and find them to be in accordance with its fundamental idea or teaching, we may unhesitatingly call them correct; as far as human judgment goes they are good and just. If on the other hand no such uniform standard can be found, if to justify those contentions we have to shift our ground, we must consider them, if not absolutely wrong (since we have no means of measuring them), but without any value whatsoever. Let us examine them.

What fundamental principle justifies the interference by one country with the internal affairs of another country? On what doctrine does one set of people base their right to dictate measures to another set of people within their own legitimate territory, and in case of non-compliance appropriate the latter by superior force? I shall be answered that it is the right and duty of a nation to safeguard the interests of, and to protect, its fellow subjects abroad. This may be so,—to a certain extent. But of what standard doctrine does this proposition form part? The intercourse between the units of the Christian part of the human race, as far as rights and duties are concerned, is at present regulated by one doctrine only: that of the Christian religion, or rather by the principles forming the basis of civil law, which is only Christian religion made practical and, as it were, brought up to date. And into that doctrine the above contention will not fit. There is no clause in the civil law which will justify one man's taking another man's property by force, and as to being one's own arbiter, why, the most honest and respected judge is by law disqualified from judging his own cause. And in the great Christian community, if we understand Christianity aright, all men, no matter to what nation they belong, should be considered equivalent, and the various nations composing it can only be compared to the families living in one country and forming one nation.

Digitized by Google

Passing on to the second proposition: on what grounds can it be contended that the opinion of the majority must necessarily be the right one? That indeed it has any more value than that of even the smallest minority? Here, it is true, we have an apparent parallel in the administration of civil law, inasmuch as in some countries the majority of the members composing a jury decide the verdict. But there are two differences which are fatal to the comparison: First, no person is admitted to the jury who has the least personal interest in the case that is being tried; and second, the juries are only called upon to decide on matters which any man of an average intelligence is supposed to be able to judge. But politics are certainly not such matter. Even the average educated man does not trouble himself greatly about studying political science and is quite satisfied with occasionally expounding his rather hazy ideas on the subject in more or less high-sounding words, supporting them with those commonplace arguments with which the leader in his daily paper provides him ready made by the dozen. How can we then expect the less educated and harder working laboring class to find the time for studying the matter and to form their own ideas? Politics seem to most people a very simple thing and a subject which any sane man can judge and understand. But those who take the trouble to look underneath the highly polished surface will soon be convinced that it is a very complicated affair indeed, rendered more so by the confusion of ideas which prevails. And even the student of political science stands bewildered at the flat contradictions to which the highest authorities on that subject treat each other on the most important points. Under such conditions what shadow of a value can the opinion of any majority have, consisting of people of whom say 90 per cent. are thoroughly convinced that they can judge any political question off hand! And if we want to know how such majorities are created, we find a very good description of the process in Sir H. S. Maine's "Popular Government." I am quoting Mr. W. Graham's summary:

"These two things, party and corruption, greatly aid in the production, not of agreement, but the appearance of agreement, in a multitude. There is

Digitized by Google

a third and very effective agency. This is the manufacture and confident utterance of general propositions on political subjects, a great device which imposes on imperfectly educated men who are much taken by it, almost as much as by ornate rhetoric. The party leader has discovered the secret of the manufacture in abundance and variety, and indeed nothing can be simpler. Utter these propositions, resting on the slenderest, flimsiest and often irrelevant base of facts, unverified, perhaps unverifiable, in striking language, and crowds of men will assent to them, applaud them, and thus there is formed a sort of sham and pretense of concurrent opinion. Such loose acquiescence in vague general propositions is a bad mental habit."

Would it not be almost safer generally to consider the opinion of the minority the more correct one, since it is obvious that only a small percentage of the population possesses any political education to speak of?

And those who still believe in the infallibility of majorities I would ask to consider the fact that in very many, if not most cases immediately before the outbreak of a war the majority in both countries is in favor of that terrible arbitrament. The cry *"À Berlin!"* rang as loud as that: *"Nach Paris!"* in 1870, and is it possible to suppose that both countries were in the right? If either was right the other must of necessity have been wrong, but it is just possible that both were wrong, majorities notwithstanding. And have not all great reformers begun by having the majority, nay, the whole people against them? Where then does that infallibility of majorities come in?

I now pass on to the last of the propositions under our consideration, *i. e.* that dealing with patriotism. I am fully aware that it is a thankless task to subject a popular ideal which through ages has been glorified and almost surrounded with a halo of sanctity, to the cold test of scientific analysis, and I myself would rather leave it untouched. But it is impossible to examine the value of political theories without first establishing the exact meaning of a word which in political oratory plays such an important part as just this one. However in trying to analyze its meaning, I should not like to render myself guilty of any attempt at minimizing or disparaging the nobility of character of all those who in the histories of all countries since the earliest ages stand prominent for patriotic deeds. I yield to none in the admiration of those who willingly sacri-

Digitized by Google

fice fortune, health or life for what they think to be the common good, and even if they did so in an entirely mistaken cause, as far as they are concerned, it would detract nothing from their merit.

What then is patriotism? Are we all who use this word so often and with such force fully conscious of the exact meaning we wish to convey? It seems a pity to me that Professor Seeley, when he gave us so admirable a definition of the word liberty, did not at the same time deal with this word which in an equally vague manner is so frequently used in conjunction with the former, to play upon the popular mind. For without definition, to use his own words, "political discussion must needs degenerate into that interminable brawl which may be profitable enough to aspiring politicians, but can be of no profit to the commonwealth."

We all know that the etymological meaning of the word is: love for one's country. But clearly there is a great variety of ways in which one may love one's own country, and certainly there must also be some limit to it somewhere. Can for instance patriotism mean that we should do anything, good or bad, that will be profitable to our country and that we should go so far in this endeavor as to utterly disregard the rights and legitimate claims of other nations? I am sure this is not the right interpretation, and we shall have to find out in what way and how far such love of one's country may legitimately manifest itself.

That man must be a thorough cynic, and utterly incapable of appreciating the higher ideals of life, who could fail to see the beauty of the principle by which every man, as part of a whole, unhesitatingly gives up some of his comfort, means and pleasures, and even, if need be, his life, for the promotion of the welfare of that whole of which he forms part. But as in most other things so also in this we must guard against overstepping the natural limits, lest we unknowingly turn good into evil. We must not forget that this co-operation of individuals is only the means to an end, and that, however noble be the means which we employ, it is chiefly the end on which they are dependent for their value. To cite one extreme instance:

Digitized by Google

we are all familiar with the many accounts of old time brigands' gangs among whom zealous and even scrupulously honest co-operation seems to have been practiced; yet that circumstance did not ennoble their profession or make them less deserving of the gallows. This instance is of course not intended to be a comparison between the ends which civilized nations have in view and brigandaccio, but merely to show that, however noble and beautiful zeal and self-denial of individuals in the promotion of the common interests be in themselves, as a principle they are not *necessarily* good.

In the popular mind of all nations the prevalent idea of patriotism, as far as external politics are concerned, would seem to be the assumed duty of every subject to co-operate in, and promote, the extension of territory and increase of power of his own country; if possible, without interfering with the rights of others, but if not otherwise possible, to the detriment of any other country that may happen to stand in the way. From a moral point of view the objections to such interpretation are obvious and there is nothing to justify it. The idea of self-denying co-operation, it is true, is based on a moral principle which forms part of the ethics of Christianity. But that principle is meant to apply to humanity as a whole, and there is nothing to justify our restricting its application to the particular nation to which we happen to belong. Such restriction is entirely arbitrary, and if we think it right to go so far, there is no reason why we should not go a step further and restrict it to our own family, leaving the State to look after itself. I shall be answered that we could not do that because our family would not be safe for long without the efficiency of the State. This is correct, but if we enter on such practical considerations we should at the same time realize that the State itself must sooner or later lose its power and greatness without that further honest co-operation extending to the whole of the human race, because under a system in which strength alone tells even the most powerful State can never hope to maintain its greatness for ever. A glance at history will show us the truth of this.

Once we have entered into the idea of that Christian principle

Digitized by Google

applying to the whole of humanity the popular interpretation of patriotism, by which every foreign country is to be considered something in the nature of an antagonist, falls to the ground.

But there is another possible interpretation which would combine the practical advantages of the one idea with the ethical beauty of the other: a system under which the various States, while continuing to look after the interests of their own subjects, would enter into a really honest co-operation among themselves by striving to strictly observe in their intercourse with each other those moral principles of right and wrong which form the basis of our social life; a system by which the various civilized countries, while keeping strictly within the limits prescribed by those principles, would vie with each other, not so much in a race for supremacy and greatest possible power, as in the nobler contest for the first place in the esteem, confidence and applause of the great family of civilized nations. This is no Utopian idea, and I shall explain myself more fully later on. But for my immediate purpose it is sufficient to assume that such system could be generally adopted,—would there be no scope then for patriotism, *i. e.* love of one's country, in the striving for that place of honor among nations? Would there be no further purpose in zealous co-operation of the persons belonging to one nation, or no occasions for noble self-sacrifice in a noble cause? Indeed there would, and the idea of patriotism could only gain in beauty by such change!

I think I may say that at the bottom of our hearts we all have a more or less vague feeling that, if it were practicable, this interpretation of patriotism would be an ethically more beautiful and correct one. I shall of course have to show that the idea is capable of being put into practice, but as it is, the great majority think anything but a strongly utilitarian principle impracticable and call those who deviate from that, enemies of their country. With what right?

It may be objected that during the time of hostilities at least the persons opposed to the course adopted by the Government should, if differ they must, keep their opinion to themselves. This may be expedient and wise in many cases, but it

Digitized by Google

does not seem to me that it can be considered a duty the neglect of which is equivalent to treason. There is an advantage even in such free expression of adverse criticism, inasmuch as it makes the opinion of the minority a factor to be reckoned with beforehand by the Government, a factor whose importance is in exact proportion to the number of persons belonging to that minority. If the duty of not opposing the Government in time of hostilities were strictly adhered to as a principle it is clear that this would ultimately deprive the people of any voice in the question of war and peace, as any Government by the mere act of declaring war could compel the tacit consent of the nation.

We have now minutely examined the chief contentions of that section of the nation which was favorable to the war, and we have not been able to justify them by any one standard. There are, I am well aware, some who maintain that politics are being conducted according to a standard quite of their own. But which is that standard? Let those who think so compare the recent events in South Africa and those in China. I do not venture to say whether the annexation of the South African Republics is right or wrong, but surely the misdeeds of the Chinese and the provocation given by them were far worse than those of the Boers, yet so far from anybody annexing their country we saw alliances and counter alliances concluded for the avowed purpose of protecting its integrity. Where is here the uniformity of principle?

The arguments of the pro-war party being incapable of being justified by any uniform standard we cannot, in conformity with our theory, attach any value to them.

And the Anti-War party? They have generally supported their views of the question by arguments which, on the whole, are in keeping with the moral standard accepted for our private life. If, therefore, we may assume that their arguments were put forward in entirely good faith, that is to say, if we may believe that they were guided by firm principles to which they would adhere in all questions and under all circumstances, we shall, if we are consequent to our theory, have to admit that their arguments were good and just; that their view was mor-

Digitized by Google

ally the more correct of the two. But apart from the extremes to which many of them have gone,—so as even to disallow the right of self-defence which in civil law is perfectly legitimate,—we are now confronted by another difficulty. An opinion may be very good and just theoretically, but to be of any real value it must also be able to stand the test of practice. And here it is where the anti-war party possibly failed, not in a moral, but in a practical sense.

We cannot possibly shut our eyes to the fact that the European countries are rapidly getting overpopulated, and that there must be an outlet for the surplus population somewhere. Hence the expedient of a colonial policy. It may of course be disputed that the inability of a country to support all its subjects within its own boundaries should give it a right to take other people's territory for that purpose. But, in the case of England at least, it is an undeniable fact that the rule thus established over such annexed territories has generally proved to be of great benefit, not only to the settlers, but also to the original population, and, by the establishment of free trade, to other countries as well. Now, this seems to me a very strong point, in fact whenever in a dispute on the war I heard it raised,—strangely enough in most cases as a last straw to cling to,—it always seemed to me an almost unanswerable argument.

Even the strictest moralist must admit that there is something in the creation of new and vigorous races that is not altogether bad. Canada, Australia, South Africa, may ultimately become independent nations, healthy and prosperous, while the power of England may decline, but was it not the merit of that England to have created them? This consideration alone seems to me to go a long way towards justifying the standpoint of those in favor of expansion. But unfortunately, though it may be right, it is not in accordance with the laws applying to our civil life. Take the case of a man who has enormous wealth which he puts to the worst use possible. His wealth may be a curse to others, yet the law protects his property. Another man may deprive him of that wealth by force and, keeping only a minute portion to himself, employ the rest

Digitized by Google

so as to be of the greatest benefit to mankind; yet the law will punish him.

We see then that the principle which seems so sound and not without nobility does not fit into our standard, and without a standard we can never positively tell what is good and what is bad.

Apart from this there is also a practical objection to the unrestricted admission of that principle. If we allow that it is a good thing that England should annex foreign territories for the spread of civilization and the benefit of their inhabitants, we must in fairness allow the same right to all other civilized countries. And this principle once admitted, what splendid pretext for indiscriminate annexation it would afford!

Our inquiry is ended, and the conclusion, I think, is clear. There is no uniform standard answering moral as well as practical requirements to which political opinions may be referred, and without such reference correct judgment is inconceivable. Without it we shall go on for ever calling a thing just, great and noble, which others will condemn as unjust and vile. And what justifies us in maintaining that those others are wrong, or them in calling our views mistaken? As long as one section of a nation looks upon things political from a merely utilitarian point of view without due consideration of moral principles, and the other from an exalted moral standpoint without any allowance for practical requirements, the dispute must remain quite beyond any possibility of settlement and the divergence of opinions necessarily becomes more acute in proportion as the freedom of thought and speech in a nation is getting more and more appreciated.

The remedy seems obvious enough, and considering the great benefit it would confer, if successful, well worth trying. The adoption of a detailed international code of law would of course be one way out of the difficulty, but I fear this remedy is impracticable. Such codification has been attempted before, but the attempt had to be abandoned in the face of the impossibility of bringing about an agreement among the various nations even on the most important points. One of the chief objections to such arrangement is that a law thus created could

Digitized by Google

not easily be enforced. Yet by agreeing to a code of law of this kind the signatories would have to take a certain moral responsibility for its observance, and it is easy to imagine the complications which might arise from such precarious state of things. No wonder therefore the well-meant efforts in this direction have proved abortive.

What seems to me more likely of success is the adoption by each country of a detailed code of rules of its own, the creation of a standard which will serve as a guide for all its political actions. This would do away with the difficulty of arriving at an agreement among all the powers, it would not give rise to any international complications, and would not be binding except in a moral sense. Its advantage on the other hand would be that it would lay down fixed rules for any emergency that may arise, and enable a nation to form a correct and unanimous, or almost unanimous, opinion. There would of course be no means of compelling any nation to adhere to its standard, but neither would there be any necessity for that. Its only end would be, as I have said, to serve as a moral guide to the subjects of each particular country. And as such its effect would soon be felt. Fixed rules, once laid down, soon permeate the whole population down to the very lowest classes, particularly if their elementary principles are made the subject of instruction at the schools. The knowledge of civil law is not diffused in any other way and yet even the least educated man has a remarkably correct idea of it.

This parallel may also be a useful consideration to those who might object that politics are too complicated and intricate a matter to allow of fixed rules being laid down for any emergency. Surely the subject with which civil law deals is incomparably more complicated and the possible emergencies are infinitely more numerous, and yet they are all provided for in the law.

Apart from this the beginning could very well be made with foreign politics only, this being the branch of politics which most stands in need of such standard. As far as home politics are concerned there is no really urgent need for it, though it would certainly be of advantage even to this branch. Al-

Digitized by Google

though the present system of legislation may not be quite an ideal one, there is in home politics a certain, as it were, automatic remedy for any mistake that may be made. Their aim is to insure the welfare of the nation, and as every subject of a self-governing nation has a share in the government, this aim will in most cases be ultimately attained. On this principle, broadly speaking, every measure is just that promotes the welfare of the commonwealth, and if any measure is passed which has not this effect, a powerful opposition will make itself felt before long, and the mistake will be corrected. In home politics, therefore, not much is to be said against the Utilitarian principle. But in foreign politics where the governing body of one nation imposes its will on, and decides the fate of, another nation, the case is quite different. Here the utilitarian principle is not generally just, but through the inevitable admixture of self-interest,—apart from other minor causes,—is even very liable to become the opposite. This is a very essential difference between the two branches of politics.

A uniform and universally accepted standard,—for such it would have to be,—which will serve to all as a moral guide in foreign politics is therefore an absolute necessity. The question now arises: what should that standard be?

I have throughout this article drawn comparisons between politics and the rules which apply to our private life and find their expression in civil law. And not without purpose. There is, it is true, a very large number of those who hold that politics cannot be conducted on the same lines as social life, indeed we may say that this is a generally accepted view. But are those persons prepared to tell us why they cannot? This belief is only one more "loose acquiescence" in one of those commonplace theories which find so much favor with superficial minds on account of the great convenience with which they may be applied to any doubtful case. We hear them stated over and over again, until we cease to exercise our minds on the point, but accept them as a matter of course. I, for one, cannot see the slightest reason why the principles regulating our private intercourse with each other should not equally apply, and necessarily apply, to politics. These principles are

Digitized by Google

those which we find laid down in our ethical laws. Now, a nation being only a multitude of individuals (governing themselves by a system of delegates chosen from among their number), can we suppose that principles should apply to that multitude of individuals, which are different from, and often diametrically opposed to, those accepted for the individuals? Can we at all imagine two entirely different kinds of justice, honor, etc.? Or, if there are some who possess such exceptional powers of imagination, where do they take their second versions from, and what do they base them on?

It is impossible not to see that those fundamental ethical principles, if they are to be of any moral value at all, must be well defined and capable of one interpretation only, and that their meaning cannot be in the least altered, unless we are prepared to abandon our present ideas of ethics altogether and set up some new standard for our actions. But such a thing is too unlikely to be worth considering. If on the other hand we maintain that standard for our private life, we cannot but apply it to our political life as well.

It follows from this that in politics as well as in our private life anything that is contrary to the laws of ethics, as expressed in our civil law, is to be considered wrong. I do not of course mean to say by this that the same clauses and the very wording of the law should be made applicable to political matters. This would be absurd, and it is just in going too far in this direction that the anti-war parties generally fail. I am only speaking of the general principles underlying that law. My idea is that a special code of rules, applicable to all political emergencies, should be compiled, which rules must be based on the same principles as civil law. And where practical requirements demand the laying down of new rules for which there is as yet no parallel in that law, these new rules should be based on such principles as are not at variance with any of those already embodied in our civil law. To better illustrate my meaning I will cite one instance: Taking a man's property by force for one's own use is strictly forbidden by law. Yet in politics it is certainly often unavoidable to occupy and annex another country. Now, if certain detailed rules could be laid

Digitized by Google

down, clearly stating under what special circumstances such annexation may be legally effected, this would not necessarily be at variance with any of the principles of civil law, as by the latter in certain well defined cases the right of distraint may be exercised on a man's property. The essential condition of the legality of such seizure is, however, that the circumstances under which it may be effected should be *clearly specified.*

It is clear that were such political code drawn up for the conduct, say, of foreign politics, it would not in any way deteriorate the chances of a nation's legitimate development of power and greatness. And if it had the effect of putting certain moral obstacles in the way of indiscriminate annexation, I think to all fair minded men this would seem an additional advantage rather than a drawback. It would further allay political disputes by providing that generally accepted standard the absence of which is just the cause of the present violent divergence of opinions. And looking further ahead into the future, it is reasonable to suppose that, if this experiment were made by one of the leading countries of the world and found to be practicable, all other countries would soon follow suit, and once so far, shall we not have made a great step towards that universal peace among civilized nations to attain which such noble efforts have repeatedly been made, and made in vain because premature? That great and noble ideal, if ever it will be reached, not to the fear inspired by powerful combinations, not to paper conventions between the powers, will it owe its attainment, but to the calling to life and directing into the right channels that much more powerful agency: the working of our inborn and ineradicable, though often slumbering and more often misguided, ethical sense!

G. SCHUBERT.

ST. MARGARETS ON THAMES.

Digitized by Google

THE DOMAIN OF UTILITARIAN ETHICS.

UTILITARIAN ethics when understood in the terms by which its principal advocates have undertaken to expound it, has always been open to successful attack from its opponents. The intuitionists have irresistibly and triumphantly urged against it, that pleasure is neither the immediate nor the ultimate end of ethical conduct; that the contemplation of pleasure as an object of desire can never arouse the feeling expressed by the word "ought;" and that the idea of pleasure is not an essential element in the consciousness of a moral agent when incited to perform or engaged in performing a moral act.

These propositions the utilitarians have attempted to refute by a semblance of logical deduction from the postulate that moral conduct has for its primary object the promotion of human welfare. They then proceed to explain that welfare is necessarily accompanied by happiness and that happiness can be nothing else than pleasure.

But what if human welfare as an ethical end signifies only those conditions under which and states in which man or mankind becomes merely free from unhappiness? In such case the object of moral conduct would not be pleasure at all, but solely the elimination or minimization of pain; and when so understood, the utilitarian moralist could face his old antagonists without flinching.

Mr. John Morley in his essay on "Aphorisms," has called attention to a statement by Aristotle, which really should be regarded as the cardinal maxim of personal morals. It is this:—*Ὁ φρόνιμος τοῦ ἄλυπον διώκει οὐ τοῦ ἡδύ.* "The wise man seeks after freedom from pain, not pleasure."

But the practical rule thus enunciated, although evidently not intended by its sagacious author as anything more than a guide to prudent conduct for the benefit of the individual who should conform to it, may nevertheless, by natural expansion of meaning be so paraphrased as to express the fundamental principle of ethics that "the moral man is he whose actions are

Digitized by Google

directed to the avoidance, prevention, removal or alleviation of pain, whenever and wherever imminent or present, and whether affecting himself or his fellow-men, but wholly irrespective of any pleasure which may thereby be attained or promoted except in the negative sense of relief from painful experience."

Of course, in actual practice conflicting duties inevitably arise when a moral agent is obliged to suffer himself in order to save another from suffering; but that does not alter the rule; it only makes the rule more difficult to apply. Self-sacrifice may be heroic or may be foolhardy. In the one case it affords an example of sublime morality; in the other case it fails entirely to win moral approbation. Such problems must doubtless be determined by comparison of evils and by choice of what seems to be the least. How that is to be done in each instance will depend upon circumstances; and at best, mistakes will frequently arise. The fact, however, that pains differ in magnitude, intensity and duration, cannot be disputed; and it is equally certain that moral conduct must often be guided by weighing one pain against another.

The point to be here emphasized, however, is that morality never requires the comparison of pleasures with pains in the performance of duty; and that no immorality is more despicable than that by which a man seeks to secure some positive form of pleasure for himself at the expense of pain inflicted upon another.

Doubtless, if for the purposes of ethical philosophy, a definition be given to the term "pleasure," which shall make it connote any gratifying sense of more or less relief from a painful state of consciousness, there can be shown some rational justification for an hedonic theory of morals. But, according to the usual meaning of the term "pleasure" it rarely, if at all, signifies such merely negative or at best, neutral gratification; while on the other hand, it embraces so wide a range of positively agreeable sensations and emotions that its employment to denote only those feelings which are directly caused by mere diminution or elimination of pain, becomes inappropriate and misleading.

Digitized by Google

Nevertheless, the great masters of utilitarianism have not attended to this distinction; because, in formulating their statements of ethical doctrine, they have, theoretically at least, included within the category of strictly moral actions, not only conduct which has for its object the accomplishment of relief from pain, but also that which seeks to promote pleasure in a positive sense; although it is interesting to observe, that whenever they have undertaken to illustrate their principles of morality by concrete examples, they have invariably cited instances in which the acts rightfully demanded of the moral agent were concerned solely with the prevention, removal or mitigation of some form of pain. Indeed, it is difficult to conceive that any body could be under moral obligation to enhance the pleasure of another who would not suffer pain from the omission of the pleasure-giving act; and if it be true that such a moral obligation could not arise, much confusion might obviously have been avoided by early recognition of the fact, and by consequent avoidance of hedonic terminology which has always tended to perpetuate the error.

Jeremy Bentham, in his "Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation," opens the discussion with the following postulate:—

> "Nature has placed mankind under the governance of two sovereign masters, *pain* and *pleasure*. It is for them alone to point out what we ought to do, as well as to determine what we shall do."

Accordingly he bases his theory of morals upon the utility of conduct which tends to promote happiness or to prevent unhappiness; and he defines his meaning thus:—

> "By utility is meant that property in any object, whereby it tends to produce benefit, advantage, pleasure, good or happiness (all this in the present case comes to the same thing), or (what comes again to the same thing) to prevent the happening of mischief, pain, evil, or unhappiness to the party whose interest is considered; if that party be the community in general, then the happiness of the community; if a particular individual, then the happiness of that individual."

But does the production of pleasure come to the same thing in morals as the prevention of pain? The feeling of moral obligation undoubtedly appertains to that form of utility which tends "to prevent the happening of mischief, pain, evil or un-

Digitized by Google

happiness" either to the community in general or to a particular individual; but this surely does not hold true of that other form of utility which tends "to produce benefit, advantage, pleasure, good or happiness" of a positive kind.

To maintain the contrary would be to counfound ethics with economics or aesthetics; and yet the whole utilitarian school has seemed to ignore the obvious distinction between these two forms of utility. It has clearly been seen that the elimination of pain is an essential condition of happiness; but it has not been recognized that after the neutral state of freedom from pain has been reached, the superinduction of pleasure is not attended with the same kind of feeling on the part of the moral agent as is the alleviation of any sort of unhappiness.

The failure thus to discriminate is almost unaccountable; because as soon as the discussion takes a concrete form no attempt is ever made to furnish an example of moral or immoral conduct by referring to some act which has for its object either to bestow a pleasurable experience upon one who would not have been unhappy without it or to withhold the same under like conditions.

Bentham's treatise in its introductory chapters gives equal prominence to pleasures and to pains, but when it comes to deal with practical morality the field is restricted to consideration of acts which by reason of their infliction of pain constitute wrong-doing, or which by virtue of their tendency to prevent or mitigate pain are regarded as right; while pleasures are taken into account only so far as the deprivation of them may be attended with such pain as it is wrong to inflict and right to prevent. Indeed, a large portion of the work is devoted to the consideration of specific penal offences.

Again, John Stuart Mill, in his little book entitled "Utilitarianism," states:—

> "The creed which accepts as the foundation of morals, Utility or the Greatest Happiness Principle, holds that actions are right in proportion as they tend to promote happiness, wrong as they tend to produce the reverse of happiness. By happiness is intended pleasure, and the absence of pain; by unhappiness, pain and the privation of pleasure."

But nowhere does he give any illustration of an act which

Digitized by Google

although only adding more pleasure to an already happy state is felt to be morally obligatory. In fact, it would be difficult to produce any evidence tending to show that either Mill or any other authoritative utilitarian philosopher ever felt or maintained that an act *ought* to be performed unless it had for its object the prevention or alleviation of unhappiness in contradistinction to the mere production or augmentation of happiness in the sense of positive pleasure.

And yet, such is the persistence of the original utilitarian formula that even Mr. Herbert Spencer has adopted it in substance, notwithstanding his dissent from some of the conclusions reached by his hedonistic predecessors.

In his "Data of Ethics," after having reviewed the principal ethical theories, he says:—

> "So that no school can avoid taking for the ultimate moral aim a desirable state of feeling, called by whatever name—gratification, enjoyment, happiness. Pleasure somewhere, at some time, to some being or beings, is an inexpugnable element of the conception. It is as much a necessary form of moral intuition as space is a necessary form of intellectual intuition." (p. 46.)

Nevertheless, throughout his books upon "The Principles of Ethics," whenever he proceeds to give concrete illustrations of moral conduct, the inexpugnable element present in each, turns out to be not the desire of pleasure as such but only the desire of freedom from pain.

Thus, in treating of good and bad conduct, he sums up as follows:—

> "Hence the fact that the words good and bad have come to be specially associated with acts which further the complete living of others and acts which obstruct their complete living. Goodness, standing by itself suggests, above all things, the conduct of one who aids the sick in re-acquiring normal vitality, assists the unfortunate to recover the means of maintaining themselves, defends those who are threatened with harm in person, property or reputation, and aids whatever promises to improve the living of all his fellows. Contrariwise, badness brings to mind, as its leading correlative, the conduct of one who, in carrying on his own life, damages the lives of others by injuring their bodies, destroying their possessions, defrauding them, calumniating them." (pp. 24, 25.)

But further on he interprets these acts in terms which are calculated to mislead, by reason of the implication that because

Digitized by Google

relief from pain or from the apprehension of pain is negatively pleasureable, moral acts may be defined as those which are productive of pleasure.

His language is:—

"Using, then, as our tests, these most pronounced forms of good and bad conduct, we find it unquestionable that our ideas of their goodness and badness really originate from our consciousness of the certainty or probability that they will produce pleasures or pains somewhere." (p. 32.)

And again:—

"The truth that conduct is considered by us as good or bad, according as its aggregate results, to self or others or both, are pleasurable or painful, we found on examination to be involved in all the current judgments on conduct; the proof being that reversing the applications of the words creates absurdities." (p. 45.)

It is by reason of just such employment of the terms "pleasure" and "pleasurable" without special restriction of their meaning to the purely negative form of gratification which results from the elimination of pain, that the utilitarians or hedonists of even the most advanced school, still leave themselves open to attack.

Their opponents, ignoring the cardinal fact that in the domain of ethics all acts which are recognized as typically good have for their object the prevention or mitigation of pain apprehended or suffered by someone, somewhere, at some time, interpret the hedonistic doctrine as meaning that morally good conduct has for its object the production of those positively agreeable states of feeling which in common acceptation are regarded as pleasures; and then proceed to show not only that virtuous acts are wholly independent of consciously pleasurable ends, but also that such pleasure properly so-called as may accrue therefrom either to the moral agent or to any one else, is accomplished solely as an indirect result and not even thus invariably.

On the other hand, if the utilitarian theory of morals should be so stated and interpreted as to make the terms right and wrong exactly the reverse of each other in meaning, and coextensive in their range of application, its position would be unassailable.

Digitized by Google

Wrongful acts are universally recognized as comprised in one or the other of two categories. They are either those of direct performance, by which suffering is inflicted or augmented, or those of wilful non-performance, by which the prevention or mitigation of suffering is refused or neglected.

In like manner, acts which are right, when viewed strictly according to moral standards, are also embraced within two categories corresponding to those of wrongful acts but diametrically opposite thereto in character. They are first, acts of abstention from the infliction or augmentation of suffering; and second, acts of direct endeavor to prevent or mitigate suffering.

Hence it results, that negative beneficence is the reverse of positive malevolence, and that positive beneficence is the reverse of negative malevolence. Pain is the invariable and essential subject-matter of both morality and immorality. The one is concerned solely with its elimination or prevention; the other always with its generation or continuance.

Manifestly, therefore, the terms, "human welfare" and "human happiness," are not well adapted to designate the ultimate objects of ethical conduct because of their distinctly positive significations. To be sure, there would be no ambiguity in the statement that the welfare of a man had been promoted by an experience of entire or even of partial relief from pain, or that such experience had been a happy one for him.

But more frequently the terms "welfare" and "happiness" denote states which are not necessary for the prevention of suffering, and which consequently can have no moral significance. Thus for example, the industry and thrift of a man conduce to the welfare of himself and his dependent family not only while providing against the miseries of poverty but also while securing sufficient abundance for more or less indulgence in the amenities of life. Yet as soon as the result of such industry and thrift ceases to be merely preventive of misery in some form, they lose their moral quality; and if practiced to the extent of producing injurious consequences they become so far immoral.

Again, it may properly enough be said that the object of

Digitized by Google

ethical conduct is to accomplish or to promote moral good, if this is to be understood as signifying the prevention, avoidance, removal or mitigation of evil. But the term "good," unqualified by the adjective "moral," is too broad to serve accurately the purposes of ethics.

The term "evil," however, particularly as a substantive, is tolerably well adapted for use in defining the scope of ethics, since the fundamental conception involved in its various concrete significations, such as, "injury," "mischief," "harm," is that of pain to a sentient being, principally man; and it becomes the object of moral regard as soon as it is connected with human agency.

But for the sake of exact definition and clear discussion, the science of ethics would seem to need a new nomenclature. Utility belongs not only to morals but to non-moral economics as well. Good is applicable to questions of aesthetics into which the categorical imperative does not enter. Welfare may likewise transcend the boundaries which limit the domain of morality; and as for happiness and its hedonic congeners, they can be made to serve as ethical terms only by ignoring their ordinary connotations.

Something is wanting to emphasize the all-important fact that morality deals exclusively with problems and conditions of pain. Resort to paraphrase, although adequate, is awkward and tedious; while on the other hand, it is not easy to give currency to newly coined words.

Nevertheless, considering the radical misconceptions denoted and implied by hedonism, there would appear to be ample justification for an attempt to promote the adoption of an appropriate substitute which might tend to establish a clear and accurate understanding of the fundamental principle of ethics.

The aphorism of Aristole, hereinbefore quoted, wherein the antithesis between τὸ ἄλυπον (freedom from pain), and τὸ ἡδύ (pleasure), is presented, readily suggests, in this connection, an etymological source from which the desired term or terms might properly be derived. The Greek substantive ἀλυπία (freedom from pain) indicates a state which it is really the object of every moral act to secure or to attain; and

Digitized by Google

hence it would obviously be advantageous, if *alypic* and *alypism* could be substituted as English words in place of *hedonic* and *hedonism,* respectively, for use in moral philosophy.

The question of nomeclature, however, is only of secondary importance, and may be left to take care of itself, provided the facts themselves and their relationship be rightly apprehended.

In the domain of morality, the conduct of the moral agent is concerned with two classes of pains, namely, those which may be experienced by himself, and those which may be experienced by another or others than himself. Upon this classification is based the distinction between personal morals and social morals.

Again, each of these classes of pains may be divided into those which are believed to arise from natural causes and those which are believed to be inflicted by supernatural agencies. Hence, there is a further division of morality into secular morals and religious morals.

These distinctions will be found helpful in considering the question of moral progress, and the character of morality to be found among men under different conditions of savagery, barbarism and civilization.

The first thing to be observed is, that among the lowest varieties of the human race, man has the least foresight, the least regard for the welfare of others, and the least fear of natural consequences. His morals, therefore, are concerned with evils which are apprehended as immediate, which relate chiefly to himself, and which are largely superstitious. He is vigilant to ward off expected attacks from his enemy, but is improvident in respect to his means of future sustenance. He has courage to join with his fellow-tribemen in repelling the aggressions of a hostile tribe, but he is indifferent to the sufferings even of his kinsmen, and is brutal to dependent women and children. He is careful to avoid displeasing some fetich or ghost, but is utterly regardless of the physical conditions which conduce to bodily comfort or health. Thus, the morality of the savage may be characterized as concerned with immediate rather than remote consequences, as personal rather than social, and as religious rather than secular.

Digitized by Google

On the contrary, the highly civilized man orders his conduct with constant reference to the future, to the welfare of his fellow-men, and to the best ascertained laws of nature. He regards present acts with relation to their remote consequences; he is scrupulous to refrain from doing anything which might injuriously affect others; and he is much more extensively influenced by considerations of natural than of supernatural agencies.

Hence, it results, that while morality is fundamentally the same for all men, namely, the determination of conduct to the end of avoiding, preventing or alleviating pain, there is concretely very little, if anything, in common between the morals of the savage and the morals of the civilized man. Ethical progress has been made in direct proportion to the subordination of present interests to future interests, of personal interests to social interests, and of religious interests to secular interests.

But moral conduct has ever resulted from causes antagonistic or superior to the cosmic process, as was maintained in Thomas Henry Huxley's Romanes Lecture. The psychological basis of morality is the instinctive effort to banish pain from consciousness. This instinct is an ultimate and imperative condition of life itself. It is present in every animal organism, and is necessary to the preservation of the integrity and existence of that organism. The homologue of moral conduct among the lower orders of animals is found in those actions which are directed by each individual of every species towards preserving itself from bodily harm. All sentient life throughout its various and extensive gradations is attended by a monitor which constantly and persistently warns it to keep within the limits set for its normal existence. This constitutes a cosmic manifestation which ultimately embraces the "ought" of ethics. It presents itself to every conscious organism as an incentive to conduct which cannot be omitted or neglected with impunity.

Necessarily, the operation of this sanction among the inferior forms of animal life is directed to the compulsion of prudential conduct which directly concerns only the individual it-

Digitized by Google

self, and which constitutes the basis of personal morals alone; but in the ascending scale there come to be developed those germs of social morals which are manifested in maternal solicitude and in gregarious co-operation against impending danger. The progress of man by the gradual enlargement of his individual self into what William Kingdon Clifford has designated the "tribal self" has been attended by a corresponding superposition of social morals upon personal morals, until the latter although still indispensable is generally regarded as of less importance than the former.

Nevertheless, it will be found, upon analytical examination, that all ethical conduct is fundamentally determined by the same organic impulses which primarily move each individual to attempt the elimination or banishment of his painful states of consciousness, whether caused by actual sensations of present lesion or by mental apprehension of future harm.

For the purposes of suffering or of enjoyment, the self of every man far transcends the conscious nucleus of the ego. It embraces not merely the bodily organism with which he is objectively identified, but also the entire environment which in any way contributes to the maintenance of his life or affords opportunity for the exercise of his vital activities.

Thus conceived, the self which constitutes the subject of ethical regard consists of the individual himself and his proprietary environment, whose injury either suffered or threatened, creates in him a painful state of consciousness.

Passing by the enumeration of those material things which belong to the category of private property, and of those surroundings within which liberty of action may be freely exercised; it is evident that the society of which each individual self is a member may, in so far as it is friendly to him, and ordinarily does, contribute the most important and most highly valued part of his proprietary environment. To be sure, his ownership of what is thus contributed is not so absolute as that of the things which are commonly reckoned among his personal belongings; but such social contributions really constitute the most precious of his possessions.

First in order come the privileges appertaining to family re-

Digitized by Google

lationship; next the benefits derived from the immediate society of which the individual concerned is an intimate member, and among which his life is chiefly passed. Beyond these are the further advantages secured by citizenship in still larger communities constituting the state or nation; and finally those resulting from intercourse with the whole world and particularly the civilized portions of it.

It is true, that all these benefits and advantages conferred upon the individual and constituting part of his proprietary environment are conditioned upon reciprocal services to be performed on his part; but they are none the less his own; and deprivation or curtailment of them when once thus possessed will be felt as a personal loss or injury.

Moral progress, therefore, has resulted not from any change in the fundamental character of the moral sense, but rather from the enlargement of its field of operation. It has always been aroused by consciousness of pain experienced by or threatened to self; but the particular conduct resulting from it has ever been determined by the existing constitution of that self.

The gradual expansion of the proprietary environment has wrought great improvement, inasmuch as the recognition of others as contributors to the personal belongings of the self has naturally been accompanied by a feeling that injury to them works corresponding injury to self. But the perfection of this process of identification of interests between the individual and the community, is the further recognition that each self is but an insignificant fraction of the aggregate out of which his proprietary environment has been created, and that the preservation of the whole community from injury is of vastly greater importance than the personal interests of any individual component. This ethical conviction, which lies at the foundation of patriotism, was doubtless felt much more intensely in the past by the constituent members of a tribe or state in constant warfare with its neighbors, than in the present by citizens of any civilized nation whose normal condition is that of peace.

The conspicuous fact in the history of morals is that, what

Digitized by Google

modern philosophy terms "altruism" has undergone great development with the progress of civilization; and however its origin may be explained, there can be no doubt that its essence consists in the emotional impulses of the individual animated by it to ward off evil from his fellows. It is the extension of the feeling which actuates the individual in keeping himself from harm, to the broader emotion which prompts him to save others likewise from painful experience.

This entire body of emotional impulses inciting each man to conduct intended to prevent, remove or alleviate pain threatened or suffered by himself, or by a fellow-man, constitutes his conscience. It embraces both personal morals and social morals, and its strength is directly proportional to the vividness with which the contemplated pain is presented or represented to consciousness.

In ordinary life, however, the occasions on which conscience is called into activity as a presentative feeling are comparatively rare. The pain to be avoided is seldom present as an actual sensation or even so near that it is perceived to be imminent at the very moment when the impulse towards avoiding it arises. Conscience is ordinarily a representative feeling. It arises generally from the contemplation of apprehended pains which are more or less remote and which are to be avoided or mitigated by intermediate conduct within a period of corresponding duration. Hence, like all emotions, its influence upon the will depends upon the degree of intensity assumed by it in view of an exciting cause which is only represented to the imagination instead of being actually present as a sensation.

An emotional impulse which determines voluntary action toward a given end necessarily implies belief on the part of the agent that such action will attain the end sought or at least will conduce to the attainment of that end. Hence it results that conscience is invariably and inevitably attended by belief that the conduct prompted by it will tend to avert some apprehended pain; and it is further manifest that the body of feeling which constitutes the conscience of each man is created and accompanied by a group of beliefs in respect to the conduct required

Digitized by Google

of him for warding off such painful experiences as he deems to be evils, whether suffered by himself or by others with whom he sympathizes.

The scope of conscience is commensurate with the extension of belief in respect to the causes of avoidable pain and the voluntary acts by which this may be prevented; and the intensity of conscience is proportionate to the conviction of certainty which characterizes such belief.

In savage life there is scanty knowledge and consequently but few rational beliefs in respect to the causes of suffering and the appropriate remedies therefor; yet the belief in the power of supernatural agents to do harm and in the efficacy of certain observances to ward off such evil, is so positive that the consequent emotional impulse controls conduct in conformity thereto with almost the power of absolute instinct. In other words, the conscience of the savage is exceedingly narrow but very intense.

On the other hand, in civilized life, knowledge of the true causes of human suffering has become more widely extended, and this has naturally brought about a general improvement in moral conduct both in respect to acts of abstention from inflicting avoidable pain and in respect to acts of interference to prevent or alleviate pain due to extraneous causes. Indeed, the attitude of the average conscience towards the grosser forms of evil which modern society brands as crime, has come to be spontaneously and unhesitatingly repugnant.

But the like does not yet hold true of a multitude of lesser evils with which society is still afflicted. This defective conscience is due not so much to lack of sympathy as to absence or imperfection of belief in respect to the tendency of certain conduct to produce painful consequences.

All beliefs are derived from one or the other of two sources, namely, inculcation and personal experience; but the beliefs which determine the deliverances of conscience are largely derived from authoritative training and teaching. It would be disastrous, and in many instances fatal, if every one had to acquire his beliefs as to the consequences of conduct by personal experience alone. The suffering which ignorance en-

Digitized by Google

tails is great enough without leaving each individual to learn for himself the painful consequences which result from misdirected actions.

Nevertheless, exclusive reliance upon authority gives no chance for the correction of belief and for the better enlightenment of conscience. Not until the knowledge of the consequences of human conduct approaches perfection can beliefs founded thereon acquire such degree of certainty as to render possible a practically infallible conscience.

It follows, then, that since the actual avoidance or prevention of suffering is directly dependent upon the accuracy of belief in respect to the efficacy of pain-averting conduct, the cultivation of knowledge adapted to enhance the reliability of such belief is itself a voluntary act of supreme importance. In order words, as has been shown by William Kingdon Clifford in his essay upon "The Ethics of Belief"* the highest duty of man is to inquire constantly into the validity of his beliefs.

All systems of ethics recognize the fact that moral conduct involves more or less self-restraint or self-sacrifice on the part of the moral agent, or in other words some degree of painful experience by him; and hence, utilitarian ethics which regards the prevention, avoidance, elimination or alleviation of pain as the sole aim and exclusive purpose of morality, becomes open to the charge of occupying the somewhat paradoxical position that its ultimate object can be attained by creating in the consciousness of the moral agent one painful state in order to destroy or abate another. Such a charge is hardly an adequate statement of the facts; but even if absolutely true it would not constitute a formidable objection to the soundness of the ethical doctrine. This will appear from the following considerations:—

There are two distinguishable classes of pains, namely, those which result from lesions and those which are caused by repressions. One class embraces the sufferings experienced from greater or less impairment of the bodily organism or of the environment which contributes to its immediate sustenance;

*"Lectures and Essays," Vol. 2, pp. 177-211.

Digitized by Google

the other class embraces the sufferings experienced from greater or less curtailment of the functional activities of the bodily organism or from greater or less curtailment of the environment within which such activities would be exercised. The first class tends to the mutilation or destruction of the organism itself or of some of its constituents, or of that which is necessary for their preservation; the second class tends to the suppression of the normal activity of the organism or of some of its constituents by depriving these of opportunity for performing their customary functions. The prevention of pains of the first class belongs to the province of ethics which is concerned with the maintenance of individual integrity, in the broad sense of the self and its proprietary environment; the prevention of pains of the second class belongs to the province of ethics which is concerned with the maintenance of individual liberty. The like observations apply to the preservation of the integrity and liberty of social organisms; but primarily ethics is concerned with the individual units of society.

Moral conduct necessarily implies a limitation of the liberty of the moral agent and not infrequently a curtailment of his proprietary environment, not to mention occasional lesion to his bodily self. In other words, every moral act requires some abstention from voluntary activity which otherwise might have been indulged in, or some expenditure of personal energy which otherwise might not have been exerted in that direction, or of personal property which otherwise might not have been devoted to that purpose.

Such self-restraint or self-sacrifice is for the most part unconscious in cases of common and obvious moral acts; as when one refrains from endangering his own life or limb, or from doing bodily harm to another, or from committing theft or damaging the property of another; or as when one lends a helping hand to another who is in peril or distress.

Morality in such cases with most civilized people has become organic and is not attended by any present sense of restraint or sacrifice. Under these conditions the conduct of the moral agent accords with his desires and is attended with as much sense of freedom as any voluntary act which has no moral quality or implication.

Digitized by Google

Ordinarily, however, a moral action, not belonging to the simple category of those which have become organic, involves on the part of the agent some consciousness of pain to himself. More frequently it is the negative kind due to the sense of restricted personal liberty by virtue of the constraining conscience, but sometimes it is the positive pain of bodily suffering to be endured in performing the moral action. This also is accompanied by a more or less conscious comparison between the kind and degree of pain which it is the aim of the moral agent to prevent or avoid, and the kind and degree of pain which he himself must suffer in realizing that aim.

Necessarily, then, there must in every moral action which is not already organic and spontaneous, be a conscious choice between evils. Pain is to be avoided always and everywhere if possible; but when the harm to be prevented by the moral act is clearly seen by the moral agent to involve greater pain than that which he would suffer in performing such act, then his conscience prompts him to perform it.

Ethical conduct thus constantly requires self-sacrifice of various degrees; and the evil to be prevented may be so great as to warrant the highest example of heroism. The intuitionist may well contend that no considerations of happiness to be attained by the hero could account for his sublime act; but such objection cannot hold against the theory here propounded, that the moral impulse may be derived from contemplation of some dire calamity which the act of self-sacrifice is believed to be adequate to avert.

It does not follow, however, that deliberate comparison takes place in every instance, nor that the really greater evil determines the direction of conduct. If the person incited is sympathetic and emotional he may do a foolhardy act instead of one commendably moral, when judged by the standards of sane reason. If on the other hand, he is naturally cautious and unemotional he may put an exaggerated estimate upon the degree of pain required for the performance of a given moral act as compared with the threatened mischief which might be warded off by such an act; so that it depends largely upon the character of the moral agent whether in a presented instance

Digitized by Google

he will feel constrained to sacrifice himself for the sake of preventing evil to another; and the question of his moral obligation, either to refrain or to perform, may not be clear even to the general sense of the community.

When we pass judgment upon the morality of individuals or of communities we must necessarily take into account the nature of their environments and the conditions under which they are involuntarily constrained to act. The behavior which is appropriate to a peaceful state of society may be wholly out of place in the midst of hostile surroundings. Conduct which under some circumstances may be utterly immoral may under other circumstances be entirely justifiable. Whenever the moral agent is confronted with a choice between two evils of which one must be suffered in order to ward off the other, his conduct is morally right, as far as he himself is concerned, if he acts in conformity to his sincere belief that by so doing he is avoiding the greater evil.

If his choice is contrary to the moral sense of the rest of the community, and he knows it, then he also takes into account the moral reprobation of his fellows and weighs that as part of the threatened pain which he believes to be of less moment than the evil which his conduct is intended to ward off. Upon this is founded the theory of responsibility for immoral acts. If the moral agent does not know that his act is such as society in general reprobates and punishes, then the threatened reprobation and punishment cannot enter into the estimate of his moral responsibility. Of course, this is an extreme supposition except in case of insanity; and the law may safely presume that the criminal however stolid, is not ignorant of the penalties which are threatened against acts such as he has committed, and that he has deliberately subjected himself to them. Nevertheless, even the commission of an act which the rest of the community regards as criminal and punishes as a crime, may be wholly moral, not only according to the belief of the moral agent but according to the sense of other more enlightened communities; as for instance, helping a runaway slave to escape.

In estimating, therefore, the moral quality of historical acts,

Digitized by Google

the inquiry must always be made whether the conduct of the individual or of the society under consideration has been prompted by sincere belief that such conduct tended to avert an evil of greater magnitude than the evil entailed by the remedial act itself. Wanton aggression has always been unjustifiable, and the practice of it either by individuals or by societies, must in every instance have been immoral because unaccompanied by belief in its necessity; but, on the other hand, forcible resistance to tyranny, or defensive warfare, or even precautionary aggression, may be regarded as moral by as much as either has been believed and intended by those making such resistance, defense or precautious attack to prevent evils of greater magnitude than the loss and suffering which must be incurred in consequence of their acts.

Although morality for all times and under all circumstances has been and is founded upon the principle of the elimination of pain in the negative and positive aspects respectively of abstention from causing it and of endeavor to prevent it, yet the actual practice of morality has always been modified by the degree of hostility existing in the environment of the moral agent. Ever since the formation of social aggregates, the beliefs prevalent in each commuity respecting dangers which threatened its integrity have governed its policy and the conduct of its members. As long as separate social groups remained predatory, the most important elements of conscience were those which tended to promote the warlike virtues. When, however, in the progress of civilization, the mutual aversions between nations became so far overcome as to permit commercial intercourse upon a basis of honest exchange, there began to arise those other virtues which are fostered by the prevalence of industrialism. Nevertheless the public policy of nations towards each other still continues to be guided by the prevalent feeling that their interests are antagonistic in many important respects, and that the ideal precepts of morality cannot possibly apply to all cases of international conduct.

The ethical conditions are, however, considerably more favorable when only concerned with the relationship of the members of an integral civilized community towards each

Digitized by Google

other. There the hostility encountered within the environment is very greatly diminished although by no means eliminated. First to be dealt with are those enemies of orderly society, who have to be repressed as criminals. To refrain from causing them pain to the extent of saving the community from their depredations, would be to relinquish the conditions of civilized life. If any individual within a community will not practise self-restraint in respect to those acts which are detrimental to the welfare of others, he must be made to feel their hostility to him in so far as his conduct is hostile to them. The *lex talionis* has in civilized countries been superseded by more intelligent modes of remedying wrongs; but it was originally founded upon a rude sense of justice. Resistance to evil must be constantly practised, and deserves moral commendation. Indeed, there is no other rational procedure possible, notwithstanding current precepts to the contrary.

Passing now from those wrongful acts which are the subjects of prohibitory statutory enactment or which are amenable to legal process and adjudication, there remains to be considered a province of ethics to which little attention is paid in treatises upon practical morality. The life of social intercourse is conditioned upon reciprocal acts. In fact, it is governed by principles which are strictly analogous to those judicially recognized and administered under the law of contracts. A concrete illustration will serve to elucidate this matter more clearly perhaps than any other mode of presentation. A gift from one friend to another in token of friendship or esteem is, of course, made without intent or expectation that an equivalent in kind is to be returned. The act is wholly voluntary on the part of the donor and is itself a gratification of his own desire. Nevertheless, the donee is not without moral obligation in respect to it. There is implied by his acceptance of the gift a cordial appreciation of the good will manifested by the donor toward him, and a disposition on his part to enjoy it as the donor intended he should. The gift, to be sure, becomes the property of the donee, and he may legally dispose of it as he sees fit; but morally he has no right to defeat the manifest intent of the donor. If instead of devoting it to his own per-

Digitized by Google

sonal gratification, he gives it away to another, he causes pain in the donor, and violates the trust created by his acceptance of the gift. In like manner the tender ministrations belonging to the relationship of husband and wife or of parent and child, all need reciprocity of conduct in order to satisfy moral requirements. Return in kind is for the most part neither desired nor possible; but reciprocal gratification is expected even though not definitely formulated in the consciousness of either party. If the child makes such use of the opportunities afforded him by his parents as meets their approval, then he is said to be dutiful, and he thus performs his moral obligations.

So with the less intimate relations between members of the same community. Every kind attention shown by one toward another, even though it be a mere act of politeness, demands for the satisfaction of moral requirement, such reciprocal conduct as will preserve the former from the pain inflicted by a neglected requital or a deliberate slight. But unfortunately petty hostilities which prevent such mutual reciprocation of beneficial acts are rife in every community; so that magnanimously inclined members are often obliged to behave with at least passive disfavor toward those who would be likely to abuse their good offices.

It is thus apparent that the precepts of practical morality must for a long time to come remain qualified by the impossibility of treating the hostile elements of society in the same manner as its friendly elements. As the existence of public enemies renders the preservation of the integrity of each nation the paramount duty; and as the existence of criminals necessitates their coercion and repression by society; so do the failures of legally unobnoxious citizens to observe the equitable requirements which the law cannot enforce but which good morals demand, make impracticable the perfect and universal fulfilment of those fundamental ethical conditions which as far as is physically possible would banish pain from human experience.

George Litch Roberts.

Boston, Mass.

Digitized by Google

MR. McTAGGART'S ETHICS.

THE subject of this article is the general ethical principles maintained by Mr. McTaggart in his recent book, entitled "Studies in Hegelian Cosmology." * Four chapters of this book are devoted to ethical subjects; and all of them certainly contain valuable contributions to the subjects with which they deal. Three of them, however, those on Punishment, on Sin, and on The Conception of Society as an organism, I shall not have space to discuss. The chapter on "The Supreme Good and the Moral Criterion" gives us Mr. McTaggart's fundamental principles; and this chapter by itself supplies matter enough to deserve very full consideration.

Of the five metaphysical chapters, which constitute the greater part of the book, it is only necessary here to say that their chief content is a very elaborate and original argument in favor of the unusually definite conclusion that the Universe consists exclusively of a number of finite persons, including ourselves, which exist timelessly and whose consciousness is solely occupied with love for one another. This conclusion it was necessary to state because Mr. McTaggart's two fundamental ethical principles are contained in the assertions: (1) That this state of things, which Mr. McTaggart holds to be the *sole reality,* is also the Supreme Good; and (2) that the best means of deciding what course of action it is right for us to pursue is, in the majority of cases, to consider which course will bring about the greatest balance of pleasure over pain "immediately, or in the comparatively near future which we can predict with reasonable certainty" (p. 99).

Now it should be noted, to start with, that these two propositions are so related that if the one is true the other must be false. This follows from Mr. McTaggart's metaphysical conclusion that the sole reality is timeless. For to say that one course of action is better than another is to imply that it either

*By John McTaggart Ellis McTaggart, M. A., Fellow and Lecturer of Trinity College, in Cambridge. Cambridge: At the University Press, 1901.

Digitized by Google

is itself or causes to exist, some real good, which, but for its existence, would not have existed. But assuredly our actions neither are themselves, nor can produce anything except the existence of something or other in time. Accordingly, if what exists timelessly is the sole reality, neither our actions nor what they produce can be real; and the unreal existence of one thing rather than another, even if it have any meaning, can certainly not have any value. This contradiction is, perhaps, concealed from Mr. McTaggart by the fact that, following ordinary usage, he speaks of the thing which is real or exists, and not of its existence or reality as the good to be attained, while he certainly conceives it possible that one and the same thing may exist both timelessly and in time. But it is, I think, plain that what we judge to be good is always that a thing of a certain sort should be real or exist; and it is certainly only the existence of certain things in time, not these things as they are apart from any existence or in their timeless existence, that our actions either are or affect. The point may, perhaps, be brought out most clearly by reference to the other form in which Mr. McTaggart expresses the doctrine that what exists timelessly also exists in time—namely that it "manifests" itself in time. For it is certainly only the manifestations, as such, that our actions can affect; and I contend that no manifestation can be better than another or good at all, since none, as distinguished from the reality of which it is the manifestation, has any reality whatever. And even if the principle that, in order to be good, a thing must be real, be not sufficiently evident, the contradiction will still follow from the fact that Mr. McTaggart uses Supreme Good in the sense of sole or complete Good. For if the timeless reality is in itself the sole Good, it follows that the fact of its also having one manifestation rather than another, or any manifestation at all (even if these suppositions do not contradict themselves) cannot be *any* good.

This contradiction, however, is only between Mr. McTaggart's Metaphysics and his Ethics; and it may be that it is his Metaphysics which are wrong. It is only the metaphysical assertion that the sole Good exists timelessly which leaves no

Digitized by Google

possibility that the existence of anything in time could be any good whatever. Mr. McTaggart's *ethical* assertion about the Supreme Good, namely that it would consist in the existence of that, which he actually holds to be the sole existent, may still be true, whether it does exist or not; and it is at least consistent with his second ethical principle about the nature of the moral criterion.

We have, then, to consider the ethical assertion that the existence of a number of persons, loving one another perfectly, would be perfectly good, and that nothing else can be any good whatever. And it may be noted again at once, that, if this be true, no action can be either right or wrong except as it tends to produce or to prevent the existence of such a state of things. Nothing that happens, until this state of things is completely realized, can be any good whatever in itself; it can only have value as a *means* to such complete realization. As such a means, indeed, it may have value; and therefore, Mr. McTaggart's second ethical principle is consistent with this his first. But Mr. McTaggart's view of what actually makes our actions right is not consistent with it. For he holds that we cannot tell whether any course of action, rather than another, will tend "to advance or retard the eventual complete realization of the complete good" (pp. 98-99); whereas we can tell that one course of action is better than another; and it is so, if it "will bring about," in that near future defined above, "the state which conforms as closely as possible to that perfection" (p. 99). Mr. McTaggart does, then, hold that the immediate realization of something more or less like what he asserts to be the sole Good is in itself a good; and, if this be true, it follows that what he asserts to be the sole Good, is *not* the sole Good.

Accordingly the fundamental principle of Mr. McTaggart's *practical* ethics, namely that one action is better than another, if it will bring about, in a near future, the state which conforms as closely as possible to perfection, compels us to deny both (1) his two metaphysical doctrines (a) that only the Absolute is real, (b) that only the Absolute is good; and (2) his ethical doctrine that only the eventual realization of the

Digitized by Google

Absolute would be good. We still, however, have left the ethical assertion that the state of things described would be *perfectly good,* in some sense which does not deny that other things are good too, but, on the contrary, implies the corollary that they are more or less good according as they more or less resemble it.

In this assertion we have the fundamental principle of Mr. McTaggart's Ethics—his doctrine of the Supreme Good; and it is not an assertion which we can be expected to accept without argument. Nor does Mr. McTaggart ask us so to accept it. He professes to give reasons for it. But whereas the assertion itself is only doubtful, the reasons he gives for it betray the utmost confusion on the most essential points of ethical reasoning.

It is, in the first place, remarkable that Mr. McTaggart should suppose such a proposition capable of being proved in three sentences. But, when we examine the supposed proof, we find still further reason for astonishment. It runs as follows:

"In the reality so defined, every conscious being—and there are no other beings—will express all his individuality in one end which will truly and adequately express it. The fulfillment of such an end as this would give satisfaction, not partial and temporary, but complete and eternal. And since each individual finds the whole universe in harmony with his end, it will necessarily follow that the end is fulfilled" (p. 96).

Mr. McTaggart argues, then, that the Absolute must be perfectly good, *because* it would give complete satisfaction to every being in it. That is to say he assumes as his fundamental principle that whatever universe would give complete satisfaction to all the beings in it (no matter what they were satisfied with) would be perfectly good. This principle certainly seems far from self-evident; and moreover it directly contradicts what is implied in the principle, which it is offered to prove, namely, that the Absolute is *better* than any other conceivable Universe. We are, then, naturally prompted to ask what considerations can have induced Mr. McTaggart to be satisfied

Digitized by Google

with so extraordinary a piece of reasoning; and indications are not wanting.

(1) The natural meaning of the argument would be that complete satisfaction itself was the sole good; since, when we say that a thing is good *because* it has certain property, we commonly mean merely that since it contains this property it contains something that has intrinsic value. It is, of course, possible that all things which contain a certain property are themselves good as wholes; but, if this be meant, it is a mistake to say that they are good *solely because* they possess this property. It will be true to say that they would not be good, *unless* they possessed it; but for the same reason it will also be true to say that they would not be good unless they also possessed their other constituents: since in both cases the judgment rests on the fact that it is the thing as a whole which is good, and that it would not be the whole it is unless it had all the parts it has. Now it is plain that Mr. McTaggart means us to understand that his Absolute *as a whole* is good: he immediately goes on to say: "The supreme good is not pleasure as such but this particular pleasant state" (p. 96): and later we find him using language which implies that it is good *not only* because it contains complete satisfaction but *also* because the ideals which it satisfies are perfect (p. 119). This being the case it is at least misleading to argue here that it is good because it contains complete satisfaction; though such an expression might be excused if it were a self-evident truth that all universes which contained complete satisfaction were equally good, and that all good universes had this and no other property in common. But it becomes inexcusable, if we assume that Mr. McTaggart intends us to understand that the Absolute is *better* than any other conceivable Universe: if, of two wholes which contain a common element, one is better than the other, it is obviously absurd to maintain that the former owes *all its* goodness to the fact that it possesses the element which is also possessed by the latter. We are therefore, I think, justified in assuming that Mr. McTaggart was influenced by the idea that complete satisfaction is itself the sole good: the more so, as he expressly states elsewhere that "It is *only* in respect

Digitized by Google

of the element of feeling in it that any state can be deemed to have intrinsic value" (p. 261). Mr. McTaggart is plainly unaware that this is inconsistent with the doctrine that the Absolute is better than any other conceivable universe, which might contain the same element of feeling, *because* the ideals realized in it are also perfect.

(2) But there is reason to think that Mr. McTaggart is also influenced by another fundamental confusion with regard to the principles of ethical reasoning. It is possible that when he says the Absolute is perfectly good, because it would give complete satisfaction, he means us to complete the argument by adding "and because nothing else could." The use of language is such that it does seem very plausible to argue: Since complete satisfaction is necessary to perfection, the only thing which could give it must be better than anything which would not. And Mr. McTaggart actually does suggest this reason for a principle, which he strongly emphasizes in Chap. IX, and which, taken strictly, is inconsistent with the argument we are now considering. In Chap. IX we are told that it is not the satisfaction of all desires, but only of those which are "fundamental demands and aspirations of our nature" (pp. 259, 266), that is necessary to the perfection of the universe. Now it is obvious that here again Mr. McTaggart is contradicting his principle that all universes which give complete satisfaction to all the beings in them would be perfectly and equally good, and asserting that a universe which completely satisfied some kind of desires would be better than one which satisfied others. But instead of asserting that the satisfaction of some desires is better than that of others, *because* the former are directed to more perfect ideals, he seems to suggest that it is better *because* they are more fundamental. Nor does he anywhere try to prove (what would be extremely difficult) that all desires for what is good are in fact fundamental (whatever that may mean) and that all fundamental desires are in fact desires for what is good. But he does suggest that the reason why fundamental desires are to be preferred is *because* "their realization is essential to permanent harmony" (p. 266); or, in other words, because we *could* not be completely and permanently

Digitized by Google

satisfied with the objects of any others (p. 259). It would seem, then, that Mr. McTaggart is influenced by the plausible argument that the only thing which *could* give complete satisfaction, is therefore better than anything else. And yet this argument is merely an instance of the very fallacy against which he rightly protests elsewhere (pp. 96, 266) in the most emphatic manner—a direct inference from "is" to "ought"! Because the nature of the Universe is such that only certain kinds of things *could* give complete satisfaction, we are *therefore* entitled to say that it is better than others in which a different natural law would allow us to be completely satisfied with other kinds of things! We might just as well say that because in this world certain evils are the only means of obtaining certain goods, *therefore* this world is better than any other in which the same goods might be obtained without the aid of any evils! It is, of course, better *as a means* that we should undergo the greatest evils, if the constitution of the Universe is so bad that by that means we can obtain greater goods than by any other: but it can be better *as a means* only. And similarly the empirical truth (and it can be no more) that only certain desires *can* be permanently satisfied may be a reason for regarding the satisfaction of those desires as the best thing that we can get; but it can be no reason for regarding a Universe in which only those desires are permanently satisfied as *therefore* supremely good.

(3) But finally we have to think that Mr. McTaggart is also influenced by a third error. His words might be interpreted as meaning not that, since the Absolute would give complete satisfaction, it is therefore *also* supremely good; but that to call it supremely good is simply another way of saying that it gives complete satisfaction. And, in fact, one of the many errors on which his whole argument in Chap. IX is based seems to be the vicious traditional assumption that the distinction between what is and what ought to be is identical with that between what is known and what is willed—that "the difference of meaning between the predicates 'true' and 'good' " is the same as that between the predicates "known" and "willed" (p. 268). Thus on pp. 266-7 we

Digitized by Google

find treated as if they were identical in meaning the two statements: "If no amount of 'ought' can produce the slightest 'is,' it is no less true that no amount of 'is' can produce the slightest 'ought,' " and "While our desires must serve in the kingdom of the true, they rule in the kingdom of the good." It is difficult to imagine that, when he wrote this passage, Mr. McTaggart was very clearly aware of any difference between the propositions "This is good" and "This is desired"; since, if there be such a difference, it seems only too obvious that what we desire may just as easily be bad as it may be unreal.

Mr. McTaggart's treatment of the fundamental question of Ethics, the question, What is best in itself? can hardly, then, be censured too severely. He seems not to have realized that it is a difficult question at all. His answers to it are both ambiguous and mutually inconsistent; and the reasons which he gives for them both mutually inconsistent and fallacious.

But his argument in favor of the doctrine that a calculation of pleasures and pains will generally give us a correct criterion of what we ought to do, deserves considerably more respect. It is here rather the truth of Mr. McTaggart's premises than the cogency of his reasoning, which may be called in question.

One part of the argument (pp. 108-118) is devoted to pointing out, what is certainly true, that quantities of pleasure *can* be compared with success. It is possible, Mr. McTaggart argues, to know that the amount of pleasure which we get from one thing is greater than that which we get from another and not only this, but *also* that the amount got from one thing is *so much* greater than that got from another that, even if we were to get the latter twice, we should not have had so much pleasure as if we got the former only once. All this is unquestionably true, whatever may be the difficulties of deciding precisely what is meant by saying that one pleasure is more than twice as great as another or greater than the sum of five others; and Mr. McTaggart justly points out that exactly the same difficulties must be incurred by any system of Ethics, since any such system must hold that we know the *value* of one thing or of one set of things to be greater than the sum of the values of another set.

Digitized by Google

So much, then, must be granted; but this is only a preliminary. Mr. McTaggart's main thesis in this chapter is what he expresses in the proportion: That the calculation of pleasures and pains is both, in general, a *correct* criterion of how we ought to act, and also *the only available* criterion (p. 127). The question whether this thesis is true is certainly of the utmost importance; and this question I now propose to consider at length.

In the first place, great care is needed to distinguish exactly what it is that Mr. McTaggart means to maintain. For he does *not* hold, as his words might imply, that wherever one course of action will produce a greater balance of pleasure than any other, the results of that course will be the best. He admits (1) that, even where we ought to choose the course that will give the greatest pleasure, the total results of that course *may* be worse (p. 124, "third case"); (2) that in some cases it is impossible to decide whether we ought to choose the course that will give the greatest pleasure, or not (p. 124, "fourth case"). Accordingly his thesis may be most accurately expressed in the following propositions: (1) that it is *never* plain we ought to choose a course which will give the less pleasure, (2) that in all cases where one course will give greater pleasure, if we can decide at all which course is right, that one is right, (3) that we often can decide that one course both will give greater pleasure and is right.

Now, it should be noted that, if this be all, to say that pleasure is "the only available criterion" is quite inaccurate. Mr. McTaggart wholly neglects to consider a case, which he plainly admits to be possible. For suppose, that one course will plainly cause less of goods other than pleasure (as in the "fourth case," p. 124), and that instead of this also giving less pleasure (as Mr. McTaggart there supposes) the amounts of pleasure produced by both courses are as far as we can judge, equal. In such a case it would plainly be our duty to choose the course which produced most of other goods. Here, therefore, we have a case, where a criterion other than pleasure, would, by Mr. McTaggart's own admission, be available. And Mr. McTaggart has not tried to show that such cases do not


Digitized by Google

occur, or are even rare: he has apparently simply failed to think of them. That one of the conditions for their occurrence, namely, the apparent equality of the pleasure produced by two courses, is by no means rare, I shall presently maintain.*

Mr. McTaggart has, then, certainly failed to show that pleasure is the only available criterion of moral action. He has failed to notice a class of cases in which, provided they occur, another criterion would, on his own doctrine, be available. But these cases are only those in which, because the amount of pleasure that would be produced by alternative courses appears to be equal, there is no balance of pleasure to serve as criterion between them at all. How are we to understand the important proposition which still remains, namely that where one course does promise more pleasure than another, this fact is, *in general* a *correct* criterion of its rightness?

It should be noted precisely what is meant by that limitation *"in general."* It is inserted in order to allow for those cases, mentioned above as admitted by Mr. McTaggart to occur, where the course which promises the greater pleasure also promises a decided loss in other goods. "In this case," Mr. McTaggart says (p. 124), "there seems no reasonable solution." A balance of pleasure is, accordingly, in this case *not* a correct criterion, in Mr. McTaggart's sense. The course which brings it *may* be the one which also brings the greatest total of good, but we cannot tell whether it is or not. But Mr. McTaggart holds such cases to constitute only a small part of those which we actually have to decide. He alludes to them as showing "the *occasional* failure of the only available criterion" (p. 127). They do, therefore, on his principles, prevent him from holding that pleasure is *always* a correct criterion, but they leave him entitled to hold that it is so *in general*.

So much by way of making quite plain what Mr. McTaggart's thesis is. His most general proposition is the first of the three given above: That in no case is the course, which would produce less pleasure, plainly the right one. The next in

*Mr. McTaggart himself admits that it occurs, p. 134.

Digitized by Google

generality is the second of those three: That, in most cases, the course which would give more pleasure, is plainly the right one. These two propositions involve the chief points of principle, which I propose to dispute: and I propose to deal with them first. Discussion of the third, namely: That we can often tell which course would give more pleasure, in cases where that one is right, may be conveniently postponed till the main questions of principle have been dealt with.

And, first of all, I propose to consider the proposition: That, in most cases, the course which would give the more pleasure, is plainly the right one; because, although it does, equally with the first, involve one of what I shall call Mr. McTaggart's two main premises, namely that pleasure is good in proportion to its amount, it is mainly to be rejected owing to an objection, which will hold whether those main premises are true or false. This objection is as follows:

The "most cases," in which the course which gives a balance of pleasure is the right course, are divided by Mr. McTaggart into three classes, which may perhaps be as briefly and clearly described in his own words as in any others.

"In the first [case]" he says, "the action to which the hedonic criterion would guide us, involves in our judgment a greater development of ideals. In this case it is clear that we should take this course, since both elements of the good are increased.

"In the second case, our action, whichever way we act, will, as far as we can see, make no difference to the development of ideals. Here, too, we can safely abide by the hedonic criterion, since that measures the only element of the good which our decision can be seen to affect.

"In the third case, our action may make a considerable difference to the development of our ideals, but we are unable to tell whether the difference will be for good or for evil. Once more we shall do well to follow the hedonic criterion. For then, at any rate, we shall gain in respect of one element of the good. We *may* indeed lose much more in respect of development. But then we *may* gain in respect of that element also. Since the effect on development is unknown, the only rational course, if we must act, is to be guided by the effect on happiness, which is known." (p. 124.)

Now, in the first of these three cases it is plain that the course which promises the greatest pleasure is the right one to adopt, *provided only* that by "our judgment" to the effect that it also involves the greatest amount of other goods, be meant a judgment, to assure the correctness of which all reasonable

Digitized by Google

precautions have been taken. A proviso of this sort we have to understand throughout. Here it need only be said, that, if it is clear that a certain course will bring a gain on the whole in all other respects as well as in pleasure, Mr. McTaggart is, if pleasure be a good, justified in holding that course to be the right one. It is, however, important to notice that this assurance, that we shall gain on the whole in all other respects, is precisely what Mr. McTaggart has previously maintained to be "impossible in most cases, if not in all" (p. 101). According to Mr. McTaggart, then, this first class of cases, in which pleasure is, on Mr. McTaggart's principles, a correct criterion, will be very rare.

But the second and third class of cases present more difficulties. In the first place, how do these two cases differ from one another? In the first it is only *"as far as we can see"* that our action will make no difference: here, therefore, it is not denied that our action "may make a considerable difference," as is the case in the second. It is impossible to discover exactly what distinction Mr. McTaggart meant to make: but three alternatives are possible. (1) He may have meant the first case to be that in which we doubt whether our action will make any difference at all; and the second to be that in which, *knowing* that it will make a difference, we doubt whether the difference is for good or for evil. Assuming him to have meant this, how does it affect his argument? We cannot refuse to admit that where the effects of two courses differ *in no respect,* as far as we can see, except in amount of pleasure, Mr. McTaggart is, if pleasure be a good, right that what gives more pleasure should be preferred. The first of these two cases, then, if this be meant by it, seems to be in Mr. McTaggart's favor. *But*—the case never occurs; for our actions always do make *some* obvious difference, other than gain or loss in pleasure: and the question whether this difference is or is not a "development in ideals," is, under another name, merely the question whether it is for good or evil—the question, which is to be dealt with under the other case. (2) Mr. McTaggart may have meant the first case to be that in which we *can* see that our action will make no difference for good or evil, and the second

Digitized by Google

to be that in which we *cannot* see whether it makes such a difference or not. If this be so, we may again admit that Mr. McTaggart's conclusion as to the right course to pursue in the first case, is theoretically correct. But it is also again quite evident that such cases can never occur. We can never judge with security that the total values of two alternative sets of goods are absolutely equal; for such a judgment would require an immensely greater accuracy than those which Mr. McTaggart himself maintains to be very rare—namely that one such total is greater or less than another. But (3) it is possible that Mr. McTaggart may mean by his first class cases where we *can* see, not indeed that two alternative totals are *equal* in value, but that they do not very greatly differ in value; and by his second class cases where, though we cannot see which is the greater, we also *cannot* be sure that the difference in value is not very great. Both these cases might be expressed by saying that the respective totals are *"as far as we can see, equal;"* since in both we cannot be sure that they are not equal: and yet there is a most important difference between the two, since in the one we are sure that the divergence from equality, if it exists, is not a great one, while in the other we are not sure but what it is a very great one. Cases of both these kinds do certainly occur; and it seems most probable that this is the distinction of which Mr. McTaggart was thinking. What are we to say of Mr. McTaggart's hedonic conclusion on this interpretation of his meaning?

I think we have to say that the objection, which, on any of the three interpretations, would have held against his judgment of the second case (his "third case"), will, on this interpretation, hold against *both*. The two cases are now alike in this, that in both we *cannot tell* but that the results of the two courses will be equal in value in all respects except amount of pleasure; and Mr. McTaggart lays it down as a universal rule that in all such cases we shall do well to prefer the course which gives the greater pleasure. This universal rule I think we may see to be certainly wrong.

The data we have to consider are these: We have two courses, one of which is certainly productive of more pleasure

Digitized by Google

than the other, whereas their results in other respects, though differing much in kind, are, so far as we can see, equal in value. It certainly seems plausible to conclude, as Mr. McTaggart does, that, assuming pleasure to be good, it is reasonable to choose the course which gives more pleasure. But this plausibility is certainly fallacious. For by the datum that the other results are, so far as we can see, equal in value, it is only meant that we *cannot* declare these totals with certainty to be unequal. And this being the case, the probability that they are *actually equal* is so small as to be negligible:* it is far more likely that the one is, in some one of the many possible degrees, greater or less than the other. The number of cases, therefore, in which the course which gives greater pleasure is right, because the other results are equal, is so small as to be negligible, and in all other cases we are just as likely to be equally right in preferring the lesser pleasure. Now this certainly gives an infinitesimal probability that we shall be right to choose the course which gives the greater pleasure; but that this infinitesimal probability gives ground for a rational solution of such cases cannot be maintained, because there is *the same probability in favor of any other criterion whatsoever.* To take an instance, which Mr. McTaggart uses above (pp. 103-104): It will be just as rational to prefer a Home Education to a Public School, on the ground that it gives a decisive superiority in *culture;* or a Public School Education to the other, on the ground that it gives a decisive superiority in *genuineness;* as to prefer either on the ground that it gives a decisive superiority in pleasure. In short, upon the principle which Mr. McTaggart here uses in favor of the hedonic criterion, it will always be *equally rational* to adopt either of two compatible courses, if only each is superior to the other *in some one respect*: that is to say, there will be *no rational solution* in such cases; the very principle which Mr. McTaggart uses in favor of the hedonic criterion is decisive against it. Let us ask ourselves the question: Am I to send my son to a Public School or to educate him at home? Mr. McTaggart

*So Mr. McTaggart himself admits, p. 126 note.

Digitized by Google

says we cannot here decide between the respective values obtained, other than pleasure; but if the principle we are now considering were true, we certainly could decide between them —we could decide rationally in favor of *either*. For Mr. McTaggart admits that the first course has a decisive superiority over the second in *one* of the many points involved—namely that it gives more "genuineness." Let us consider all the other points, *except* the two degrees of genuineness. Can we say that *in these other points* the home education is decisively the best? Not according to Mr. McTaggart; for this is still one of the questions—a comparison of sums of goods other than pleasure—"which it is impossible in most cases, if not in all, to decide." We have it then that of two courses, *equal, as far as we can see, in other respects,* one is decisively superior in the good of genuineness: *therefore,* Mr. McTaggart would be bound to say on his present principles, *choose that one.* But unfortunately by an exact parity of reasoning, we should also be bound to choose the home education. For this, according to Mr. McTaggart, has a decisive superiority in respect of *culture.* Let us now consider all results *except degree of culture,* including, of course, now, in each, its degree of genuineness. These two totals are also, in all probability, *as far as we can see equal.* Therefore of two totals, apparently equal in other respects, one is decisively superior in the good of culture: and we are bound to choose this one. Of course, we are not bound to agree with Mr. McTaggart (nor perhaps Mr. McTaggart to agree with himself) that, when we consider two sets of results in all except some one respect in which the one set has a decisive superiority, these other respects will be, as far as we can see, equal in value. The only point we require to make is that, *if* they are so, this decisive superiority in one respect is no ground for preferring the course which has it; since, if it were we should often have an equally good ground for preferring *either* course. The facts may be expressed in another way, which makes them seem sufficiently obvious as soon as it is pointed out. If of two totals, upon the relative values of which we cannot decide, there be added to one a greater, to the other a less, amount of pleasure, the two new totals thus

Digitized by Google

formed will still, in general, be totals, upon the relative values of which we cannot decide: we shall still be unable to say whether or not the one is greater than the other, and consequently unable to say which is the greater; so that we obviously shall have no ground for rational choice. That Mr. McTaggart must hold these two new totals to be *always* thus "as far as we can see, equal in value," follows from his contention that we can never determine the relative values of any amount of pleasure and any other good: for the one could only be certainly greater than the other, if the difference between the amount of plasure contained in the one and that contained in the other were certainly greater than any possible difference in value between the two sets of remaining constituents. Mr. McTaggart cannot hold that this is *ever* the case. It may, however, be allowed, if we believe that a certain amount of pleasure can be seen to be greater than a certain amount of other goods, that it may sometimes be the case, in the last of the two cases we are now considering—namely where we *can* see that the difference between the total values of the two sets of other constituents is not very great. Mr. McTaggart has debarred himself from the right to hold that the distinction he makes between this and the other case has any bearing on the correctness of the hedonic criterion. But we may admit so much in his favor: That, where the difference in value between the other goods is very small, and that between the amounts of pleasure very large, it *may* be right to prefer the course which gives the greater pleasure. But such cases are certainly not very common: and how far short does the admission of them fall from the sweeping contention of Mr. McTaggart that, wherever we cannot see which set of remaining results has the greater value, we are entitled to judge the course which gives most pleasure the best!

I conclude, then, that Mr. McTaggart's attempt to show that the course which promises most pleasure is in most cases the right one has utterly broken down. On his own principles, it will *only* be the right one in the *first* of the three cases which he distinguishes—namely where we can also see that the other results of the pleasantest course are also better than those of

Digitized by Google

the other. And it is plain that there is little meaning in calling amount of pleasure a *criterion,* if it is only safe to follow it where we can also see directly that the total results are better. Of the other two cases, on which Mr. McTaggart must rely to make up his majority, I have tried to show that Mr. McTaggart's universal conclusion is simply fallacious. It can only be admitted that in a *subdivision* of the first of these, the course which gives the greater pleasure *may* be plainly the right. But here, too, it is idle to talk of amount of pleasure as a *criterion,* since in order to show that the pleasantest course is the best, we must, *in each individual case,* institute a comparison between the difference in amount of pleasure and the difference in amount of other goods.

It has, however, only been shown that the proposition: The course which gives most pleasure is, in general, the right one, cannot be sustained by the reasons which Mr. McTaggart gives for it. The peculiarity of Mr. McTaggart's attempt to prove it, consists in the fact that his proof, if sound, would hold, whatever view we took of the value of pleasure relatively to other things. My refutation of this proof shows that, unless we *can* estimate the value of pleasure relatively to other things, any rational choice is impossible in three out of the four classes into which Mr. McTaggart divides all practical cases. Mr. McTaggart holds that we can never form any estimate of the value of pleasure relatively to other things; and it seems to me to be demonstrated that, if this be so, no rational choice is open to us, in any case, where there is a balance of pleasure on one side, except in the first of Mr. McTaggart's cases—namely where there is also a balance of other goods on the same side. This first class of cases, as we saw, Mr. McTaggart must hold to be comparatively rare; and, therefore, we get the result that on his view a rational choice is in most cases impossible. But Mr. McTaggart may be wrong about the rarity of these cases also. Our decision upon the actual truth of the proposition that, in most cases, the pleasanter course is the best, must, it is now plain, depend (1) upon the view we take of the nature of most practical cases, (2) upon the view we take of the value of pleasure relatively to other things. The first of

Digitized by Google

these questions I propose to postpone: upon the second some light will be thrown by the discussion of Mr. McTaggart's most general proposition, namely: That it is *never* plain we ought to choose a course which will give less pleasure. To this discussion I shall now proceed. The proposition would certainly follow from what I have said I should call Mr. McTaggart's two main premises. These are (1) that pleasure is a good, and a greater quantity of pleasure always proportionally better than a less, (2) that no other good is ever certainly greater than the smallest obvious quantity of pleasure. The first of these premises was also involved in the proposition we have just been considering; and we shall see no great reason to quarrel with it. The second, on the other hand, is highly important, since, if Mr. McTaggart's view of practical cases is also correct, it would prove that in the majority of cases no rational choice is open to us. What are we to say of these two premises?

Now the first of them is part of what Mr. McTaggart has failed to prove by his treatment of the question of the Supreme Good. Mr. McTaggart has given us no reason to think that pleasure is good at all. Even if the Absolute as a whole were very good (and this was not proved) and if also its goodness partly depended upon its containing pleasure, it would not follow that pleasure was good at all. For it is quite possible that a whole may be the better for containing a certain element, and yet that element itself possess no value whatever. And apart from the question of proof it does seem very probable that pleasure has no value at all; even although we admit that certain states of mind are the better for containing pleasure. And again, even if we admit that pleasure has some value (and it would be rash to deny it), it would not follow (as Mr. McTaggart assumes) that a greater quantity of pleasure was always also proportionally greater in value.

Nevertheless, even if this first assumption of Mr. McTaggart's, that a greater quantity of pleasure is always proportionally better than a less, is erroneous, the error does not seem very serious; but it does not seem serious, only because the error involved in his second assumption seems so enormous. So far

Digitized by Google

does it seem from being the case that no other good is ever certainly greater than the smallest quantity of pleasure, that the very greatest quantity of pleasure seems to have an almost imperceptible value compared to many other things. This second assumption of Mr. McTaggart's is the premise that seems most obviously open to question.

Whether it is or is not preposterous, must in the last resort be left to inspection. I may give an instance, which seems to me to show its absurdity as plainly as any other. It certainly seems to me that the state of mind of a person feeling, with great pleasure, that kind of love which Mr. McTaggart takes to exemplify the other element in his Absolute, is far more than twice as good as that of a drunkard who might be enjoying twice as much pleasure in the occupation of breaking crockery. The ultimate decision must, I say, depend upon the view we take of instances like these: but it may be useful to point out certain defects in the arguments which Mr. McTaggart uses to give plausibility to his view.

(1) It is not quite plain that Mr. McTaggart recognizes all the consequences which his view entails. What he says is (I choose the clearest statement, but the same view is also expressed on p. 124): The position that "a great change for the good in one element will counterbalance a moderate change for the bad in the other is theoretically indefensible. It implies that we have some means of knowing, *within very broad limits,* how much happiness will be more worth having than a given degree of development. And it is impossible to settle this" (p. 123). (The italics are mine.) Plainly this involves that no loss in other goods can be seen to overbalance any obvious gain in pleasure. But Mr. McTaggart does not apply the doctrine to his Supreme Good and say: Supposing the pleasure in the Absolute just perceptibly decreased, and the other element remaining the same, we cannot tell whether or not it would be superior to a world of persons enjoying that perceptibly greater pleasure but whose minds were otherwise solely occupied with the contemplation of dunghills. The argument with which, as we have seen, Mr. McTaggart might be tempted to rejoin, namely that the pleasure in his Absolute *could* not

Digitized by Google

be less than it is, and that the contemplation of dunghills *could* not give as much, is, as we have also seen, irrelevant.

(2) Mr. McTaggart does not recognize that he does admit the possibility of knowing, with regard to two goods as heterogeneous as pleasure and, say, love, that one is greater than the other. That he does so is obscured by the fact that he treats all other goods as if they were merely one, under the name "development of ideals." Yet it is obvious that when he says "one man's ideals may be lower than another's" he means not merely that the one man admires the same things, only less strongly or less often than the other, but that to admire one kind of thing is worse than to admire another. This being so, it seems unreasonably arbitrary to maintain that with regard to pleasure alone we can make no judgment of this kind. Pleasure itself is merely one among ideals; and there seems no greater difficulty in deciding that a man whose education has led him to regard mere pleasure as the Supreme Good, instead of so regarding, let us say, Mr. McTaggart's Absolute has suffered a deterioration, than in making the same judgment of a man whose education has led him to prefer "Philistinism" to "culture."

(3) Mr. McTaggart shows a considerable confusion as to the *grounds* of his contention that no other good is ever certainly greater than any amount of pleasure. I have just pointed out that he does not seem aware of his admission that we *can* compare the values of heterogeneous goods. In spite of this admission, he seems to rest his contention with regard to pleasure on the proposition that we *cannot*. And he actually states that we cannot in the most emphatic manner: it is "impossible," he says (p. 123), "to compare" *any* two "elements of the good with any hope of discovering which" is "the most desirable." This statement is certainly in flat contradiction with his admission that we can tell whether our ideals have or have not been developed; and yet it is solely to it that he appeals in support of the doctrine that pleasure cannot be compared with other goods: he only adds that pleasure and development exhibit "*the greatest* heterogeneity" which is, in itself, by no means apparent (p. 123). But the confusion to which

Digitized by Google

I wish to call attention here is that he refers to this doctrine that we cannot compare heterogeneous goods as something which "we saw above"; whereas the only thing which he has tried to show previously is something quite different. He must be referring to the long argument, in which he professes to show "that the idea of perfection cannot give us any criterion of moral action" (pp. 99-107). But all that he tries to show in this passage is that where we are considering *two complicated sums of goods,* it is "impossible in most cases, if not in all" (p. 101), to tell which is to be preferred. With regard to two such sums (he gives as an instance "marriage" and "free love," p. 102) he obviously does try to make us see that we cannot be sure of their respective merits. But his very argument in favor of this contention, implies that with regard to certain *elements* of those sums we can make a very decided judgment. In order to see that this is so, we need only refer again to Mr. McTaggart's second instance—the comparative merits of Public Schools and home education (pp. 103-104). "Are we nearer to heaven," asks Mr. McTaggart, "if at this moment we buy genuineness with Philistinism, or buy culture with *Schwärmerei?*" That *this* question is, as Mr. McTaggart says, difficult to answer, may be admitted. But it is obvious that its difficulty depends upon the ease with which we can judge that other question—upon the ease with which we can judge that "culture" is better than "Philistinism," and "genuineness" than *"Schwärmerei."* It is difficult only because, on each side, we have a thing comparatively good *bought with* another comparatively bad. The difficulty would not arise, unless it were obvious that a combination of "genuineness" with "culture" would be actually *more than twice as good as* a combination of the evils of "Philistinism" with those of *"Schwärmerei."* When, therefore, Mr. McTaggart appeals to this passage in favor of the assertion that it is impossible to compare any two elements of the good with any hope of discovering which is the most desirable, it is plain that the facts to which he appeals show something quite different: they even imply the contradictory of his assertion. In this passage he only tries to show that

Digitized by Google

upon those *complicated* sums of goods which occur in *practical* cases it is very difficult to decide: whereas for his later point it is essential he should show of the single good, "any given amount of pleasure," that it is never certainly less in value than any other single good. For my part, it seems to me quite obvious that a lifetime of genuineness is certainly superior in value to the pleasure obtained by a moment's enjoyment of turtle-soup: and the point I am now making is that, whereas Mr. McTaggart seems to think he has shown that it is *not* certainly superior, he has said nothing which even tends to show this. That such judgments will not suffice, by themselves, to decide *practical* cases, must, of course, be admitted. But the question whether practical cases are soluble, is quite different from the question what data we have for deciding on their solubility; and we have evidence that, owing to a confusion of these two questions, Mr. McTaggart has arrived at a wrong conclusion on the latter. We cannot decide off-hand, as he does on his "fourth case" (p. 124), that, where a gain in pleasure is certainly accompanied by a loss in other goods, there is "no reasonable solution." We *may* be forced to the conclusion that there is no reasonable solution either in this or in Mr. McTaggart's second and third cases: but all three questions must be treated on the same principles, and we cannot decide this one on the ground that no pleasure is ever certainly less in value than any other good.

The same confusion between practical cases and our data for their solution is very strikingly exhibited by another characteristic of Mr. McTaggart's argument—a characteristic which is worth mentioning, because it also exhibits another weakness in Mr. McTaggart's hedonistic position. Mr. McTaggart obviously thinks that in practical cases of importance we often can decide which course will bring the most pleasure: the whole point of his argument is to show that pleasure is an applicable and correct criterion *of morality,* not only of those cases "in which we do not bring morality into the matter" (p. 111). But it is very noticeable that all the instances which he gives, as showing that we can estimate the relative value of pleasures, are taken from cases of the latter sort; whereas in

Digitized by Google

those problems "which are the real ethical difficulties of life" (p. 105), he does not attempt to show that it is plain which course would give the greater pleasure. He *fancies,* indeed, that why most independent thinkers have concluded in favor of marriage, is "because they take a more practical criterion. If we estimate the gain or loss of happiness which would follow from the abolition of marriage, we may *perhaps* find excellent reasons for declining to make the change" (p. 103). But he does not give these excellent reasons; and that "most independent thinkers" have actually been led to their conclusion by the use of the hedonistic criterion may be confidently affirmed to be a *mere* fancy. Hedonistic arguments have, indeed, been frequently used with success to give plausibility to a conviction of which a thinker was already strongly convinced; but that an impartial consideration of the hedonistic evidence has *ever* sufficed, by itself, to produce a strong conviction on any question of importance it is by no means bold to deny. However that may be, Mr. McTaggart's argument in favor of the usefulness of pleasure as a criterion exhibits just the converse fallacy to that which appears in his arguments against the applicability of other goods. In the case of pleasure he only shows that we can *sometimes* decide that one sum of pleasure is greater than another; and then concludes, without further demonstration, that we can so decide about the highly complicated sums involved in practical problems. In the case of other goods he only tries to show that we cannot decide on the complicated sums involved in practice; and then concludes, without further demonstration, that we cannot decide that *any* one element of the good is preferable to another.

Mr. McTaggart has, therefore, given us no reason in support of his opinion that we cannot pronounce with certainty that any other good is greater than the smallest quantity of pleasure; and, accordingly, he has also failed to prove his most general practical proposition, namely that it is never plainly right to prefer a course which would give less pleasure: he has given us no reason to think that in his "fourth case," no reasonable solution is ever possible. If, however, this unsupported opinion were correct, I have shown that no reasonable solution would be possible, in any of Mr. McTaggart's three

Digitized by Google

last cases: we should only be able to decide which was our right course, when one course showed a decided superiority both in pleasure and in other goods; pleasure would be a correct criterion, only if in most cases a gain in pleasure coincided with a gain in other goods. But I have already said that this opinion appears to me not merely incorrect but preposterous; and I have given an instance which seems to me to make this self-evident. If, however, the opinion is incorrect, if we can estimate, within broad limits, the value of pleasure relatively to other goods, we have seen that a rational solution may be possible both in the second and the fourth of Mr. McTaggart's cases: our decision on them will depend on the value we assign to pleasure relatively to other goods. The assumption, therefore, that Mr. McTaggart's opinion is incorrect, calls for a re-consideration of practical cases, in which the question how much value pleasure has will probably not be unimportant. It is only by such a re-consideration that we can decide, whether, after all, pleasure is, in general, a correct criterion; and, if not, by what other principles we can guide our actions.

And, first of all, it appears to me, as I have already said, that the value even of very large amounts of pleasure is very small in comparison to that of other goods: for it may be questioned, without paradox, whether pleasure has any value at all. That such a doubt is not paradoxical may I think be made apparent, if we refer to a principle which Mr. McTaggart strangely neglects. Mr. McTaggart assumes that the value of a whole must always be the same as the sum of the values of its parts (*e. g.* p. 115)—a view which is, perhaps, the only one, in the whole range of philosophy, to which his own term "Atomism" can be justly applied as a term of abuse. If, on the contrary, we remember, what is certainly true, that the value of a whole may be very much greater than the sum of the values of its parts, it becomes plain that from the fact that the presence of pleasure very much heightens the value of certain wholes, we cannot infer that pleasure has any value at all. But it is only this proposition—that the subtraction of pleasure from certain wholes would very much impair their value—which it is paradoxical to deny. There is certainly a very gen-

Digitized by Google

eral tendency to think that the presence of pleasure in certain states of consciousness very much adds to their value; and from this fact it is commonly inferred, as by Mr. McTaggart, that *pleasure itself* has a very high value. Yet, if it be even possible that the value of a whole should differ from the sum of the values of its parts, the inference is utterly invalid. And can any other fact than this, that pleasure *often* adds greatly to the value of a whole, be urged in defense of the proposition that great pleasure has admittedly great value? On the contrary, the supporters of that proposition have notoriously great difficulty in reconciling their opinion with the verdict of Common Sense, that many states containing the most intense pleasure are nevertheless of little value, if not positively bad. There will, of course, be no such difficulty, if the principle, that the value of a whole may differ from the sum of the value of its parts, be admitted; but then also the contention that pleasure has very great value loses all its plausibility. The question must now be settled by the consideration whether the existence of pleasure, by itself, apart from any thing else whatever that we are able to distinguish from it, would even in the greatest quantities, have any great value; and it is certainly not paradoxical to deny this. On the contrary it seems self-evident that its value, if it have any, would be very small indeed.

Assuming, then, that the value of pleasure, even in large amounts, is very small indeed, we may proceed to our second question, and ask: Is it true that, in most practical cases, the course which gives most pleasure will also give most good on the whole? Is pleasure, after all, a correct criterion of morality? What is the nature of practical cases, in general?

I think the first answer that should be given to these questions is an admission of very thorough ignorance. Until the subject has been investigated far more conclusively than has ever yet been done, no conclusion should be asserted dogmatically. I shall confine myself to certain generalities, which seem to make against the conclusion that pleasure is the best available criterion.

In the first place, it seems to me that in most cases, where a man will actually ask himself with anxiety: "Which is the

Digitized by Google

right course?" it is impossible to ascertain, with any certainty, *either* which course will in the immediate future bring most good on the whole *or* which will bring most pleasure. On the first point, as we have seen, I have Mr. McTaggart with me; and on the second, as we have also seen, I have his remarkable failure to give any instance to the contrary. But this state of things (if it is the state of things) may well be due to the fact that such cases are only those in which Common Sense does not give a clear decision. It is, in general, only where this is the case, that a man will ask himself the question; and, if we assume that Common Sense morality has decided rightly upon most of the cases, where our ignorance allows a right judgment, it will follow that in the cases, which we cannot decide, the difference in value between the alternative results will probably not be very great. That Common Sense has generally decided rightly where it has decided, may, I think, be proved: and it may, at least, be fairly assumed here, since most moralists are agreed about it, at all events as regards the Common Sense of Christendom, and Mr. McTaggart is certainly no exception. It only, then, remains to ask whether, in the vast number of cases where Common Sense is clear, and in the few, in which perhaps a conclusion can be drawn by a philosophical examination of Common Sense, the course preferred will give most pleasure; and whether, therefore, in the few cases where we can perhaps see a balance of pleasure on one side and cannot see a balance of good, pleasure may be safely used as a criterion.

Now the question of the relation of the hedonic criterion to Common Sense has been very fully discussed by Professor Sidgwick, in the interest of the view, which Mr. McTaggart agrees with me in rejecting and the falsehood of which I have claimed to be self-evident, that pleasure is the sole good. It does not seem probable that a much better case for the agreement of hedonistic judgments with those of Common Sense could be made out, than Professor Sidgwick has given us; and it must be admitted that even on this case the verdict remains very problematical. But, assuming that Professor Sidgwick's verdict is correct, what exactly does it state? No more than

Digitized by Google

this: That in most cases there is no very manifest divergence between the course which would give most pleasure and that which is recommended by Common Sense. This conclusion is certainly problematical; but, if it were true, it would be sufficient for Professor Sidgwick's point: for it would show that Common Sense could not be seen, in a majority of cases, to *conflict* with hedonic judgments. But, even if it be true, is it sufficient to show that pleasure is a safe *criterion,* when admittedly pleasure is not only not the sole good but is one of the least among goods? This is quite a different question; and it seems to me that for this purpose Professor Sidgwick's conclusion is *not* sufficient. For it does not assert that in a majority of cases the hedonic judgments manifestly agree with those of Common Sense: on the contrary we may fairly assume that the number of cases in which the two do obviously agree is no greater than that in which they obviously disagree; or, in other words, that Mr. McTaggart's fourth class of cases is about equal in number to his first class. He cannot, therefore, argue that, since the pleasure-criterion is correct in a majority of the cases which are *clear,* it will be safe to use it in those which are uncertain; for Professor Sidgwick's conclusion does not maintain that it is correct even in a majority of the cases which are *clear.* We have then to consider by themselves the large number of cases, in which, for one reason or another, we cannot tell whether a course which gives most pleasure does or does not coincide with that which Common Sense declares to be best on the whole: it is only by adding these to the cases, where the two certainly coincide, that Professor Sidgwick gets, as a large majority among all cases, those in which there is no obvious disagreement between Hedonism and Common Sense. Now among these cases a large number will certainly be indeterminate for the reason that it is not plain which course gives a balance of pleasure; and these obviously cannot affect at all our judgment as to the correctness of the hedonic criterion. There remain only the cases, which, although they do present a balance of pleasure on one side, are unclear because Common Sense does not declare which is best on the whole. These are the cases which form Mr. McTaggart's

Digitized by Google

second and third class; and it is plain that the probability with regard to them is that the number of cases in which the hedonic course does, and in which it does not, coincide with that which is best on the whole will be equal in number. It was pointed out that in these cases there is, on Mr. McTaggart's principles, no rational solution, since, wherever one course shows a decisive superiority in one good (be it pleasure or any other), the other course will show a decisive superiority in some other. That there is, for this reason, no rational solution, must, I think, still be admitted; but, if we now take into account the fact that pleasure is a very slight good, I think it may be seen that pleasure is likely to be a *worse* criterion than many others. For if we use as our criterion a superiority in any good more valuable than pleasure, the chances that our choice will coincide with the course that is best on the whole will still be equal; but, in the cases where it does not coincide, the gravity of our error is likely to be considerably less, since we shall at any rate have secured a good of considerable value. Of course, it may be said that the course which shows a superiority in pleasure will generally also show a superiority in some more valuable good. But it cannot be assumed that this is always the case. And, for practical purposes, the important point to insist on is that, if pleasure be a comparatively small good, we cannot safely be satisfied that we have chosen a course, as good as we can see any to be, if we have chosen on the ground that it offers a balance of pleasure. For to adopt pleasure as a criterion, on the ground that it is as likely to be right as any other, means that in doubtful cases, where with great hesitation we decide that there is probably a superiority of pleasure on one side, we shall give the preference to that decision over an equally doubtful judgment that there is probably a superiority in other goods on the other side. The immense majority of cases are cases of such hesitating judgment; and, if pleasure be a small good, it is certain that to give this preference to the hesitating hedonic judgment will probably be wrong.

If this be so, then, if we must adopt any criterion at all, to adopt as such *any* considerable good will be more likely to lead

Digitized by Google

us right than to adopt pleasure. It may be said that of no other single good will there be so often a distinct superiority on one side as of pleasure. But, even if this be so, it will still be better to use different kinds of good as criteria in the different cases where they are applicable than to use pleasure in all. And finally it may well be doubted whether the calculation of pleasures does give us a definite result in more cases than the attempt to balance the total of goods on each side. That it does so is generally maintained on the plausible ground that to determine the effects of our actions on a single kind of good *must* be easier than to determine the effects on all together. But we have seen that Mr. McTaggart gives us no reason to think that the calculation of pleasure does in most cases give us a definite result; and against the *a priori* argument that such a calculation must be less complicated than the other, we have to urge the fact, which is generally neglected, that in this other we are dealing with quantities most of which exhibit a very decided difference in size. The greater *number* of the terms which we have to take into account may well be counterbalanced by the magnitude of their differences in respect of the relevant kind of quantity—namely quantity of intrinsic value. And, indeed, it seems, in practice, to be just as easy to decide that two whole sets of results are nearly equal in total value, as to decide that they are nearly equal in pleasure-value: and in practical cases, as has been said, such a judgment is all that we can hope for. In the vast majority of cases, cases in which we do not raise a question, Common Sense clearly has no doubt that the total of good on the one side is unquestionably greater than on the other; and the philosopher who argues that there is a superiority of pleasure on the same side cannot avoid bearing witness to the clearness of this judgment, and generally bears witness also to his own conviction that the judgment is correct. Mr. McTaggart himself does not fail to give indications of the ease with which he can judge totals of good other than pleasure: "The happiness a man gives is" he can see "generally more closely proportioned to the development of his ideals than is the happiness he enjoys" (p. 125). In any case, whether it be easier or not, it is by endeavoring to compare totals of

Digitized by Google

different goods and not of pleasure only, that men always have attacked and do attack their practical cases; and most men find it easy to see a decisive superiority on one side. They may, perhaps, be as often wrong as right; but, until a further philosophical investigation has settled the point, there is reason to think that, since the value of pleasure is small, when they are wrong, they are less wrong, than if they had taken pleasure for their guide.

G. E. Moore.

Trinity College, Cambridge.

BOOK REVIEWS.

Ethik. Von Max Wentscher. I. Theil. Leipzig. J. A. Barth. 1902. Pp. x, 368.

The author of this book declares that it is not in line with the intellectual tendencies of the times. Our age is empiristic and realistic, his ethics is idealistic. Our age is deterministic, his ethics is an ethics of freedom. It is also individualistic, while the favorite conception of the day is socialistic. It is not the mirror of the age, but the expression of its deepest, innermost yearning to bring humanity nearer the goal which an old faith expressed in the words: God created man after His own image.

It is this so-called "unmodern" character of Wentscher's system which makes it interesting. It really represents a protest against the determinism and socialism of modern systems and makes an earnest plea for the "free rational individual." For this reason it is stronger in its negative than in its positive phases; its criticisms of other systems forming, in my opinion, the most valuable portions of the book.

Part I, the volume before us, tries to furnish a critical basis of ethics. It aims to discover, through the critical discussion of other possible views, ultimate self-evident standards of all ethical evaluation. It finds these in the so-called "ethical axioms," which are to serve as material for the free self-determination of the *ego*. The nature and conditions of true freedom, in which all moral good finds its ultimate ground and justification, are then examined. Part II, which has not yet been published, promises to give the practical application of the principles to life.

Digitized by Google

Ethics, the author declares, is not an empirical science, it does not register laws, it prescribes laws; it precedes its objects while the other sciences follow them. Hence the method of ethics differs from that of other sciences. It does not deal with an already existing subject-matter, but aims to set up ends and ideals of a possible willing, a willing that is not yet given in any experience. Moreover, the ethical is not the result of a necessary gradual development, nor a content determined by an absolute authority outside of us. Hence, the notion of *duty* will not stand in the foreground of our ethics, but the concept of *freedom*. Our problem is, What can we will? What are the highest ends? These ends are not the ends of a blind caprice, but ends given and approved by our own true self. Our will-activity which rises to perfectly *free* willing, which finds its ground in itself and expresses our innermost essence, is as such the ideal of absolute worth, morally good, and is not first made so by submission to an authoritative law foreign to it, or by any objectively given conditions of reality. The will in its perfect autonomy, in its highest freedom, is at the same time the good will.

The chief business of ethics is to discover whether there are such "ethical axioms," what reason we have for claiming them as axioms, and further to show how from such axioms—if there be any—all the standards of our ethical evaluations and all the contents which we are said to recognize as ethically valuable, can be deduced in a natural manner. Neither the empiristic-eudæmonistic principles (individualistic eudæmonism, social eudæmonism, evolutionism) nor the aprioristic-idealistic principles will solve our problem. They contain either too little or too much. We must search for axioms which contain only what can be made self-evident to every willing rational being as the ultimate goal of his willing, and express everything that we include in morality, so that the particular ethical rules can be deduced from them. The sought-for ethical axioms must be self-evident ideals of a free personality. Hence Kant is right in saying that there is nothing good except a good will. The first axiom advanced by Wentscher is: The will of every willing, thinking being strives by its nature to develop itself more and more into a complete self, into a free will. An immanent standard of value is also expressed in this axiom: a willing is the more perfect, the more nearly it corresponds to what follows from the idea of will. This standard of value judges the

Digitized by Google

will only in itself, it does not refer it to any external factor or external purpose.

But our will also comes in contact with an environment, it becomes more comprehensive and more skilled in its control of the world. We also bring our willing into relation with that of other beings so that ends which would transcend the powers of the individual are easily realized by co-operation. These ends can never be ends in themselves, however, to which our will is to subordinate itself; no, they have value only as activities of our self, of our personality. We can therefore supplement our axiom as follows: Every being, becoming conscious of its freedom, will naturally strive to make the richest, most vigorous, and comprehensive use of its power to will. This proposition too is a necessary consequence from the idea of willing, considered on its objective side. These axioms can also be expressed as imperatives: 1. Strive after the highest possible expression of your being and of fixed principles of your own free will. 2. Make the most vigorous and comprehensive use of this power of free activity. The first of these axioms furnishes, in the concept of morality, the element of freedom, the second the element of personal power and efficiency. In these two elements everything must be exhausted that we have a right to include in morality.

In the second half of his book Wentscher takes up the discussion of the will and the freedom of the will. The freedom of the will he justifies in the usual way, by the consciousness of freedom, remorse, the sense of guilt, and responsibility. He does not accept the doctrine of the *liberum arbitrium,* however. Such an isolated willing without a subject is an empty abstraction to which nothing real corresponds. Volition is the decision of our ego for a certain idea, the assumption of the responsibility for the decision, and hence the exact opposite of blind chance. This decision of the ego, however, is never necessarily determined by what has preceded, but is a self-decision, which belongs entirely to the present moment, a new active and autonomous step beyond the past ego, regardless of whether this decision confirms the past development or gradually leads it into new channels.

The arguments of determinism are considered and carefully criticised under the following heads: The universal validity of the law of causality; the unbroken natural causal nexus; the results of moral statistics; psychical uniformity; the religious arguments. Much valuable material is to be found in these sections, among

Digitized by Google

other things the discussion of the theories of parallelism and interaction, upon which subject the author wrote an able book several years ago.

In a concluding chapter Wentscher gives his notion of the nature of the freedom which we are justified in holding on ethical grounds. The free individual is not to be conceived as something fixed and unchangeable, developing along one fixed line under the influence of particular conditions. He must be endowed with such a predisposition to freedom that he can help to determine his development from a certain point and can from that point on fashion a true self by the decisions of his will. Hence some *germ* of freedom, some power to create a self, must necessarily be presupposed in the individual. But this germ must not be conceived as predetermined to a fixed development, but only as a general faculty to base an independent nature on a received empirical nature. In the last analysis ideal freedom and morality will depend on the energy with which the intellectual reflection can assert itself. This energy of self-concentration may be potentially considerably increased by education, etc., but its real activity always remains the work of the individual himself. It is an absolute spontaneity of the individual. It is not blind, however, like the *liberum arbitrium,* a blind groundless choice between *a* and *non-a,* but freedom is an *ethical* freedom, and as the final condition of the same it is the faculty of starting the intellectual reflection, or intensifying it, and of bringing it to definite results.

Wentscher's system is, as we see, essentially Kantian; it is Kantian ethics in a somewhat more modern garb. In its method it pretends to differ from other sciences, assuming that the ethical standards can be deduced *a priori* from the notion of the human will. But the only way to find out anything concerning the human will is to examine it introspectively, and introspection is scientific and empirical. What ideals the will—particularly a free will—is going to place before itself, can be known only from a study of the will itself in its relation with the environment. Wentscher's entire book seems to me to disprove the claim that ethics differs from other sciences in its methods. Even if it were so that the free will and its ideals cannot be explained empirically, even if our ethical evaluations were unexplainable deliverances of the will itself, that would not make our knowledge of these facts different from our knowledge, say, of the laws of nature, which are just as unexplainable in the last analysis. The chief business of ethics is to discover

Digitized by Google

a standard or standards, and these standards cannot be deduced from the concept of human nature or human will as such, unless we have already learned in the usual way what that human nature or will is.

We cannot deduce anything from the concept of the human will except what we put into it. Wentscher's own axioms are examples of the truth of this statement. That the will of every willing, thinking being strives to develop itself more and more into a *complete* self, that a willing is the more perfect, the more nearly it corresponds to what follows from the idea of will, and that every being, becoming conscious of its freedom, will strive to make the richest use of its power to will, these are propositions which cannot be reached except by way of experience, inner and outer.

It is also to be noted that Wentscher's axioms contain terms which have no meaning unless we already have a standard by which to measure them. He tells us that the will strives to develop itself more and more into a *complete* self, that a willing is the more *perfect,* the more nearly it corresponds to the idea of willing, that it strives to make the *richest, most vigorous, most comprehensive* use of its power to will. What a *complete* self, a *perfect* will is, we cannot tell unless we have some standard by which to judge it. We need a criterion which will enable us to tell when we have reached the "highest possible expression of our being," and "the most vigorous and comprehensive use of this power of free activity," and such a criterion Wentscher never furnishes us.

Besides, the attempt to base all morality on the conscious desire of the individual to extend the sphere of his willing does not seem to me to be supported by the facts. The desire to help others cannot be explained merely as a desire to exercise one's power to will. Wentscher rejects the notion of a "social impulse," and thinks that the feeling of power and pleasure which follows the extension of our sphere of willing is the cause of our evaluation of social life. That means that we are social beings because the increased activity afforded us by community-life gives us a feeling of power and pleasure, and that we value this feeling. This certainly seems to be a close approximation to the theory of egoistic hedonism which our author takes such great pains to refute.

The theory of freedom advanced by our author is somewhat inconsistent. According to him the individual must be endowed with such a predisposition to freedom that he can determine his own development in a certain measure. We may grant that without ac-

Digitized by Google

cepting free will. But that is not the decisive point in the question, as Wentscher himself declares. The real problem is: Can the individual put forth an indeterminate amount of energy in his willing? Wentscher thinks this energy can be considerably increased by education, etc., but that in the last analysis it is the "absolute spontaneity of the individual." These two statements do not seem to hang together very well. It is hard to understand how an "absolute spontaneity" can be increased by education, and what need there would be of increasing it. Besides, if we can increase "the energy of self-concentration in intellectual reflection," if we can train the individual to make rational decisions for himself, is that not all that is necessary for ethical progress? What more can we ask?

FRANK THILLY.

UNIVERSITY OF MISSOURI.

DEMOCRACY AND SOCIAL ETHICS. By Jane Addams. New York: The Macmillan Co. 1902.

The failure of imaginative sympathy on the one hand and "organized charity" on the other to understand and to explain the ethical valuation and outlook of the city poor, gives a remarkable importance to this little book which sets forth in plain vigor the doctrinal results of the writer's long career of experimental sympathy.

The futility of the usual assumption of philanthropic persons, that the poor are either virtually void of moral standard, or are possessors of an altogether "lower" one than prevails among the comfortable, educated classes, is effectively exposed in the opening chapter on Charitable Effort. Tolstoi is his "What to Do" describes how his own early charitable experiments in Moscow taught him the same lesson, which Miss Addams embodies in her distinction between the charity which consists in being good "to" people, and being good "with" them; the former attitude fails to help because it fails to understand. Miss Addams is not, however, much concerned with elaborating generalities: her real service in this part of her book lies in the detailed illustrations which bring home to us the real morality in the life of the poor, so often mistaken for immorality. So for example (p. 22), "The evolutionists tell us that the instinct to pity, the impulse to aid his fellows, served man at a very early period, as a rude rule of right and wrong. There is no doubt that this rude rule still holds among

Digitized by Google

many people with whom charitable agencies are brought into contact, and that their ideas of right and wrong are quite honestly outraged by the methods of these agencies." In a word, the "charity" of the poor to the poor, which has no particular regard to whether a "case" is "deserving" or technically "helpable," is really not charity, but the morally higher form of a "communism" which, as Kropotkin proves with such convincing force in his latest book, has suffered a temporary eclipse in our recent "competitive" stage of social growth. The highest esteem in which the impulsive, almost instinctive, operations of a kind heart are rated, the comparatively low place assigned to prudence, strict justice and the more "rational" virtues, receives a wealth of interesting and often humorous illustration. The chapter on Political Reform, most of which appeared in the pages of the INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF ETHICS, explains on this basis of valuations, the popularity of the "boodling" Alderman, how his huge misappropriations of public money and his corrupt abuses of office are easily condoned by reason of his many little acts of personal kindnesses and thoughtful generosity.

Of other broad lessons conveyed in this volume, two strike me as of urgent present importance. One is the stress laid by Miss Addams on the true, as distinguished from the false, contribution of private munificence in the broad work of social progress. "There are doubtless many things which the public would never demand, unless they were first supplied by individual initiative, both because the public lacks the imagination and also the power of formulating their needs. Thus philanthropic effort supplies kindergartens, until they become so established in the popular affection that they are incorporated in the public school system. Churches and missions establish reading rooms, until at last the public library system dots the city with branch reading rooms and libraries" (p. 164). This suggests a permanently valuable law of discrimination between private enterprise and public organization, which transcends the ground of charity and lays a foundation for the harmony between Individualism and Socialism in the industrial arts which the twentieth century may be designed to work out. The other point is contained in a really profound criticism of the defects of current educational methods among those who wish to "elevate" working classes. Such education either tends to become too narrowly practical on special lines and for particular grades, as where secondary education is bent to the purpose of a

Digitized by Google

distinctively commercial class by increasing the supply of cheap clerks, or else, genuinely concerned with literary culture, it is severed too completely from the working-day to which it is designed as a relief element. Miss Addams pleads powerfully for a more integrated treatment of education which shall help to counteract the narrowing tendencies of specialized machine processes, by enabling the worker in one of these processes to feel and understand the part he is playing, as a unit in the wider economy of the Society for which he works. "Feeding a machine with a material of which he has no knowledge, producing a product, totally unrelated to the rest of his life, without in the least knowing what becomes of it, or its connection with the community, is, of course, unquestionably deadening to his intellectual and moral life. To make the moral connection it would be necessary to give him a social consciousness of the value of his work, and at least a sense of participation and a certain interest in its ultimate use; to make the intellectual connection, it would be essential to create in him some historic conception of the development of industry, and the relation of his individual work to it" (p. 214). Here and everywhere throughout the volume, we find stimulating hints of the application of the spirit of democracy to the hard, concrete problems of our age.

JOHN A. HOBSON.

PHILOSOPHY: ITS SCOPE AND RELATIONS. By Henry Sidgwick. London and New York: Macmillan. 1902. Pp. xvii, 252.

I do not myself find it by any means an easy task, and I think it probable that my perplexity will be shared by other students—to say precisely what is the general impression left upon my mind after perusing Prof. Sidgwick's posthumous volume of lectures introductory to the study of Philosophy. Some of the fine qualities one had learned to expect from the author of "Methods of Ethics" are certainly as prominent in these Lectures as in the works which appeared in his life-time and had the advantage of his final revision. There is the same tone of detachment from the various conflicting parties to one or other of which most of us who take an interest in Philosophy are only too ready to commit ourselves, the same candid and nobly impartial endeavor to let the views which the author himself finally rejects receive full and fair exposition, the same note of unmistakable distinction in the style.

Digitized by Google

The pages of the present volume, like those of its predecessors, are moreover from time to time enlivened by the sallies of a grave and gentle humor, none the less enjoyable because it is held in severe restraint on most occasions, and is absolutely free from malice when it is allowed to appear. Such epigrams as this, directed against the sociological Phenomenalist, "the word *true* has no magic to neutralize the scepticism latent in the word *relative*," or this, with reference to the Comtian "law of the three stages." "I am even disposed to admit a large element in his doctrine of three stages so far as it is positive; only instead of 'theology' and 'metaphysics' I should venture to substitute 'crude theology' and 'bad metaphysics' ",—may rank with the best specimens of their author's lighter style.

And yet, on the other hand, these lectures also seem to me to exhibit what I at any rate have always felt as the cardinal defect of the "Method of Ethics," a want of real grasp of fundamental philosophical problems. Prof. Sidgwick's discussions of various views as to the sphere of Philosophy and its relations to the special sciences are always interesting and usually instructive; yet when one has laid the book down, one hardly feels that one has learned anything fresh either as to the nature of philosophical problems or as to the difference in aim and method between Philosophy and the sciences. Altogether the discussion seems to me to leave the beginner in the subject pretty much where it found him, in the antechamber of Philosophy. Partly, no doubt, this want of definite result is capable of an historical explanation. The adequate discussion of the scope of Metaphysical Philosophy and the nature of the distinction between it and other branches of study presupposes in the first place a definite metaphysical doctrine, and in the second a satisfactory theory of the methodology of knowledge. Prof. Sidgwick, whose genius may fairly be said to be shown in all that he has written to be far more critical than constructive, had himself not a positive metaphysic or theory of knowledge of his own, nor did the systems which he was in the main interested in criticising adequately supply the want. Neither in Mill, nor in Green, nor in Herbert Spencer could he have found a systematic and fully worked out view as to the proper scope and merits of philosophical construction on the one side, and the various groups of sciences on the other; while Comte, with whom the author is largely occupied in the later lectures, has only the theory of knowledge without the

Digitized by Google

metaphysics. As an illustration of the comparative superficiality with which the want of a thoroughly worked-out philosophical point of view leads Prof. Sidgwick to treat some highly important issues, I may take the account of History which he adopts in the two lectures on the relation of Philosophy to History (Lectures 6 and 7). History, according to this view, is simply a complete and accurate record of the events of the past. Thus "Natural History" and historical astronomy or physics are placed on exactly the same footing, with respect to their scope and method, as the history of human societies. And the only difference of spirit recognized between these latter sciences and abstract mechanics is that the former deal with what has actually happened. Yet it should be obvious, except to those, if there are any such still left, who regard History in the light of an "old almanac," that human History, at any rate, aims at being a great deal more than a "record of past facts;" its object is not the mere recording of the facts in their chronological order, nor yet their relation to laws of sequence, but their teleological interpretation as the progressive embodiment of national character. From this it follows at once that the relation of Philosophy to History, in the true sense of the word, cannot be adequately determined until we have recognized the differences of aim and method which separates the true historical sciences from the purely physical, and again that Prof. Sidgwick's identification of social History with sociology is at least open to the very gravest doubt. The study which aims merely at the establishment of what are ultimately statistical uniformities in the conduct of social groups, and that which seeks to interpret the life of an individual group as the expression of an individual character may well diverge widely in concepts and methods, and without some recognition of their divergent aims and methods, the question of their respective relations to general Philosophy can scarcely be profitably discussed.

Similarly with respect to the Physical Sciences. Prof. Sidgwick gives as one main reason for rejecting the view that Metaphysics deals with reality but Physics with appearance, the argument that in Physics too a distinction is drawn between the real and the merely apparent (Lecture 4.) But the value of this argument depends entirely on our view as to whether there are or are not different "orders" or "degrees" of reality; if there are, it will not follow that every science which, for its own purposes, distinguishes what is real from what is apparent must be claiming to deal with an

Digitized by Google

ultimate reality. Whether Physics in particular makes this latter claim, and if so whether the claim is justified, are questions which cannot be answered except on the strength of a searching examination of the logical nature of the fundamental postulates of the mechanical view of natural process with which the successful prosecution of Physics appears to be bound up.

A still more difficult problem is suggested by the existence of such a science as Biology. How far, in evolutionist Biology, is the standpoint of the description of events in terms of the mechanical hypothesis of Physics abandoned for the teleological interpretation of events in the spirit of History? And what are the metaphysical implications of the application of teleological concepts like that of development to processes of the non-human world? These and similar problems are the questions which appear to me to call for solution in any adequate attempt to determine the scope of Philosophy and its relations to the various sciences, and it is because I neither find any solution of them in the present volume, nor discover in it any guiding principle which would help me to solve them for myself, that I am forced to confess to a certain disappointment with it.

To turn to the individual lectures; in the first two, the positions established as to the general scope of Philosophy are in the main two, (1) that Philosophy, as distinguished from the special sciences, aims at the understanding of the world as a *whole,* and (2) that the supreme task of such a study is the co-ordination of "Theoretical" with "Practical" Philosophy, the inclusion in a single coherent system of our knowledge of what "is" and our moral and æsthetic judgments as to what "ought to be." In connection with the first position a good point is made, against the Spencerian conception of Philosophy as completely *unified* knowledge, by the argument that the differences between the various aspects or departments of existence studied by different branches of knowledge, are just as significant for our final view of the systematic whole to which they belong as the agreements. Less satisfactory is the reason given for rejecting the view that the *differentia* of Philosophy lies in its being concerned with reality as opposed to appearance, viz: that Philosophy cannot afford to disregard "phenomena," while the sciences, in their turn, claim to deal with realities. On the second half of this argument, as repeated in Lecture 4, with special reference to Physics, I have already commented. The first half seems further open to the objection

Digitized by Google

that it tacitly assumes the position of a dualism which the principal defenders of the definition would certainly repudiate. From their point of view, "phenomena" or "appearances" are only "unreal" when you deal with them in abstraction from the concrete whole which manifests its nature through them. Thus Philosophy *must* deal with "phenomena" precisely *because* its object is to know "onta," and again, if the other sciences deal with "mere appearance," that is not because they are concerned with "phenomena," but because they view "phenomena" from a standpoint which disregards their character *as* phenomenal of the "on" or "onta" of which they are the systematic expression. Prof. Sidgwick's criterion seems, in fact, unduly influenced by the tacit identification of "reality," as contrasted with appearance, with the Kantian "Thing-in-itself."

As to the second contention, we might perhaps find a difficulty about the precise form in which the problem is stated. Prof. Sidgwick, in his second lecture, argues convincingly against the reduction of the whole content of knowledge to "positive" science in the sense of a mere record of facts. But, so long as he is allowed to except the "normative sciences" and the allied "arts" from the scope of positive science, he seems quite content that the historical sciences should be included under it. I should like to ask whether the real opposition is not between sciences which employ teleological categories, and those which are content with merely mechanical conceptions, *i. e.*, between historical interpretation and mechanical description? To my own mind, the distinction between History and Statistics, for instance, appears much more fundamental than that between History and Ethics. And, as already suggested, I find a further difficulty in the position of the biological and psychological sciences, which seem, *prima facie* at least, to have both a teleological ad a mechanical aspect. In a word, the rough distinction between positive and normative sciences appears to require expansion into a detailed theory of the possible points of view which facts can be studied and the consequent differences of method and initial postulates.

With the third lecture we approach the difficult problem of the distinction between Psychology and Philosophy. For most readers the main interest of the chapter will probably be in the argument by which Prof. Sidgwick seeks to defend the dualistic view of the ultimate disparateness of mind and matter against "Men-

Digitized by Google

talism." By Mentalism, it must be explained, the author understands any doctrine which regards material things as ultimately composed of mental elements. Thus the term embraces not only the sensationalism of Hume and Mill, but also the relationism of Green, the only representative of the Neo-Kantian views of whom Prof. Sidgwick takes particular account. It is only Mentalism of the former type, the doctrine that the material thing is a complex of sense-presentation, which in his view can be met and refuted by denying the claim of psychological analysis to decide the metaphysical issue of the independent existence of matter. The Neo-Kantian "Idealist" takes his stand elsewhere than on the results of psychological analysis and has to be met along other lines.

Against sensationalism then Prof. Sidgwick's case is this: (a) Reflective analysis enables us to distinguish, in the case of the primary qualities of body (*i. e.*, according to his interpretation, the qualities discerned by touch and "the muscular sense,") between (1) "a sensational complex . . . composed of elements belonging to muscular sense as well as to the sense of touch," and (2) "a cognition . . . of relational qualities of matter as it exists independently of any perception" (p. 68). Take for instance the quality hardness. I can distinguish between the tendency of a body to preserve its form and internal structure unchanged when it comes into collision with another body, (the "relational quality" of hardness) and the complex sensation of touch, pressure, and "muscular sense," which I receive when a body possessing this tendency is in contact with one of my bodily organs. But if I can thus distinguish (1) and (2), reflective analysis cannot warrant the inference that the material world *is* nothing but the presentation-complexes through which I cognize it. And (3) if *Psychogonical Analysis* is invoked to prove that all our cognitions have been originally developed out of associations between sensations, (one sees here, by the way, that Prof. Sidgwick's psychological opponents belong to a now antiquated school) then, over and above the doubts which might be raised as to the truth of this proposition, its relevancy may be denied. For at best it only shows that the sensations in question are the antecedents, not that they are the constituent elements of our conception of the material world. Moreover, the ordinary sensationalist usually contradicts himself by presupposing the existence of a brain and nervous system as a condition of the supposed development.

Now, if we set aside the last contention, which does appear to

Digitized by Google

hit a blot in all the sensationalist theories, it may be doubted whether Prof. Sidgwick's argument, as it stands, would really be found unanswerable by the sensationalist, and it is, I think, clear that it is at least more damaging to sensationalism than corroborative of "Natural Dualism." Take first his fundamental point, the distinction between certain qualities of matter and the sensations through which we cognize them. A sensationalist who knows his business will surely fasten upon the presence of the word "tendencies" in Prof. Sidgwick's account of these primary qualities. "You say," he might urge "that the hard body A not only does preserve its structure when in collision with B, but that it permanently has the *tendency* to do so. What sort of actual fact do you mean by this tendency? Can you give it any definite meaning, except what is derived from the content of tactual and visual sensation of some kind? *E. g.*, A is hard, tends to preserve its structure, even when it is not in collision with anything. Of this I may satisfy myself by visual perception. Then, it this tendency is not to be resolved into the existence of the visual perception in question, in which case we are once more thrown back upon sensationalism, you surely must distinguish for the visual percept, as you did for the tactual, between the presentation and the fact cognized through it. Thus your argument against sensationalism is at least inconsistent with your previous admission (p. 64) that *secondary* qualities are mere sensation-complexes." Now if the argument were thus revised, by making the distinction between the sensation and the quality it cognizes universal, though it clearly would be fatal to sensationalism, I do not see how it supports the particular conclusion of the Natural Dualist. From another side, again, we might urge that a theory which identifies the "independent" qualities of bodies with their relations to one another is bound to take some note of the famous difficulties connected with the relational scheme, a topic upon which Prof. Sidgwick is entirely silent.

Prof. Sidgwick's rejoinder to the Neo-Kantian Mentalist is only imperfectly represented in the appendix to the fourth lecture, from which it appears that his fundamental objection to their view was that it implies the relegation of time and space to the rank of mere appearance. Prof. Sidgwick is perhaps mistaken in urging that this denial of the ultimate reality of time and space, even if thinkable, is useless, because it does not assist us in solving problems relating to the phenomenal world. I should have thought

Digitized by Google

e. g. that the question of the reality of time had an obvious bearing upon the problem created by the apparent existence of evil, a problem which Prof. Sidgwick in his concluding lectures appears to consider entirely insoluble.

In the fourth and fifth lectures Prof. Sidgwick attempts to discriminate between Metaphysics and Philosophy in general. The result at which he ultimately arrives, after a somewhat desultory discussion, is that Philosophy is Metaphysics, so far as the synthesis of truths which it affects goes beyond the limits of what can be directly verified by particular experiences, nor Metaphysics so far as it rests content with constructions which might conceivably be verified by special experiences. Further, Metaphysics differs from logic in that logic gives the criterion of mediate Metaphysics of immediate general truths. It is not, I think, quite clear how far the latter of these positions is really compatible with the former. It is not merely that, as the author admits, logical and metaphysical investigations cannot be ultimately separated, but that the whole content of pure logic would seem to be included in Metaphysics, according to the definition previously given of Metaphysical Philosophy. Nor, again, is it quite clear how far the author could seriously have defended the notion that there are "axioms of knowledge which are immediately self-evident in the proper sense, *i. e.*, not merely presupposed by, and revealed by analysis in the structure of knowledge as a whole, but actually capable of being immediately discerned as true by simple inspection of their contents."

It is possible that the apparently "intuitive" character which is ascribed in the "Method of Ethics" to certain simple ethical propositions led Prof. Sidgwick to minimize the difficulties inherent in such a recognition of "unproved premises of proof."

I have dwelt at such length on some of the general features of Prof. Sidgwick's volume that I must abstain from going into details with regard to the six lectures (6-11) which deal with the relation of Philosophy to History and Sociology. I have already indicated what seems to me the serious deficiency of this part of the book. Prof. Sidgwick, as I have said, fails to appreciate the fundamental distinction between Natural and Historical Science in respect of aims and methods, and in consequence, does not seem to me to throw much light upon the relation of the truths of History and Sociology to the "ultimate synthesis" of truths which is Philosophy. What he really does in this series of lectures is to dis-

Digitized by Google

cuss in an interesting way the bearing of recent developments of historical and sociological study upon the spirit in which Philosophy should be pursued. Thus the main result of lectures 6 and 7 is the, as I think, valid demonstration that the theory of biological evolution does not afford any cogent arguments for Materialism. Lectures 8 and 9 discuss the question whether sociological inquiry into the origin of beliefs is logically bound to lead to scepticism as to the validity, and lectures 10 and 11 the question whether the study of history of itself will yield a satisfactory criterion of social progress. Both questions are answered in the negative. As to the latter, at any rate, it might perhaps be urged that if by history we mean the teleological interpretation, as distinct from the mere record, of the past, the "Progressionist" might have more of a case than Prof. Sidgwick allows. If we can detect in the past not a mere succession of changes but a continuous approximation to a coherent ideal, may we not validly use that ideal as a standard by which to estimate further progress in the future? The full working out of this thought would lead to a reconsideration of the question propounded by the twelfth lecture, whether the divergence of "theoretical" and "practical" Philosophy is irreducible. Prof. Sidgwick's own opinion here, as in the works published in his lifetime, appears to be that it is at best only partly reducible and that only by means of Theistic assumptions which cannot be demonstrated.

A. E. Taylor.

Owens College, Manchester.

Philosophy and Life and Other Essays. By J. H. Muirhead, M. A., Professor of Mental and Moral Philosophy in the University of Birmingham. London: Swan Sonnenschein & Co., Ltd. 1902.

Professor Muirhead has given us, in this volume of essays, thirteen papers, nine of which are classed as "ethical," and four as "logical." Some of the "ethical" ones would certainly not be regarded as philosophical essays by the pedantry or affectation of philosophical dry-as-dusts, who think nothing can be "philosophical" which has any life or vital interest about it. At the same time, the four closing papers on "logical" themes—which were read before the Aristotelian Society of London—are far the ablest and most valuable in the book.

Digitized by Google

Taking them, however, as they stand, and beginning with "ethical" papers, we have first of all one on "Philosophy and Life." It is unfortunate for Professor Muirhead that it would not be easy for a reviewer, in speaking of his essay, to forget the really fine paper on the same subject by Professor Höffding in THE INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF ETHICS last year (January number). It is not merely that Professor Muirhead's treatment is more popular in character: my main fault with it is, that "life," in its amazing depth and fullness has no manner of justice done to it. The Professor seems to me content to deal with living more than with "life." But I do not mean to question the use and suitability of the paper for the purpose for which it was given. An appreciation follows—of the late Professor William Wallace. It is a piece of work so admirable in its kind that one feels as though criticism would be out of place. It will be read with interest and pleasure by all, whether sharers of Wallace's strongly held Hegelianism or not. The third paper is concerned with "R. L. Stevenson's Philosophy of Life"—an inspiriting little paper, though rather lacking in point or summarizing in the end. The extracts are not too numerous and are judiciously chosen. The paper has this particular value, that, whereas the work of Stevenson has been often appraised only in respect of his lightness of touch, lucidity of expression, and other literary qualities, there is here brought out the reality of moral substratum underlying his work as a literary artist. The next item is an essay on "Abstract and Practical Ethics." It is a plea for comprehensiveness of view, that is, the unifying view of the various sides or aspects of a subject. "What Imperialism Means" succeeds this. It contains points of much historic and practical interest, in particular, how the policy of keeping our colonies stands related to names like Carlyle, Burke, and John Stuart Mill. Of practical interest, too, are the discussions on "The Science of Poor-Law Relief" and "Modern Temperance Reform." The closing topics of the "ethical" series are Educational—"A Liberal Education" and "Psychology and Education." The former puts forward claims for harmonious, well-balanced, and symmetrical culture. The latter desiderates the teaching of well-attested psychological results to instructors of youth without binding on them the yoke of a complete curriculum. In this connection the sentiments of Herbart, Volkmann, Wundt, Spencer, Bain, James, Lloyd Morgan, and Münsterberg, have more or less reference made to them. Of these "ethical" papers taken in whole, it cannot be said that they

Digitized by Google

contain a great deal that is striking, either in matter or style. But they are sensible and practical, and will prove useful. But for the four subsequent essays, classed as "logical," we might have been tempted to think the author rather lacking in strength of thought or philosophical acumen, the truth really being that the earlier subjects do not afford his powers sufficient scope. It appears to me this would have seemed a stronger, if less popular, book, had these closing chapters come first. At any rate, they will be apt to suffer in appreciation from their present place, and possibly the book with them. Should it so happen, it will be matter for regret, for these papers are able and good. The first deals with "The Concept in Logical Doctrine," and advances Professor Muirhead's reasons for disapproving "the complete subordination of the concept to the judgment" in "recent logical treatises." The second is taken up with "The Goal of Knowledge," and deals with variations from Hegel, found in writers like Dr. Bradley and Mr. McTaggart. "As Mr. Bradley assumes that the unity of which knowledge is in search is incompatible with its differences, Mr. McTaggart conversely assumes that the differences by which we seek to know the thing are incompatble with its unity." And later in the chapter he concludes that "these two (complete differentiation and complete unification) are not two different ideals, but different sides of the same." The third paper treats of "Hypothesis," its nature, contents, aim, and verification. The final paper is headed thus—"Is the Knowledge of Space *a priori?*" The positions dealt with are mainly those of Professor James.

Professor Muirhead has done rightly in bringing these papers together, and the collection is so varied that most readers will find something in the volume to interest them. We fancy that some of the sentences he writes as to Professor Wallace are largely applicable to Professor Muirhead himself, so far as one may judge from these specimens of his work: "Philosophy was not so much a special kind of occupation different from those of ordinary life, but just those ordinary occupations thoroughly understood." "He had no sympathy with the exclusiveness of genius or culture." "He held that the thinker was only a pioneer going before his fellows, and making straight the path in the wilderness of conflicting opinions." "From another side also he held that the philosopher had a practical function to perform, which ranked him with the politician and reformer." "The difference is that the burden in the case of the reformer is what is practically unbearable, in the case

Digitized by Google

of the philosopher what is mentally unintelligible. As the one feels himself borne down by the weight of custom, heavy as frost and deep almost as life, so the other is borne down by the burden of all this unintelligible world. As the reformer aims at readjusting a nation's habits, so as to make them serve the ends of its spirit, so the philosopher aims at readjusting men's beliefs about the world they live in, after such a manner that they may feel at home in it."

The proofreading has not been quite so carefully done as it might have been, as there are a few slips such as might have been easily corrected.

JAMES LINDSAY.

KILMARNOCK, SCOTLAND.

THE STRENGTH OF THE PEOPLE, A STUDY IN SOCIAL ECONOMICS. By Helen Bosanquet. London and New York: Macmillan & Co. 1902. Pp. xii, 345.

"Those who are watching with the keenest interest the present development of social work and social knowledge, are aware that a comparatively new branch of science is shaping itself in the hands of thinkers and workers—a science to which we give tentatively the name of Social Economics." With these words Mrs. Bosanquet begins the preface to her book, which "does not pretend to be more than a preliminary study in that science, an attempt to suggest how we may work out some theory of human nature and social life, which will be a guide to us when applied to the acutal problems which we have to face." It is clear that the real interest of the authoress is to obtain rules for practical guidance, so that the science she speaks of is more in the nature of an art, or applied science, than a science which aims at mere knowledge with no care for its practical application. Most arts use several sciences as their handmaids. There is no special science corresponding to each art, and it might be argued that Mrs. Bosanquet's new science is really an art based on several sciences, among which political economy is the most important. The question which requires solution is, "How to deal with other people;" one answer which has been given is, "Do unto others as you would they should do unto you." This precept, however, is not in practice very commonly adopted and does not invariably lead to the happiest results. The scientific investigation of which this book is the out-

Digitized by Google

come leads to a rule which, stated compendiously, is, "Don't do for others what they can do for themselves." Unquestionably Mrs. Bosanquet makes a very strong *prima facie* case in favor of this rule, but it may be doubted whether a world in which such a rule was carefully acted upon would be for the best. Many acts of courtesy consist in doing for persons what they could do for themselves. Mrs. Bosanquet, it is true, does not state the rule quite so crudely, for she is only considering the effect of not obeying the rule upon the "saving interests;" but, even in her own words, "But the one thing to avoid in all our work, whether legislative, social or personal, is the risk of diminishing the saving interests in the life of an individual or a class by doing for them what they could do for themselves. The lesson is one enforced by all the teachings of history" (p. 341)—the rule is too broadly stated and if rigidly applied might lead to difficulties in family life.

Yet Mrs. Bosanquet's thesis is true in the main and her book should have a most excellent effect. She begins with psychology and then proceeds to discuss production and distribution under three questions,—the business man's "How to attain the maximum production?"—the philanthropist's, "What distribution produces the greatest happiness?"—the statesman's, "How does the method in which wealth is distributed effect the welfare of those concerned?" Her criticism of Bentham's famous propositions is very well done, but surely the statement (p. 73) that "In practice few people can resist the claims of a need which is greater than their own, when brought face to face with it" is quite inaccurate. I have again and again walked along the embankment late at night on my way home to bed. At a late hour the seats are full of unhappy persons who are unable to afford a shelter for the night. Nothing could be more patent than the fact that their need was greater than mine, but I have never given one of those unfortunate persons enough money for a night's lodging and I have never seen any one giving them money. Nor can I take credit to myself for having deliberately resisted the claims of other human beings, and I know that I am not singular in this respect.

But to return to the main drift of the book. The question is How are we to deal with poverty? We are met by the paradox that by gifts of money we often decrease the income of the recipient. Consequently we must aim at strengthening and improving character. The work of Chalmers is an admirable instance of the

Digitized by Google

way in which the manhood of a people can be strengthened. The results of the old Poor Law are a hideous illustration of the amount of destitution and degradation which may be caused by inordinate outdoor relief. Mrs. Bosanquet's views are, of course, not original, but she states the case so fairly and so well that all guardians ought to be compelled to read this portion of her book. In England there is a great danger that a policy of outdoor relief may become so fashionable that we shall find a large increase of destitution and pauperism. The connection between outdoor relief and pauperism is sometimes denied, but English statistics bring out the evil effects of outdoor relief.

On the subject of the family Mrs. Bosanquet is not so satisfactory. It may be true that (p. 30) "No stronger proof of the guiding power of family responsibilities need be urged than the life led by the tramp who has cut himself adrift from them, and who wanders through the world aimlessly and without a clue, following always the impulse of the moment because he has nothing else to follow." But, at the same time, Lord St. Albans may have had truth on his side when he asserted that "Certainly, the best workers, and of greatest Merit for the Publike, have proceeded from the unmarried or childless men, which both in Affection and Means have married and endowed the Publike." A decent man must have an aim in life. Mrs. Bosanquet quotes Ulysses' speech to his seamen—

> "Fatti non foste a viver come bruti,
> Ma per seguir virtute e conoscenza,"

but she forgets to quote the earlier lines,

> "Nè dolcezza di figlio nè la piéta
> Del vecchio padre, nè il debito amore,
> Lo qual douca Penelope far lieta,
> Vincer potero dentro a me l'ardore,
> Ch' io ebbi a divinir del mondo esperto,
> E degli vizi umani, e del valore."

There is another side to family life; the beauty and importance of the family may be underestimated, but they may also be overestimated; the family possesses a sentimental sanctity; but its defects must be frankly admitted; the "higher qualities" are not the monopoly of "heads of families."

Special chapters are devoted to the children and the aged. Children are now provided for in many ways. Mrs. Bosanquet examines and classifies the legislation for children under three headings: "Industrial, limiting the hours and time of work in specific places; Educational, providing instruction of various kinds and com-

Digitized by Google

pelling attendance at school; Protective, punishing cruelty and neglect on the part of those responsible for the care of children." After describing the various institutions provided for the community, such as Day Industrial Schools and Poor Law Schools which supplement or limit the activities of the family, Mrs. Bosanquet very properly emphasizes the fact that "their proper use is to supplement and not to supersede the family." The aged naturally make us think of Old Age Pensions. This part of the book is not altogether satisfactory; but the case against pensions is powerfully argued. The substance of the argument is given in the following words: "Here then is the answer to the question why we should not add State pensions to other forms of provision for old age. We cannot simply add State pensions to other forms of provision, because their inevitable tendency would be to kill out all other forms. The methods of independence and those of dependence cannot exist side by side; we have to choose between them. And it is because the methods of independence bring with them strength and hopes of progress which have no connection with the methods of dependence, that we should declare for the former regardless of the temporary unpopularity of such a view." But it is so certain that a prospect of five shillings a week at the age of sixty-five would deter a person from belonging to a Friendly Society? That is the crux; is it possible to prophesy with certainty?

Trade Unionism and modern Colonial labor legislation raise many difficult and interesting questions. The good and bad side of Trade Unionism has been so much to the fore of late that it might seem otiose to deal with the matter, were it not that there still seems to remain in the minds of many people a feeeling that Trade Unions are on the whole good and, therefore, their policy must be good in all respects. The plain fact is that in England some Trade Unions are too powerful, and can succeed, on the one hand, in preventing employers from using the latest machinery and, on the other hand, from teaching unskilled laborers to do certain parts of the work. The unskilled and less efficient workman has few greater foes than Trade Unions. Recent labor legislation in the Colonies has been advertised with deliberate persistency. Mrs. Bosanquet's criticisms are just, but time is needed to test the actual workings of the Victorian Wages Boards. It can hardly be said that up to the present they have been completely successful.

Without question this book should have an important and most useful effect in stopping illjudged or positively pernicious philan-

Digitized by Google

thropy. It is written with knowledge and intelligence; but it unfortunately has a slightly patronizing tone, as of (say) a Bishop's wife lecturing the Curates. This is a hard saying, but it is well to say it because some people, especially those who should benefit most by this book, are liable to dislike its tone. It may be that I have been overcritical in noticing this point, but it is so important that careful and thoughtful books like the present should be properly read and appreciated by all lovers of mankind, that a slight defect of this kind may greatly impair the general usefulness of the book, which must be most cordially recommended.

C. P. SANGER.

LONDON.

THE SOCIAL UNREST. Studies in Labor and Socialist Movements. By John Graham Brooks. New York and London: Macmillan Company. 1903. Pp. 394.

This is an altogether sane and timely contribution to the literature of the social problem. The theme is one to which the author has devoted many years of careful and painstaking investigation, so that there is probably no other American so well equipped for the task which Mr. Brooks has here set for himself. His keen sympathy with the wage-earner is manifest on every page and yet he has, for the most part, preserved an entirely fair and judicial attitude as well in the presentation of the facts as in the summing up of the evidence. Mr. Brooks' main thesis seems to be the contention that every failure of a strike; every defeat of a labor organization only serves to swell the ranks of socialism. In a word it is here held that society must choose between the radical program of the doctrinaire socialist and the more conservative program of the labor unions.

Attention is also called to the marked change in the attitude of the employing class towards organized labor which the last few decades has brought about. In the not remote past employers insisted on dealing directly with the individual workman; later they were persuaded to treat with a committee of their own employes; under still further pressure they consented to hear a committee of workmen of that particular trade, and finally we find them agreeing to treat with anyone representing their employes, as attorney in fact.

This right of collective bargaining, though not universally rec-

Digitized by Google

ognized, has yet gained sufficient recognition to justify the belief that the precedent has been securely established. This brings us to the coming problem in the evolution of labor unions, Can they or should they be made legally responsible for their acts? Many labor leaders, fearing the adverse action of courts that are in close touch and sympathy with the employing class, are disposed to fight shy of all attempts to fix legal responsibility upon their organizations. Some of their oldest and best friends, like Frederick Harrison in the Taft-vale case, believe that any such liability would mean the destruction of all combinations of labor. Mr. Brooks does not go so far as this; he admits that incorporation or some form of legal responsibility will come in time but that it cannot be realized now or for some time to come, and this because of the fact that the labor leaders are opposed to it. The wisdom of this opposition on the part of the labor leaders may well be called into question. That it would increase some of the practical difficulties of such organizations is undoubtedly true, but it is just as true that it would aid them in other ways. However, that is a long chapter. What here interests us is Mr. Brooks' contention that the legal responsibility of the labor unions cannot be established either now or in the near future, because forsooth the labor leaders are opposed to it.

First, as to the question of fact. Is it true that all labor leaders are opposed to legal responsibility? I think it would be difficult to establish this as a general proposition. Clarence S. Darrow and John Mitchell have recently declaimed in rather intemperate and ill-advised terms against incorporation, but the fact remains that some unions have already accepted incorporation, and in several instances this legal responsibility dates back a number of years. Under such circumstances it rests upon the opponents of incorporation to show that this has worked injury to their organization. But after all, is this a question that will be settled by the labor leaders alone? The trust leaders have been just as bitterly opposed to any control or restriction of their affairs by the government, and yet we have gone ahead and enacted legislation, which, if effective, will very seriously interfere with their conduct of what they are pleased to call their own private business, and the ground upon which this interference is based is their monopoly control of an industry. So too the monopoly control exercised by labor unions will be the ground upon which society will insist upon its right to exercise some legal control of these organizations; and

Digitized by Google

this without any more regard for the wishes of the leaders of these organizations, than it has displayed for the wishes of trust magnates.

Collective bargaining and collective responsibility cannot long be divorced. If labor leaders refuse to incorporate, then some other means will certainly be found for fixing legal responsibility upon the unions. Government by injunction calls forth the most vigorous protest from labor leaders. It is undoubtedly a device fraught with the gravest dangers to constitutional liberty, but is not recourse to it the natural and necessary result of their refusal to assume collective responsibility under incorporation? Again one does not need to be a prophet or the son of a prophet to see that this failure to assume collective responsibility is likely to result in a revival of those conspiracy laws that have long remained as dead letters upon the statute books.

If labor leaders were always wise in their management of the affairs of their organizations, society would not be constrained to interfere; but have we any more reason to expect this unfailing wisdom on the part of labor leaders, than on the part of those in control of our trusts? The latter, in the early days of the coal strike, were given to declaring that the conduct of their mining interests was their own private business; but he is a Bourbon of the Bourbons among them who now fails to recognize the untenableness of this position. In any event society at large has insisted upon its interest and right to interfere in this matter. It is strange, to say the least, that such capable and broad gauged men as Mr. Darrow and Mr. Mitchell should have been betrayed unto an equally untenable and arrogant attitude in regard to the affairs of their labor unions. One has declared and the other has approved the declaration that it is little short of impudence for anyone to suggest that labor unions should be incorporated. How they manage their affairs is their own private business and no one outside of the organization has a right to interfere even by suggestion. And yet how they declaimed, and rightly, against this same arrogant atttitude on the part of the operators. So long as a man runs an isolated corner grocery, or the individual miner bargains for his wages, society is not apt to take much interest in the transaction, and so allows each to think that the matter is his own private business. But when the corner grocery becomes part of a great trust and the miner avails himself of the monopoly control and advantage that comes from collective bargaining, society at

Digitized by Google

large begins to take notice and is apt to insist that it too has some interest in both transactions.

It is long since it was written "pride goeth before a fall." Let the labor leaders persist in this opposition to incorporation on the ground that no one has any right to interfere in their affairs even by suggestion, and society will be compelled to find other devices by which to restrict and control these organizations—devices that may prove far more harmful to these organizations than incorporation, and far more dangerous to the development of those democratic ideals which it is the mission of trade unions to foster and develop.

The author calls attention to the fact that the experience of the Belgian labor unions in the conduct of their large co-operative enterprises has done much to disabuse their minds of doctrinaire socialism. The practical difficulties which they have encountered has led them to a saner and more temperate view of the whole problem of modern industrialism. This indeed is one of the most hopeful signs of the time. For the sake of a like sobering influence upon some of our more radical labor leaders it is to be hoped that co-operative enterprises of considerable magnitude may be developed at an early date in this country.

In conclusion, it should be said that Mr. Brooks has given us an admirable discussion of a pressing problem. It is a book that should be read by everyone desiring to keep in touch with the great industrial and social problem of the time.

C. W. MACFARLANE.

PHILADELPHIA.

NATIONAL EDUCATION. Essays towards a Constructive Policy. By Prof. H. E. Armstrong, H. W. Eve, Sir Joshua Fitch, Prof. W. A. Hewins, John C. Medd, T. A. Organ, A. D. Provand, Rev. B. Reynolds, Francis Stoves, and the Editor, Laurie Magnus, M. A., Magdalen College, Oxford. London: John Murray, 1902.

This book is mainly a plea for a directly utilitarian aim in education, and for further state organization of the means of education.

The Editor maintains that there is a growing consciousness of the need for some sort of education which shall be the same for all classes and which shall obliterate the distinction between pri-

Digitized by Google

mary, secondary and university education. "The reform," he says, "in education, when it is consummated, will be the result of a levelling up as well as a levelling down. The methods of teaching will be liberalized and humanized for the city clerk, and the subjects taught will be selected with a view to the practical needs of pupils in the so-called public schools." Again, he says, "the problem of studies is to be determined, in part, at least, by the vital needs of the nation and of the empire, and the imperialism of the school room has brought with it the wholesome resolve to set the education of young England in some kind of relation with the future occupation of the pupils."

In the essays contributed by Mr. Provand and Mr. Organ on Industrial Needs, and on Secondary Commercial Education similar views are expressed. Mr. Provand says, "It is, I fear, hopeless to expect English Universities and Public Schools to become fully alive to modern educational interests. . . . Still it is not too late to reform our methods of teaching. Scientific and commercial education in all countries, including Germany and the United States, has only recently been introduced."

Mr. Hewins describes the sort of education he considers necessary for men of university standing to fit them for the higher posts in commerce. "The object of a system of higher commercial education is to train a body of students who at the end of their course shall (1) have mastered the subjects which bear upon their calling, and (2) be so equipped that they can rapidly and efficiently make good use of their practical experience, and (3) have their minds open and alert to the larger issues of their business, and its relation to the commercial life of the community. It follows at once that in constructing the syllabus of training we must keep in view the needs of particular callings."

It would not, however, be fair to imply that all, if any of the writers in this book, demand a solely utilitarian education. With a view to giving a certain amount of culture in addition to useful attainments the editor would have English literature and modern languages taught in all schools. He includes in his collection of essays an excellent paper by Mr. H. W. Eve on the teaching of modern languages. The Rev. Barnard Reynolds, the author of an essay on Church Schools and Religious Education, maintains that religion should be taught to children whether or not we believe it to be true, for, he says, "it professes to embrace interests of the highest moment, interests which, presuming they are true,

Digitized by Google

cannot be neglected without depriving the children of what concerns their welfare in a way that no other interests can possibly concern them. Even if religion is not true, there has not been discovered any system intelligible to children which has anything like the power that religious education possesses to impress those virtues of honesty, cleanliness, chivalry and patriotism, the possession or non-possession of which makes all the difference whether they will be useful members of the State or not and whether the nation to which they belong will march abreast of or behind other nations."

Mr. Henry Armstrong, in his paper, "Science in Education," makes an eloquent appeal for the teaching of science in schools, not so much for the sake of its utilitarian as of its disciplinary value. Sir Joshua Fitch and Mr. Stoves deal respectively with the inspection of Secondary Schools and with the Training and Registration of Teachers, and make no distinct reference to the aim of education. Both writers are in favor of further State regulation of Secondary Schools.

In spite of the fact that these essays contain interesting facts and fruitful suggestions, and that some of them, written as they are by authorities on the subject, are of considerable value, yet the general impression the book leaves is one of incompleteness and want of thoroughness.

Mr. Laurie Magnus, in his introduction, says: "The common purpose of the following essays is not merely expository, but constructive. Their object is not fulfilled by explaining how and what English boys and girls are taught. They aim further at indicating the defects in system and in method and at helping to build up a scheme of organization rigid enough at its centre to radiate an enlightened policy without waste or fluctuation (sic) and wide enough in its circumference to include and to provide for all the educational needs which modern life has come to recognize." But this purpose is by no means fulfilled. In none of the essays do we find any searching criticism of existing ideals in education nor any thought out determination of what these ideals ought to be. Even these writers who have stated a utilitarian aim seem to have adopted it without clearly considering their reasons for doing so. The Rev. Barnard Reynolds and Prof. Armstrong, who would claim a more disinterested view, speak of "marching abreast of other nations" and of "keeping pace with others" as if they too really believed commercial prosperity to be the only thing of genu-

Digitized by Google

ine worth. Nor again is there any one constructive policy put forth in the book. Each writer calls for something to be done in his own special branch of education, but does this not bring us much further out of the general "Education Muddle?"

Again it is difficult to see on what principle these essays are selected. They do not touch on all important subjects in the field of Education, nor do they deal adequately with any one. For instance, the vexed question of the relation of the Church to the Schools and of the place of relgion in education is dealt with in a merely polemical spirit and by an author who is dominated by ecclesiastical bias and party feeling. In short, we are left after reading these essays with a number of unanswered problems and a sense that the most serious difficulties have been barely touched upon.

It is particularly important that writers on education should avoid the faults of want of thoroughness and superficiality which are so commonly found in the treatment of this subject.

The clamor for more technical and commercial education seems to be generally actuated by this same superficiality of outlook, and there seems to be a grave danger of its producing like superficial results. What is needed above all things is to make people think. Given a nation of men and women who can think hard and industriously search for truth and surely all subsidiary aims of education will be fulfilled. "Seek ye first the Kingdom of Heaven and all these things will be added unto you." How to make people think and to care about truth is the real difficulty in education and one which ought to be dealt with earnestly by all teachers.

A. D. Sanger.

London.

Principles of Western Civilization. By Benjamin Kidd. London; Macmillan & Co. Pp. 518.

A writer who attempts to give a theory of civilization in Europe and America sets himself a task involving an encyclopædic knowledge. It is not only questionable whether any living person has that knowledge; it may be also doubted whether Mr. Kidd's method is a right one. According to Mr. Kidd there cannot be a true science of human life and progress apart by itself. "There cannot be, we must understand, such a science regarded

Digitized by Google

as an isolated section of knowledge; or in any other sense than as a department of higher biology" (p. 31). But can the view of the history of the world as the realization of a moral purpose throughout the ages be established as an empirical induction from the facts of history? The problem is so vast that any induction from historical facts within our knowledge may not give us the slightest rational presumption in favor of any particular solution. The interpretation of history is a problem for philosophy, the solution of which will depend upon a philosophical theory of knowledge and morality. In short, evolution itself needs to be explained.

Apart from any such preliminary objection as the above, it cannot be said that Mr. Kidd has anything new and true to tell us. His whole book is devoted to the demonstration of "the profound antinomy" between the interests of the present and the future. "We begin to see that in so ultimate and fundamental a matter as the average duration of life in the individual, the determining and controlling end, towards which Natural Selection has operated, must have been, not simply the benefit of the individual, nor even of his contemporaries, in a mere struggle for existence in the present, but a larger advantage, probably always far in the future, to which the individual and the present alike were subordinated. This extended view taken of the operation of the law of Natural Selection, and the consequent shifting into a region no longer bounded by the conception of advantage to existing individuals of the end towards which Natural Selection works, marks the departure we are considering" (pp. 48-9). This is Mr. Kidd's "great antinomy." It is the ascendency of the future over the present. Mr. Kidd hails this as a great discovery. But when stripped of its setting in a rich vocabulary of adjectives, it seems to mean nothing more than the old conflict between egoism and altruism, a question as old as that of free will. It is in Weismann's theory of Natural Selection that Mr. Kidd finds revealed this antinomy between the interests of the present generation and the interests of future unborn generations. Mr. Kidd seems to assume, rather than to prove, that Natural Selection is the only factor in the process of evolution. What of the dissent from Weismannism which we find in such writers as Mr. Spencer, not to mention Mr. A. Russell Wallace and others? Mr. Kidd is contemptuous of Mr. Spencer. "Of that deeper conception of human progress as an integrating social process, of which all the principles are in the last resort


Digitized by Google

controlled by the fact that the present is in reality not so much related to the past as passing out under the control of the future, there is to be distinguished no grasp in Mr. Spencer's writings" (p. 83). Mr. Kidd's contempt is not confined to Mr. Spencer. Mr. Huxley's famous Romanes Lecture makes an "entirely superficial" distinction between "the cosmic process and the ethical process" (p. 31). As the evolutionist "rises from the study of Mill's writings, the superficiality of the whole system of ideas represented profoundly impresses his mind" (p. 77). "The comparisons which Grote instituted between ancient and modern Democracy—the ideas involved in which may be traced through the phase of thought represented in the modern utilitarian movement—are entirely superficial" (p. 191). We read also of "that notorious theory of population propounded by Malthus—socially suicidal, and biologically foolish" (p. 411). But it is unnecessary to detail further instances of Mr. Kidd's contempt for other thinkers, a contempt which is displayed throughout the whole book. Contemptuous epithets are not arguments.

Taking for granted the truth of Weismannism—a rather large assumption with which to begin a system of evolutionary philosophy—and apparently oblivious of the difference that must exist between human and pre-human evolution and which is all the difference between man and the lower animals, Mr. Kidd, with that love of broad generalization which leads people so often away from fact, divides the evolution of human society into two stages. "In the first epoch of social development the characteristic and ruling feature is the supremacy of the causes which are contributing to social efficiency by subordinating the individual merely to the existing political organization" (p. 140). The Greek and Roman civilization was, according to Mr. Kidd, organized in the interests of the present in the ancient world. This is hardly a correct representation of the Greek or Roman State. It is no doubt true, as we find in Plato, that the individual was subordinated to the state of which he was a member. The state was regarded as everything. But this subordination is not the subordination of the future to the present. Indeed it is the very reverse. The state was a corporation which had an immortal existence; and in identifying himself with his state, the Greek citizen was realizing himself as an active member of the corporate whole, the interests of which necessarily extended into the distant future. But characteristic as this identification of the indi-

Digitized by Google

vidual and the state was of Greek thought and life, one must not forget the cosmopolitanism of the Stoics. One formula will not express the tendency of an epoch in social history, or, if it does, it will do it badly.

"In the second epoch of human society we begin to be concerned with the rise to ascendency of the ruling causes, which contribute to a higher type of social efficiency by subordinating society itself with all its interests in the present to its own future" (p. 142). In the sudden development of Christianity Mr. Kidd finds a challenge of the ascendency of the present. He traces "the development of the great antinomy" through the breaking up of the old Greek and Roman world, and through the Middle Ages down to the present time. This is perhaps the more interesting part of his book. But though it shows wide reading on Mr. Kidd's part and even suggestiveness of thought, one parts from the book with disappointment. The fact is that Mr. Kidd misconceives the ideas of Christianity. The future with which Christianity deals, is not so much the future of this world as that future beyond death in which time shall be no more. In this way it also insists upon the importance of the present as partaking of the Infinite. We must remember that the Kingdom of God is within us. It has been indicated above that Mr. Kidd's "great antinomy" amounts to nothing more than the old conflict betwixt altruism and egoism. But to speak strictly it seems to have no less than three different meanings: (1) At the outset of the book, and indeed throughout the greater part of it, it means the conflict between the interests of the present generation and the interests of future unborn generations. (2) But in discussing ancient society Mr. Kidd confuses this conflict with that between the individual and the state. (3) Lastly he identifies the future with the Infinite in his account of Christianity. Such an Infinite is the mere endlessness, the going on forever, against which Hegel uttered such a strong protest. This may be a mistaken interpretation of Mr. Kidd's words. But he constantly uses phrases into which it is very difficult to put an exact meaning. This book is however the first volume of a system of evolutionary philosophy. So in another or others Mr. Kidd may tell us what exactly the principle of "projected efficiency" is when interpreted in terms of human life. He has hitherto left the reader in the dark.

W. F. TROTTER.

EDINBURGH.

Digitized by Google

BOOKS RECEIVED.

A Study in the Psychology of Ethics. By David Irons, M. A. (St. Andrews) Ph. D. (Cornell), Associate Professor of Bryn Mawr College. Edinburgh and London: William Blackwood & Sons. 1903. Pp. vii, 176.

Pure Sociology: A Treatise on the Origin and Spontaneous Development of Society. By Lester F. Ward. New York: The Macmillan Company. London: Macmillan & Co., Ltd. 1903. Pp. xii, 607.

The Social Unrest: Studies in Labor and Socialist Movements. By John Graham Brooks. New York and London: The Macmillan Company. 1903. Pp. 394.

Heredity and Social Progress. By Simon N. Patten, Wharton School of Finance and Economy, University of Pennsylvania. New York: The Macmillan Company. London: Macmillan & Co., Ltd. 1903. Pp. vii, 214.

Constructive and Preventive Philanthropy. By Joseph Lee, Vice-President of the Massachusetts Civic League. With an introduction by Jacob A. Riis. New York: The Macmillan Company. London: Macmillan & Co., Ltd. 1902. Pp. xii, 242.

The Psychological Elements of Religious Faith. Lectures by Charles Carroll Everett, D. D., LL. D., late Bussey Professor of Theology in Harvard University. Edited by Edward Hale. New York and London: The Macmillan Company. 1902. Pp. xiii, 215.

Fragments in Philosophy and Science: Being Collected Essays and Addresses. By James Mark Baldwin, Ph. D., Princeton, Hon. D. Sc., Oxon, LL. D., Glasgow, Stuart Professor in Princeton University. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons. 1902. Pp. xii, 389.

Dictionary of Philosophy and Psychology. Written by Many Hands and Edited by James Mark Baldwin, Ph. D. (Princeton), Hon. D. Sc. (Oxon), Hon. LL. D. (Glasgow), Stuart Professor in Princeton University. In Three Volumes. Vol. II. New York: The Macmillan Co. London: Macmillan & Co., Ltd., 1902. Pp. xvi., 892. 21s. net.

Democracy and the Organization of Political Parties. By M. Ostrogorski. In two Volumes. Translated from the French by Frederick Clarke, M. A., formerly Taylorian Scholar in the University of Oxford. With a Preface by Right Hon. James Bryce, M. P. London: Macmillan & Co., Ltd. New York: The Macmillan Co., 1902. Pp. lviii., 627; xliii., 793. 25s. net.

The Origin of the Knowledge of Right and Wrong. By Franz Brentano. English Translation by Cecil Hague, formerly Lector at Prague University. With a Biographical Note. Westminster: A. Constable & Co., Ltd., 1902. Pp. xiv., 125. 5s. net.

Man's Place in the Cosmos and Other Essays. By A. Seth Pringle-Pattison, LL. D., Professor of Logic and Metaphysics in the University of Edinburgh. Second Edition. Revised and Enlarged. Edinburgh and London: W. Blackwood & Sons, 1902. Pp. viii., 319. 6s. net.

The Origin and Propagation of Sin: Being the Hulsean Lectures Delivered before the University of Cambridge in 1901-2. By F. R. Tennant, M. A. (Camb.), B. Sc. (Lond.), Student of Gonville and Caius College,

Digitized by Google

Cambridge. Cambridge: The University Press, 1902. Pp. xv., 231. 3s. 6d. net.

THE MAKING OF CITIZENS: A Study in Comparative Education. By R. E. Hughes, M. A. (Oxon.), B. Sc. (Lond.), (The Contemporary Science Series, Edited by Havelock Ellis). London and Newcastle-on-Tyne: The Walter Scott Publishing Co., Ltd., 1902. Pp., 405. 6s.

THE GOSPEL OF WORK: Four Lectures on Christian Ethics. By W. Cunningham, D. D., Fellow of Trinity College, and Vicar of Great St. Mary's, Cambridge. Cambridge: At The University Press, 1902. Pp. xiv., 144. 2s. net.

POVERTY: A Study of Town Life. By B. Seebohm Rowntree. Fourth Edition. London: Macmillan & Co., Ltd. New York: The Macmillan Co., 1902. Pp. xxi, 426. 2s. 6d. net. [A notice of the First Edition appeared in the JOURNAL for October, 1902. In the Second Edition, which this one reproduces, a little additional matter was added, particularly some information regarding the number of persons "in poverty" who would be relieved by a scheme of Old Age Pensions.]

A HISTORY OF THE PROBLEMS OF PHILOSOPHY. By Paul Janet, Membre de l'Institut, Professeur á la Faculté des Lettres de Paris, and Gabriel Séailles, Docteur ès Lettres, Maitre de Conférences à la Faculté des Lettres de Paris. Translated by Ada Monahan. Edited by Henry Jones, LL. D., Professor of Moral Philosophy in the University of Glasgow. Vol. I: Psychology. Vol. II.: Ethics, Metaphysics, Theodicy. London: Macmillan & Co., Ltd. New York: The Macmillan Co., 1902. Pp. xxvii., 389; xiii., 375. 10s. net.

STUDIES IN THE CARTESIAN PHILOSOPHY. By Norman Smith, M. A., Lecturer at Queen Margaret College, and Assistant to the Professor of Logic in the University of Glasgow. London: Macmillan & Co., Ltd. New York: The Macmillan Co., 1902. Pp. xiv., 276. 5s. net.

REASON AND REVELATION: An Essay in Christian Apology. By J. R. Illingworth, M. A., D. D. London: Macmillan & Co., Ltd. New York: The Macmillan Co., 1902. Pp. xix., 271. 7s. 6d.

THE MIND OF MAN: A Text-Book of Psychology. By Gustav Spiller. London: Swan Sonnenschein & Co., Lim. New York: The Macmillan Co., 1902.

PROPHETIC IDEAS AND IDEALS: A Series of Short Studies in the Prophetic Literature of the Hebrew People. By W. G. Jordan, B. A., D. D. Chicago, New York, Toronto, London and Edinburgh: Fleming H. Revell Company. 1902. Pp. 363.

OPTIMISM AND PESSIMISM IN THE OLD AND NEW TESTAMENT. By Adolph Guttmacher, Ph. D. Baltimore: The Friedenwald Company. 1903. Pp. 255.

PSYCHOPATHOLOGICAL RESEARCHES: Studies in Mental Dissociation, With Text Figures and Ten Plates. By Boris Sidis, M. A., Ph. D. New York: G. E. Stechert. 1902. Pp. xxii, 329.

PAPERS, ADDRESSES AND DISCUSSIONS, at the Twenty-first Church Congress in the United States, held at Albany, N. Y., October 14-17, 1902. New York: Thomas Whittaker, 3 Bible House. Pp. 216.

Digitized by Google

SWORDS AND PLOWSHARES. By Ernest Crosby. New York: Funk & Wagnalls Company. 1902. Pp. 126.

ETHICAL HYMN BOOK. Third and enlarged edition of "Ethical Songs." Compiled and edited for the Union of Ethical Societies. 313 Hymns, 12 Canticles. London: Swan Sonnenschein & Co., Ltd. 1903.

THE SOCIAL REVOLUTION. By Karl Kautsky. Translated by A. M. and May Wood Simons. Chicago: Charles H. Kerr & Company. 1903. Pp. 189.

THE LAST WORDS (Real and Traditional) OF DISTINGUISHED MEN AND WOMEN. Collected from various sources by Frederick Rowland Marvin. New York, Chicago and Toronto: Fleming H. Revell Co. 1902. Pp. 334.

L'ETICA EVOLUZIONISTA: Studio sulla Filosofia Morale di Herbert Spencer. Di Guglielmo Salvadori. Torino: Fratelli Bocca Editori. 1903. Pp. xv, 476.

AUSGEWAEHLTE BEITRAEGE zur KINDERPSYCHOLOGIE UND PAEDAGOGIK. Von Dr. G. Stanley Hall, Mit Erlaubis des Verfassers aus dem Englishchen ubersetzt, von Dr. Joseph Stimpfl. Altenberg: Druck und Verlag von Oskar Bonde. 1902. Pp. 454.

MONDE SENSIBLE: Essai de Synthèse Philosophique. Par Henry Lagrèsille. Paris: Librairie Fischbacher. 1902. Pp. 580.

DIE RELIGION BABYLONIENS UND ASSYRIENS. Von Morris Jastrow, Jr., Professor of Semitic Languages in the University of Pennsylvania. Geissen: J. Ricker'sche Verlagsbuchhandlung. 1902. Pp. v, 80.

LA TEORIA DELLA CONOSCENZA; come induzione sociologica E L'esigenza Critica del Positivismo. Di Icilio Vanni. Roma: Presso la "Rivista Italiana di Sociologia." Pp. 54.

LA FRATELLANZA: Fondamento Dell 'Evoluzione Sociale. Di Pier Nicola Gregoraci. Napoli: Tipografia Melfi & Joele. 1902. Pp. 23.

IL PENTIMENTO E LA MORALE ASCETICA. Di Zino Zini. Torino: Fratelli Bocca, Editori. 1902. Pp. xii, 232.

ZEDEKUNDE. By G. H. Lamers. Vyfde Stuk: Tweede Deel: Erste Afdeeling. Materieel Deel.—Individueel Gedeelte. Groningen: J. B. Wolters, 1902. Pp. 357-420.

IL DOMINIO DELLO SPIRITO: Ossia Il Problema della Personalita e Il Diritto all' Orgoglio. By Giavanni Marchesini. Torino: Fratelli Bocca, 1902. Pp. viii., 285.

BOLLETTINO DELLA LEGA PER LA MORALITA PUBLICA. Anno 7.—NO. 11. Novembre, 1902. Torino: Via Accademia Albertina, 3. Pp. 41-44.

THE HIBBERT JOURNAL: A Quarterly Review of Religion, Theology and Philosophy. Vol. I., No. 1. October, 1902. London and Oxford: Williams & Norgate. Pp. 208.

Articles by writers in Great Britain should be sent to
Prof. J. S. Mackenzie, 7 Richmond Terrace, Cardiff, Wales.
Books to be reviewed, published in Great Britain, should be sent to
G. E. Moore, M. A., Trinity College, Cambridge, England.

Digitized by Google

INTERNATIONAL

JOURNAL OF ETHICS.

JULY, 1903.

OXFORD UNION SOCIETY

EMERSON—THE PHILOSOPHER OF DEMOCRACY.*

It is said that Emerson is not a philosopher. I find this denegation false or true according as it is said in blame or praise—according to the reasons proffered. When the critic writes of lack of method, of the absence of continuity, of coherent logic, and, with the old story of the string of pearls loosely strung, puts Emerson away as a writer of maxims and proverbs, a recorder of brilliant insights and abrupt aphorisms, the critic, to my mind, but writes down his own incapacity to follow a logic that is finely wrought. "We want in every man a long logic; we cannot pardon the absence of it, but it must not be spoken. Logic is the procession or proportionate unfolding of the intuition; but its virtue is as silent method; the moment it would appear as propositions and have a separate value, it is worthless." Emerson fulfills his own requisition. The critic needs the method separately propounded, and not finding his wonted leading-string is all lost. Again, says Emerson, "There is no compliment like the addressing to the human being thoughts out of certain heights and presupposing his intelligence"—a compliment which Emerson's critics have mostly hastened to avert. But to make this short, I am not acquainted with any writer, no matter how assured his position in treatises upon the history

*A paper read at the Emerson Memorial Meeting, the University of Chicago, May 25, 1903.

Digitized by Google

of philosophy, whose movement of thought is more compact and unified, nor one who combines more adequately diversity of intellectual attack with concentration of form and effect. I recently read a letter from a gentleman, himself a distinguished writer of philosophy, in which he remarked that philosophers are a stupid class, since they want every reason carefully pointed out and labelled, and are incapable of taking anything for granted. The condescending patronage by literary critics of Emerson's lack of cohesiveness may remind us that philosophers have no monopoly of this particular form of stupidity.

Perhaps those are nearer right, however, who deny that Emerson is a philosopher, because he is more than a philosopher. He would work, he says, by art, not by metaphysics, finding truth "in the sonnet and the play." "I am," to quote him again, "in all my theories, ethics and politics, a poet;" and we may, I think, safely take his word for it that he meant to be a maker rather than a reflector. His own preference was to be ranked with the seers rather than with the reasoners of the race, for he says, "I think that philosophy is still rude and elementary; it will one day be taught by poets. The poet is in the right attitude; he is believing; the philosopher, after some struggle, having only reasons for believing." Nor do I regard it as impertinent to place by the side of this utterance, that other in which he said "We have yet to learn that the thing uttered in words is not therefore affirmed. It must affirm itself or no forms of grammar and no plausibility can give it evidence and no array of arguments." To Emerson, perception was more potent than reasoning; the deliverances of intercourse more to be desired than the chains of discourse; the surprise of reception more demonstrative than the conclusions of intentional proof. As he said "Good as is discourse, silence is better, and shames it. The length of discourse indicates the distance of thought betwixt the speaker and the hearer." And again, "If I speak, I define and confine, and am less." "Silence is a solvent that destroys personality and give us leave to be great and universal."

Digitized by Google

I would not make hard and fast lines between philosopher and poet, yet there is some distinction of accent in thought and of rhythm in speech. The desire for an articulate, not for silent, logic is intrinsic with philosophy. The unfolding of the perception must be stated, not merely followed and understood. Such conscious method is, one might say, the only thing of ultimate concern to the abstract thinker. Not thought, but reasoned thought, not things, but the ways of things, interest him; not even truth, but the paths by which truth is sought. He construes elaborately the symbols of thinking. He is given over to manufacturing and sharpening the weapons of the spirit. Outcomes, interpretations, victories, are indifferent. Otherwise is it with art. That, as Emerson says, is "the path of the Creator to his work;" and again "a habitual respect to the whole by an eye loving beauty in detail." Affection is towards the meaning of the symbol, not to its constitution. Only as he wields them, does the artist forge the sword and buckler of the spirit. His affair is to uncover rather than to analyze; to discern rather than to classify. He reads but does not compose.

One, however, has no sooner drawn such lines than one is ashamed and begins to retract. Euripides and Plato, Dante and Bruno, Bacon and Milton, Spinoza and Goethe, rise in rebuke. The spirit of Emerson rises to protest against exaggerating his ultimate value by trying to place him upon a plane of art higher than a philosophic platform. Literary critics admit his philosophy and deny his literature. And if philosophers extol his keen, calm art and speak with some depreciation of his metaphysic, it also is perhaps because Emerson knew something deeper than our conventional definitions. It is indeed true that reflective thinkers have taken the way to truth for their truth; the method of life for the conduct of life—in short, have taken means for end. But it is also assured that in the completeness of their devotion, they have expiated their transgression; means become identified with end, thought turns to life, and wisdom is justified not of herself but of her children. Language justly preserves the difference between philosopher and sophist. It is no

Digitized by Google

more possible to eliminate love and generation from the definition of the thinker than it is thought and limits from the conception of the artist. It is interest, concern, caring, which makes the one as it makes the other. It is significant irony that the old quarrel of philosopher and poet was brought off by one who united in himself more than has another individual the qualities of both artist and metaphysician. At bottom the quarrel is not one of objectives nor yet of methods, but of the affections. And in the divisions of love, there always abides the unity of him who loves. Because Plato was so great he was divided in his affections. A lesser man could not brook that torn love, because of which he set poet and philosopher over against one another. Looked at in the open, our fences between literature and metaphysics appear petty—signs of an attempt to affix the legalities and formularies of property to the things of the spirit. If ever there lived not only a metaphysician but a professor of metaphysics it was Imanuel Kant. Yet he declares that he should account himself more unworthy than the day laborer in the field if he did not believe that somehow, even in his technical classifications and remote distinctions, he too, was carrying forward the struggle of humanity for freedom—that is for illumination.

And for Emerson of all others, there is a one-sidedness and exaggeration, which he would have been the first to scorn, in exalting overmuch his creative substance at the expense of his reflective procedure. He says in effect somewhere that the individual man is only a method, a plan of arrangement. The saying is amply descriptive of Emerson. His idealism is the faith of the thinker in his thought raised to its *nth* power. "History," he says, "and the state of the world at any one time is directly dependent on the intellectual classification then existing in the minds of men." Again, "Beware when the great God lets loose a thinker on this planet. Then all things are at risk. The very hopes of man, the thoughts of his heart, the religion of nations, the manner and morals of mankind are all at the mercy of a new generalization." And again, "Everything looks permanent until its

Digitized by Google

secret is known. Nature looks provokingly stable and secular, but it has a cause like all the rest; and when once I comprehend that, will these fields stretch so immovably wide, these leaves hang so individually considerable?" And finally, "In history an idea always overhangs like a moon and rules the tide which rises simultaneously in all the souls of a generation." There are times, indeed, when one is inclined to regard Emerson's whole work as a hymn to intelligence, a paean to the all-creating, all-disturbing power of thought.

And so, with an expiatory offering to the Manes of Emerson, one may proceed to characterize his thought, his method, yea, even his system. I find it in the fact that he takes the distinctions and classifications which to most philosophers are true in and of and because of their systems, and makes them true of life, of the common experience of the everyday man. To take his own words for it, "There are degrees in idealism. We learn first to play with it academically, as the magnet was once a toy. Then we see. in the hey-day of youth and poetry, that it may be true, that it is true in gleams and fragments. Then, its countenance waxes stern and grand, and we see that it must be true. It now shows itself ethical and practical." The idealism which is a thing of the academic intellect to the professor, a hope to the generous youth, an inspiration to the genial projector, is to Emerson a narrowly accurate description of the facts of the most real world in which all earn their living.

Such reference to the immediate life is the text by which he tries every philosopher. "Each new mind we approach seems to require," he says, "an abdication of all our past and present possessions. A new doctrine seems at first a subversion of all our opinions, tastes and manner of living." But while one gives himself "up unreservedly to that which draws him, because that is his own, he is to refuse himself to that which draws him not, because it is not his own. I were a fool not to sacrifice a thousand Aeschyluses to my intellectual integrity. Especially take the same ground in regard to abstract truth, the science of the mind. The Bacon, the Spinoza, the Hume, Schelling, Kant, is only a more or less

Digitized by Google

awkward translator of things in your consciousness. Say, then, instead of too timidly poring into his obscure sense, that he has not succeeded in rendering back to you your consciousness. Anyhow, when at last, it is done, you will find it is not recondite, but a simple, natural state which the writer restores to you." And again, take this other saying, "Aristotle or Bacon or Kant propound some maxim which is the key-note of philosophy thenceforward, but I am more interested to know that when at last they have hurled out their grand word, it is only some familiar experience of every man on the street." I fancy he reads the so-called eclecticism of Emerson wrongly who does not see that it is reduction of all the philosophers of the race, even the prophets like Plato and Proclus whom Emerson holds most dear, to the test of trial by the service rendered the present and immediate experience. As for those who contemn Emerson for superficial pedantry because of the strings of names he is wont to flash like beads before our eyes, they but voice their own pedantry, not seeing, in their literalness, that all such things are with Emerson symbols of various uses administered to the common soul.

As Emerson treated the philosophers, so he treats their doctrines. The Platonist teaches the immanence of absolute ideas in the World and in Man, that every thing and every man participates in an absolute Meaning, individualized in him and through which one has community with others. Yet by the time this truth of the universe has become proper and fit for teaching, it has somehow become a truth of philosophy, a truth of private interpretation, reached by some men, not others, and consequently true for some, but not true for all, and hence not wholly true for any. But to Emerson all "truth lies on the highway." Emerson says, "We lie in the lap of immense intelligence which makes us organs of its activity and receivers of its truth," and the Idea is no longer either an academic toy nor even a gleam of poetry, but a literal report of the experience of the hour as that is enriched and reinforced for the individual through the tale of history, the appliance of science, the gossip of conversation

Digitized by Google

and the exchange of commerce. That every individual is at once the focus and the channel of mankind's long and wide endeavor, that all nature exists for the education of the human soul—such things, as we read Emerson, cease to be statements of a separated philosophy and become natural transcripts of the course of events and of the rights of man.

Emerson's philosophy has this in common with that of the transcendentalists; he prefers to borrow from them rather than from others certain pigments and delineations. But he finds truth in the highway, in the untaught endeavor, the unexpected idea, and this removes him from their remotenesses. His ideas are not fixed upon any Reality that is beyond or behind or in any way apart, and hence they do not have to be bent. They are versions of the Here and the Now, and flow freely. The reputed transcendental worth of an overweening Beyond and Away, Emerson, jealous for spiritual democracy, finds to be the possession of the unquestionable Present. When Emerson, speaking of the chronology of history, designated the There and Then as "wild, savage and preposterous," he also drew the line which marks him off from transcendentalism—which is the idealism of a Class. In sorry truth, the idealist has too frequently conspired with the sensualist to deprive the pressing and so the passing Now of value which is spiritual. Through the joint work of such malign conspiracy, the common man is not, or at least does not know himself for, an idealist. It is such disinherited of the earth that Emerson summons to their own. "If man is sick, is unable, is mean-spirited and odious, it is because there is so much of his nature which is unlawfully withholden from him."

Against creed and system, convention and institution, Emerson stands for restoring to the common man that which in the name of religion, of philosophy, of art and of morality, has been embezzled from the common store and appropriated to sectarian and class use. Beyond anyone we know of, Emerson has comprehended and declared how such malversation makes truth decline from its simplicity, and in becom-

Digitized by Google

ing partial and owned, become a puzzle of and trick for theologian, metaphysician and litterateur—a puzzle of an imposed law, of an unwished for and refused goodness, of a romantic ideal gleaming only from afar, and a trick of manipular skill, of specialized performance.

For such reasons, the coming century may well make evident what is just now dawning, that Emerson is not only a philosopher, but that he is the Philosopher of Democracy. Plato's own generation would, I think, have found it difficult to class Plato. Was he an inept visionary or a subtle dialectician? A political reformer or a founder of the new type of literary art? Was he a moral exhorter, or an instructor in an Academy? Was he a theorist upon education, or the inventor of a method of knowledge? We, looking at Plato through the centuries of exposition and interpretation, find no difficulty in placing Plato as a philosopher and in attributing to him a system of thought. We dispute about the nature and content of this system, but we do not doubt it is there. It is the intervening centuries which have furnished Plato with his technique and which have developed and wrought Plato to a system. One century bears but a slender ratio to twenty-five; it is not safe to predict. But at least, thinking of Emerson as the one citizen of the New World fit to have his name uttered in the same breath with that of Plato, one may without presumption believe that even if Emerson has no system, none the less he is the prophet and herald of any system which democracy may henceforth construct and hold by, and that when democracy has articulated itself, it will have no difficulty in finding itself already proposed in Emerson. It is as true to-day as when he said it: "It is not propositions, not new dogmas and the logical exposition of the world that are our first need, but to watch and continually cherish the intellectual and moral sensibilities and woo them to stay and make their homes with us. Whilst they abide with us, we shall not think amiss." We are moved to say that Emerson is the first and as yet almost the only Christian of the Intellect. From out such reverence for the instinct

Digitized by Google

and impulse of our common nature shall emerge in their due season propositions, systems and logical expositions of the world. Then shall we have a philosophy which religion has no call to chide and which knows its friendship with science and with art.

Emerson wrote of a certain type of mind: "This tranquil, well-founded, wide-seeing soul is no express-rider, no attorney, no magistrate. It lies in the sun and broods on the world." It is the soul of Emerson which these words describe. Yet this is no private merit nor personal credit. For thousands of earth's children, Emerson has taken away the barriers that shut out the sun and has secured the unimpeded, cheerful circulation of the light of heaven, and the wholesome air of day. For such, content to endure without contriving and contending, at the last all express-riders journey, since to them comes the final service of all commodity. For them, careless to make out their own case, all attorneys plead in the day of final judgment; for though falsehoods pile mountain high, truth is the only deposit that nature tolerates. To them who refuse to be called "master, master," all magistracies in the end defer, for theirs is the common cause for which dominion, power and principality is put under foot. Before such successes, even the worshipers of that which to-day goes by the name of success, those who bend to millions and incline to imperialisms, may lower their standard, and give at least a passing assent to the final word of Emerson's philosophy, the identity of Being, unqualified and immutable, with Character.

JOHN DEWEY.

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO.

Digitized by Google

EMERSON'S VIEWS OF SOCIETY AND REFORM.*

Emerson is commonly thought of as one of our chief men of letters, perhaps also as a prophet of religion—but his relation to reform is sometimes lost sight of. Yet he was one of the chief influences for reform in the second quarter of the last century. An early lecture in Boston was called "Democratic-locofoco" throughout, and put Mr. George Bancroft, then Collector of the Port there, into such ecstasies that he invited him to come and address a Democratic mass-meeting —indeed, a grave Whig-looking gentleman could only account for the lecture on the supposition that Emerson wanted a place in the Custom-house.

Emerson's essential sympathies were all with the rising tide of democratic and social (if not socialistic) feeling that make the better part of the political history of that time. Even in England in 1848—a momentous year for Europe—he spoke of the man of honor as being by tendency, like all magnanimous men, a democrat. "The instinct of the people is right," he said later, and he quoted a French deputy with approval, "March without the people, and you march into night." He thought with Fisher Ames that a republic was better than a monarchy, even though, in contrast to a monarchy, which is like a merchantman that sails well, it is like a raft, on which your feet are always in water; the raft will never sink, while the merchantman may strike a rock and go to the bottom. With all his personal reserve and "superficial coldness," Emerson knew that a life out of touch with the common life was not wholesome; he criticised the Transcendentalists for their "solitary and fastidious manners," and likened some of them who wanted to put away their "uncles and aunts" in a village by themselves, to those who should put the dough in one pan and the yeast in another. In the Phi Beta Kappa address of 1837, which Dr. Holmes called

*An address at the Emerson Memorial Meeting, the University of Chicago, May 25, 1903.

Digitized by Google

"our intellectual Declaration of Independence," he almost anticipated Mr. Howells in saying, "The literature of the poor, the feelings of a child, the philosophy of the street, the meaning of household life, are the topics of the time. It is a great stride. . . . I ask not for the great, the remote, the romantic; what is doing in Italy or Arabia; what is Greek art or Provencal minstrelsy; I embrace the common, and explore and sit at the feet of the familiar, the low. Give me insight into to-day, and you may have the antique and future worlds." When (with others) he founded *The Dial*, he proposed that it should not be "a mere literary journal," but that it should go straight into life and lead the opinion of the generation on property, government, education, as well as on art, letters and religion.

In fact, the reforming impulse was deep in Emerson. His view of religion itself led that way. Religion, he said, no longer tended to a *cultus*, but to a heroic life. He called the reformers of his day "the visible church of the existing generation." "The leaders of the crusades against War, Negro Slavery, Intemperance, Government based on force, Usages of Trade, Court and Custom-house oaths, and so on to the agitators on the subject of Education and the laws of Property, are," he said, "the right successors of Luther, Knox, Robinson, Fox, Penn, Wesley and Whitefield. They have the same virtue and vices, the same noble impulse and the same bigotry." Probably no one has done more toward shifting religion towards its proper domain of right and justice and all manly virtue than Emerson. His saying is well-known, "The mind of this age has fallen away from the theology to morals. I conceive it an advance."

Emerson had no prejudices against wealth—he said, "man is by constitution expensive and needs to be rich." He liked the merchants he met with in his lecture-trips to the West—they seemed to have more manly power of all kinds, he remarked, than scholars. At the same time he thought the question of how wealth was got, legitimate. He could not agree to our American contraction of ethics to the one duty of paying money—so that if you pay it, you may play the

Digitized by Google

tyrant at discretion and never look back to the fatal question, Where had you the money that you paid? Wealth got by denying freedom stirred him to the core. He was the first American scholar, Mr. Conway says, to cast a dart at the Python of slavery. Even while in the pulpit, he allowed anti-slavery speakers to come there. In 1846, when a negro had been seized in Boston and carried back to slavery, and commerce and wealth seemed to breathe freer, he said, "It is high time our bad wealth came to an end." Again and again he spoke his mind, and when the Fugitive Slave law was passed, he declared not only that it must be abrogated, but that while it stood it must be disobeyed. Such was his indignation that it moved him for once in his life to personal denunciation—and this of a man for whom he had had great admiration, Daniel Webster. When the war came, he was overheard to say once in the Charlestown Navy Yard, "Sometimes gunpowder smells good." Lowell testifies to the high influence he had on the young men who went into the war—and Mr. John J. Chapman says it will not be denied that he sent ten thousand sons there.

But even wealth got under our general system of trade was not quite without taint, in Emerson's eyes; for this system (apart from blacker traits that are exceptional and are commonly denounced) is, he says, a system of selfishness, does not spring from the high sentiments of human nature, is not measured by the exact law of reciprocity (much less by the sentiments of love and heroism), but is a system of distrust, of concealment, of superior keenness, not of giving but of taking advantage. He charges no class, merchant or manufacturer—everybody partakes, everbody confesses, he says, and nobody feels responsible. Particularly does he find the common treatment of "working people" lamentable. See, he says, this wide society of laboring men and women. "We allow ourselves to be served by them, we live apart from them, and meet them without a salute in the streets. We do not greet their talents, nor rejoice in their good fortune, nor foster their hopes, nor in the assembly of the people vote for what is dear to them. Thus we enact the part of the self-

Digitized by Google

ish noble and king from the foundation of the world." There were sensitive, ingenuous youth in his day who, not liking the ways of trade, came forth from it. But, says Emerson, by coming out of trade you do not clear yourself. The trail of the serpent reaches into all the lucrative professions and practices of man. Each has its own wrongs. Each finds a tender and very intelligent conscience a disqualification for success. Each requires of the practitioner a certain shutting of the eyes, a certain dapperness and compliance, an acceptance of customs, a sequestration from the sentiment of generosity and love. Yes, Emerson finds the evil custom reaching into the whole institution of property, until our laws which establish and protect it seem, he says, not to be the issue of love and reason, but of selfishness. Love and universal rights are so truly the standard to him that he takes it as matter of course that if another man has no land, my title to mine, your title to yours, is at once vitiated. Grimly, he says, the same spirit accuses men of driving a trade in the great boundless providence which has given the air, the water, and the land to men, to use and not to fence in and monopolize.

And Emerson not only spoke, he acted or tried to act in his private circle, from the higher ideas. He was troubled over domestic service—he was uneasy at being waited on at table in the ordinary one-sided way; he made an attempt to have all the members of his household sit together—but the cook spoiled the plan; "a cook was never fit to come to table," etc., she said. He was extremely considerate of all his hired help, wincing visibly when they were reproved and always respecting their holidays. He also made an attempt at co-operative housekeeping, being, as he said, a bit of an agrarian at heart and having become a little impatient of the inequalities around him—wishing either that he had a smaller house or else that it sheltered more persons. The proposition was made to the Alcotts—but Mrs. Alcott declined; and so another plan was foiled. He even undertook the experiment of manual labor, on which he was setting much store in his lectures. But after trying it, he concluded,

Digitized by Google

"The writer shall not dig"—not that he may not work in the garden, as Emerson had always done, but that his stay there must be measured by the needs not of the garden, but of the study. "When the terrestrial corn, beets, onions and tomatoes flourish," he wrote a friend, "the celestial archetypes do not." And so he frankly owned that if he judged from his experience he should have to unsay all his fine things about the manual labor of literary men.

But sympathetic as he was with the new ethical spirit and acquiring new scruples himself, Emerson was chary of joining associations or organized movements, and never became, in the technical sense, a reformer. He was strongly drawn to the Brook Farm community; he gave "earnest attention and much talk" to the subject—we find him writing at one time that he had not decided "not to go;" but later he wrote Mr. Ripley, the leader in the enterprise, that he had concluded, "yet very slowly," and he might almost say, "with penitence" not to join. In the main his feeling was that he had a work of his own to do in life and that the work might suffer if he joined the community—yet he wrote in his journal, "I approve every wild action of the experimenters." It was not timidity, conservatism, or unbelief that held him back, but the conviction that he must serve men after his own genius. Truth to himself, to his own ideas—this was his supreme need, and when we consider what the range and nobility of those ideas were, we are content that he chose to stand alone and pour them forth unhindered and uncompromised. The various reforms were partial, men who immersed themselves in them lost the sense of proportion—he wished to stand for the whole of duty and the whole of man. Let not the abolitionist, he said, "exaggerate by his pity and blame the outrage of the Georgian or Virginian, forgetful of his own town and neighborhood, of himself." He did not think it exactly wholesome for Boston to be pushed into a false, showy, theatrical attitude, and persuaded that she was better than she really was. He saw that the North was not so different from the South after all. The planter does not want slaves, he said,—no, he wants his luxury, and he will pay even this

Digitized by Google

price for it. How then, he asks, will the abolitionist make a successful assault on that luxury save by abating his own?

Emerson saw deep into the whole labor problem—which is still a problem, though slave labor is abolished—when he said, "If I am selfish, then is there slavery, or the effort to establish it wherever I go." The only real cure is a change of principles in the heart. When men are democratized, the sequel will flow easily out; but simply putting them in a phalanx (the co-operative or socialistic term of his day) they remaining unchanged, would not, he said, much mend matters—for so long as people want the things we now have and not better things, they will certainly, under whatever change of forms, keep the old system. The word is still pertinent. Character is the deepest thing in reform as everywhere else in life. Reforms and reformers as well as other things and people go to pieces for want of it. It is next to useless, Emerson thought, and I might say a bit nauseous as well, for a man not himself renovated, to attempt to renovate things about him. Emerson had high hopes for society, but they all rested on this deep basis of ethics or religion. He looked for a day of great equalities, though admitting that all our experience (or rather inexperience) was of inequalities. He could imagine the "cash-nexus," which his friend Carlyle had found about the only bond holding present society together, superseded by bonds of love and justice. But it was these principles that were to regenerate, it was this unlocking of the heart, that was to give fresh life to man. Do you suppose, he asked, that the reforms which are preparing will be as superficial as those we know? No, he replied, there will dawn ere long a nobler morning in the sentiment of love. Here he found the remedy for all ills, the panacea of nature. We must be lovers, he said, and at once the impossible becomes the possible. He took comfort in the thought that this "great, overgrown, dead Christendom of ours keeps alive at least the name of a lover of mankind;" but, he said, "one day all men will be lovers, and every calamity will be dissolved in the universal sunshine."

We may call this the language of rhapsody, and indeed it

Digitized by Google

is. Only it must be remembered that Emerson had a view of human nature which makes rhapsody possible and natural. To Emerson there were no limits to what man might do under the influence of ideas. The practical man urges that it is impossible to construct a heavenly society out of foolish, sick, selfish men and women; true enough, but these men and women may be transformed. Emerson says, "The believer not only beholds his heaven to be possible, but already to begin to exist—not by the men or materials the statesman uses, but by men transfigured and raised above themselves by the power of principles." Emerson judged actual men as keenly as Carlyle, but with all this, with his haughty, almost contemptuous, descriptions of the swarming masses in our great cities, with his flat assertion, "There is no man; there never hath been. The Intellect still asks that a man may be born," he held in faith to the men that might be, he could imagine the selfish man of business transformed, he could imagine the swarming masses, "hungers, thirsts, fevers, appetites walking," transformed. Once he notes the fact that of the sixty thousand men who made Napoleon's army at Eylau, some thirty thousand were thieves and burglars. The great general won his victories with the help of a class, whom in ordinary times we hold if we can in prisons, with iron at their legs. What a suggestion for the misfit and the unfit in our cities now—if an industrial leader, a leader with love and with brains, could arise and marshal them! We never know what is possible. Emerson pointed to the victories of the Mohammedan Arabs, who from a small beginning established a larger empire than that of Rome—"They did," he said, "they knew not what. The naked Derar, horsed on an idea, was found an overmatch for a troop of Roman cavalry. The women fought like men and conquered the Roman men." In truth, a fount of supernatural energy lies back of man, or, as Emerson puts it, "The soul of God is poured into the world through the thoughts of men."

Men lifted by thoughts, by principles—that is Emerson's hope. What is this but saying that reform takes us back to

Digitized by Google

religion? Believe me, young men and young women, there is still room for religion in the world, if it be real. From our ordinary surface selves, the selves that ordinary business deals with, that the ordinary statesman reckons with, that the ordinary church, alas! and even the ordinary reformer hardly knows better than to appeal to, it may be impossible to expect much. Matching selfishness against selfishness, might against might, man against man, will not work—even if men were equal (which they are not), it would not work. In this way regroupings may come in the world, but not much change. What the world needs is to be lifted to a new level—and only religion does that. Only what touches the depths of man lifts him to his possible heights—and converse with the depths, that is religion. I look for a religion once more that shall believe in the infinite in man, that shall teach the doctrine of the soul—and no one makes such and all divine possibilities credible like him whom we are honoring today, Ralph Waldo Emerson.

WILLIAM M. SALTER.

CHICAGO.

BETTING AND GAMBLING.*

I HAVE been asked to speak on the theory of the subject: its ethical aspect. For this purpose one ought to have a quite clear view of the meaning of one's terms, and such clear view is not very easy to obtain. "Bet," according to Dr. Skeat, is a mere contraction of "abet," to instigate or incite, and that is from the same root as "bait," to set dogs on, literally, to make to bite. When the sharper is caught in his own toils, it is a case of the biter bit. The meaning has changed its emphasis in the course of time. The idea of instigating or inciting another or others is in modern usage rather consequential to the idea of a bet than of its essence. There may be a bet without any result upon others than the two persons immedi-

*A paper read at a Conference of Schoolmasters, College Tutors and Lecturers, at Cambridge, January 9, 1903.

Digitized by Google

ately concerned, the giver and the taker, and they may be equally willing. To bet, according to the most familiar explanation, is to back one's opinion: to agree to sacrifice something of value if one proves wrong, on condition that one receive something of value should one's opinion prove correct. Some degree of uncertainty, therefore, and willingness to take the risk are essential for a bet. "One does not bet on a certainty," it is sometimes said; but only, as a rule, because there is no one to take the bet. One's own opinion as to the issue may rise to certainty, but there can be no common or recognized certainty on the matter, or there would be no bet. The result may depend almost entirely on strength or skill, as in a fencing match; or on a combination of skill with chance, as at whist or bridge; or on skill, chance, and fraud in varying proportions, as on the race-course or stock-exchange, or in playing with marked cards or loaded dice. None of these differences make the bet though they may profoundly affect our judgment of its moral quality. The element of fraud is in reality quite irrelevant to our enquiry. It may be said, indeed, that betting offers opportunities for fraud; but I suspect that fraud is really just as inimical to the system of betting as it is to the system of trade. And the element of what we call chance is never quite absent, though that of skill may be. The bet remains in its own nature much the same whether the issue depend upon chance alone, or upon chance and skill combined, or almost entirely upon skill, and whether the skill relied on be our own or that of some other persons.

There is no essential difference, so far as I can see, between "betting" and "gambling:" except that the latter term seems generally to be applied to a more or less complicated series of bets. To gamble is just to game, to play for money or other valuable consideration. The term is applied specially to such amusements as cards and dice, but has come to be used also of certain applications or misapplications of serious business as found for example in the Stock Exchange. But in all cases it would seem to be equivalent to a bet or series of bets.

Let me try then to put together the points which characterize a bet:

Digitized by Google

The first is that the issue upon which one stakes is uncertain. This is perhaps the most salient and attractive feature; but it has been already sufficiently illustrated.

The second is that one backs one's opinion: stands to win or lose as one's opinion proves correct or false. To make this apply all round one must take "opinion" in a wide, perhaps rather a loose, sense. It is often not one's own opinion of the issue but one's opinion of some one else's opinion that is followed, or one may estimate the chances as even, as when one bets on the fall of a coin, or the color of trumps, and stakes on red rather than black because one of them must be chosen for there to be a bet at all: and this indeed becomes the model for the most simple and yet most complete form of gambling. Or one may be ready to take any bet at odds determined by expert knowledge but weighted in one's own favor; and this form of betting may require much special knowledge of the subject-matter of the bet. These all make very important differences in the social aspect of betting. But if we are merely trying to get at the common character—the definition—of betting, we shall not be wrong in saying, in the sense explaind, that one backs one's opinion.

Are there any further characteristics than these two? One that suggests itself must, I think, be excluded. The issue need not be independent of one's own action. But it certainly is the case that the enormous developments of betting have been rendered possible only by a kind of specialization which distinguishes between the man who bets and the man who acts. There would be little betting on football matches if only those who joined in the play could lay a wager, or on the race-course if one had actually to ride the horse one "backed."

There is, however, another feature which perhaps points to a wider and a narrower sense in which we speak of betting. In the more precise sense as it is used of games of chance or when one man makes a wager with another, what is gained by the winner comes directly out of the pocket of the loser or losers. Not only is there no increase of utility, as the Economists say, in the transaction: there may be none or very little when one tradesman rather than another receives an order, when one

Digitized by Google

candidate rather than another obtains a scholarship or an appointment in the Civil Service: but there is a simple transfer from one pocket to another. The loser not merely fails to win, in the way that a defeated candidate does; he has himself to supply the winner's prize.

The word is used in a wider sense when the whole competitive system under which many enter for a few prizes is spoken of as a system of betting—and perhaps condemned by being so called. This system cetainly has the two features previously ascribed to betting. An uncertain result is aimed at, and one backs one's opinion of oneself or one's pupil or one's son. Nay it still more nearly approaches betting in the strict and commoner sense in that what is gained by one is by that very fact lost by another. The stakes too may be large not in money only, but in consuming a section of one's life and giving what may prove to be an unprofitable direction to one's energies. The difference is that the loser has not himself to provide the prize: the prizes are provided by, and limited by, the social system; they cannot be created at will by any two competitors who have anything to lose.

An even wider signification has been given to the term, which makes it independent of any competition between one man and another. The issues of conduct are always tinged with uncertainty; life itself hangs on a thread; we must, therefore, as many moralists have said, make up our minds as to the probabilities and trust to them. In trusting to them we are simply backing our opinion about a result which no man can foresee. Men have different views about the meaning and purpose of life; but he who lives strenuously puts all he has upon his interpretation of it; he who fears the wager must follow an aimless course. I will therefore distinguish three applications of this term "betting," all agreeing in the complementary implication of hazard and confidence, and yet distinguished from one another by certain clear and essential features. I doubt the advisability of using the same name of them all; but I will suppress this doubt for the nonce, and call them the Wager of Life, the Wager of Strife, and the Wager of Play. The terms

Digitized by Google

are not very appropriate; but they will serve to recall what I mean.

1. The Wager of Life. Of late we have heard once again of Pascal's famous wager. It has been made into a canon of belief and guide for conduct. "It is certain," says Pascal, "either that God is or that there is no God; no middle course is possible . . but reason, you say, cannot determine which is true. . . A game is being played; and in the end it will turn up head or tails." And when his imaginary antagonist says that it is equally wrong, in such circumstances, to say "head" or "tail;" "the proper course is not to bet at all," Pascal replies, "Yes, but you must bet; it is no matter of choice; you have embarked on your course; not to bet that God is is to bet that there is no God. . . . You have two things to lose, the true and the good; and two things to stake, your reason and your will, your knowledge and your happiness; and your nature has two things to avoid, error and misery. Do not hesitate then, but bet that God exists: your reason is not hurt by choosing this course more than by choosing the other, for one of them must be chosen. . . . And as to your happiness, weigh the gain and the loss: in taking the side of belief, if you win you win all; if you lose, you lose nothing."

I do not quote this passage now with any intention of examining the view it embodies of the spiritual interpretation of life—either as Pascal himself expressed it, or in the more systematized form in which it has but recently been sprung upon a world resentful of the limits set to its aspirations by its knowledge. But I wish to guard against the idea that it is only some mere modern fancy that applies the terms "wager" and "bet" to the serious concerns of life. So far is this from being the case, that Pascal deliberately adopts the analogy of the gaming-table, and speaks of all human interests as staked on a single throw. Much might justly be said (were this the place for it) in criticism of his expressions. But yet this much is true: that what I have called the correlative factors of hazard and confidence strike their roots deep in our attitude to our surroundings. We look out upon the course of the world with a vision which has been widened by the discoveries of science

Digitized by Google

and disciplined by its methods. Our knowledge of facts accumulates; our conviction of regular sequence grows stronger; but the issues of things still remain uncertain, and the veil that hides their final purpose grows darker as we approach it. I omit the case of the philosopher who is convinced of his principles and their interpretation: for such a case is rare; and I omit the case of the plain man in whom reflection has not awakened: for to such I am not speaking, although they are many. But for us others, is it not a hazardous thing to act at all in such a world, to impose our interpretation of life upon things whose purpose is hidden from the wise and prudent, to attempt to guide a course which is driving rapidly to an end unknown by science?

These larger questions are merely hinted at. It would land us too far from our immediate purpose to consider them. But in the details of life, at any rate, it is surely evident that there is a hazard of this sort, and that confidence is needed to meet and take the hazard. The confidence should be enlightened by knowledge; but we cannot by knowledge turn it into absolute security. He who will take any risks is a fool: he who will take no risks can do nothing. It is not in marriage only that hostages are given to fortune: the choice of a profession, the writing of a book, the start on a scientific enquiry are, in this sense, as much of the nature of a bet as the fighting of a duel or a "deal" on the Stock Exchange. One must back one's opinion. And not one's opinion of oneself only, but also of others. One must act in company, agree to serve under a leader, or choose one's subordinates—and one may be said to bet on the man of one's choice.

But in all this observe the conditions of the hazard: they are simply the conditions of life as determined by natural law and by some,—by any—social order. We may ask whether it is right for us to take this or that risk; but we may not ask whether it is right for us to take any risk at all: for some risk must be taken. Here, therefore, the moral question for the individual does not arise.

2. The Wager of Strife. Pascal's wager was a wager with or on the universe. His welfare was the stake and might be

Digitized by Google

lost or won. But his winning would not entail loss upon another. On the contrary his venture might induce others to stake and win on the same wager. So it is with all the cases just referred to under the Wager of Life: one man's gain is not at the expense of another's loss. But into all modern life—indeed into all social life as we know it—there enters an element of competition. It dominates industry and is perhaps needlessly prominent in scholastic and academic affairs. Here prizes are to be gained: and one man's success does mean the failure of another. This constitutes a *differentia* which the moralist cannot afford to overlook. The competitive order of society seems to involve in its very essence an anti-social element. We must remember, indeed, that the competitive order is but a crude method of selecting the best; that the fact of struggle is fundamental in human existence; that as long as there is struggle with nature, it is hard to see how strife between man and man for the possession of the best that can be wrested from her can be avoided. Yet, when all this is admitted, it remains the business of the social order to regulate rather than simply to develop the strife; and almost every effort after the moral improvement of society recognizes this as its task. But here again I must only "touch and remit." The ethics of competition is too large a subject to be taken in hand now: especially as something still remains to be said on the third way in which hazard and confidence are united in determining conduct. This is—

3. The Wager of Play—what is called betting or gambling in the narrower, but most common, use of the terms. It is distinguished from the Wager of Life in the same way as the Wager of Strife is distinguished from it, by the feature that the gain of one man entails loss by another. But both in the Wager of Life and in the Wager of Strife, the subjects about which one "bets" (if the word be allowed) are determined for one by one's relation to the order of nature and of society, and the prize-money is paid by the same order. On the other hand, in what we ordinarily call "betting," the stake is a matter of arbitrary agreement quite independent of the conduct or incident on which it is laid, and such "bets" therefore can be laid

Digitized by Google

upon anything at will, provided the issue is fairly clear and not too remote. Further, as the bet is something outside the conduct or incident betted on, that which the winner wins must come to him directly out of the loser's pocket. This I have called the Wager of Play, for it is chiefly in amusements rather than in the serious work of life that scope for it is found. But it is not entirely restricted to play. Mr. Milnes, father of the late Lord Houghton, when a young man, bet a friend a hundred pounds that he would be Chancellor of the Exchequer before he was three and twenty. On his twenty-third birthday he sent his friend a cheque for £100, along with a letter from the Prime Minister offering him the Chancellorship—which he had refused. This I count as a Wager of Play; for although it concerned the issue of what at the time seemed a serious political career, the stake was something outside that issue, arbitrarily agreed upon, and needing to pass from pocket to pocket.

I have selected this last point—the actual transfer from loser to gainer—as the salient feature distinguishing the Wager of Play from any wider sense in which the term "wager" or "bet" is used. But it is itself a result of the arbitrary connection between the issue or event and its reward.

If we wish a more precise statement of the moral quality of this Wager of Play, we will do well to bear some previous distinctions in mind. We must not condemn it because a hazard is accepted or confidence shown where the issue is uncertain—for that, as we have seen, would be to condemn the noble venture with the base. Shall we then say that it is wrong to affix arbitrarily loss and gain to an issue in which they are not naturally involved—an issue too which may itself be indifferent? If we do so are we not ourselves guilty of arbitrarily manufacturing a moral law to suit the circumstances? Gambling has indeed been condemned by a long line of statesmen and moralists. It is forbidden—but to the clergy only—by the Canon Law. And yet I know of no recognized "middle axiom" of ethics under which it can be brought like theft or murder or falsehood. The ethical aspect can only be understood if we take not a narrower, but a wider, view of the con-

Digitized by Google

duct we are estimating, and consider its effect on character and its effect on society.

Considered as a factor in the social order, it is significant that betting attaches itself to both sport and business, and, so to speak, lives upon them. And it changes the nature of each. It makes a business of sport, by introducing into it the factor of pecuniary gain: in so far as this factor is dominant, the sport loses its character as an amusement and becomes a means of money-making—the spurious kind of money-making in which any one man's gain is rendered possible only by the corresponding loss of another. The invasion of regular business by gambling is a still more serious fact of contemporary life. It is difficult for an outsider to draw the line between gambling and legitimate business in the complicated transactions of the Stock Exchange. But I suspect that stock-brokers would have no difficulty in recognizing the difference. A stock-broker once described his business (somewhat contemptuously) as the art of changing two shillings into half-a-crown. When this apparently desirable result is and can be brought about only by somebody else's half-crown being changed into two shillings, we have the essence of the gambling-transaction. Transactions of this nature may be so mixed with ordinary business as to be difficult to disentangle. They are possible only because they are connected with genuine business operations. But they are not themselves genuine business, but simply its parasites; they lead to no increase of utility, and in their own nature are anti-economic, anti-social.

If we turn to look at the matter from the other or personal side—the kind of character which the practice of gambling tends to build up—we see that it makes little or no difference whether one's operations are on the race-course, or on the stock-exchange, or at roulette. What is of importance is the end set before one. And here again there are two main varieties of what is called gambling—pleasure and business. In the former the "bet" is simply an incidental feature of the amusement aimed at, a condiment used to tickle the appetite. For the other the stake is the real matter of interest; and the game—if game it is—has the grim earnestness of business or battle. In this

Digitized by Google

latter event it needs no discussion to show that the player is governed by the desire of money, although that money represents no improvement of external conditions but simply another's loss. In aiming at his own success he is always aiming simply at his companion's failure; and this attitude is fundamentally immoral.

It is certainly most difficult to decide the question off-hand when the desire of gain is not the leading motive, and the stake is added simply to increase the excitement of the game. In this case, when the "play" is not an excuse for "business," the element of sordidness is absent, and the conduct belongs to a different category from that in which money is the real motive of the game. It would be unreasonable, I think, roundly to condemn as immoral every amusement on which a stake of money is lost and won. At the same time, even here, certain considerations have to be borne in mind. It is very rarely that the amount of the stake is indifferent to all or both players,—indeed rarely that it is indifferent to any player. If the stimulus of the stake is required to give the requisite interest to the game, then the amount of the stake must be of some consequence: else counters would do as well. And an amusement which requires an extraneous stimulus of this sort to keep it alive is apt to tend more and more to rely on its adventitious issue, and thus to pass by almost insensible degrees into the "gamble" in which gain is, if not the sole, at any rate a dominating motive.

W. R. Sorley.

University of Cambridge.

Digitized by Google

THE ETHICAL BASIS OF METAPHYSICS.*

I SUPPOSE that nearly every one has at one time or other been struck with Matthew Arnold's famous phrase that "Conduct is three-fourths of Life," and has wondered why he left it to be imagined whether the remaining fourth was made up of misconduct or something else. And no doubt you must have wondered also how the impressive precision of his formula was arrived at. By what experiments did this gifted author manage to surpass experimental psychology in subtlety and exactitude and establish that precisely 75 per cent. of life was composed of conduct? But I fear that, as their record has not been preserved, so scientific a genesis of Arnold's dictum will hardly be credited. And so, in the absence of more definite information, we are forced to speculate, and I will hazard an explanation more consonant, perhaps, with Arnold's mode of thought.

Let me conjecture, therefore, that, contemplating on the one hand the philistine's inarticulate belief that conduct is the one thing that really matters, and on the other the mystic's profound contempt for action, he splits the difference between all and nothing. But this would only make conduct one-half of life; so the extra quarter was added just to mark Arnold's patronizing sympathy with the feelings of the ordinary man.

But Matthew Arnold was not a philosopher, and his procedure, however it was motived, is not likely to satisfy the philosophic mind. The philosopher's imperious logic does not deal in quarters: it is prone to argue *aut Cæsar aut nullus;* if conduct be not the whole life, it is naught. And latterly the second alternative seems to have grown philosophically almost inevitable. For, under the auspices of the Hegelizing "idealists," Philosophy has uplifted herself once more to a metaphysical contemplation of the Absolute, of the unique Whole which includes and transcends all things. Now whether this conception has any value for metaphysics is a moot point, on which I

*An address delivered to the West London Ethical Society on February 15th, 1903.

Digitized by Google

have elsewhere expressed a decided opinion; but there can hardly be a pretence of denying that it is the death of morals. For the ideal of the Absolute Whole cannot be rendered compatible with the antithetical valuations which form the vital atmosphere of human agents. They are partial appreciations, which vanish from the standpoint of the Whole. Without the distinctions of good and evil, right and wrong, pleasure and pain, self and others, then and now, progress and decay, human life would be dissolved into the phantom flow of an unmeaning *mirage*. But in the Absolute all moral distinctions must, like all others, be swallowed up and disappear. The All is raised above all ethical valuation and moral criticism: it is "beyond Good and Evil"; it is timelessly perfect, and therefore incapable of improvement. It transcends all our antitheses, because it includes them. And so to the metaphysician it seems an easy task to compose the perfection of the whole out of the imperfections of its parts: he has merely to declare that the point of view of human action, that of ethics, is not and can not be final. It is an illusion which has grown transparent to the sage. And so, in proportion as his insight into absolute reality grows clearer, his interest in ethics wanes.

It must be confessed moreover that metaphysicians no longer shrink from this avowal. The typical leader of this philosophic fashion, Mr. F. H. Bradley, never attempts to conceal his contempt for ethical considerations, nor omits a sneer at the pretensions of practice to be heard in the High Court of Metaphysics. "Make the moral point of view absolute," he cries,* "and then realize your position. You have become not merely irrational but you have also broken with every considerable religion."

And this is how he dismisses the appeal to practice,† "But if so, what, I may be asked, is the result in practice? That I reply at once, is not my business"; it is merely a "hurtful ‡

*"Appearance and Reality," p. 500-1.

†Ibid., p. 450.

‡But does not this *"hurtful"* reaffirm the ethical valuation which Mr. Bradley is trying to exclude?

Digitized by Google

prejudice" if "irrelevant appeals to practical results are allowed to make themselves heard."

Altogether I can conceive nothing more pulverizing to ethical aspiration than chapter 25 of Mr. Bradley's "Appearance and Reality." *

And the worst of it all is that this whole treatment of ethics follows logically and legitimately from the general method of philosophizing which conducts to the metaphysical assumption of the Absolute.

Fortunately, however, there appears to be a natural tendency when the consequences of a point of view have been stated without reserve, and become plain to the meanest intelligence, to turn round and try something fresh. By becoming openly immoralist, metaphysic has created a demand for its moral reformation. And so, quite recently there has become noticeable a movement in a diametrically opposite direction, which repudiates the assumptions and reverses the conclusions of the metaphysical criticism of ethics which we have been considering. Instead of regarding contemplation of the Absolute as the highest form of human activity, it sets it aside as trivial and unmeaning, and puts purposeful action above purposeless speculation. Instead of supposing that Action is one thing and Thought something alien and other, and that there is not, therefore, any reason to anticipate that the pure contemplations of the latter will in any way relate to or sanction the principles which guide the former, it treats Thought as a mode of conduct, as an integral part of active life. Instead of regarding practical results as irrelevant, it makes Practical Value an essential determinant of theoretic truth. And so far from admitting the claim to independence of an irresponsible intelligence, it regards knowledge as derivative from conduct and as involving distinctively moral qualities and responsibilities in a

*If in any one's mind any lingering doubts have survived as to the purport of this philosophic teaching, he has only to turn to the ingenious but somewhat flippant and prolix exposition of the same doctrine in Mr. A. E. Taylor's *"Problem of Conduct."* To Mr. Taylor the real problem of Conduct would appear to be why any one should continue to hanker after so manifest an absurdity as a rule of conduct.

Digitized by Google

perfectly definite and traceable way. In short, instead of being reduced to the nothingness of an illusion, Conduct is reinstated as the all-controlling influence in every department of life.

Now, I cannot but believe that all effective ethical effort ultimately needs a definite basis of assumptions concerning the nature of life as a whole, and it is because I am convinced that this new method of philosophizing will supply such a basis in an almost perfect way, that I am addressing you to-day as its earnest advocate. If I am asked for its name, I can only say that it has been called *Pragmatism* by the chief author of its importance, Professor William James, whose recent book, "The Varieties of Religious Experience." I dare say many of the readers of this JOURNAL have been enjoying. But the name in this case does even less than usual to explain the meaning, and as the nature of Pragmatism has been greatly misunderstood, and even writers of intelligence and repute have conspicuously failed to grasp it, I must try to put it in a clearer light.

And perhaps I shall best begin by mentioning a few of the ways in which Pragmatism may be reached, before telling you how it should in my opinion be defined. For a considerable prejudice against it has arisen in some minds by reason of the method by which Professor James has approached it.

Professor James first unequivocally advanced the pragmatist doctrine in connection with what he calls the "Will to believe".* Now this Will to believe was put forward as an intellectual right (in certain cases) to decide between alternative views, each of which seemed to make a legitimate appeal to our nature, by other than purely intellectual considerations, viz. their emotional interest and practical value. Although Professor James laid down a number of conditions limiting the

*He had, however, laid the foundation of his doctrine as long ago as 1879 in an article in *Mind*. And in some form or other the recognition of the *thing*, if not of the name, runs through the whole history of thought. Indeed it would be strange if it had been otherwise, seeing that, as we contend, the actual procedure of the human mind has always been (unconsciously) pragmatist.

Digitized by Google

applicability of his Will-to-believe, the chief of which was the willingness to take the risks involved and to abide by the results of subsequent experience, it was not perhaps altogether astonishing that his doctrine should be decried as rank irrationalism.

Irrationalism seemed a familiar and convenient label for the new doctrine. For irrationalism is a permanent or continually recrudescent phenomenon of the moral consciousness, the persistent vogue of which it has always been hard to explain. It is ably and brilliantly exemplified at the present day by Mr. Balfour's "Foundations of Belief," and, in an extreme and less defensible form, by Mr. Benjamin Kidd. And if, instead of denouncing it, we try to understand it, we shall not find that it is entirely absurd. At bottom indeed it indicates little more than a defect in the current rationalism, and a protest against the rationalistic blindness towards the non-intellectual factors in the foundation of beliefs. And Common Sense has always shown a certain sympathy with all such protests against the pretensions of what is called the pure intellect to dictate to man's whole complex nature. It has always felt that there are "reasons of the heart of which the head knows nothing," postulates of a faith that surpasses mere understanding, and that these possess a higher rationality which a narrow intellectualism has failed to comprehend.

Now if one had to choose between Irrationalism and Intellectualism, there would be no doubt that the former would have to be preferred. It is a less violent departure from our actual behavior, a less grotesque caricature of our actual procedure. Like Common Sense, therefore, Pragmatism sympathizes with Irrationalism in its blind revolt against the trammels of a pedantic Intellectualism. But Pragmatism does more; it not only sympathizes, it explains. It vindicates the rationality of Irrationalism, without becoming itself irrational; it restrains the extravagance of Intellectualism, without losing faith in the intellect. And it achieves this by instituting a fundamental analysis of the common root both of the reason and of the emotional revulsion against its pride. By showing the "pure" reason to be a pure figment, and a psychological impossibility, and the

Digitized by Google

real structure of the actual reason to be essentially pragmatical, and permeated through and through with acts of faith, desires to know and wills to believe, to disbelieve and to make believe, it renders possible, nay unavoidable, a reconciliation between a reason which is humanized and a faith which is rationalized in the very process which shows their antithesis to be an error.

That, however, Pragmatism should have begun by intervening in the ancient controversy between Reason and Faith was something of an accident. In itself it might equally well have been arrived at by way of a moral revolt from the unfruitful logic-chopping and aimless quibbling which is often held to be the sum total of philosophy.

Or again it might be reached, most instructively, by a critical consideration of many historic views, notably those of Kant and Lotze,* and of the unsolved problems which they leave on our hands. Or, once more, by observing the actual procedure of the various sciences and their motives for establishing and maintaining the "truth" of their various propositions, we may come to realize that what works in practice is what in actual knowing we accept as "true."

But to me personally the straightest road to Pragmatism is one which the extremest prejudice can scarce suspect of truckling to the encroachments of theology. Instead of saying like Professor James, "so all-important is it to secure the right action that (in cases of real intellectual alternatives) it is lawful for us to adopt the belief most congenial with our spiritual needs and to try whether our faith will not make it come true," I should rather say "the traditional notion of beliefs determined by pure reason alone is wholly incredible. For how can there be such a thing as 'pure' reason? How, that is, can we so separate our intellectual function from the whole complex of our activities, that it can operate in real independence of practical considerations? I cannot but conceive the reason as being, like the rest of our equipment, a weapon in the struggle for ex-

*Or, as Professor James suggested, and as Prof. A. W. Moore has actually done in the case of Locke (see his "Functional versus the Representational theory of Knowledge"), by a critical examination of the English philosophers.

Digitized by Google

istence and a means of achieving adaptation. It must follow that the practical use, which has developed it, must have stamped itself upon its inmost structure, even if it has not moulded it out of pre-rational instincts. In short, a reason which has not practical value for the purposes of life is a monstrosity, a morbid aberration or failure of adaptation, which natural selection must sooner or later wipe away."

It is in some such way that I should prefer to pave the way for an appreciation of what we mean by Pragmatism. Hence I may now venture to define it as the thorough recognition that the purposive character of mental life generally must influence and pervade also our most remotely cognitive activities.*

In other words, it is a conscious application to the theory of life of a teleological psychology which makes the problems of logic and metaphysics appear in a new light, and gives decisive weight to the conceptions of Purpose and End. Or again, it is a systematic protest against the practice of ignoring in our theories of Thought and Reality the purposiveness of all our actual thinking, and the relation of all our actual realities to the ends of our practical life. It is an assertion of the sway of human valuations over every region of our experience, and a denial that such valuation can validly be eliminated from the contemplation of any reality we know.

And inasmuch as such teleological valuation is also the

*This is wider, and I think more fundamental, than any of the definitions in Baldwin's "Dictionary of Philosophy," (II p. 321-2) for the reason that the logical development of pragmatist method in my essay on *Axioms as Postulates* came out (in *"Personal Idealism"*) too recently to be available for the purposes of the "Dictionary." I think, however, that intrinsically also neither Peirce's, nor James', nor Baldwin's accounts are quite adequate. In Peirce's sense, that a conception is to be tested by its practical effects, the principle is comparatively unimportant, and, as he says, somewhat a matter of youthful buoyancy. James' definition, that the whole meaning of a conception expresses itself in practical consequences, does not emphasize the essential priority of action to thought, and does not correlate it with his own "will to believe." Baldwin tries to confine it to the genetic sphere and to deny that it yields a philosophy of reality. But he fails to explain how he can get at reality without knowing it, and how our estimations of what "truth" *is* can disregard and become independent of our modes of establishing it.

Digitized by Google

special sphere of ethical inquiry, Pragmatism may be said to assign metaphysical validity to the typical method of ethics. At a blow it awards to the ethical conception of *Good* supreme authority over the logical conception of *True* and the metaphysical conception of *Real*. The Good becomes a determinant both of the True and of the Real. For from the pursuit of the latter we may never eliminate the reference to the former. Our apprehension of the *Real,* our comprehension of the *True,* is always effected by beings who are aiming at the attainment of some *Good,* and it seems a palpable absurdity to deny that this fact makes a stupendous difference.

I should confidently claim, therefore, that by Pragmatism a further step has been taken in the analysis of our experience which amounts to an important advance in that self-knowledge on which our knowledge of the world depends. Indeed this advance seems to me to be of a magnitude comparable with, and no less momentous than, that which gave to the *epistemological* question priority over the *ontological.*

It is generally recognized as the capital achievement of modern philosophy to have perceived that a solution of the ontological question—*What is Reality?*—is not possible until it has been decided how Reality can come within our ken. Before there can be a real for us at all, the Real must be *knowable,* and the notion of an unknowable reality is useless, because it abolishes itself. The true formulation therefore of the ultimate question of metaphysics must become—*What can I know as real?* And thus the effect of what Kant called the Copernican revolution in philosophy is that ontology, the theory of Reality, comes to be conditioned by epistemology, the theory of our knowledge.

But this truth is incomplete until we realize all that is involved in the knowledge being *ours* and recognize the real nature of our knowing. Our knowing is not the mechanical operation of a passionless "pure" intellect, which

> "Grinds out Good and grinds out Ill,
> And has no purpose, heart or will."

Pure intellection is not a fact in nature; it is a logical fiction which will not really answer even for the purposes of technical

Digitized by Google

logic. In reality our knowing is driven and guided at every step by our subjective interests and preferences, our desires, our needs and our ends. These form the motive powers also of our intellectual life.

Now what is the bearing of this fact on the traditional dogma of an absolute truth and ultimate reality existing for themselves apart from human agency? It would utterly debar us from the cognition of "Reality as it is in itself and apart from our interests" if such a thing there were.

For our interests impose the conditions under which alone Reality can be revealed. Only such aspects of Reality can be revealed as are not merely knowable but as are objects of an actual desire, and consequent attempt, to know. All other realities or aspects of Reality, which there is no attempt to know, necessarily remain unknown, and for us unreal, because there is no one to look for them. Reality, therefore, and the knowledge thereof, essentially presuppose a definitely directed effort to know. And, like other efforts, this effort is purposive; it is necessarily inspired by the conception of some good at which it aims. Neither the question of *Fact,* therefore, nor the question of *Knowledge* can be raised without raising also the question of *Value.* Our "Facts" when analyzed turn out to be "Values," and the conception of "Value" therefore becomes more ultimate than that of "Fact." Our valuations thus pervade our whole experience, and affect whatever "fact," whatever "knowledge" we consent to recognize. If then there is no *knowing* without *valuing,* if knowledge is a form of *Value,* or, in other words, a factor in a Good, Lotze's anticipation * has been fully realized, and the foundations of metaphysics have actually been found to lie in ethics.

In this way the ultimate question for philosophy becomes—What is Reality *for one aiming at knowing what?* "Real" *means,* real for what *purpose?* to what *end?* in what *use?* And the answer always comes in terms of the will to know which puts the question. This at once yields a simple and beautiful explanation of the different accounts of Reality which are

*"Metaphysics" (Eng. Tr.) ii p. 319.

Digitized by Google

given in the various sciences and philosophies. The purpose of the questions being different, so is their purport, and so must be the answers. For the direction of our effort, itself determined by our desires and will to know, enters as a necessary and ineradicable factor into whatever revelation of Reality we can attain. The response to our questions is always affected by their *character,* and *that* is in our power. For the initiative throughout is ours. It is for us to consult the oracle of Nature or to refrain; it is for us to formulate our demands and to put our questions. If we question amiss, Nature will not respond, and we must try again. But we can never be entitled to assume either that our action makes no difference or that nature contains no answer to a question we have never thought to put.

It is no exaggeration therefore to contend, with Plato, that in a way the Good, meaning thereby the conception of a final systematization of our purposes, is the supreme controlling power in our whole experience, and that in abstraction from it neither the True nor the Real can exist. For whatever forms of the latter we may have discovered, some purposive activity, some conception of a good to be attained, was involved as a condition of the discovery. If there had been no activity on our part, or if that activity had been directed to other ends than it was, there could not have been discovery, or *that* discovery.

We must discard, therefore, the notion that in the constitution of the world we count for nothing, that it matters not what we do, because Reality is what it is, whatever we may do. It is true on the contrary that our action is essential and indispensable, that to some extent the world (our world) is of our making and that without us nothing is made that is made. To what extent and in what directions the world is plastic and to be moulded by our action we do not yet know. We can find out only by trying: but we know enough for Pragmatism to transfigure the aspect of existence for us.

It frees us in the first place from what constitutes perhaps the worst and most paralyzing horror of the naturalistic view of life, the nightmare of an *indifferent* universe. For it proves that at any rate Nature cannot be indifferent to us and to our

Digitized by Google

doings. It may be hostile, and something to be fought with all our might; it may be unsuspectedly friendly, and something to be co-operated with with our whole heart; it *must* respond in varying ways to our various efforts.

Now inasmuch as we are most familiar with such varying responsiveness in our personal relations with others, it is I think natural, though not perhaps necessary, that the pragmatist will tend to put a personal interpretation upon his transactions with Nature and any agency he may conceive to underlie it. Still even ordinary language is aware that things behave differently according as you "treat" them, that *e. g., treated* with fire sugar burns, while *treated* with water it dissolves. Thus in the last resort the anthropomorphism of our whole treatment of experience is unavoidable and obvious; and however much he wills to disbelieve it the philosopher must finally confess that to escape anthropomorphism he would have to escape from self. And further, seeing that ethics is the science of our relations with other persons, *i. e.* with our environment *qua* personal, this ultimateness of the personal construction we put upon our experience must increase the importance of the ethical attitude towards it. In other words our metaphysics must be in any case *quasi-ethical.*

It may fairly be anticipated, secondly, that Pragmatism will prove a great tonic to re-invigorate a grievously depressed humanity. It sweeps away entirely the stock excuse for fatalism and despair. It proves that human action is always a perceptible, and never a negligible, factor in the ordering of nature, and shows cause for the belief that the disparity between our powers and the forces of nature, great as it is, does not amount to incommensurability. And it denies that any of the great questions of human concern have been irrevocably answered against us. For most of them have not even been asked in the pragmatist manner, and in no case has there been that systematic and clear-sighted endeavor which extorts an answer from reluctant nature. In short, no doctrine better calculated to stir us to activity or more potent to sustain our efforts has ever issued from the philosophic study.

It is true that to gain these hopes we must make bold to take

Digitized by Google

some risks. If our action is a real factor in the course of events, it is impossible to exclude the contingency that if we act wrongly it may be an influence for ill. To the chance of salvation there must correspond a risk of damnation. We select the conditions under which reality shall appear to us, but this very selection selects us, and if we cannot contrive to reach a harmony in our intercourse with the real, we perish.

But to many this very element of danger will but add to the zest of life. For it cannot but appear by far more interesting than the weary grinding out of a predetermined course of things which issues in meaningless monotony from the unalterable nature of the All. And the infinite boredom with which this conception of the course of nature would afflict us, must be commingled with an equal measure of disgust when we realize that on this same theory the chief ethical issues are eternally and inexorably decided against us. Loyal co-operation and Promethean revolt grow equally unmeaning. For man can never have a ground for action against the Absolute. It is eternally and inherently and irredeemably perfect, and so leaves no ground for the hope that the "appearances" which make up our world may somehow be remoulded into conformity with our ideals. As they cannot now impair the inscrutable perfection of the Whole, they need not ever alter to pander to a criticism woven out of the delusive dreams of us poor creatures of illusion.

It is a clear gain, therefore, when Pragmatism holds out to us a prospect of a world that can become better, and even has a distant chance of becoming perfect, in a sense which we are able to appreciate. The only thing that could be preferred to this would be a universe whose perfection could not only be metaphysically deduced, but actually experienced: but such a one our universe emphatically is *not*.

Hence the indetermination which, as Professor James has urged * Pragmatism seems to introduce into our conception of the world is in the main an advantage. It brings out a connection with the ethical conception of Freedom and the old

*"Will to Believe." p. ix.

Digitized by Google

problems involved in it, which I cannot here consider fully. But I need only say this, that no indetermination can be of the slightest ethical value which does not vindicate and emphasize our moral responsibility.

And this brings me to the last point I wish to make, viz., the stimulus to our feeling of moral responsibility which must accrue from the doctrine of Pragmatism. It contains such a stimulus, alike in its denial of a mechanical determination of the world which is involved in its partial determination by our action, and in its admission that by wrong action we may evoke a hostile response, and so provoke our ruin. But in addition it must be pointed out that if every cognition, however theoretical, have practical value, it is potentially a moral act. We may incur indeed the gravest responsibilities in selecting the aims of our cognitive activities. We may become not merely wise or foolish but also good or bad by willing to know the good or the bad; nay our very will to know may so alter the conditions as to evoke a response congenial with its character.

It is a law of our nature that what we seek that we shall, in some measure, find. And so, like a rainbow, Life glitters in all the colors; like a rainbow also it adjusts itself to every beholder. To the dayflies of fashion life seems ephemeral; to the seeker after permanence, it strikes its roots into eternity. To the empty, it is a yawning chasm of inanity; to the full, it is a source of boundless interest. To the indolent, it is a call to despairing resignation; to the strenuous, a stimulus to dauntless energy. To the serious, it is fraught with infinite significance; to the flippant, it is all a somewhat sorry jest. To the melancholic, each hope is strangled in its birth; to the sanguine, two hopes spring from every grave of one. To the optimistic, life is a joy ineffable; to the pessimistic, the futile agony of an atrocious and unending struggle. To love it seems that in the end all must be love; to hate and envy it becomes a hell. The cosmic order, which to one displays the unswerving rigor of a self-sufficient mechanism, grows explicable to another only by the direct guidance of the hand of God. To those of little faith the heavens are dumb; to the faithful, they disclose the splendors of a beatific vision.

Digitized by Google

And so each sees Life as what he has it in him to perceive, and variously transfigures what, without his vision, were an unseen void. But all are not equally clearsighted, and which sees best, time and trial must establish. We can but stake our little lives upon the ventures of our faith. And, willing or unwilling, that we do and must.

And now in conclusion let me avow that after professing to discuss the relations of Philosophy and Life, I must seem to have allotted an undue share of my time to the former, and to have done little more than adumbrate the practical consequences of my philosophy. In extenuation I must urge that the stream of Truth which waters the fertile fields of Conduct has its sources in the remote and lonely uplands, *inter apices philosophiæ,* where the cloud-capped crags and slowly grinding glaciers of metaphysics soar into an air too chill and rare for our abiding habitation, but keenly bracing to the strength of an audacious climber. Here lie our watersheds; hither lead the passes to the realms unknown; hence part our ways, and here it is that we must draw the frontier lines of Right and Wrong. And moreover, I believe that in the depths of every soul there lurks a metaphysic aspiration to these heights, a craving to behold the varied patterns that compose life's whole spread out in their connection. With the right guides such ascents are safe, and even though at first twinges of mountain-sickness may befall us, yet in the end we shall return refreshed from our excursion and strengthened to endure the drudgery and common-place that are our daily portion.

F. C. S. Schiller.

Corpus Christi College, Oxford.

Digitized by Google

PERSONAL IDEALISM AND ITS ETHICAL BEARINGS.

In a volume entitled "The Limits of Evolution, and Other Essays," published something over two years ago, I set forth a new system of Idealism, and illustrated it from several points of view, which together cover the three chief fields of human concern—Science, Art, and Religion. I have called this system "Personal Idealism" because, as I undertake to show, it is alone consistent with the existence of a world of genuine persons, including a personal God. I have been asked to give here a brief summary of the system, and to point out whatever importance it may have for the aims of the higher ethical life.

The system is closely affiliated with another, with which readers of the JOURNAL are probably familiar, advocated by the late Thomas Davidson, and called by him Apeirotheism; that is, the doctrine of a divine nature, or ideal rationality, distributed in an indefinite number of individual minds. I mention this affiliation, because, although it is unmistakable, it came about from studies entirely independent, and without collusion or even conference. The agreement, so far as it exists (and it by no means exists throughout), must be explained as an encouraging coincidence, resting on a common connection with the same foundations in the history of previous thought: two investigators, working quite apart upon a common problem, without any knowledge by either of what the other was doing, have come out upon a result in the main the same. And it is of great interest to note that a third thinker, remote from both of us, Mr. McTaggart, of the University of Cambridge, has reached a kindred view, closer to Mr. Davidson's, in fact, than my own.

This common result is the doctrine that the world of absolute reality is a world of minds, each eternal in the sense of being immutably real, self-active, and self-determining; none of them is a derivative, or mere result, of the efficient causality of any other being whatsoever, though all co-exist in a mutual

Digitized by Google

recognition intrinsic to the essential nature of each. Thus, by their eternal (*i. e.,* essential) freedom, they constitute a moral order, in the profoundest and only proper meaning of that phrase.

But beyond this base-line of agreement, the system as it has developed in my own mind diverges in important ways from that reached by Mr. Davidson. In the first place, I have to dissent from the view recorded in his title of Apeirotheism: I am unable to regard as divine any of the individual minds that he took account of; they are, to me, all of a type which I should describe as human, in contrast to divine. In the second place, I find it necessary, in order to complete the logical circuit of the whole world of minds, to recognize in it a member to whom the name of God, as designating the absolutely realized perfection of Personality, is alone adequate. This supremely personal Being, this one and only God, my honored friend did not recognize, because, like so many of the members of the Ethical Societies who sympathized with his view or were directly influenced by his reasonings, he found neither necessity nor warrant for it: he could see no propriety in calling by the name of God any one of the eternal society of minds rather than another.

I must not burden the pages of this journal with any argument upon the point of difference between myself and my lamented friend. I merely wish to set it forth, and to call attention to it as vital to the view I name Personal Idealism. Readers who care to follow up the argument, I must refer to my full discussion of the matter, in the fifth and seventh essays of my volume.*

In accordance with this fact (as I aim to show it) that the eternal world is a world of minds falling under the two heads of (1) God, and (2) non-divine consciousnesses who yet in their eternal aspect constitute with God and with each other an indivisibly harmonious whole, I give to this World of Spirits the name of the City of God, following, though with a heightened

*The Limits of Evolution and Other Essays, illustrating the Metaphysical Theory of Personal Idealism. New York: The Macmillan Company; London: Macmillan & Co., 1901.

Digitized by Google

meaning drawn from the fact of universal moral autonomy, the usage that has prevailed regarding this name from the time of the Stoics, and that has been consecrated in Christendom from the days of St. Augustine. The characteristic difference between God and all the other minds, I find to lie in the possession by the latter, and by them only, of a sensuous consciousness, rising everlastingly, through a serial being in time and in space, toward a complete harmony with the eternal ideal that is the changeless central essence of each mind, and whose proper and only real object is God. In short, the new system refers the entire being and linkage of Nature to the minds other than God, so far as concerns its *efficient* causation. God is not the creator, in the sense of the literal producer, or First Cause, of any mind as such, nor even of that aspect in the conscious life of other minds which we know as their merely natural being, whether of psychic states or of physical processes. It is here that the system parts company with such an idealism as Berkeley's, and takes part with that of Kant, or, still more closely in some regards, with the earlier theory of Aristotle.

As Final Cause, however, or attracting Ideal, God has, according to this view, absolute and immutable living relations to the being of all other minds (as these also, reciprocally, have to God's own being), and likewise to the being even of Nature; so that Nature takes its supreme law, the law of Evolution, from God's existence as the eternally-realized Ideal of every mind. Hence, as Final Cause, God is at once (1) the Logical Ground apart from which, as Defining Standard, no consciousness can define itself as *I*, nor, consequently, can exist at all; and (2) the Ideal Goal toward which each consciousness in its eternal freedom moves its merely natural and shifting being, in its effort after complete accord between the two phases of its nature, the eternal and the temporal, the rational and the sensuous.

Thus the system teaches that the two supreme Divine Offices celebrated in historic theology, Creation and Regeneration, have alike a most real meaning, though indeed not a literal but only

Digitized by Google

a metaphorical one. It invites theology to realize the pressing need of now revising and correcting the conception of Creation, in a similar metaphorical sense to that in which the conception of Regeneration has now for some time been reformed: as the latter is now by leading theologians interpreted as the influence of a consciously apprehended ideal truth, the purely final causation by which the Holy Spirit gains its ends, so let the former be for the future read in the corresponding sense of a final causation alone. Between mind and mind, between God and all other minds, there is no causation but Final Cause; the sole realm of Efficient Cause is the realm of Nature, whether physical and psychic, objective or subjective; efficient causation operates from the non-divine minds to their natural (or phenomenal) and sensuous contents, or else, in a secondary manner, between the serial terms of these. Hence God is in nowise responsible for the evil, either natural or moral, that we find in the world of experience, but only for the good that gradually arises in it; and even for this good, only in chief, and not solely; for to every mind that promotes the good and helps to check the evil, belongs indefeasibly the credit of his part in the increase of good and the decrease of evil. The evil in the world is the product of the non-divine minds themselves: the natural evil, of their very nature; the moral, the only *real* evil, of their failure to answer to their reason with their will.

This brief sketch of the view must suffice as preparation for the main task which I have been asked to undertake, namely, to exhibit, with some convincing detail, any advantages the system affords to the aims of moral life. To do this I must proceed from the foregoing outline in two directions: (1) I must clearly show the moral need for the system, by exposing the moral inadequacy of all the other current philosophical schemes, even of the many current Idealisms, thus bringing out more exactly, by the way, the precise and pertinent points in which the system is new; and (2) I must then collect the several items in which the system displays its worth for those who care supremely for moral endeavor.

Digitized by Google

I.

That the historic systems of philosophy, not only those which have been directly influenced by the historic systems of religion and theology, but also those which have originated more or less in opposition to these, or in correction of them, are unequal to meeting the conditions essential to the existence of a moral order and to the possibility of a moral life in individuals, will appear plainly upon a brief analysis of their leading conceptions.

They are every one of them (with the single exception named below) colored through and through with Creationism, at least tacit, and generally conscious and deliberate,—a term by which, taken literally, I conveniently designate the reference of all realities to a single First Cause, conceived as explaining existence by being their efficient, or originating, or producing Source. In other words, from the fourfold system of causes set forth by Aristotle—Material, Formal, Efficient, and Final—they all select Efficient Cause as the category which is to be primordial in their scheme of explanation; then they have this Efficient Cause produce the Material, and mould and change it by the Formal, in answer to the Final as its purpose. In proceeding so, they no doubt follow a universal historic impulse of the human mind, unpurified by sufficient self-criticism; for this impulse displays itself in all the various systems of religion and their accordant theologies.

This theme of literal creation is so inwrought into the structure of historic thinking, that it will require a long struggle on the part of criticism to get rid of it. Through the influence of the Church and the philosophical schools, it may be said to have become in fact institutional, so that combatting it is like fighting organized civilization itself. Yet one can make the truth clear, that only by the dislodgment of it is the success of the deeper principle possible which is the real soul of civilization,—I mean the principle of moral life, the life of duty freely followed.

If we examine the great historic systems, we see that with reference to this Creationism they may be thrown into the following four main groups:

Digitized by Google

First, those that are either (1) the direct theological expressions of the post-exilic Hebraism which, taking occasion from the Eternal Dualism of the Parsees, and correcting it by a modified recognition of the Supreme Being of the older Orientalisms, taught a dualism of a monarchotheistic sort—of a Creator, and a creation summoned into existence at a certain date by his sheer fiat (e. g., the systems of Augustine, Aquinas, and Scotus), or else are (2) philosophical enterprises, undertaken in all rational good faith, but silently engendered by the influence of this Hebraic doctrine even when they greatly modify it (e. g., the systems of Descartes, Leibnitz, Locke, Berkeley, the Deists, and, with all his protests, at the last pinch even Kant).

Second, those that for this dualistic and miraculous exercise of efficient causation, for creation *ex nihilo,* substitute the older but more rationally continuous view of the immanence of the creation in a monistic Creator or Eternal Source, and thus carry us back into the current of pantheistic Emanationism dating from primeval times. E. g., the systems of Erigena, Nicolas Cusanus, Malebranche, Spinoza, Fichte, Schelling, Hegel; with such later offshoots as in Spencer, Fiske, T. H. Green, the two Cairds, Bradley, and Royce,—all tracing back, in the last resort, to the great oriental philosophies, of which the Vedanta is the type. In this group belong, too, unless I quite misunderstand them, the systems of Dr. W. T. Harris, Professor Kedney, and Professor Macbride Sterrett.

Third, those that abandon every sort of consciousness as a First Principle, drop Final Cause from the list of causes, and so make Matter the producing source of every one of its forms, through the force supposed to be inherent in it or commanent with it. These are the manifold Materialisms, atomic or other, from Democritus to Büchner, Vogt, or Dühring.

Fourth, those that repudiate the search into causes as baseless and futile, demand that philosophy, to be sound, shall drop metaphysics as well as theology, and confine itself rigidly to observational and experimental science, merely describing with precision the facts of history and experience. This is Positivism, and bears but one noted name, that of Comte, though all

Digitized by Google

the strictly sceptical systems have contributed to it, from the Later Academy down to Hume. In its own way, it frees itself from Creationism utterly. But this way is the way of confessed and open Atheism.

Considering these four groups with reference to their bearing on the possibility of moral action, we at once throw out the third and the fourth, as systems of confessed necessarianism, which do not even pretend to furnish any basis for individual freedom or for the pursuit of a rational aim (such as fullness of life in the whole spirit) from conviction and choice. On the ground either of Positivism or of Materialism, Ethics can never, properly speaking, be Morals. If it escapes fatalism of the hardest sort, with all the consequent hopelessness for most it cannot avoid hedonism, nor, in the logical end, an egoistic and utterly transient and trivial hedonism.

We have to confine ourselves, then, in any hope of finding conditions adequate for morality—conditions adequate, that is for the life of serious duty—to the first and second of our groups. But from the second,—the systems of efficient causation construed in terms of Monism and Immanence,—the self-determining individual is necessarily cancelled. All the particular beings involved in the being of the monistic Whole are but modes or expressions of the sole self-activity of the Whole; they have no activity really their own, but only a derivative *operation,* determined by the One. This is either openly confessed by the supporters of these systems, or, if they attempt to evade it, they are compelled to end in more or less concealed confessions of it, despite all their efforts. If anybody doubts this, let him attentively read Hegel on this question, or T. H. Green, the brothers Caird, and Professor Royce.*

The first group of systems, the dualistic or literal Creationisms, have, to first impression, a certain appearance of providing for the possibility of freedom, and therefore of a genuine morality. For it seems nominally possible that a Creator by fiat

*Let the interested reader consult, particularly, Professor Royce's "Supplementary Essay" in the volume entitled "The Conception of God" (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1897), in the chapter where he undertakes to deal with the question of the freedom of the individual.

Digitized by Google

might say: "Be thou!—a being with power to perceive and to judge, and with will to choose, unpredestined. I create thee rational, and leave thee untrammeled." But not to mention the complete contradiction of this which the usual theologies and other schemes of predestination introduce, from the need of organizing the world-scheme consistently with their monarchotheistic First Principle, it soon appears that Creationism itself, even in this dualistic form (which does to some degree extricate, or appear to extricate, the creature from the embrace of the Creator), must logically exclude the possibility of freedom. For the Creator cannot, of course, create except by exactly and precisely conceiving; otherwise his product would not differ from nonentity. The created nature must therefore inevitably register the will and the plan of the Creator; and there is really no more escaping this under the dualistic scheme than under the monistic, where the consequence has been fearlessly drawn for us all, for all time, in the classic illustration of Spinoza concerning the moving stone, flung from the sling and coming to consciousness after the impulse. Aware only of its unimpeded movement, and not at all of the impelling start, this would of course imagine itself self-moving and free. But those who see whence that unhindered movement really comes, know better. They know how utterly predetermined are both its direction and its rate, by the One who gave it to be.

So much for the problem of Freedom. There is another, also essential to the working fulfilment of a moral life,—I mean the problem of Evil. Our third and fourth groups indeed have alike no conscious World-Author to blame for evil, but they alike reduce all evil to natural evil, since their necessarian systems provide no room for blameable wrong in men. Thus they furnish no field for the compensation of even natural evil, to say nothing of moral, by voluntary good, and therefore they force the unreserved acceptance of things as they are.

Nor is this result escaped by a resort to the second group of our systems. Neither Spencerian Agnosticism nor the higher forms of evolutional philosophy known as Cosmic Theism or Idealistic Monism can avoid making the One Ground of Things, whether conceived of as conscious or as unknowable,

Digitized by Google

responsible for all that is in life, the evil as well as the good. And the utterly intimate intermingling of the First Cause with all of its effects soever, which these monistic systems all imply, and in some cases even maintain, renders this responsibility so direct and complete as to shock all our ideal sensibilities and make reverence for such a Being, vast and mighty as it may be, quite impossible,—not to speak of adoring devotion. How can we revere that which consciously produces or permits uncontrolled evil, even on the pretense that it is done for eventual good? How worship that which sins in and with us, even if this sinning be for ultimate universal penitence and amendment? Or how can we commit our guidance, devoutly, to that of which we cannot say whether it is conscious or unconscious, and into whose counsels, or whose drift, if perchance it have any, we cannot possibly penetrate? It is condemnation, not recommendation of these systems, to any moral mind, when their advocates declare, as sometimes they do, that "the God of things as they are is the God of things as they ought to be." A mind heartily moral knows better when the poet, however plausibly, declares that "whatever *is* is right." As moral beings, we *know* that much which is is *wrong,* and is in no way palliable, or even to be tolerated, by a good being; yes, that our whole business with it is simply to get rid of it, and to bring on a state of the world in which it shall no longer have room to exist.

This same responsibility for evil, even for sin, is also carried back upon God by the systems in our first group. The predestinating Sovereign, the universal Maker, cannot escape the contagion of the evil and the wickedness that pervades the world which he creates and from moment to moment sustains. Even the natural evil in the world, however regarded as a means of greater good, is so extensively administered (if it *is* administered) with a reckless hand, absolutely regardless of the suffering of conscious beings, as to revolt minds even as little developed in goodness as ours. How dare we say that such things are wrought even by the *consent* of divine Justice and Love? Still less, surely, dare we say that they are wrought by a God's predestinating *edict.*

Digitized by Google

II.

Under such lights as these, which are shed from what the vast majority of thinking men agree is the profoundest and best that is in us, all such systems as we have described display their final moral incompetency. Let us turn now to the new view, the view that abandons both Monism and Monarchotheism, that abandons Creationism in both its forms, takes resort to Final Cause as the primary and only explanatory principle, and holds to an Eternal Pluralism of casual minds, each self-active, though all recognizant of all others, and thus all in their central essence possessed of moral autonomy, the very soul of all really moral being. How will this view adjust itself to the primary conditions of moral life? In answering this, I must avoid all practical detail, and confine myself to the universal conditions of moral activity.

(1). *The first of these conditions is the reality of moral freedom.* Upon this the new system is clear, absolutely clear, and alone is so. It alone founds the real and the phenomenal world in the unqualified reality of a world of individual minds, each of them individual in the only sufficing sense—the sense of self-active intelligence as well as of complete particular identity. It establishes this as a fact in the only way in which such establishment is possible; that is, by proving for each mind a system of *a priori* cognition, here following and at the same time clarifying the argumentation of Kant, and taking care to note, and to refute, the counter-argumentation founded on the theory of natural evolution. It provides, too, for freedom in both senses: that of spontaneous decision and action, eternally and unchangeably adhering to the cause of Right alone; and that of choice in alternatives, as these continually present themselves in time,—the ever-recurring alternative between the one eternal choice of Right and the manifold and ever-varying forms of temporal defect and wrong.

Not a single one of these causally real individuals is determined to his acts by any extraneous efficient causation, not even God's, but each is led wholly by ideal influences, by final causation purely, as these ideal influences are apprehended and interpreted. The responsibility of each goes back, in the last

Digitized by Google

resort, to his responsibility for right knowledge and right judgment, the sources of which he possesses in his essence, as knowing *a priori.*

The complete reality of freedom is found, however, in the possibility of realizing a moral order in the world of experience. By this I do not mean the mere maybe-so of such an order, but the real power of bringing it about; and the new system provides for this, and alone provides for it, first, by the objective aspect of its theory of Freedom, and, secondly, by its supplying a thorough proof for the doctrine of Immortality. But these two matters carry us into further conditions of the moral life, and require separate treatment.

(2). *The objective, the socially objective, nature of the self-active consciousness.* Without this, the moral ideal would be nothing but an empty egoism, incapable of transcending solipsism, and leading only to a self-centred culture. Justice and benevolence would have no place in such a life, but only æsthetic self-refinement and self-poise—what the Greeks called σωφροσύνη and we try quite in vain to translate by temperance, moderation, self-control, sobriety, and what not. But the new theory puts altruism into the very being of each spontaneous self, and lodges his necessary recognition of others in the very primal intelligent act whereby he defines himself and gives intelligible meaning to his saying *I.* The spontaneous logical form of this first certainty for each, is thus primordially social. By this the system reveals the fact that Kant's "categorical imperative," in its final and fully significant form, *So act as to regard humanity, whether thine own or that of another, as an End withal, and never merely as a means,* is in reality the very first principle of knowledge. Hence the moral principle gets the desired warrant from intelligence which past systems have all failed to give it. The interrupting Kantian gap between morality and intelligence is closed; morality itself becomes *intellectual*—at once itself objective, inclusive of others equally real with the self, and conferring objectivity, that is, universally intelligible value, upon the individual intelligence. The sources of *objective* moral judgment in the world of time and circumstance are also thus laid open to the

Digitized by Google

experience of each mind, in the power to consult the public judgment and to verify or correct the private judgment by it.

(3). *Fulfilled freedom, however, as the experimental realization of a moral life, founded in autonomous judgment, depends upon the Immortality of the Individual, in the sense of the everlastingness of his process of experience.* On no other terms, as Kant has well shown, can the moral person fulfil his task, to win the realization of his divine ideal, the reduction of his transitional life under the dominance of his eternal choice of the image of God—the image of perfect Holiness, Justice, and Love. Now the New Idealism, the organic Rational Pluralism, furnishes the only clear proofs of individual immortality, in the sense of an everlasting personal continuance in a world of perceptions organized by the presence of eternal ideals, supplying power for their eventual victory. But lack of space forbids me from here rehearsing these proofs. I must refer the interested reader to the form of them presented in the sixth essay of my book.

(4). *The hope of the real improvement of this present world, an improvement in the long run steadfast, by our moral endeavor.* With lack of this, there would be moral discouragement, and the chief use of this life would be merely to find the means of departing out of it. Righteousness would only be "in Heaven." This added essential to moral effort, Personal Idealism supplies, with assurance of hope, in its indivisible union of the eternal and the temporal worlds; a union in which the eternal is the unitary whole, and the temporal the potentially governed part. More than this, indeed much more, and of higher interest, might be said; but more I must here for lack of room forbear to say, and must again refer readers to the fuller exposition in the first and seventh essays of my book.

(5). *The validity of the belief in the solvability of the Enigma of Evil.* We can have no hope in moral endeavor in a world whose Source and Controller we cannot clear of the suspicion of intending or causing evil, or of being in collusion with it, or even of conniving at it. We have seen, above, how all the systems that work from a single Efficient Cause hopelessly fail to attain this clearance of the Cause. I have already hinted

Digitized by Google

at the contrasted success of the new Pluralism. Its God has no part whatever in the causation of evil, but the whole of evil, both natural and moral, falls into the causation, either natural or moral, that belongs to the minds other than God. They alone carry in their being the world of sense, wherein alone evil occurs or wrong-doing can be made real. This evil pertaining to the non-divine is moreover capable of cure, through the immanence of each being's eternal principle of good and the presence to it of the divine Friend and Saviour. So we pass to the concluding condition.

(6). *The validity of the belief in God.* That is, the belief in a real absolutely perfect Person, transcendent of every other, immanent in none, except by the presence eternally of his Image, or Ideal, before each mind; a real Being, not an Ideal simply; complete in Holiness, Justice, and Love, changelessly attentive to every other mind, rationally sympathetic with all its experiences, and bent on its spiritual success; its inexorable Judge, but also its eternal Inspirer, by his omnipresent reality and his ever-present Image in the conscience.

The absence of objective reality from such an ideal Being, its reduction to a subjective ideal simply, as some modern philosophers caught in an agnostic snare have proposed, would strip moral life of the main support for its struggle against wrong. Amid the manifold disappointments and discouragements of the long battle with defect and wrong, the merely subjective ideal would tend to fade out, to decline both in vividness and in character, and so cease to attract and adequately guide effort. The only adequate support (and it *is* adequate) is the *reality* of God, the heavenly Judge, the unfailing Beholder and Sympathizer. To him, the one Absolute Conscience, in every moral disaster *our* conscience turns for assured refuge and certain renewal of moral courage and strength. That is the real act and infallible function of Prayer.

I think it may justly be said that the new Harmonic Pluralism furnishes the only valid proofs for the reality of such a Being. What these proofs are, I must again spare space by avoiding here to recite. For one form they take, let me again refer to my volume, in its concluding essay, and also, in a some-

Digitized by Google

what simpler expression, in its fifth. I would point out the fact, however, that all other systems professedly theistic draw their proofs for the being of their God either from naturalistic considerations that must fall short of all attributes properly divine, while they also unavoidably stain the image of the Most High with direct or indirect responsibility for all evil; or they rest their case on that fallacious form of the Ontologic Proof which unavoidably fails to carry us beyond subjective ideality; or else, as in the moral method of Kant, they lose all hold on *known* reality, and leave God's being, for its sole support, to our fealty toward our moral calling.

G. H. Howison.

University of California.

THE LIMITATIONS OF ETHICAL INQUIRY.

Success in any of the sciences is so obviously dependent upon a clear understanding of their special boundaries and method that no apology is necessary for an attempt to define more accurately the logical pre-suppositions of ethical inquiry. No advance is possible without a knowledge of what are, and are not, its legitimate problems and method. More especially the many recent demands for a scientific or, specifically, for a psychological treatment of morality raises these underlying questions of epistemology and make it imperative upon us to understand clearly the purpose of our study.

There are two pre-suppositions which must be made by every special science of a character so simple that it would seem an impertinence to mention them were it not that they have been apparently ignored by many reputable writers on ethics.

1. No science has to prove the existence of its own subject matter, but assumes it as part of the common experience of the race. Zoology is not expected to demonstrate the existence of living creatures, nor do we demand of mineralogy that it prove the reality of minerals. Such sciences take for granted the existence of certain phenomena and set them-

Digitized by Google

selves the task of discovering their laws. It is of their essence as empirical sciences that they assume a given element independent of the individual investigator, an element not created, but found. These facts once given constitute the materials for analysis and interpretation and all the other activities of knowledge, but the special science is content to explain within its chosen field careless of the reality of its data from any other standpoint than its own. The validity of its conclusions depends upon the fidelity with which it respects these materials of its thought, which are neither proved nor constructed, but found.

In the case of ethics, as the science of moral experience, it is no otherwise. The reality of morality is not a fact which ethics is called upon to prove, but a datum upon which it has to build. The significance of our judgments of a better and worse in conduct is indeed the central problem of the science, but their reality in human experience is beyond the reach of proof. That there is a right and a wrong in every situation of life is not a fact we are at liberty to doubt, however much we may argue in regard to its interpretation. Ethics is not a rational or *a priori* science in the sense that it is independent of experience for it rests upon the actual facts of everyday life as solidly as do any of the biological sciences upon those of physical life. Just as little as the biologist can invent a new life can the moralist invent a new morality. In his own person as actor he may indeed contribute to the morality to be observed but as thinker and critic he must wait upon the results of this creative activity and study them objectively as data. Ethics as a science, then, assumes the existence of its subject matter, the moral experience of men.

2. No special science has to prove the possibility of knowledge about its material, but approaches it directly under the supposition that such knowledge is possible. However various may be the phenomena of life, the biologist pursues his investigations under the tacit assumption that system and unity can be found in them and that a science of them can be constructed. His problem is, not to prove that a system of

Digitized by Google

them is possible, but to discover what that system actually is. The incompleteness of his knowledge is no ground for scepticism as to its reality, but an incentive to greater labor.

So, too in ethics, it is no part of that science to demonstrate the possibility of a system of our moral experience. The rationality of this it takes for granted and finds its problem only in the concrete determination of what that system is. Conduct may be never so various and apparently inconsistent, yet its variety is no greater than that of the world of physical objects, and the question of knowledge is no more pertinent. It is no greater an assumption and no less necessary that we live in a common world of ends than that we live in a common world of objects. If the judgments we pass upon objects be valid not only for ourselves but for others, it is no less true that the judgments we pass upon ends holds for an experience larger than our own. The moral character of murder is not determined by conditions peculiar to myself alone, it is not a matter of individual caprice, but depends upon conditions valid for all rational beings. So, too, with all other judgments in regard to the values of life, they are capable of reduction to a rational system. This is the assumption of all active life and not a matter for ethical proof. If the possibility of the validity of the judgment that magnets attract iron be not a legitimate problem for physics, neither is wrong a problem for ethics. Whether magnets do attract iron is a physical question, and whether murder is wrong is an ethical one, but the possibility of attaining truth in regard to these matters is a problem with which neither has anything to do. As rational beings we act upon the supposition that there is an ideal order of experience discoverable by thought both in the spheres of fact and of value, a supposition without which there would be neither knowledge nor conduct and which experience is daily proving true.

In respect of both of these pre-suppositions, therefore, ethics is upon the same plane with the natural sciences and is under no necessity for calling its foundations in question. It is free to start with unquestioned data and to investigate

Digitized by Google

them with uncriticized knowledge. Scepticism in ethics as in the special sciences is out of place.

In the matter of method, again, ethical inquiry must follow the general principles of science. Its aim is theoretical, not practical or hortatory, and as such its conclusions are explanatory of the material of which it treats. Whatever may be the sphere of inquiry, to explain is to exhibit the principle involved in a given instance, thereby relating it to that ordered system of experience we call the real world. The value of the principle consists wholly in its unifying power, its reference to other possible experience with which it relates the instance in question, so that the completed system of the sciences constitutes an exhaustive index to the otherwise baffling complex of reality. To understand is to interpret the meaning of an event, scientific laws and concepts being the symbols through which this meaning is conveyed.

To discover this meaning observation and analysis of experience can be the only method, since it is the meaning of this experience that is sought. The test of truth can be found nowhere save in experience itself which alone can confirm or disallow the judgments made in regard to it. When science has determined the consistency of the individual judgments in regard to reality, when it has reduced them to a coherent system by determining the conditions under which the single judgments are true, its task is accomplished. Its concepts and symbols have value only in reference to this systematic unity of experience.

The method of ethical inquiry must be the same. It, too, seeks to interpret the meaning of a given experience in terms of universal experience through the exhibition of its principle. As the explanation of morality it must look to morality itself for the confirmation of its theories and the meaning of its terms. The significance of Socrates' death can be shown only by reference to the universal principle involved in his voluntary submission to the laws of Athens, and to discover this principle there is no other way than the appeal to the experience itself in which it is contained. His action is explained morally when its place has been found in that system

Digitized by Google

of judgments which constitutes a rational moral experience, in the same way that the formation of ice is explained when our perceptions of it have been brought into rational unity with the rest of our perceptions of the external world. Analysis and interpretation of actual moral experience is the only sound method of ethical inquiry.

Yet in spite of the fact that ethics uses the same method as that employed in the other natural sciences and that it rests upon the same pre-suppositions, it is important to note an essential difference in the nature of its explanatory concepts. Even among the physical sciences themselves there is this necessary difference in the symbols used, since if they are to have explanatory power they must be adapted to the material to which they refer. Facts are to be explained in terms of other facts like in kind, not in terms of an experience wholly different in its nature. Science does indeed ignore differences in its abstract procedure and treat the most concretely varied objects as if they were alike in kind, as they are from a single point of view, but it does so of purpose and with the recognition that there are other aspects of the same reality whose meanings are not expressed in its single set of concepts. The real purpose of the sciences in their totality is not the ignoring of differences but the complete expression of them in a systematic unity. For each of the many aspects of reality we must have a different set of symbols if the differences of those aspects are to be adequately represented. If life is qualitatively different from the non-living it is idle to expect that its whole significance can be expressed in symbols adapted to the latter. The concepts of biology must differ from those of physics unless the new aspect is to be ignored. Every advance in kind demands the employment of a new and higher system of categories, not to supersede the old, but to supplement them.

If this is true as between the special branches of the physical sciences, much more is it true between the whole body of these sciences and ethics, the difference between which depends not upon a division of territory among the objects of experience, but upon fundamental differences in the aspects

Digitized by Google

which experience presents. This world of our experience presents itself as a problem both for our intellect and our will. We may, on the one hand, regard it as a series of events to be understood, in which our own actions are to be included as a part, though a very subordinate part, of the whole. We may stand off from our world, subordinate our desires to it, and contemplate it as a spectacle in which our wishes count for nothing, and in which our only interest is to understand the mechanism of the process. To discover the law of this process, the order of this succession, is the goal of our ambition. The concept in which that order is expressed is that of causality—we seek the causes of the events in our experience, the conditions under which they occur. With this term we symbolize the rational order of the world irrespective of its value. The goodness or badness of an action is a characteristic with which natural science has nothing to do, save as it may serve to explain a causal sequence. Its function is completed when it has described the conditions of that which is.

But the world is also a problem for our will, a set of materials for our use, a series of possibilities to be realized. The objects observed so indifferently by science are also objects of our human will, the conditions analysed so coldly and dispassionately are often circumstances unendurable by man. Though regarded by science as only a fact among other facts, man is also a fact and power in the service of an ideal. The world for him is not a fact to be acquiesced in, but a material to be transformed. Life itself is possible only as this active attitude is assumed toward experience, only as a series of choices is made between the better and the worse. There is involved in human experience itself a standard of its worth essential to the existence of that experience. To live is not alone to observe, but to select, to choose, to hold fast to and realize purposes. It is in this selective activity of life that moral experience takes its rise and it is with these choices of a better and a worse that ethics is concerned. Instead of the scientific judgment, A is the cause of B, the unit of moral experience is, A ought to be

Digitized by Google

done by B. The predicate in the one case is a law of succession, in the other a standard of value. In the one judgment the subject is referred to its place in the order of events, in the other it is estimated with reference to a rational system of life. If then the explanation of any experience consists in exhibiting the principle it involves, or in referring it to its place in a rational and consistent order of experience, and if experience itself presents this twofold aspect, it is evident that explanation must be of two kinds. We may refer our actions to a causal law of occurrence irrespective of their worth, or we may just as legitimately refer them to an ideal system of values irrespective of their occurrence.

This two-fold reference of events means the employment of distinct categories of explanation. The symbols used in determining the objective order of events become inadequate when applied to the value of those events. It is insignificant to reply that B follows A in time when we ask whether B is better than A, in the same way that it would be irrelevant to insist that B is better than A when the problem is as to whether A is the cause of B. Causality has no significance in ethics, nor has obligation in physics. It is no answer to the problem of the value of industry to state the conditions under which men are industrious, or to give the statistics in regard to the prevalence of the habit, or even to show the causes in heredity and environment which lead us to expect industry in our own case, the question of its worth is quite distinct from that of its causal conditions. The ethical problem is concerned with what *now* is worth the doing regardless of the antecedents which have made the conditions actual. The knowledge of these antecedents, the understanding of the history and causal connections of the present bit of experience is indeed valuable, but only as bringing clearly before us its real nature and furnishing us with the materials upon which our judgment of value is passed, not as giving us the standard for that value. The history of a drunkard or of all drunkards does not in itself contain the condemnation of the vice however much it may add to our knowledge of its nature. Our question is not as to our ancestors' habits but as to our

Digitized by Google

own. On the other hand, this ethical ought has no significance for natural science, whose principle of causality has reference solely to the actual order of experience, but, neither does it contradict it. The ought of morality does not imply a reversal of the natural order, but a judgment upon it from the point of view of its value. Socrates ought not to have been executed however natural may have been the causes which led up to the event. The distinct reality of the real and ideal order of experience makes conflict between the two impossible. To say that an event ought not to have occurred is not to make an assertion in regard to a natural order and hence it is not subject to the conditions of such an order. It is its reference to a place in a consistent system of human values, just as the statement that an event did or did not occur is its reference to a place in a consistent system of human perceptions. The concept of the good expresses this rational system of values and that of obligation the relation of this system to the actual human will.

The modern demand for the application of scientific method to ethics, therefore, is justifiable in so far as it involves the observation and analysis of actual moral experience, but in so far as it demands also the interpretation of that experience in terms of causality it is illegitimate. To base ethics upon psychology or anthropology is to ignore the essential difference in their subject matter and point of view. The moral judgment is indeed a fact in human experience with which psychology is properly concerned, but it is concerned with it wholly as a fact, regardless of its value. The problem for ethics to solve is, not that of the genesis or history of this fact, but that of its place in a rational system of conduct, its goodness or badness with reference to an ideally desirable life. For the solution of this problem the concept of causality is as useless as that of purpose for the explanation of mechanism. The standard by which we value facts is not itself a fact.

Norman Wilde.

University of Minnesota.

Digitized by Google

THE SEARCH FOR UNITY OF BELIEF.

I.

In an endeavor to rise above the clash of ideals of modern life and thus find a principle for their reconciliation, one instinctively turns for light to one or another of those historic institutions which have made the elucidation of truth their professed aim. As our individual temperament and training may dictate, we seek help from religion, from philosophy or from science.

But any estimation of the respecting harmonizing value of these branches of inquiry meets an initial obstacle in the variable and instable significance of the words by which they are symbolized to the mind. Each of the terms denoting the three institutions just mentioned has two distinct senses, the one broad, the other exclusive, which in the process of thought are continually and unconsciously interchanged.

Religion has certainly a valid use in the purport given it by Carlyle:—"The thing a man does practically believe; the thing a man does practically lay to heart and know for certain, concerning his vital relations to this mysterious universe, and his duty therein." In this sense every earnest man is religious, the sincere agnostic or infidel as well as the priest. For as so employed the word stands for the totality of meaning which we are able to derive from the world, for the sum of the ideals which we most reverence. And in general this term, possessing as it does an inherited halo of sanctity, is still used by many of those who have given up all belief in the historic faiths, to signify what is in the deepest sense their outlook upon life. But the word has a narrow intention also, and one quite as justifiable. It may stand for religion as it has objectively manifested itself in the world. To many it seems, and certainly not without reason, that it should be applied not to any personal interpretation of things, but to that complexity of creed and emotional force which has played a specific role in human history, and to that particular method of attaining to

Digitized by Google

truth, that special attitude towards life, which in playing that role it has characteristically emphasized.

The almost infinitely numerous shades of meaning inherent in the word *philosophy* may also be separated into two divisions, the one catholic, the other narrow. If philosophy is love of wisdom, few there are who would not assert their right to be called philosophers; if it signifies the sum of our best knowledge about the constitution and meaning of things, it is a universal possession. And with such significations as these the term is to be found in the pages of polemical literature. But equally valid is its more concrete purport. Like religion it may stand for an influence that has played a specific part in the human drama. In this more definite sense it betokens the great historical inquiry into the basic nature of things, together with the results which that inquiry has yielded and the particular method by which it has been persued.

A similar dualism of significance is present in the word *science.* As synonymous with *knowledge,* it is one thing; but as representing that particular section of knowledge attained by exact and empirical investigation, it is quite another. Everywhere in controversial literature may be observed the employment of the term in these two senses with seldom a recognition of the difference in their meaning. If science is to signify all truth ascertained or ascertainable, then it would be mere fatuity for religion and philosophy, to attempt to oppose it. But if the term is to stand not for a generic ideal but for a historical actuality, for that particular sort of truth and method of attaining it which have of late become fashionable in civilization, then there may be at least room for debate as to the possibility of other points of view.

The evil inherent in this dual use of the words resides in the fact that much of the argument for the more specific historical institution is based, often quite unconsciously, on the bias in favor of the generic ideal. In reality, so long as the three words are employed in their broader import, there is no essential difference in their meaning. My general outlook upon life represents not only the sum of the most approved knowledge to which I have been able to attain, but also my best estimate

Digitized by Google

of the worth of things; it is at once my science, my philosophy and my religion.

It is only when the terms are endowed with their more specific implications that they refer to actual and dissimilar fields of inquiry. It is therefore requisite that any attempted estimation of the respective co-ordinating efficacy of these diverse fields confine itself studiously to the use of the words in their narrower and contrastive sense, employing them to refer not to ideal constructions but to historical realities.

II.

In view of the transformation wrought in the constitution of modern life through the influence of science, a majority of persons not of the distinctively religious temperament feel that from this source will issue the truth that shall in part allay the turbulence of the age. The history of the progressive extension of the scientific method over one field after another gives support to such expectation. First exercising its activity in those regions most remote from the problems of the human heart, science has steadily pressed forward to embrace those questions with which the spiritual needs of men are most closely identified. Two thousand years ago it was busied with the principles which govern the constitution and behavior of numbers, areas, and the heavenly bodies. During the last few decades it has been endeavoring to show that laws rule personality as well, that every volition of the human will, every shade of feeling in the human heart, is as thoroughly a part of the universe of casual necessity as is the circular movement of the heavens or the falling of an autumn leaf. The last citadel seems to be well-nigh taken, the world appears to lie under the heel of science, and all human interests apparently only at its sufferance.

That science will be able to replace those older creeds which it has helped to destroy by a constructive ideal of its own, adequate to the full scope of human nature, is a hope which has naturally arisen; yet doubts occur as to the possibility of this expectation ever being fulfilled. To reject the results of scientific investigation in the many fields where it has amply

Digitized by Google

justified itself, would be, in this age, an anachronism; and to believe that having gone so far, science must suddenly stop, is to lose sight both of the utter impossibility of setting a sharp limit to the quest for law and of the fact that this quest was never progressing so fast as it is at present. But in spite of these visible truths, certain considerations occur which force the conclusion that science, by itself, is wholly incapable of providing a unifying ideal for the diverse tendencies of life.

The essence of an ideal resides in its satisfactoriness: if it lack this quality it fails to elicit enthusiasm and therefore exerts no moving influence. And the ideal which science offers humanity is eminently unsatisfactory. The notion of individual immortality has no place in its constitution, yet it does not offer any particular hope to the individual here on earth. It teaches the lesson that the unit is ruthlessly sacrificed for the group. Yet this is not a sacrifice which can inspire the individual with enthusiasm, for as science itself teaches, humanity as well as the units which compose it must eventually pass away. "The theory of evolution encourages no millenial anticipations. If, for millions of years, our globe has taken the upward road, yet, sometime the summit will be reached and the downward route will be commenced. The most daring imagination will hardly venture upon the suggestion that the power and the intelligence of man can ever arrest the procession of the great year."*

Herein is the source of that bitterness in the cup of hemlock which science would have us drink with joy: the object of the sacrifice is not worth while. If there is no ultimate worth in one man there is surely none in a limited series of men.

Even Mr. Spencer's millenium, which has given vast satisfaction to many a *naif* defender of the scientific point-of-view, would be at the best, passing over the Weismannian objections in regard to its very possibility, but a momentary flash of happiness out of the void. For with reference to eternity, threescore-and-ten and a few geological ages are alike infinitessimally short. In the end "the uneasy consciousness which

*Huxley, "Romanes Lecture," p. 36.

Digitized by Google

has arisen in this obscure corner of the universe will be at rest. 'Imperishable monuments' and 'immortal deeds,' death itself and love stronger than death, will be as though they had never been. Nor will anything that *is* be better or worse for all that the labor, genius, devotion and suffering of man have striven through countless generations to effect."*

But it may be said, after all, the scientific forecast is based on fact, and though it furnish but little hope, it is surely better to face the truth like men, and endure, rather than pamper ourselves with empty delusions. But such a rejoinder is founded on the supposition that the destiny unrolled by science is inevitable. And this is very far from being the case.

First, even if the universe be wholly mechanical, there is the ever present possibility that the scientific provision may be wholly upset by the advent of undiscovered factors. Although it were possible to outline in considerable detail the trend of organic evolution, the whole theory might be controverted and its authors wiped out of existence by the intervention of a comet from the farther realms of space. Or again, if it be contended that the race is irrevocably destined to extinction with the cooling of the earth, this conclusion may be overthrown by the discovery of a method of etherial locomotion; however improbable such an event may seem, it is still within the range of possibility that some future generation of the human race may be enabled to migrate, when this planet becomes uncomfortably cool, to some other world prepared for its reception.

This ever-present possibility of the refutation of our prognostications by the advent of the unconsidered factor is well illustrated in the mistakes of science which have slowly forced the recognition of the principle that the law of the lower group or organism is not the law of a higher. Certain schools of sociologists have attempted to derive complete formulae for human society from data gathered from the sub-human species; but the garments have always proved too small. Until one has seen the tree and the flower they cannot be envisaged from the seed. And not otherwise can the butterfly be predicted from

*Mr. A. J. Balfour, "The Foundations of Belief," p. 31.

Digitized by Google

the caterpillar, the man from the embryo or the complexity and refinements of human society from a community of anthropoid apes. The impossibility of absolute prevision arises from the incompleteness of science; and none of its devotees voice the hope that in actual time this incompleteness will be ended. Yet until the last item of knowledge is attained, science cannot adopt any but an hypothetical attitude towards the future; until then there must always be a chance that from the egg labeled x may issue any possible sort of untoward event.

Secondly, if there is an element of freedom in human thought and action, then man is not merely swept resistlessly on to his destiny, but has power of altering it; and how far this power may extend no mere prediction can say. It is true science does not and can not countenance free-will; but to base any argument on its absence, it must go further than this and show conclusively that it does not exist; and this it has not done. The experimental psychologist is forced to confess that not until every factor which may have entered into the composition of the man-machine be perceived, can it be mathematically determined whether expression exactly equals impression; but no one realizes better than the psychologist himself that such a complete exposition of the antecedents of human thought and action is an ideal impossible of actual attainment. Far, therefore, from science having succeeded in its attempt to explain man as a link in a causal chain, it has itself opened up so many new vistas of infinite possibility, as to cause that goal steadily to recede. Certainly such explanation is, and must evidently remain, the aim which science holds before itself; but it is an aim that in historic time is clearly not to be realized. And so long as it is unattained, science is not in a position to deny the possibility of freedom and hence to constrain humanity to accept the destiny it proffers.

The wide-spread popular error that experimentation had practically demonstrated man to be a complex machine, is in part an expression of disappointed reaction from the earlier hope that it might, in its investigations, haply come upon a spiritual essence. The expectation of lighting upon the soul amid the recesses of the grey matter in the brain, or of con-

Digitized by Google

densing God in a chemical retort for the edification of all beholders, is now, fortunately, almost extinct. But the error which succeeded it is more persistent. For close upon the heels of the conviction that science is practically incapable of giving a mechanical explanation of life, there follows a declaration of the need of "scientific faith." Even if it is not proved, and can never be proved, that absolute necessity rules everywhere we must have faith that it does, else, chaos. But "scientific faith" is not scientific. Ascertained truth is scientific, and working hypotheses are also legitimate; but the acceptance of the latter as the former *without unimpeachable logical proof* is but scientific self-abuse.

The frequent failure to recognize this is doubtless in large measure due to the dual connotation of the word *faith*. It may signify the balance of confidence that a theory will turn out to be verity; in this sense faith is very properly utilized in scientific speculation, for it is only such excess of belief over doubt that makes it worth while to seek the truth in one direction instead of in another. But the word is also employed to symbolize settled assurance where proof, or even a considerable preponderance of evidence, is lacking: thus a man may have faith, in spite of the misery on every hand and of his own many failures, in the goodness of God and in his own powers. In the former sense, faith is the intellectual conviction of logical probability, in the latter it is essentially an act of will; in the one case *final judgment is withheld*; in the other it is *freely and finally rendered*.

The cry for "scientific faith" is almost invariably an attempt, under cover of a requisition for purely intellectual faith, to take advantage of faith that is volitional; and although science has a right to the former, its demand for the latter is clearly a violation of its spirit and basal precepts, and a confession of its own limitations.

And here we come to the final doubt in regard to the possibility of science uniting the diverse forces of society: it is incapable of finding a dynamic for conduct. Working solely in the world of mechanism, any other language than that of causal necessity to it is meaningless. With ideal aspiration,

Digitized by Google

belief in myself, my friend or my beloved that refuses to abnegate before a mere balance of unfavorable evidence, immolation of self for noble ends, with these things it has no concern. From the point of view of science alone there is really no reason for any solicitude for the good of the greatest number of for the welfare of posterity; what is to be, shall be; I can neither hasten the momentary happiness of humanity nor retard its ultimate doom. Nor, aside from the question of freedom can the problem be solved by an appeal to the sense of justice. Surely it is not "just" that my welfare should be wholly subordinated to that of future generations: for what did these generations ever do for me? And thus, although science may furnish an immeasurable amount of knowledge which may be turned to account in the conduct of life, it is incapable of creating the sanction for that conduct; it may provide us with law but not with obligation. Though it give us never so many ideas about life, it can never furnish, in the true sense of the term, an ideal of life. The transmutation of an idea into an ideal is an alchemic change that takes place beyond the confines of scientific authority and into whose mysteries scientific speculation does not penetrate.

III.

Philosophy in the narrower sense of the term, or metaphysics, although it makes but little appeal to the popular mind, affords to certain more exclusive circles of thought far more hope than science for the emergence of a principle of coordination. From a survey of the general necessities of the situation, however, doubts arise in regard to the possibility of this promise being fulfilled.

A man may approach philosophy in one of two ways: he may go to it as a layman, recognizing that he has neither the time nor the aptitude for original investigation and seeking for the accepted conclusions of the masters; or he may draw near its mysteries with the determination to fashion out of them his theory of life. But either plan lands him in difficulty.

If he chooses the path of authority and seeks the results of expert investigation, he will find none beyond question.

Digitized by Google

Physicians may agree as to the manner in which a broken bone is to be set, but metaphysicians ever dispute as to the right method of repairing the ills of the spirit and of supplying the inanition of thought. At the present time no school of philosophy has an assured ascendency. This diversity in results in no wise vitiates the worth of metaphysical speculation; on the contrary it may rather go to show that such speculation is a living activity; but it certainly proves that philosophy nowhere yields conclusions which may be deemed authoritative. When the masters thus disagree, the layman must necessarily decline to pledge his faith to the doctrines of any.

On the other hand if a man decide to plumb the philosophic depths for himself, he is confronted by a new set of obstacles. As Dr. Bradley has said, no one can hope to accomplish much in metaphysics who does not devote his life to it. But where one gives one's life to anything one ceases to be a layman in reference to it; hence all but professional philosophers are barred from seeking assured philosophic beliefs. But even after a man has definitely taken on the mantle of his calling and set out on his individual voyage of discovery, all is not plain sailing. Adrift without bearings on the ocean of speculation, and consciously seeking originality of thought, he is at last almost certain to drift, as history proves, into some little haven of his own. And thus the philosophers are scattered, usually far beyond hailing distance of one another, along the illimitable and fog-wreathed coasts of conceptual possibility. The evil of this issue is plain. Since the diversity in the results of metaphysical speculation is due to inherent and ineradicable conditions, such speculation offers small hope of providing a unifying ideal.

There must also be taken into account the aversion of the ordinary mind for abstract philosophy. The widely spread prejudice against the aroma of extreme apriorism which has always clung about it has certainly some real justification for its existence, and perhaps metaphysics will never entirely free itself from the tendency to confuse thought and thing, and from the habit of relying over-confidently on the mere mechanism of reason for the elucidation of ultimate truth. Yet without

Digitized by Google

enlarging on this aspect, it is plain that the difficulty of purely philosophical study, and the suspicion, however validly grounded, as to its methods, have combined to render metaphysics distasteful to popular thought. And this creates a strong improbability that any numerically important section of humanity could ever be vividly impressed by a creed elucidated and justified by metaphysics alone. The language of metaphysics is not the language of life and would not be understood; its proofs are labyrinthian and would fail to convince; fear of the delusive strength given an argument by the mere juxtaposition of words would keep the majority aloof. It would be easy to exaggerate the effect of this antipathy. It is true that great thoughts frequently become progressively simplified and so filter down to lower intellecutal levels. But on the other hand enthusiasm bubbles upward, and no thought so abstruse or unattractive as to be incapable of making a reasonably strong appeal to the ordinary mind could exercise a wide-spread popular influence. In practice the world is ever swayed by simple rallying-cries rather than by systems of metaphysics.

But above all, speculative philosophy must be considered as inherently incapable of providing a synthetic ideal for the forces of a new period. That is not its function. In the many discussions of the present poverty of literature there has been wide-spread misapprehension on this point; usually such discussions close with the assertion that a revival of letters is conditioned on the attainment of a new metaphysic. But this is a mistake. Philosophy, like literature, is first of all not a cause but a product; it does not dominate the future but interprets the past.

"Only one word more concerning the desire to teach the world what it ought to be. For such a purpose philosophy at least always comes too late. Philosophy as the thought of the world does not appear until reality has completed its formative process and made itself ready. History thus corroborates the teaching of the conception that only in the maturity of reality does the ideal appear as the counterpart to the real, apprehends the real world in its substance, and shapes it into an intellectual kingdom. When philosophy paints its grey in grey, one form of life has become old, and by means of grey it cannot be rejuvenated, but only known. The owl of Minerva takes its flight only when the shades of night are gathering."*

*Hegel, "Philosophy of Right." Preface, Dyde's Translation.

Digitized by Google

It has been well said that every determinate age has its prophet, its poet and its philosopher: its prophet who comes at the dawn of the era and gives the people their watchword and their religion; its poet who comes in the noon-time of a period and voices its greatness; its philosopher who arrives at the end and analyzes its meaning. Religion, literature and metaphysics are the respective symbols of the beginning, the climax and the close of an age. If the forces of the present time are to be coördinated by a general ideal, the essential spirit, if not the form, of the unifying thought must be religious rather than metaphysical in character.

IV.

Religion and patriotism, observes De Tocqueville with keen intuition, are the only forces that can unite society. Since now the nations are interconnected by innumerable bonds, the necessary synthesist must clearly be world-wide and not national; hence patriotism may be left out of account.

Yet objections arise even to religion—not to the essentially religious spirit and point of view, nor to that which religion might be, and perhaps by some of its founders was intended to be, but to religion as manifested in the concrete character of the particular sects. Certainly the time for purely destructive attacks on religious faith has gone by; it is justifying itself now as it has through all the past. Yet certain very real obstacles stand in the way of religion furnishing to society a unifying ideal.

In the first place there is, as with philosophy, the difficulty existent in the conflict of authority. If we survey the various faiths from a point of view external to any one of them we are forced to conclude that none occupies a position of commanding importance. In our Western civilization the instinctive tendency is to look upon Christianity as supreme. Yet Buddhism has more adherents and Islamism is growing with greater rapidity. Considered objectively, therefore, not one of these three sects is entitled to issue authoritative commands.

There is also to be taken into account the weight of internal evidence, the appeal which a faith makes to the reason and to

Digitized by Google

the sense of spiritual values. But after all, the form which such an appeal takes is for the most part dependent on objective conditions. Thus when a Mohammedan, for instance, refuses to accept purely traditional authority for his creed, the chances are strongly in favor of his continuing in the faith because his inherited racial temperament needs that sort of faith, and because to his inherited way of thinking that faith is the only logical religion. Few there are, whether European or Asiatic, who have not disguised, quite unconsciously, their inherited religious predilections beneath a cloak of reason; but such disguisement can scarcely be said to add greatly to the logical worth of faith. Certainly there must be a residuum of valid internal evidence; some creeds must be better than others. But the practical difficulty of determining which faith occupies the highest place in the scale of value still remains. Individually one may solve the problem to one's satisfaction. But such a personal solution, preserving and even accentuating the existent diversity, must tend rather towards greater divergence in thought than towards unity.

Besides the variety of the historical creeds, their general emphasis on miraculous interruptions of the course of events tends to disqualify them from becoming the source of a coördinating influence for the present age. Whether rightly or wrongly, modern science and free speculative thought have combined to create an aversion to the supernatural in every form. Of late the more progressive religions have evinced a desire to minimize this element which heretofore has been of supreme importance, and to lay more emphasis on those other aspects of faith which are germane to the needs of the time. But it is clear that this transposition of values will have to go still further before religion can make a dynamic appeal to the spirit of modern life.

A third impediment in the way of religion is its character of "Other-Worldliness." All the historical faiths have exemplified this, to their demerit. Since it is all but impossible to preserve in practice a mean between extremes, religion, in insisting on the importance of another world, has fallen into the error of belittling this. In Christianity this other-world attitude engendered that antipathy towards the human body

Digitized by Google

and natural emotion which, by a curious irony, was the cause of much of the brutality of the Dark and Middle Ages.* It produced also that aversion to worldly advancement and natural beauty which caused a long and utterly useless pause in the practical and fine arts. And finally, it is this other-worldliness which has engendered that ominous antagonism to religion which is prevalent among the mass of the extreme social reformers; that antagonism which makes them accord assent to George Eliot's celebrated characterization of religion as a soporific to dull the sense of pain in the down-trodden.

Here also religious emphasis has of late been perceptibly coming into line with the needs of the age; yet the tendency to other-worldliness, like the insistence on miracle, must clearly be considerably lessened before the age can be brought to heed the claim of religion that the transient instant has more than a transient significance.

The hope that a harmonizing force might emerge from religion is further discredited by another consideration. Religion in the abstract is powerless, and the concrete faiths bear always the determining and limiting characteristics of their genesis. The creed originating in one quarter of the world, and developed under local conditions, can not be bodily carried over into another. The evolution of Javeh or Jehovah from a tribal to a national and finally to an international deity, might seem to contradict this; but not so, for the Old Testament Jehovah is very far from being the Christian God. Only when a faith arising in one locality undergoes structural change does it become suitable for extension; and no race or people is deeply influenced by a creed which they themselves have not helped to build up: in the end, race always modifies the character of religion, as does religion that of the race. To believe that any particular faith is, in itself and without modification, adequate to the needs of all the world is to lose sight not only of the evolutionary character of religion, but also of the fundamental distinctions in tone and temperament which render every race and people unique. If it be that now, for the first time in his-

*Cf. Galton, "Hereditary Genius," p. 358.

Digitized by Google

tory, it is a world-civilization whose diverse forces need grasping together, then the conclusion follows that only a religion which should send its roots deep into the sub-soil of the diverse sections of the human race could be creative of a synthetic ideal. Such a religion alone could express the need and voice the aspirations of each distinct racial genius, and only such a religion, by affording a common spiritual language, could interpret the alien quarters of the world one to another.

The possibility that a faith having the qualities of a truly catholic origin might be instituted by a new revelation, is worthy of consideration. The external conditions of the time favor this contingency. The unprecedented interfusion of races which is taking place makes possible, from a naturalistic point of view, the arrival of a prophet or savior who, affected by world-wide influences, might voice the spiritual needs of the diverse peoples and thus bring them into harmony. Such a spiritual interpreter might perhaps be looked for in India or in Japan, where the East and the West, the old and the new, are in seething juxtaposition.

Yet if this be a possibility, it is assuredly scarcely more. If an individual were to appear laying claim to divinity, he either would or would not make recourse to exhibitions of miraculous power. In the one case, if his efforts were successful, they would certainly be ascribed in this day and generation to a superior, but in no way supernatural control of natural force. On the other hand, if he made use of nobility of character and the practice of good works, he might be hailed as a leader and a guide, as one possessing loftier manhood, but never as a divinely constituted savior. The world as a whole has been fast moving towards a position which causes it to refuse a hearing to the claimant of inspiration. This attitude is not to be ascribed to indifference on the part of the world to its salvation; it is due rather to the common feeling that the time for gaining light from any supernatural source has gone bye. However great was the opportunity in times past of influencing humanity by the testimony of prophecy and divination, that possibility evidently no longer exists.

They who are blind to this fact fail to see that the world

Digitized by Google

is ever changing. If life is always travelling in a circle, endlessly repeating the same experiences and continually demanding a repetition of the same ideal call, then it certainly were hardly worth the living. But on the contrary, each particular age seems to have had its own peculiar significance, its own characteristic need, and to have found its Star of Bethlehem in a special quarter of the heavens. Certain levels are past in religious experience, as in artistic creation and in social organization, never to return. Every great period seems to have had an intuitive anticipation of the direction whence its illumination was to come, to have sensed the dawn-light before it became visible to consciousness. In the past, prophet and savior appeared when the ear of the age was keyed to respond to the note of inspiration. But in modern times the hope of attaining an ideal from supernatural revelation has long been fading. Now, the world is prepared to hearken only to a very different message—one that must issue not from the external world but from the depths of the personality and from the heart of the race.

V.

Science, philosophy and religion, therefore, seem alike incapable of bringing the conflicting aspirations of the time into harmony. Each is lacking in some of those elements necessary in the elaboration of an ideal which should respond to the complex demands of modern life. But this inability does not necessarily imply any lack of worth or absence of truth in these branches of inquiry. It is evidently solely due to the fact that each has a particular point of departure for its quest, follows a unique method, and gives emphasis to special aspects of reality; and the determinations which give it power for a special purpose become limitations when that purpose is generalized into a search for the purport and significance of reality as a whole.

Each of these alike is the offspring of human thought; each alike is a human interest. And no emanation from a single branch of the human intelligence can do justice to the whole of that intelligence, or respond to the complex need of the personality behind it. Man as he exists in the world to-day will

Digitized by Google

refuse to be inspired by any hypothesis, which, holding that mechanism is universal, makes of him a mechanical puppet; he will turn away in scorn from any theory which is so bound up in abstractions as to neglect the pulsing value of concrete fact; and he will refuse to be convinced by that creed which, failing to recognize the ordiliness and worth of the present universe, lays chief stress on miraculous interruptions to the course of events, and which would wholly subordinate the values of this world to those of another.

It is true, in the past unifying ideals have been based on narrower conceptions of existence: religion and patriotism have played this part, as De Tocqueville said, sometimes in turn, sometimes united. But it is to be remembered that in previous eras cerain sides of human nature have been developed at the expense of others, and a single point of interest has sufficed to become the nucleus about which the attention crystallized. In ages surcharged with religious excitement and among nations waging incessant war, religion and patriotism, singly or together, would be adequate to induce unity of thought and effort. But in our time the conditions are different. Certainly the present age, like previous periods, has over-emphasized a special side of human nature: in contradistinction from the earlier and more emotional eras, it has become fond of the purely cognitive way of approach to reality. But on the other hand, it is the nature and function of cognition to examine all things. Hence, instead of our attention being fixed on one section of life it is dissipated over the visible and invisible universe. The age has become amazingly intricate in constitution; and a complex period requires a complex enlightenment. For the first time the world has seriously taken up with the comparative and eclectic view of things; and hereafter any partial view must fail to satisfy.

Thus the conclusion thrusts itself inevitably upon us that modern social effort can in a measure be harmonized, and the aspirations of the individual be to some extent satisfied, only by an outlook upon life which, while avoiding the particular evils inherent in these more special fields of speculation, will yet blend something of the definiteness and solidarity of science,

Digitized by Google

some measure of metaphysical depth of vision, with the driving force and unifying power of religion. For if man is a lover of law, he is also a lover of freedom; if he is ever searching for abstract truth, he is equally unwilling to forego his delight in that actuality which impinges upon the senses. And and theoretical outlook which would narrow the scope and lessen the richness of reality by leaving any of these interests out of account must henceforward fail of enduring influence.

FREDERICK HAMMOND.

SAN FRANCISCO.

THE PRACTICAL MAN AND THE PHILOSOPHER.

PHILOSOPHY suffers the distinction of being regarded as an essentially academic pursuit. The term *philosophy,* to be sure, is used in common speech to denote a stoical manner of accepting the vicissitudes of life; but this conception sheds little or no light upon the meaning of philosophy as a branch of scholarship. The men who write the books on Epistemology or Ontology, are regarded by the average man of affairs, even though he may have enjoyed a "higher education," with little sympathy and less intelligence. Not even philology seems less concerned with the real business of life. The pursuit of philosophy appears to be a phenomenon of extreme and somewhat effete culture, with its own peculiar traditions, problems and aims, and with little or nothing to contribute to the real enterprises of society. It is easy to prove to the satisfaction of the philosopher that such a view is radically mistaken. But it is another and more serious matter to bridge over the very real gap that separates philosophy and common sense. It is the aim of the present paper to accomplish something towards that end. Such an aim is realized when philosophy is seen to issue from some interest that is of vital importance to human life; or when, after starting in thought at a point where he deals with ideas and interests common to all, one is led by the inevitableness of consistent thinking into the sphere of philosophy.

There is but one starting-point for reflection when all men

Digitized by Google

are invited to share in it. Though there be a great many special platforms where special groups of men may take their stand together, there is only one platform broad enough for all. This universal standpoint, or common platform, is *life*. It is our more definite thesis, then, that philosophy, even to its most abstruse technicality, is rooted in life; and that it is inseparably bound up with the satisfaction of practical needs, and the solution of practical problems.

Every man knows what it is to live, and his immediate experience will verify those features of the adventure that stand out conspicuously. To begin with, life is our birthright. We did not ask for it, but when we grew old enough to be self-conscious, we found ourselves in possession of it. Nor is it a gift to be neglected, even if we had the will. As is true of no other gift of nature, we must use it, or cease to be. There is a unique urgency about life. But we have already implied more, in so far as we have said that it must be *used,* and have thereby referred to some form of movement or activity as its inseparable attribute. To live is to find one's self compelled to do something. To do *something*—there is another implication of life: some outer expression, some medium in which to register the degree and form of its activity. Such we recognize as the environment of life, the real objects among which it is placed; which it may change, or from it it may suffer change. Not only do we find our lives as unsolicited active powers, but find, as well, an arena prescribed for their exercise. That we shall act, and in a certain time and place, and with reference to certain other realities, this is the general condition of things that is encountered when each one of us discovers life. In short, to live means to be compelled to do something under certain circumstances.

There is another very common aspect of life that would not at first glance seem worthy of mention. Not only does life, as we have just described it, mean opportunity, but it means self-conscious opportunity. The facts are such as we have found them to be, and as each one of us has previously found them for himself. But when we discover life for ourselves, we who make the discovery, and we who live, are identical. From that

Digitized by Google

moment we both live, and know that we live. Moreover such is the essential unity of our natures, that our living must now express our knowing, and our knowing guide and illuminate our living. Consider the allegory of the centipede. From the beginning of time he had manipulated his countless legs with exquisite precision. Men had regarded him with wonder and amazement. But he was innocent of his own art, being a contrivance of nature, perfectly constructed to do her bidding. One day the centipede discovered life. He discovered himself as one who walks, and the newly awakened intelligence, first observing, then foreseeing, at length began to direct the process. And from that moment the centipede, because he could not remember the proper order of his going, lost all his former skill, and became the poor clumsy victim of his own self-consciousness. This same self-consciousness is the inconvenience and the great glory of human life. We must stumble along as best we can, guided by the feeble light of our own little intelligence. If Nature starts us on our way, she soon hands over the torch, and bids us find the trail for ourselves. Most men are brave enough to regard this as the best thing of all; some despair on account of it. In either case it is admittedly the true story of human life. We must live as separate selves, observing, foreseeing and planning. There are two things that we can do about it. We can repudiate our natures, decline the responsibility, and degenerate to the level of those animals that never had our chance; or we can leap joyously to the helm, and with all the strength and wisdom in us, guide our lives to their destination. But if we do the former, we shall be unable to forget what might have been, and shall be haunted by a sense of ignominy; and if we do the second, we shall experience the unique happiness of fulfilment and self-realization.

Life, then, is a situation that appeals to intelligent activity. Humanly speaking, there is no such thing as a situation that is not at the same time a theory. As we live we are all theorists. Whoever has any misgivings as to the practical value of theory, let him remember that, speaking generally of human life, it is true to say that there is no practice that does not issue at

Digitized by Google

length from reflection. That which is the commonest experience of mankind, is the conjunction of these two: the thought and the deed. And as surely as we are all practical theorists, so surely is philosophy the outcome of the broadening and deepening of practical theory. But to understand how the practical man becomes the philosopher, we must inquire somewhat more carefully into the manner of his thought about life.

Let any one inspect the last moment in his life, and in all probability he will find that his intellect was employed to discover the means to some end. He was already bent upon some definite achievement, and was thoughtful for the sake of selecting the economical and effectual way. His theory made his practice skillful. So through life his knowledge shows him how to work his will. Example, experience and books have taught him the uses of nature and society, and in his thoughtful living he is enabled to reach the goal he has set for the next hour, day or year of his activity. The long periods of human life are spent in elaborating the means to some unquestioned end. Here, again, is the curious truth that we wake up in the middle of life, already making headway, and under the guidance of some invisible steersman. When first we take the business of life seriously, there is a considerable stock in trade in the shape of habits, and inclinations to all sorts of things that we never consciously elected to pursue. Since we do not begin at the beginning, our first problem is to accommodate ourselves to ourselves, and our first deliberate acts are in fulfilment of plans outlined by some predecessor that has already spoken for us. The same thing is true of the race of men. At a certain stage in their development men found themselves engaged in all manner of ritual and custom, and burdened with concerns that were not of their own choosing. They were burning incense, keeping festivals, and naming names, all of which they must now proceed to justify with myth and legend, in order to render intelligible to themselves the deliberate and self-conscious repetition of them. Even so much justification was left to the few, and the great majority continued to seek that good which social usage countenanced, and individual predisposition confirmed. So every man of us acts from day to day

Digitized by Google

for love's sake, or wealth's sake, or power's sake, or for the sake of some near and tangible object; reflecting only for the greater efficiency of his endeavor.

But if this be the common manner of thinking about life, it does not represent the whole of such thought. Nor does it follow that because it occupies us so much, it is therefore correspondingly fundamental. Like the myth-makers of old, we all want more or less to know the *reason of our ends.* Here, then, we meet with a somewhat different type of reflection upon life, the reflection that underlies the selection of ideals. It is obvious that most ends are selected for the sake of other ends, and so are virtually means. The poor boy or girl fights for years to secure a college education. This definite end has been adopted for the sake of a somewhat more indefinite end of self-advancement, and from it there issues a whole series of minor ends, which form a hierarchy of steps ascending to the highest goal of aspiration. Now upon the face of things we live very unsystematic lives, and yet were we to examine ourselves in this fashion, we should all find our lives to be marvels of organization. Their growth, as we have seen, began before we were conscious of it; and we are commonly so absorbed in some particular flower or fruit that we forget the roots, and the design of the whole. But a little reflection reveals a remarkably unitary adjustment of parts. The unity is due to the dominance of a group of central purposes. Judged from the standpoint of experience, it seems bitter irony to say that everyone gets from life just what he wishes. But a candid searching of our own hearts will incline us to admit that after all, the way we go and the length we go, is determined pretty much by the kind and the intensity of our secret longing. That for which in the time of choice we are willing to sacrifice all else, is the formula that defines the law of each individual life. All this is not intended to mean that we have each named a clear and definite ideal which is our chosen goal. On the contrary, such a conception may be almost meaningless to some of us. In general the higher the ideal the vaguer and less vivid is its presentation to our consciousness. But, named or unnamed, sharp or blurred, vivid or half-forgotten, there may be found in the

Digitized by Google

heart of every man that which of all things he wants to be, that which of all deeds he wants to do. If he has had the normal youth of dreaming, he has seen it, and warmed to the picture of his own imagination; if he has been somewhat more thoughtful than the ordinary, his reason has defined it, and adopted it for his life; if neither, it has been present as an undertone throughout the rendering of his more inevitable life. He will recognize it when it is named as the desire to do the will of God, or to have as good a time as possible, or to make other people as happy as possible, or to be equal to his responsibilities, or to fulfil the expectation of his mother, or to be distinguished, wealthy or influential. This list of ideals is miscellaneous, and ethically reducible to more fundamental concepts, but these are the terms in which men are ordinarily conscious of their most intimate purposes. We must now inquire respecting the nature of the thought that determines the selection of such an ideal, or justifies it when it has been unconsciously accepted.

What is most worth while? This obviously depends upon what is possible, upon what is expected of us by our own natures, and upon what interests and concerns are conserved by the trend of events in our environment. What I had best do, presupposes what I have the strength and the skill to do, what I feel called upon to do, and what are the great causes that are entitled to promotion at my hands. It seems that we cannot separate the ideal from the real. We may some of us feel that our fundamental ideal is an immediate utterance of conscience, as mysterious in origin as it is authoritative in expression. In such cases we may feel willing to defy the universe, and expatriate ourselves from our natural and social environment, for the sake of the holy law of duty. Count Tolstoi has little to say of the possible or the expedient or the actual, and is satisfied to stand almost alone against the brutal facts of usage and economy. We all have a secret sense of chivalry, that prompts, however ineffectually, to a like devotion. But that which in such moral experiences appears to indicate a severance of the ideal and the real, is, if we will but stop to consider, only a severance of the ideal and the apparent. The

Digitized by Google

martyr is more sure of reality than the adventurer. He is convinced that though his contemporaries and his environment be against him, the more fundamental order of things is for him. He believes in a spiritual world more abiding, albeit less obvious, than the material world. Though every temporal event contradict him, he lives in the certainty that eternity is his. Such an one may have found his ideal in the voice of God and His prophets, or he may have been led to God as the justification of his irresistible ideal; but in either case, the selection of his ideal is reasonable to him in so far as it is harmonious with the ultimate nature of things, in so far as it stands for the promise of reality. In this wise, thought about life expands into some conception of the deeper forces of the world, and life itself in respect of its fundamental attachment to an ideal, implies some belief concerning the fundamental nature of its environment.

But lest in this account life be credited with too much gravity and import, or it seem to be assumed that life is all knight-errantry, let us turn to our less quixotic, and perhaps more effectual man of affairs. He works for his daily bread, and for success in his vocation. He has selected his vocation for its promise of return in the form of wealth, comfort, fame, or influence. He likewise performs such additional service to his family and his community as is demanded of him by public opinion and his own sense of responsibility. He may have a certain contempt for the man who sees visions. This may be his manner of testifying to his own preference for the ideal of usefulness and immediate efficiency. But even so he would never for an instant admit that he was pursuing a merely conventional good. He may be largely imitative in his standards of value, recognizing such aims as are common to some time or race; nevertheless none would be more sure than he of the truth of his ideal. Question him, and he will maintain that his is the reasonable life under the conditions of human existence. He may maintain that if there be a God, he can best serve Him by promoting the tangible welfare of himself and those dependent upon him. He may maintain that, since there is no God, he must win such rewards as the world can give. If he

Digitized by Google

have something of the heroic in him, he may tell you that since there is no God, he will labor to the uttermost for his fellow-men. Where he has not solved the problem of life for himself, he may believe himself to be obeying the insight of some one wiser than himself, or of society as expressed in its customs and institutions. But no man ever admitted that his life was purely a matter of expedience, or that in his dominant ideal he was the victim of chance. In the background of the busiest and most preoccupied life of affairs, there dwells the conviction that such living is appropriate to the universe, that it is called for by the circumstances of its origin, opportunities and destiny.

Finally, the man who makes light of life has of all men the most transparent inner consciousness. In him may be clearly observed the relation between the ideal and the reflection that is assumed to justify it.

> "A moment's Halt—a momentary taste
> Of Being from the Well amid the Waste—
> And lo! the phantom Caravan has reach'd
> The nothing is set out from— . . . "
>
> "We are no other than a moving row
> Of Magic Shadow-shapes that come and go
> Round with the Sun-illumin'd Lantern held
> In Midnight by the Master of the Show."

Where the setting of life is construed in these terms, there is but one natural and appropriate manner of life. Once believing in the isolation and insignificance of life, one is sceptical of all worth save such as may be tasted in the moment of its purchase. If one's ideas and experiences are no concern of the world's, but incidents of a purely local and transient interest, they will realize most when they realize an immediate gratification. Where one does not believe that he is a member of the universe, and a contributor to its ends, he does well to minimize the friction that arises from its accidental propinquity, and to kindle some little fire of enjoyment in his own lonely heart. This is the life of abandonment to pleasure, accompanied by the conviction that the conditions of life warrant no more strenuous or heroic plan.

In such wise do we select ideals, or justify them when half-

Digitized by Google

unconsciously adopted. In each case, the pursuit of an ideal implies a belief in its validity. Such a belief will invariably appear when the groundwork of the daily living is laid bare by a little reflection. And if our analysis has not been in error, there is something more definite to be obtained from it. We all believe in the truth of our fundamental ideals, but we believe, besides, that such truth involves the sanction of the universe as a whole. The momentousness of an individual's life will be satisfied with nothing less final. For every individual, his life is all his power and riches, and is not to be spent save for the greatest good that he can conceive. Life is as irrevocable as it is unique, and is not willingly submitted to caprice. Possibly the felt magnetism of the ideal must always remain a mystery, but even so, it may represent more or less of wisdom and enlightenment. He who stands where he sees much, will find himself attracted quite differently from what would be the case were his view more limited. To know of many possibilities is to be sensitive to many affinities, and the best selection denotes the greatest wealth of experience. It is not necessarily true that he who has seen more will in all cases pursue the higher ideal, for instinct or authority are often better sources of aspiration than is experience. But the validity of the ideal is determined at last by the wealth of the experience from which it issues. We trust instinct and authority because we believe them to represent such experience on the part of the race as a whole, or on the part of God. He whose knowledge is broadest and truest would know best what is of most worth. On this account, most men can see no more reasonable plan of life than obedience to God's will, for God in the abundance of his wisdom, and since all eternity is plain before him, must see with certainty that which is supremely worthy. We mean, then, that the selection of our ideals shall be determined by the largest possible knowledge of the facts pertaining to life. We mean to select as one would select who knew all about the antecedents and surroundings and remote consequences of life. In our own weakness and finitude we may go but a little way in the direction of such an insight, and may prefer to accept the judgment of tradition or authority, but we recognize a distinct

Digitized by Google

type of knowledge as alone worthy to justify an individual's adoption of an ideal. That type of knowledge is the knowledge that comprehends the universe in its totality. Such knowledge does not involve completeness of information respecting all parts of reality. This, humanly speaking, is both unattainable and inconceivable. It involves rather a conception of the *kind* of reality that is fundamental. For a wise choice of ideals, it is unnecessary that we should know many matters of fact, or even specific laws, provided we are convinced of the inner and essential character of the universe. Some of the alternatives are matters of every-day thought and speech. One cannot tell the simplest story of human life without disclosing them. To live the human life means to pursue ideals, that is, to have a thing in mind, and then to try to accomplish it. Here is one kind of reality and power. The planetary system, on the other hand, does not pursue ideals, but moves, unconscious of itself, with a mechanical precision that can be expressed in a mathematical formula, and is representative of another kind of reality and power. Hence a very common and a very practical question: is there an underlying law like the law of gravitation, fundamentally and permanently governing life, in spite of its apparent direction by ideal and aspiration? Or is there an underlying power like purpose, fundamentally and permanently governing the planetary system and all celestial worlds, in spite of the apparent control of blind and irresistible forces? This is a practical question because nothing could be more pertinent to our choice of ideals. Nothing could make more difference to life, than a belief in the life or lifelessness of its environment. The faiths that generate or confirm our ideals always refer to this great issue. And this is but one, albeit the most profound, of the many issues that arise from the desire to obtain some conviction of the inner and essential character of life. Though so intimately connected with practical concerns, these issues are primarily the business of thought. In grappling with them, thought is called upon for its greatest comprehensiveness, penetration and self-consistency. By the necessity of concentration, thought is sometimes led to forget its origin and the source of its problems. But in naming itself

Digitized by Google

philosophy, thought has only recognized the definiteness and earnestness of its largest task. Philosophy is still thought about life, representing but the deepening and broadening of the common practical thoughtfulness.

We who began together at the starting-point of *life,* have now entered together the haven of *philosophy.* It is not a final haven, but only the point of departure for the field of philosophy proper. Nevertheless that field is now in the plain view of the man who occupies the practical standpoint. He must recognize in philosophy a kind of reflection that differs only in extent and persistence from the reflection that guides and justifies his life. He may not consciously identify himself with any one of the three general groups which have been characterized. But if he is neither an idealist, nor a philistine, nor a pleasure-lover, surely he is compounded of such elements, and does not escape their implications. He desires something most of all, even though his highest ideal be only an inference from the gradation of his immediate purposes. This highest ideal represents what he conceives to be the greatest worth or value in the universe. And his conception of the greatest worth is based upon the largest generalization that he can make or borrow. The complete justification of his ideal would involve a true knowledge of the essential character of the universe. For such knowledge he substitutes either authority or his own imperfect insight. But in either case his life is naturally and organically correlated with a thought about the universe in its totality, or in its deepest and essential character. Such thought, the activity and its results, is philosophy. Hence he who lives is, *ipso facto,* a philosopher. He is not only a potential philosopher, but a partial philosopher. He has already begun to be a philosopher. Between the fitful or prudential thinking of some little man of affairs, and the sustained thought of the devoted lover of truth, there is indeed a long journey, but it is a straight journey along the same road. Philosophy is neither accidental nor supernatural, but inevitable and normal. Philosophy is not properly a vocation, but the ground and inspiration of all vocations. In the hands of its devotees, it grows technical and complex, as do all efforts of thought, and to pursue philosophy

Digitized by Google

bravely and faithfully is to encounter obstacles and labyrinths innumerable. The general problem of philosophy is mother of a whole brood of problems, little and great. But whether we be numbered among its devotees, or their beneficiaries, we shall do well to have discovered, and to remember that philosophy is continuous with life.

RALPH BARTON PERRY.

HARVARD UNIVERSITY.

THE ETHICS OF ST. PAUL.

IN Christianity religion and ethics were interwoven from the very beginning. Whether the latter element were not the stronger, we may not stay to enquire. Enough let it be to point out its prominence. "Eo religiosior quo justior" one of the early apologists declares to be the standard of membership.

In the ethical development within the church no teacher counts for more than Paul. He was born with a craving for righteousness. The Jew shut out from politics and society, uneasy with a sense of something amiss with his nation, spent his energies in cherishing his religious aspirations by observance of the "law of Moses," a system of conduct which encircled and shaped all his activities from the highest to the lowest.

In this system Paul was bred up and served it with filial devotion from his youth. But the parent could not in the end provide sufficient sustenance for its nursling.

This code of conduct awoke in the mind of the young aspirant, both approval and resistance. It is the effect of all law, religious or social, in some stages of human growth. Whilst it remains outside the individual, imposed by authority, enforced by penalty, it may extort acknowledgment of excellence but it appears a harsh friend. It curtails freedom. It stands in the way of inclination and often rouses rebellion, so making matters worse. This effect was powerfully felt in a system of control so far-reaching as that of the Jews.

Paul's first idea of goodness, the keeping of the command-

Digitized by Google

ments, led to moral enlightenment at the cost of painful experience. He found himself divided against himself. He discovered morality to lie in the adjustment of two parts of his nature, the desires and the mind, the flesh and the spirit, the human and the divine.

In this struggle what could help to a successful issue? Conscience? Paul it seems rightly conceived this to be not an independent faculty but reason discerning between higher and lower in choices of action. This perception found in all men comes to decisive clearness by debate in the tribunal within. It was perhaps more serviceable to the heathen than to the Jew, who possessed an embodied conscience in his written laws. Yet written or unwritten it could only enjoin more often with "Thou shalt not" than with "Thou shalt." It could not rescue or reinforce the baffled performer in his struggle. Before success could be gained there must be a harmonizing of the inner discord, a subordination of Flesh to the Spirit.

Deliverance comes through a new conception of goodness. Paul felt as keenly as any modern writer the necessity of "good will" to give value to moral action. No amount of good works, duties performed at the bidding of law or conscience, could avail towards personal righteousness as long as they were rendered as a tribute levied by an outward authority even the highest, or for the purchase of personal safety. Only a man in the right condition could act rightly from within. The tree must be good before it could bear good fruit.

To attain this end Paul worked out his theory, of great originality in his day, of which the keyword is "faith." This I take to be the equivalent in religious phrasing of "good will," the attitude of soul towards God which creates goodness. The grasp of the divine which is the expression of the man's desire for it, gives a new quality to all his doings. They are no longer the fulfilment of commandments laid upon him by the strong hand of the Lawgiver. They are the willing outflow of his energies.

Law changes its nature, passes within and becomes the method of working out the true nature of man as well as the divine purpose. Man's welfare and the glory of God are one.

Digitized by Google

The new conception brings with it regenerative power, the "old" man gives place to the "new" man. This is the creation of the "Spirit of life" in Christ Jesus, a phrase which may be fairly paraphrased—the idea of manhood as presented in Jesus the Christ.

This rescued Paul from unsuccessful struggle, from domination of evil. It brought a feeling of unity. It concentrated the will upon one aim—the development of the man after the image of Him that created him. To work out one's own salvation was to attain ever more closely to the truth and completeness of human nature. This could not be done in individual isolation. It was only in the Christian company such development was possible. It could not prosper out of a social organism. By the give and take of society alone could all sides of the Christian character be drawn out and enriched. Paul advanced towards the more modern view of organic unity of society. His own was not quite so wide. It was true for him within the circle of Christian believers. There he saw the manifoldness of the Christ idea, working itself out in many men by mutually helpful complements.

What is the goal of this development? Now it is the perfect man evolved more and more completely by the growing advance of society. For Paul it was Jesus of Nazareth, no individual specimen of humanity, for apart from his historical existence he had become the type of manhood so completely that events in his actual life repeat themselves in the moral life of the Christian. He is the second man, a life giving idea renewing itself in all receptive souls. "In Christ," a favorite phrase of Pauline mysticism, looked at outwardly tells how the Christian man's activity moves within the circle of the Christ life, is inspired and controlled by it. The great moral endeavor is to attain more entirely to it on all sides, to grasp it in practice, to realize the Master, or rather to allow him to realize himself in us.

The individual with all his mutually assisting companions moves on towards the mark of his high calling, the consummation of human excellence—the full grown or complete man in an environment fitted to maintain him always at the highest

Digitized by Google

pitch of attainment. What are the features of the model man, the contents of the character to be achieved?

At first sight, to look for instance at the fruits of the Spirit (the Christ idea), the virtues of self-restraint and self-repression stand out most prominent. Indeed it is noteworthy that the few references (in Paul's letters) to the actual facts of the story of Jesus all point toward self sacrifice and service of others (Christ pleased not himself, etc.). Yet throughout self assertive virtues hold their place. In the claim for individual freedom and independence, in his favorite military metaphors, in his insistence on the duty of searching for truth, intellectual excellence—the fullness of Paul's ethics may be seen.

We find him saying, "Work out your own salvation," immediately after presenting a picture of Christ in all humility doing the will of the Father even to the Cross. It is a moral task then to be accomplished, the working out in themselves ("your own") of a like character.

In the same letter written at Rome where his mind, keenly responsive to all surroundings, must have come into contact with the popular culture of the day, he embraces for thought and action all that has been accepted as good by the many, all that has been approved as worthy by the wise, all that mankind has stamped for virtue by its praise.

The will of God, the means and end of spiritual transformation wherein we seem to hear the sound of a direct voice from heaven, is explained in the universal judgment of men, "what is good and acceptable and perfect."

Religion is morality recognized as the crown and completion of life. Be it for the individual or for the society the end is the same, "spirit, soul and body preserved entire without blame," "a glorious church not having spot or wrinkle or any such thing."

The very exaltation of Jesus the Redeemer of humanity represents the reward, we might say the result of his moral action, of his obedience, his unselfish humility, his unshrinking fulfilment of his life work.

This dominant ethical strain of the Apostle keeps him alive, makes him intelligible for us to-day, in spite of his Jewish ac-

Digitized by Google

cent, of his methods of argument learnt in the Rabbinical schools. His largeness of manhood appeals to us powerfully. He approaches to modern ways of thinking at many points.

1. In his endeavor to get down to fact for the base of his theories. He holds, for instance, Rabbinic views of the origin of sin, but he founds his argument on the actual condition of the Jewish and Roman world of his time, or on the facts discerned by looking within himself and recalling his own moods and conduct. May we not see the same tendency in the curious use of the sacred term "law" in connection with sin and death? We must not color this word with a tinge of modern science. It signifies authority, imperiousness of demand. Not only has righteousness its law, but unrighteousness too puts forth in a strange way its claim. Even the fleshly has its rights, shall we say? At any rate a power which it may push too far and exert a destructive sway.

2. In making the idea of perfect manhood the regulative principle of ethics.

3. In perceiving the necessity of the interchange by social union, of impulse, suggestion, and example, to attain this perfection in each part as well as in the whole.

4. In his hints of a progressive order in human development —first the natural then the spiritual—a process of evolution from the lower to the higher in the individual if not in the race.

5. In combining two strains of moral teaching, the Hebraistic and the Hellenic—the one thriving by self-sacrifice, the other by self-realization. These rivals, it is sometimes asserted, cannot form alliance. In Paul's writings, we find together utter self surrender to the will of another; ("I no longer live, but Christ") and the straining activity after perfection. These two not merely live side by side; they work in with one another; partners in the same business. In this mysticism man does not lose but rather finds himself in the divine.

The sacrifice of the false, anarchic, sense-bound, makes way for the reign of the rational and spiritual self; for be it ever remembered, conformity to Jesus Christ was for Paul the realization of the true man after the divine pattern.

Digitized by Google

Close as was the union between religion and conduct in the mind of Paul, we do him no wrong, rather set him in a truer light, by taking apart the ethical part of his creed. It forms the backbone of his character, no less than of his theology. The passion for righteousness of his early days never ceased to burn. It glowed with purer, stronger flame, the longer it burned.

His conversion marked a change of belief and method, not a change of purpose. It was a new start in the old direction. He held on in quest of that betterment, the dream of his youth, which his Christian faith, bringing within reach, helped him to realize. And still we hear him in his later years, crying with unabated eagerness, "I press forward."

R. BREN.

BIRMINGHAM.

BOOK REVIEWS.

STUDIES IN POLITICAL AND SOCIAL ETHICS. By David G. Ritchie, M. A., LL. D. Swan Sonnenschein & Co., 1902.

This book is a collection of eight papers all of which have appeared in some form in print before. Several of them have appeared in this JOURNAL, while some have been published separately as pamphlets. With few exceptions they were in the first instance written either for ethical societies or for societies with similar aims and of like popular constitution. The essays are therefore primarily intended for persons whose intellectual habits and aims are practical rather than speculative. The author states in his Preface that "anyone trained in philosophical studies who may look into this volume may, perhaps, have to be reminded that the essays and addresses, from the circumstances of their origin or first publication, are 'exoteric discourses.'" From the explanation which follows this description, it would seem that the author's aim in these chapters has been twofold. He has sought to steer clear of discussions on the philosophic basis or first principles of ethics and, on the other hand, to reach conclusions of practical value from premises with regard to which there is general agreement. Dr. Ritchie has realized his intention with complete success. The premises which he assumes as points of departure are

Digitized by Google

such that few would care to gainsay or deny. They consist of the principles which are embraced under the name "evolutionary utilitarianism" and which imply "that faith in the value and meaning of human society and human history which is implied in all serious political and social effort." We are of opinion that there is great need and ample room for books written from this standpoint. In an essay on "The scope and limits of the work of an Ethical Society," ("Practical Ethics" chap. I) such a standpoint is defined with great care and clearness by the late Dr. Sidgwick, and its adoption is recommended in lectures and discussions where the primary aim is action rather than knowledge. The passage in which the writer just alluded to sums up his views seems to apply so well to the aims and methods of Dr. Ritchie's "Studies" that no apology is necessary for transcribing it. "The region in which we are to move I conceive as, philosophically, a middle region, the place of intermediate ethical generalization which we are content to conceive in a rough and approximate way, avoiding fundamental controversies as far as we can; while from a religious point of view it is a secular but not therefore irreligious region, in which we pursue merely mundane ends but yet not in a worldly spirit." ("Practical Ethics," p. 15).

The subjects which are discussed in the spirit and from the standpoint described in this quotation include some of the more interesting and familiar topics belonging to Sociology or Politics. The treatment is throughout lucid, suggestive, and extremely interesting. As we are told in the Preface, the same subject is often approached from various starting-points, so that the different papers qualify or supplement one another. And although the titles of the various chapters suggest perhaps only a remote connection between their subjects, the presence of certain dominant ideas throughout gives to the book a real unity.

The most important chapters in the book are chapters I, VII and VIII, which deal with "Social Evolution," "The Ultimate Value of Social Effort" and "Free Will and Responsibility" respectively. In these are found the ruling ideas which the remaining chapters exemplify and impress in more concrete fashion.

The first essay deals with the application of biological conceptions to social phenomena. This is a subject which Dr. Ritchie has cleverly handled in some of his previous books. The chief interest of the present essay lies in the much needed correctives

Digitized by Google

which it supplies to the more vague and sweeping generalizations occurring in Mr. B. Kidd's "Social Evolution."

Chapter VII contains the ruling thought of the book. Here the author states the case for a *humanist* position in ethics—*i. e.* the view that apart from all supernatural sanctions the individual ought to regulate his conduct by reference to what the highest well-being of the community requires. On this view the sanction of religion may be replaced by a "social faith" which is based partly on a knowledge of past history and partly on the actual intuitive solidarity of human beings. Such a faith, it is alleged, may be substituted without prejudice to the interests of morality, for the sanction of the old faith. It would perhaps be unfair to complain that Dr. Ritchie does not succeed in proving the complete adequacy of such a "social faith" to the needs of a moral life. Such a proof would require an appeal to metaphysics which he has decided to exclude from the discussion. A more relevant objection, though not one to which much importance can be attached, is that in stating the argument from history, the author seems to underrate the extent to which the humanitarian spirit is itself the result of the very sanction, which it is, on the humanist view, made to replace. In this connection one may refer to the view of a writer whom we have already quoted. After tracing the development of the feeling of regard for humanity and of philanthropy in pre-Christian times, he adds—"still the utmost point that this development reached fell considerably short of the standard of Christian charity." (Sidgwick's "History of Ethics," p. 122).

The life which is sustained and inspired by "social faith" is a life of active citizenship and of work done for the good of others. The practical realization of this faith and the conditions under which such realization is possible supply subjects for the remaining chapters of the book. If we except the chapter on "War and Peace," which was written for this JOURNAL, Jan., 1901, these contain scarcely any controversial matter. The other subjects dealt with are "Equality," "Law and Liberty," "Civic Duties and Party Politics," "1792—year 1."

In the chapter on "War and Peace" the exposition seems at times wanting in clearness. The author does not distinguish between two standpoints which it is important to keep apart—the standpoint of the historian and that of the statesman. The historian judges the moral character of events, including wars, after

Digitized by Google

they have occurred and in the light of their effects upon the development of civilization. The standpoint of the statesman, on the other hand, is prospective. He has as yet no results to guide him and he must decide without their aid. It may thus happen that each of two rival nations may claim to represent "the higher civilization." It does not therefore appear that Dr. Ritchie's criterion is of much value except for purposes of retrospective judgment.

The closing chapter is on "Free Will and Responsibility." The discussion which contains an excellent refutation of indeterminism is subservient to the practical aim of the book. If the will is determined by motives and these in turn by the character and circumstances of the individual, the importance of putting individuals in good surroundings and of giving them strong motives to choose rightly is at once realized.

All the essays are extremely interesting and fresh, and are written in a style that is always lucid, and often vivid and piquant. They are, moreover, pervaded by an irrepressible optimism which indicates the possession in a large measure by the author of the faith he so ably inculcates on others.

W. Jenkyn Jones.

University College, Aberystwyth.

Democracy and the Organization of Political Parties: By M. Ostrogorski. Two volumes. Translated from the French by Frederick Clarke, M. A., with a Preface by the Right Hon. James Bryce, M. P. London: Macmillan & Co., 1902. Pp. lviii, 627, 793.

It would be difficult to improve upon the criticism of this remarkable book, which Mr. Bryce has contributed by way of a preface. Mr. Bryce does ample justice to its merits. M. Ostrogorski has filled a gap in political science. There was room for a treatise which should take Party Organization and Party Machinery for its specific subject, and should endeavor to treat these phenomena of modern politics "with a fullness commensurate to the importance of the part which they play to-day in modern governments." The systems of Party Organization in America and in Great Britain "have now found in M. Ostrogorski a singularly painstaking and intelligent student." It is indeed a sociological

Digitized by Google

document of the highest interest and importance—an original and valuable contribution to the pathology of party government. For M. Ostrogorski is a remorseless as well as an indefatigable analyst. And it is at this point Mr. Bryce breaks in with a "note of mild dissent" without presuming to say how far the system of party machinery in America is as black as it is painted by M. Ostrogorski. Mr. Bryce has no doubt that the author's description—a minute and, on the whole, accurate, as well as fair description—is considerably out of perspective. He believes that the particular facts and incidents which M. Ostrogorski states are, taken one by one, almost always correctly stated; but it is the writer's "tendency to assume these facts and incidents to be more generally typical of English political methods as a whole than I believe them to be, and the omission of qualifying considerations, such as perhaps only an Englishman can fully appreciate, may make his account suggest to those who do not possess an independent knowledge of England a judgment too unfavorable." I should fully endorse this judgment. It is remarkable how true and how minutely true M. Ostrogorski's description really is; but then it is not the whole truth. His study of "the machine" is at once too external and too abstract. On the other hand, the facts have never been so skillfully marshalled or so systematically handled; and however much we may be inclined to qualify M. Ostrogorski's judgments, or demur to some of his generalizations, he has certainly written a book which *donne furieusement à penser*—a book which no good citizen can afford to overlook. Not only is the subject, as Mr. Bryce says, of the highest significance, as being at once an interesting branch of political science, and also an important branch of politics as an art, but it is handled in a striking and masterly fashion.

As regards M. Ostrogorski's remedy for the evils of party organizations, most persons will probably agree with Mr. Bryce in thinking his scheme "either impossible to introduce, because too much oppopsed to existing notions and habits, or impossible to work, or perhaps open to both these objections." M. Ostrogorski would get rid of "permanent" parties altogether: he regards them as at once superfluous and mischievous. He would substitute a system of *ad hoc* parties, so to speak; and to make it work he would favor a scheme of "preliminary polls"—the system of "leagues" and of the preliminary poll being all that is required to "rehabilitate" Hare's original system of proportional representa-

Digitized by Google

tion. There is much in M. Ostrogorski's suggestions that is notable and interesting; but his "plan" is certainly not convincing. It is difficult not to agree with Mr. Bryce that Party Organization has come to stay; that it is a logical and inevitable consequence of party government in a large democracy; and M. Ostrogorski has not been more successful than any other philosopher in showing us how it is possible to get rid of party government itself.

But here again, whatever we may think of M. Ostrogorski's conclusions there is no doubt that he has called attention, in a most striking way, to the evils and dangers of the party system as it exists in America and (to a less degree) in Great Britain; and he has demonstrated the necessity of bringing it into greater subjection to the democratic ideal. Students will find his volumes not only replete with facts, but penetrated with acute observation, and pervaded throughout by a high ideal and a noble enthusiasm.

SIDNEY BALL.

ST. JOHN'S COLLEGE, OXFORD.

CONSTRUCTIVE AND PREVENTIVE PHILANTHROPY. By Joseph Lee, Vice-President of the Massachusetts Civic League, with an Introduction by Jacob A. Riis. New York: The MacMillan Co. 1902.

Wealth of information on the subjects treated, sanity of judgment (with a touch of humor, often a test of sanity) and a genuine democratic spirit mark this little volume, which is one of a series on "American Philanthropy of the Nineteenth (*sic*) Century," edited by Herbert S. Brown. It is the work of a scholar, able to state clearly in an opening chapter the essence and limitations of his subject, and yet abounds with details which are evidently the result of first-hand study, observation and experience. Savings and loans, the home, vacation schools, playgrounds for small children and playgrounds for big boys (a significant separation), baths and gynasiums, outings, boys' clubs and industrial training are some of the topics treated. I know of no single book so useful to the practical philanthropist and "settlement" worker. It is a book to give one encouragement too, for a large part of the philanthropic effort recorded dates from the year 1887 (when, by the way, Dr. Coit's "Neighborhood Guild," afterwards the "University Settlement,"

Digitized by Google

was started in New York—was not Mr. Weston's "Neighborhood Guild" in Philadelphia started about the same time?), and half of it, Mr. Lee thinks, dates from 1897—such has been the extraordinary acceleration of effort and achievement within the last few years.

It would be impossible to summarize the mass of detailed information and suggestion given in this volume, but I must claim space for one or two general observations by the author that are of interest to the ethical and sociological student. Mr. Lee tells us that in order to understand the philanthropy of the present day, it is necessary to note that its motive has shifted and is shifting, from a motive felt by one class to do good to another class, into a motive that it can be entered into by all, which takes as its object not the helping of one sort of people, but the building up of the better life of the community (p. 7). This is a significant change. The standpoint is not that of the individual, but of the member of the community, the *socius*. Hence the method is co-operative, as far as possible—not doing *for*, but doing *with* other people. Mr. Lee tells of the model town of Pullman—apparently on the physical side, as he says, "a miracle of wise planning and capable administration," without pauperism and almost without crime. "If," says the author, "Thomas Carlyle, Kipling, and the other believers in the duty of the strong and the wise to utterly control and manage the weak and foolish, are right, then Pullman was as near heaven as we can get on this earth." But, he adds, "the fact that, heaven or no heaven, it was not popular with the employés is, I think, one more example of the fact that man cannot live by bread alone, or even by drainage, theatres, and libraries supplied by an alien will, and that there are some merits in democracy which those who judge government purely by its outward results have not learned, as yet, to realize (pp. 103, 104). How easily Mr. Lee handles his subject and masters it is shown, too, by his remark about the artistic household industries that have sprung up under the auspices of two women in Deerfield, Mass.—these activities "ought not, perhaps, to be classed as philanthropy, because philanthropy so successful as that is not philanthropy, but rises into a higher sphere, that of citizenship." As an instance of the author's mingled sanity and humor, let me quote what he says of the American custom of closing the school yards after school hours: "As soon as the children are let out we close the yards, for fear, apparently, that they might become of some use." He dismisses the reason usually alleged,

Digitized by Google

that the children will do mischief if they are allowed inside, and says, "The real reason appears to be that the janitors do not like the trouble involved in having the yards open; and as everybody knows, the function of the school janitor is to direct the school-committee (p. 144). It is interesting to learn that it has been the law in New York City since 1895, that no school house shall be constructed without an open-air playground attached to or used in connection with the same." This law is called by Mr. Lee the "favorite law" of Mr. Riis, who contributes a characteristic and delightful introduction to the book.

WM. M. SALTER.

CHICAGO.

THE MAKING OF CITIZENS: A Study in Comparative Education. By R. E. Hughes, M. A., B. Sc. The Walter Scott Publishing Co.

Mr. Hughes thus announces his purpose in writing this volume of the Contemporary Service Series: "It is our aim here to paint, with as light a brush as possible, four pictures showing how these four countries [England, France, Germany and the United States], like good mothers, endeavor to prepare their future citizens for life." The book, then, deals mainly with the externals of education—with the organization, financing, and curricula of schools, and only incidentally and indirectly with the real inner spirit of the national educational processes. We may say at once that this main aim is very well carried out. Mr. Hughes gives us a very convenient and lucid summary of the organization of the schools in the four countries, though the omission of the universities leaves the picture incomplete. Unfortunately the book was written just before our whole English system was reorganized by the bill of last year, so that most of what Mr. Hughes says of the schools of England and Wales is now only of historical interest, and will need re-writing when a second edition of the work is called for. The only reference to the new system the book contains is in a very brief appendix. But, putting this aside, we do not know where so much information as to foreign school systems can be so conveniently found as in Mr. Hughes' work. It ought, there fore, to be peculiarly valuable at this juncture when the new educational authorities in England are making a fresh departure

Digitized by Google

in school organization. Of course such a summary cannot be summarized; it can only be commended.

When dealing with the deeper questions of real educational life we find Mr. Hughes generally sound on the most fundamental point that a school system must be judged by its relation to the national character. "Any system of training which would tend to crush national aptitudes and characteristics must be condemned; whereas any system, crude though it be, which tends to develop these must receive commendation." And, consistently with this he gives us the by no means needless warning that "to Germanize the English school, it would be necessary to Teutonize the Saxon." Yet in several passages he speaks as if there could be an absolutely best system of schools out of relation to any particular form of national life. We have here the first example of a constantly recurrent inconsistency which much mars the book. On p. 235 we read that "Germany possesses a system of secondary schools which is the admiration of the pedagogic world. . . . It endeavors to meet the needs of all classes of society, and to a large extent succeeds." Yet on p. 248 we are told "Germany is to-day busily educating youth out of life." On p. 179, "All German teachers are philosophers, and many of them are to-day enthusiastic Herbartians;" on p. 323, "The majority of German teachers love neither Frœbel nor Herbart." On p. 148, "there is much to be said in favor of" the text-book method of instruction; on p. 290, the same method "at its best is none too good; at its worst, it is no method at all." On p. 201 German teachers are praised for opposing all changes in the curriculum; on p. 174 they are blamed for the same thing; on p. 174 France has much to do "before she can overhaul" Germany in educational matters, on p. 105 she has practically done so. On p. 326, "The future lies with the nation of animals, not with the nation of philosophers;" on p. 328 the "supply of intellectual capacity is the only permanent national capital," and on p. 366, "the type of being that will be needed in the future will be . . . skilled, versatile minds;" whilst a little further on (p. 366), "Evolution promises to make of man a woman, and of woman a child. It is the glad cry of the child on the mother's shoulders, as it stretches its hands to the light, that rings down the centuries." Fortunately there is not very much of this kind of rhapsody, but there are in many places, signs that Mr. Hughes allows his feelings to run away with his

Digitized by Google

judgment, and this accounts, we believe, for the frequent contradictions, only a few of which we have quoted.

The book has, nevertheless, a distinct message for us. It is that we shall make no attempt to de-nationalize our schools, and especially that England has less to learn from Germany in the matter of true education than has Germany from England. As set forth by Mr. Hughes, who yet has much admiration for German schools, it is borne in on the mind that the German conception of the school is fundamentally false, that the aims of the school are wrong, and its results deplorable. Even its teaching does not seem to us nearly as praiseworthy as Mr. Hughes thinks. He owns indeed that "the weakness of German teaching is the lack of cultivation of the child's activity," and that "there is no variety in German teachers. . . . There is a lack of initiative, resource, and self-help, a lack of responsiveness to modern demands;" but he apparently does not see that teaching which has "but rarely engendered in [the primary pupil] a love of education" and which turns out from the secondary schools the products described on pp. 255 and 263, however mechanically polished it may be, lacks the very spirit without which all teaching is but as sounding brass or a tinkling cymbal. Mr. Hughes, indeed, advises England to look to America rather than to Germany "for guidance in the development of her national system of education." But a few pages later he warns us that "America is suffering intellectually from her admiration of the almighty dollar," and "will never rule the minds of men." It would seem then that we should not seek "guidance" even there; indeed it is evident from Mr. Hughes' own pages that, especially in secondary instruction, America has much yet to do. But that many fruitful suggestions can be gathered from a study of the best American schools and from a consideration of how far their excellence is due to the absence of bureaucracy is certain, whilst, taken as a whole, the French and German systems must be regarded mainly as examples of what we must avoid: they may be excellent for France or Germany—or they may not; but they are certainly unsuited to our more individualistic life.

J. Welton.

The Yorkshire College, Leeds.

Digitized by Google

REASON AND REVELATION: An Essay in Christian Apology. By J. R. Illingworth, M. A., D. D. London: Macmillan & Co.; New York: The Macmillan Co., 1902. Demy 8vo. Pp. xx, 271.

Dr. Illingworth, I imagine, addresses his words to the general public rather than to the student. For he furnishes very few references. There may be throughout the book thirty, mostly appeals to the Fathers. In addition there is an appendix which contains some passages from English writers on religion of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. It is in accordance with this popular character that the author's method is that which Greek tradition marked off as rhetorical. I venture to think that he has not sufficiently kept in view the difference which holds between scientific method and the method of the advocate. He tries to persuade rather than to convince. He appeals from historical and textual criticism, and from the thorough-going search for truth to the presuppositions and prejudices of men who are immersed in the business of the world. And the instrument by which, at one stroke, he cuts away the ground from under the feet of the critic, is the *argumentum ad hominem*. Dr. Illingworth treats the possession of special knowledge in any subject as to some extent a disqualification for passing judgment upon the matters which fall within its sphere. You are a specialist, he says in effect, and therefore your judgment is to be disregarded.

This attack upon scientific method is made in the name of concrete knowledge. Concrete knowledge is gained "by studying things in as much of their context as possible," (p. ix). This might seem to refer to the specialist who certainly does so study things. What, however, is denoted, is something else; the presuppositions which are imported from the rest of our experience. The context referred to is rather *our* context (p. 61). And here I must express my regret that Dr. Illingworth should have introduced confusion by altering the sense of a very useful term. In the classification of the sciences, those are called abstract, which, like mathematics, deal with but one or two aspects of reality; those are called concrete which, like botany or political economy, deal with certain parts of reality considered in their context. But instead of contrasting mathematics with, say, the historical method, it is set over against "poetry, philosophy and knowledge of the world" (60). I say nothing of the impropriety of contrasting philosophy with any of the subjects of which it must take ac-

Digitized by Google

count, as though we were to contrast the notion of color with the notion of blue. But when we pass from any science to the other subjects, poetry and "knowledge of the world," we pass from realms in which knowledge is supreme, to the worlds of feeling or of practical opinion. The Socrates of Plato's "Apology" shall estimate for us both the poets and the men of the world. "I was conversing with a politician," says Socrates, "and he seemed both to others and to himself to be wise, but in reality he was not." And Socrates anticipated the appeal to the poets such as that which Dr. Illingworth makes. "I noticed," he says, "that because of their poetry they thought that they were the wisest men in other matters also, whereas they were not." Every reader of Plato will recall the discussion in which the distinction between "science" and "opinion" is established. Dr. Illingworth,—to use this old distinction,—is contrasting abstract knowledge not with concrete knowledge, but with mere opinion. For the conclusions which are formed by the poet and the man of the world as such, are after all mere opinion.

Let us consider for a moment what the value of such opinion is likely to be; I do not mean for the practical conduct of affairs, for that is not now in question, but for the study of the subjects with which practical opinion is conversant. So far are affairs from being an adequate training for the intellectual perceptions, that they have a noted tendency to lower the moral standard. That is to say, knowledge which is practical and nothing more, cannot apprehend even practice in its proper or ethical aspect. The disrepute which attaches to the name of Machiavelli, should rather fall upon the statesmen whose methods he analyzed. And although in some directions the moral dangers of practical affairs are lessened nowadays, it is doubtful whether things are really so much better as they seem. For the defects of an age are often those of which it is least conscious. Dean Church in a striking passage, ("Occasional Essays," I, 237), warns "Christian explorers and expounders of truth" against those "entangling and difficult paths of public activity in which it is easy for the thinker, the divine teacher to pass into the religious partisan, the religious manager, contriver and meddler." Dean Church viewed the English religious politics of the sixties and seventies from the inside. There is no reason to think that the beginning of the twentieth century is the dawn of a new era.

Having dealt with the method of Dr. Illingworth's book, let us

Digitized by Google

now turn to the subject matter, the Christian revelation. "The Trinity, the Incarnation and the Church," he says, "together constitute the revelation that God is love" (184). Such was not the opinion of the first Christian apologists. For them the Christian revelation turned upon the life of Jesus and upon the division of the human race into the believing and the unbelieving. Christian theology as a system begins with Origen, and he in turn derives from the gnostic commentaries upon the "Fourth Gospel" by Theodotus and Heracleon. The aspect of Christian teaching which by its novelty most impressed those to whom it was first imparted, was that God was the Father, not of all men, but of those who believed in Jesus Christ. And these doctrines of the Trinity, the Incarnation, and the Church, which Dr. Illingworth treats as primordial, are themselves inferences elaborated by arguments of a special kind. If the reason is to yield to practical opinion, then certainly there is no such discipline as Christian theology. For, as Aquinas says, "theology is practical knowledge, but, to a greater degree and in a more eminent sense, speculative knowledge."

It thus appears that Dr. Illingworth setting out to weaken the authority of strictly systematic reasoning by an appeal to the uninstructed opinion of the Christian public, inevitably calls in question the fundamental articles of his creed. He is met with this dilemma. Either the logic of the Alexandrian fathers is valid, or it is not. If it is not, what becomes of the Nicene creed?

There is another striking inconsistency in Dr. Illingworth's book which may serve as a further warning against the "concrete" method. He defends the Johannine authorship of the "Fourth Gospel," by casting doubts upon the orthodoxy of every one who impugns it (109). I am not called upon to discuss this problem, but only the sophistical argument by which Dr. Illingworth would solve it. I will content myself with one remark. Certitude of an intellectual, as distinguished from a moral character, can only be reached by examining and questioning and testing all presuppositions. The charge of heterodoxy has been employed from the first to burke all enquiry and I am surprised that it should be employed in a work which claims to be philosophical in form. If one thing is certain, it is that the argument from tradition taken alone cannot stand. Tradition about the history of the church was questioned in the *Magdeburg Centuries* and the works of Scaliger and Casaubon. Historical criticism waited two centuries more before it was in a position to deal with the Bible. It has at-

Digitized by Google

tained probable results with reference to the "Old Testament," results of which Dr. Illingworth takes account when he speaks of the doctrine of the Fall (*227*). "The account in Genesis is obviously mythological in form." Yes, obviously, but to whom? To the critic, but not to uninstructed opinion. And this method which has been successively applied to the history of the church, and to the "Old Testament," Dr. Illingworth rejects when he comes to the "Fourth Gospel," by arguments which would have prevented any advance upon the historical conceptions of the middle ages.

I wonder how the "concrete" method affects the case of Cyril of Alexandria? Julian, we are told, would have been unknown to us but for Cyril: "it was the Christian who survived." Yes, as the Alexandrian prince-bishop, "whose Christianity did not succeed in making him just," (Harnack, "History of Dogma," iv, 174), or (to quote a more orthodox writer) in whom "dogmatic interests overpowered all other considerations" (Westcott, *St. John* xcv).

The absence of references makes it difficult to estimate Dr. Illingworth's indebtedness to Newman's "Grammar of Assent." Newman also has a great deal to say about concrete knowledge and real assent. His whole treatment of the subject however is much more systematic and argumentative than Dr. Illingworth's. Certitude is based by him upon the convergence of many probabilities, not upon the use of presumption drawn from practice.

The student of ethics is concerned, more than at first sight appears, with this "concrete" method. It encourages that prejudice against systematic thought, which is one of the weaknesses of the Anglo-Saxon mind. At any time such a result ought to be deplored, but above all at the present, when every thing is being subordinated to the most immediate and obvious utilities, and when the wider and deeper relations of things are passing out of the common view. The "concrete" method is part of the equipment of the advocate and rhetorician; it has no place among the instruments of disinterested inquiry.

FRANK GRANGER.

UNIVERSITY COLLEGE, NOTTINGHAM.

THE DAWN OF DAY. By Friedrich Nietzsche. Translated by Johanna Volz. New York: Macmillan & Company. 1903.

In this new translation of "Morgenröthe" English readers may see Nietzsche perhaps at his best. In experimenting upon the

Digitized by Google

public it is not clear why the selection has thus far been from his more violent moods. There was ground for omitting his first book —"Die Geburt der Tragödie," and it may be said that in translating "Der Fall Wagner" the public attention would, at least, be startled. Portions indeed of the "Unzeitgemässe Betrachtungen" would have reached this end quite as effectively, at the same time showing the reader far more of Nietzsche's resources.

It is common to call the "prosepoem" Zarathustra, the author's chief performance. It is, however, so marred by the unhappy evidence of egomania as to put the tolerance of the reader to a severe test. I once heard a man described as striking fire at the very suggestion that anyone was more radical than he. Nietzsche's passion is for every extreme of opinion. No one shall outdo him in startling utterance. It is his delight to shatter every idol that attracts worshippers, that mankind approves; *anything* in education, art, letters, religion, politics is ground enough for the Titan's wrath. That men should show interest in a "social question" and reforms, appears to him mere "instinkt-entartung." As Wagner grows popular and pays tribute to the "vampire," Christianity, he becomes "the arch enemy to his own craft." Wagner is henceforth a "breeder of hysterics," and is classed among Nietzsche's sicknesses. The saint becomes to him the sneak; pity and sympathy mere signs of invalidism and decay.

There is, I believe, no truer name for Nietzsche than the "aristocrat of anarchism." Every form of democracy excites his loathing because it implies sympathies and equalities that are only names to him for degeneracy. "What then is good? It is anything that gives the feeling of power, that gives force to the will. It is power alone that elevates humanity. What is bad? Everything from which weakness springs. What is happiness? The feeling that power is growing in us. Not contentment but more power: —above all not peace but war and struggle, not virtue but toughness and valor. Virtue and power are one and the same."

He says somewhere "aristokratischer Radikalismus, das gescheiteste Wort, das ich bisher über mich gelesen habe." No extremer individualism has anywhere been expressed than in "Zarathustra." I remember no passage so contemptuous against the Socialists as the end of paragraph 203 in "Jenseits von Gut und Böse." Social reforms and all extension of protecting functions for the weaker in the social struggle excite his instant hostility. "Who cannot swim against the tide, by that very fact should be engulfed."

Digitized by Google

In the "Dawn of Day" (Gedanken über moralischen Vorurtheile) this imperious instinct appears in its least offensive form. "I will yield in great things as in small, only to that law which I myself have given," asserts itself as in Zarathustra but with less insistence. The book is composed of five hundred and seventy-five paragraphs upon every conceivable subject that could be classed under "Moral judgments:" art, education, politics, manners, science, religion. It is, I think, the fourth volume of the translations. If this finds readers, several other volumes are promised in the immediate future. The book contains no trace of argument, but is a succession of flashes of unequal brilliancy, but never lacking the stimulating shock. It would be difficult to open a page on which one could not find a telling thought. He finds fault even with his favorite Schopenhaur, because he does not present "a passionate history of the soul." Nietzsche, at least, does this. It is pleasant that in this volume, begun in 1880, the unhappy malady to which he at last succumbed, had not worked its wreck upon him. It is full of splendid bits of critical insight which put us in debt to the translator, Johanna Volz, who has done the work with something more than fidelity, and, that, in spite of extraordinary difficulties, inhere in the most remarkable literary style of any modern Prussian writer.

JOHN GRAHAM BROOKS.

CAMBRIDGE, MASS.

OPTIMISM AND PESSIMISM IN THE OLD AND NEW TESTAMENTS. By Adolf Guttmacher. Baltimore: The Friedenwald Co. 1903.

One of the most gratifying features of this book is the title page. The author is the Rabbi of a prominent Jewish congregation, and it is a healthful sign of the times to find one occupying an official position in the Jewish church extending his studies to the New Testament. If there is ever to be brought about a better understanding of each other by Jews and Christians, it can only be hoped for by each studying in a broad and unprejudiced spirit the religion and the religious records of the other. As yet Jewish scholars have done little towards the elucidation of the Christian scriptures and in veiw of considerable prejudice still existing in certain Jewish circles (by no means all) against the study of the New Testament, Dr. Guttmacher is to be commended both for his courage and for his spirit. It is also gratifying to

Digitized by Google

note that the author, although a Jewish rabbi, has not yielded to the absurd prejudice against the use of the terms "Old and New Testaments." The terms are purely conventional ones and in so far convenient as they indicate the decided divergence in religious conceptions, despite important points of contact between the older Jewish literature and its direct successor the new Christian literature, which contains, as is now pretty generally recognized, elements derived from the Persian religion, and later Babylonian religion by the side of distinctively Jewish features. He might have gone a step further and employed the letters A. D. as well as B. C. since both are again purely conventional symbols.

After a brief introduction on the origin and meaning of optimism and pessimism, the author begins his subject proper with a survey (which is entirely too fragmentary to be of any use) of the pessimistic elements in the views of the world developed in Persia, Greece and India. Since nature everywhere presents two aspects to a people—a beneficent and a malevolent one—it is not necessary to account for Persian pessimism as our author does by the "struggle for existence, due to the sterility of the soil and to excessive and enervating heat." Indeed one misses the main point involved in pessimism by thus connecting it with climatic conditions instead of seeking its origin in the deepening of human thought as culture advances and as civilization adds to the complications of existence. The author's failure to recognize this close connection between culture and pessimism is perhaps the most serious defect of the book and brings about a somewhat distorted view of the whole subject of optimism and pessimism as found in the Old and New Testaments. Pessimism is as natural an outcome of advanced culture as optimism is natural to primitive culture, and if, despite this, we find certain cultures leading to optimism, the problem consists in ascertaining the forces at work that enabled a people to overcome a natural tendency.

Coming to the Old Testament, the author discusses the subject in seven chapters in which he takes up in turn the view of the world as found in the Old Testament, the origin and view of evil, the view of life, reward and punishment, Messianism and resurrection. The chief value of those chapters consists in the conglomeration of passages from the various books of the Old Testament introduced as illustrations, but the promise made in the introduction (p. 19) that the passages will be arranged "chronologically according to the teachings of modern Biblical criticism" is

Digitized by Google

unfortunately not fulfilled. There are surely traces of earlier views of the world in the Old Testament than are to be found in the creation story with which the author begins and one is amazed to find Dr. Guttmacher asserting that "the creation of the universe forms the beginning of the early records of all great civilizations" (p. 27). Such a generalization is false and misleading. The "earliest records" of great civilizations are, so far as our knowledge goes, of a historical character; and even in literature creation records come long after magical formulas and incantation rituals have been given a permanent form. In this chapter, as in all the succeeding ones, Dr. Guttmacher makes the fundamental mistake of throwing passages from the Old Testament *pele mele* together without regard to chronological sequence, and as a consequence, since he starts from an assumption that Judaism is preponderatingly "optimistic," he involves himself in intricacies and even contradictions in the attempt to account for the decidedly pessimistic tendencies in many parts of the Old Testament. This error in method vitiates the author's conclusions, and instead of lightly throwing aside important references to fatalism (p. 37) and interesting references in the Talmud to "fallen angels" (ib) as exceptions, he should have carefully discussed these passages, which illustrate on the one hand the conflict between optimistic and pessimistic tendencies in Jewish literature and on the other hand the persistent influence of primitive notions as well as the presence of foreign doctrines even at a comparatively late period.

By far the most satisfactory chapter in the book is the one on "Rewards and Punishments," in which the subject is treated in a systematic manner. But in the chapter on "Messianism" one again misses a historic view of the development of that doctrine. Passages are thrown together which ought to have been kept widely apart. There should have been furnished a careful discussion of the origin and significance of the phrase "day of Jehovah," which is the key in a measure to the whole Messianic doctrine, but this important point is passed over hastily and, instead, we have a confusing and bewildering array of passages from various parts of the Old Testament put together with scarcely any discussion of their *real* import. Nor is the reader helped very much by the mass of references in the foot-notes which show that the author has amassed many titles of books and monographs and presumably has studied many of them.

Digitized by Google

What has been said of the Old Testament, applies also to the discussion of the views of the World and of Life, of Sin, Atonement and Satan, etc., in the New Testament. Here would have been a great opportunity for the author to trace the development of Jewish thought modified through the introduction of various foreign factors. The author's defective method, which may be summed up in a single word "unhistorical," again has led him astray and despite the evidence of conscientious study to be observed in these chapters, as a contribution to the subject its value is considerably lessened by a hopeless throwing together of passages from the New Testament, without the necessary differentiation into early and late and the no less necessary indications of their full and real import. In short, throughout the book the author has given us a picture without perspective. He talks of the Old Testament as though in any sense it can be considered as a "unit;" and he speaks of the New Testament as though it reflected a single point of view. His book contains the material needed for the subject with which it deals and as such has a decided value, but the author has not succeeded in grasping the true import of his subject and has, therefore, failed to produce an illuminating work. The subject is an intensely interesting and important one and merits a careful consideration, and it is to be hoped, therefore, that our author will regard his present work merely as a preliminary survey of the field and that he may be prompted to follow it up with a series of monographs, entering fully, and by an application of the proper method, into a consideration of the various phases of the theme. The absence of an index is inexcusable and the author should also have added a list of the Biblical passages introduced.

MORRIS JASTROW.

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA.

DICTIONARY OF PHILOSOPHY AND PSYCHOLOGY, ETC. Edited by James Mark Baldwin, Ph. D. Etc., Stuart Professor in Princeton University. Vol I. (Second Notice.)

In this notice I continue the running comment on the detail of the book, which I had carried as far as the end of the letter A (I. J. E., Oct., 1902). "Beauty" is a useful article, with much historical information well put together. But it is hardly correct to say that (according to Plato) beauty "is distinguished from wis-

Digitized by Google

dom in that it is visible, perceptible by sense" (p. 105a). Plato certainly does not regard it as necessarily perceptible *by sense.* Again the reader is apt to be confused by being told (107a) that, according to Kant, beauty is "subjective" and at the same time (*loc. cit.*) that "objectivity" is one of its "essential marks." The different meanings with which the terms are used should be made clear, so as to avoid the apparent contradiction. The paragraphing at the foot of p. 105b and at the foot of p. 108a is confusing. In both cases there should not be a new paragraph. "Belief" is good and clear; but in view of its general trend, some reference should be made to Berkeley's account of belief in the reality of an external world. A cross-reference to "External objects" might suffice. "Biological analogy (in sociology)" would be more useful and appropriate to a Dictionary, if it gave a fuller exposition of the method rather than an argument against it. "Brain" is the longest article in the volume and contains a very large amount of terminological information, with a number of good plates and figures. There is also an elaborate and interesting article on the deaf mutes, Laura Bridgman and Helen Keller.

"Cabala" is incomplete without some reference to Spinoza, and the common spelling "Kabbala" should be given under K. While "Calculus (in mathematics)" is briefly explained, there is no reference to the logical or the hedonist calculus. Some historical account should be given of the philosophical use of "Capacity." The description of "Case (or instance)" as "the result of a single observation or experiment" is from a logical point of view, very inadequate. In the excellent article "Category" reference should be made to the recent contention that the table of the categories is due to the Academy and not to Aristotle, and an indication should be given of the logical problem of predication which the categories were intended to solve. Under "Catharsis" the reference to *Politics* v, 7, should be to *Politics* viii, 7. "Causa Sui" in Spinoza is wrongly defined as "that the idea of whose essence involves existence." "Cause (notion of)" and "Cause and Effect" are on the whole good articles. As regards the latter, however, it may be pointed out that the logical priority of cause to effect may be maintained apart from the conclusions that (a) one cause has many effects, (b) the cause can exist without the effects, though not the effects without the cause, and (c) the cause is real, while the effects are phenomenal (p. 164b). The historical part of this article is well done; but it may be asked whether τί ἐστι

Digitized by Google

is not better than τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι as a phrase for Aristotle's formal cause and whether the account of Plato's εἶδον (p. 165b) is not true merely of an imperfect stage in the development of Plato's theory. In connection with the account of Leibniz's view, men tion ought to have been made of his description of the cause as the relatively clear and distinct "perception" which is the explanation of the effect. There is also no adequate summary of Kant's position. Yet one is glad to find so much space devoted to the history of the conception. "Change" is a very careful article; but the reference to Hegel is inadequate, especially as there is no sufficient treatment of the subject under "Becoming." "Character" was worthy of an article, indicating the ethical problems which it involves. The brief remarks under this head are quite insufficient. "Charity," like the other articles on the virtues, is admirably concise and clear; but "Chiliasm" might have been limited to its first paragraph. The article "Christ" is also too long, and it is not altogether accurate. "Christology" and "Christophany" should also be much shorter, especially as the subjects are so fully treated in works of easy reference. The various articles on "Classification" are useful and carefully done, although Comte's classification of the sciences is not made quite clear. The definition of "Clearness and distinctness" as "the Cartesian test of truth, criticised and developed by Leibniz" is much too vague to be of use. Under "Code" some reference should be made to the Indian Code, in addition to those which are mentioned. "Cogito, ergo sum" is altogether inadequate, even with the reference to Eisler. The smaller articles on Logic are excellent, but "Collective" would be clearer if some reference were made, by way of contrast, to "Singular and Universal." "Common Sense" is insufficient, not to say inaccurate, in so far as it implies that *all* men possess it. Under "Compatible" reference should be made to "Compossible," which is mentioned under "Consistency" but nowhere defined. The fallacies of "Composition and Division" should be more clearly defined. "Complex" and "Compound" require a considerable supplement in the way of historical statement. Another instance of the historical inadequacy of the Dictionary is that, while "Conation" is defined in practically the same way as Leibniz's "appetition" this interesting fact is not mentioned. Again there is no explanation of Spinoza's special use of the term "Conatus." "Conception" may be noted as an excellent article. "Concomitant Variations" should be mentioned in

Digitized by Google

the title of "Concomitance." Hamilton's "Philosophy of the unconditioned" is quite inadequately explained by a brief quotation from Höffding (p. 210a) and it is hardly accurate to describe it as the *work* in which he developed his view that to think is to condition. Clear, distinct, confused, etc., are surely not defined by Leibniz as "quantities of notions" (p. 212a). "Connotation" should have cross references to "Comprehension" and "Intension," and the connotative term should be explained. "Conscience" is very clear and good; but perhaps the emotional element in conscience, as defined by the British moralists, should be alluded to. "Construct" should have reference to such phrases as "ideal construction," used by other authors than the writer of the article. Under "Contemplation," why should there not be at least a good reference to Aristotle? It is recommended that the term "Contingent" should in future be limited to the sense of "conditioned;" but this is at once to neglect the historical use of the term and to omit the differentia from the definition. The contingent is no doubt conditioned; but it is surely to be distinguished from other conditioned things in that its conditions are to a great extent unknown or incalculable. Under "Continuity" some reference should be made to the law of continuity as it has been historically stated. "Contraposition" is defined in such a way as to identify it with obverted contraposition, which is afterwards described as a further process. The confusion may be removed by deleting the words "the negative of" in line 18 p. 227a. The other technical terms by which the process has been described should also be given or reference should be made to explanations of them elsewhere. Does "Incredulity" (p. 242b) necessarily mean "*under*-readiness to believe"? "Criticism" is quite inadequately described, and cross-references should be given to "dogma," "dogmatism" and "epistemology." In the literature of æsthetic "criticism," Prof. Saintsbury's history should be included. Is Bildung not a better German equivalent for "culture" than Kultur? It should at least be added. "Custom (in law)" is described as "the child of morals and the mother of law," and custom in the individual is similarly said to be "the mother of morals and the daughter of law." Both of these epigrammatic descriptions are misleading, and it would be better to lay stress on the statement of Prof. Sorley (250b) that "originally, both morality and law are indistinguished from the custom of the community." The ingenuous reader of all the three statements will have tangled

Digitized by Google

ideas of the subject. Hume's special use of "custom" in connection with association should also be mentioned.

"Damnation (eternal)" refers to "Judgment" and "Judgment" to "Eschatology," in neither of which is there anything about it. Similarly "Death (spiritual)" refers to "Eschatology" and "Future punishment" to "Judgment." In all these cases the reference should be to "Hell," which, by the way, is far from being accurate. Under "Dancing Mania" reference should be made to the obvious case of the Dervishes. In this part there are some excellent psychological, biological and logical articles, such as those on Degeneration, Delusion, Delirium, Dementia, Deduction, Demonstration and Denotation. "Desire" is good, but too brief. Reference should be made to "universe of desire." "Determinants" is defined solely in its biological use, without reference to the meanings it has in mathematics and logic. "Dialectic" is both inadequate and inaccurate, especially as regards its use in ancient philosophy. Under "Dilemma" explanation should be given of the "horns" and the "rebutting dilemma." "Dimaris" and "Dimatis" should refer to "Mood" and not to "Dibatis," where no information is given. Under "Discursive" the reference to Kant ["Micklejohn," by the way, being misprinted for "Meiklejohn"] is not to a passage in which the distinction between "intuitive" and "discursive" is made, but to one in which the Divine "intuition" is distinguished from an "intuition" under the forms of space and time. In connection with "Distribution (in logic)," the "distributive term" should be explained. In connecton with "Divison of Labour" Plato should be mentioned as well as Xenophon and Aristotle. Under "Dogmatism" a fuller explanation of the Kantian distinction between dogmatism and criticism should be given, especially as this is not adequately treated under "Criticism." "Double Aspect Theory" and "Dualism (in philosophy)" may be noted as excellent articles; but it is astonishing to find an article on "Doubt" with no mention of Descartes.

"Ecclesia: see Church" ignores entirely the classical meaning of the word, which is most likely to occur in philosophical reading. "Eclaircissement—see Enlightenment" (*i. e.*, aufklärung) is beyond comment. Mention should be made of Roman as well as of Greek "Eclecticism," and the article, with its suggestion of a "more or less arbitrary choice" is somewhat unfair to Leibniz, who is mentioned as an "eclectic." The "economic" articles, here and throughout the book, are generally admirable. "Elenchus"

Digitized by Google

is not "refutation by argument," but a reasoning or syllogism which refutes. The explanation of "Eminenter" is most inadequate. "Emotion" is a useful article, but it might be improved by a definite reference to the various forms or classes of emotion, vaguely described as "coarser," "finer," "higher," "cruder," etc. On p. 317a there should be a cross-reference to "emotional expression" as well as to "James-Lange Theory." "Empirical" is badly defined; but there is an altogether admirable article on "Empirical Logic." Professor Baldwin's long discussion under "End (ethical)" can hardly be called illuminating. It is a mistake to turn a dictionary article into an argumentative plea for one side in a very difficult and unsettled controversy. If the matter is to be discussed at all, both views should be fairly stated. But the article assumes as its basis a sharp separation between the "logical" and the "practical," "science of fact" and "appreciation of worth," a separation which many thinkers would refuse to admit Finally, indeed, there is handed over to metaphysics the "problem of finding a category in which facts and worths are both subsumed in a profounder synthesis." But it may quite fairly be contended that, if Prof. Baldwin's fundamental assumption is valid, the problem is insoluble. Under "End (in Psychology)" emphasis is laid upon the distinction between "(1) the form in which the end appears to the striving subject before its attainment," and "(2) the psychical state which arises when it is completely attained." It is proposed that the term "end" should be used for (1) and "terminal end" or "terminus" for (2) and similarly that "End-state" should be used as a general term for "that state in which any specific process in consciousness issues and completes itself." The distinction is a useful one, so long as care is taken that it does not harden into a separation. There is considerable danger of this in ethical discussions. The article "Energy" is a model of clear, concise and adequate statement. The etymology of "Enthymeme" should be given as the Greek verb and not as the combination of preposition and noun, which is misleading. The Aristotelian uses of "Epagoge" and "Epicheirema" ought to be clearly and fully explained. "Epicureanism" is an excellent article, of a type which is much too sparingly represented in the Dictionary. "Epistemology" also is remarkably lucid and comprehensive. For the meaning of "Eros" reference should be made to Plato, as well as to Neo-Platonism and Mysticism. "Essence" is a very unsatisfactory article. The statement about Aristotle is misleading,

Digitized by Google

without further explanation, and one is tempted to suppose that the author has been led astray by Eisler's quotations. The subject deserved a very much longer and fuller article. "Essential Attribute" refers to "Essence," in which there is nothing about it. "Ethical Theories" and "Ethics" are admirable articles. Under "Evil" we have the remarkable statement that Leibniz's "metaphysical evil" is "the necessary limitation of the Creator." For "Creator" read "created." In the excellent articles on Development and Evolution and in many other kindred articles, Haeckel's use of "Ontogenesis" as regards development and "phylogenesis" as regards evolution, with the corresponding adjectival forms, is rightly adopted throughout. Another very useful discrimination is that between "psychic" and "psychological," which is employed in a large number of articles. "Experience" is an excellent article, the discussion of "external" and "internal" experience being particularly good. Reference should be made, however, to the peculiar Kantian use or uses of the term. A cross-reference to "Kantian terminology" might suffice. The term "Experiential" should also be explained. Under "Explanation," the distinction which is often made between explanation and description should be mentioned with references. "Extension" is defective on the historical side, through the absence of reference to the views of Descartes, Spinoza, Leibniz and others.

Under "Faculty" a fuller history of the use of the term should be given. "Faith and Knowledge (in theology)" is lacking in specific reference to the older literature of the subject in mediaeval and modern times. Is it not possible to define mental "Fatigue" more exactly than as "a qualitative state following upon continued mental activity"? The recommendations as to the use of the terms "Feeling," "Affective" and Affection" seem good; but under "Feeling" something should be said about the various historical meanings of the term. Under "Force (figurative meanings)" there is a useful suggestion as to terminology. It is proposed to distinguish between (1) "forces proper to the group of phenomena of a science" and (2) "those of another group and science which limit or in any way condition the former," by attaching to (2) adjectives ending in "-nomic." Thus corresponding to "social forces" (1), we should have "socionomic forces" (2); corresponding to "psychological forces" (1), we should have "psychonomic forces" (2); and so on. In the excellent article "Free and Freedom" reference should be made to the political

Digitized by Google

use of "free" in such expressions as "a free church" and to the psychological use of the word in terms such as "free ideas." Is not "esprits forts" as good a French equivalent for "Freethinkers" as "libres penseurs"?

"Gambling" is a very interesting article, although it is rather an original discussion of the subject than a dictionary account of it. Prof. Baldwin, who writes the article, holds that the only valid ethical objection to gambling is that it is "in a large sense dishonest." It is unreasonable action because it implies a pretence to know where knowledge is impossible. "The man who loses is the victim of this mutual pretence to know, and the man who gains is rewarded for it." This is ingenious; but I do not find it satisfactory. Does the gambler really pretend to know? In many cases he surely does not. He acts as a rule from a belief in his own luck or in the luckiness of certain numbers or other circumstances. And as the pretence, so far as it exists, is mutual, it is difficult to see where the dishonesty lies. Dishonest pretence surely implies deceit. Otherwise the acting of plays would be dishonest. In the article "Genus" the curious and misleading statement is made (without any proof) that the logical rule against cross-division is "signally violated in the modern classifications of chemistry, mathematics and logic itself." So cryptic an utterance should not be thrown at a guileless reader without a word of explanation. "Gnosiology" is equally puzzling, though for a different reason. It is defined as the "science of knowledge, its origin, process and validity," and it is recommended as a term for Epistemology in its second meaning, viz: Theory of knowledge, including its nature and validity. And it is further recommended that "Epistemology" should be used for the "theory of the origin, nature and limits of knowledge." We have thus Gnosiology=the theory of the origin, process, nature and validity of knowledge, and Epistemology=the theory of the origin, nature and limits of knowledge. It would be difficult to imagine anything more confusing. Under "Gospel" the long account of the mutual relations of the four Gospels is unnecessary in a dictionary of Philosophy. The elaborate article on "Greek Terminology" is written with care and learning. Too much space, however, is given to a discussion of the way in which terminology arose, and the article would have been more useful if for this there had been substituted a fuller discussion of some of the more important terms. There is no real difficulty in supposing (p. 423b) that the

Digitized by Google

"fire" of Heraclitus remains "*mere* fire." The statement about Aristotle's name for logic (p. 427b) is likely to mislead students. The references to books on the subject are an excellent feature of the article. The articles on "Grief" and on the emotions generally contain no reference to such a treatment of the subject as we find in Spinoza.

Under "Habit" some reference should be made to the ethical use of the term. The psychological and anthropological significance of "Hades" (as worked out, *e. g.* by Gomperz) ought to be indicated. "Hallucination" and "Hearing" are excellent articles. The suggested derivation of "Heaven" from Latin *camera* is manifestly absurd. It is surely an Anglo-Saxon word. "Hegel's Terminology" is a very good and clear article; but it strangely omits all reference to Hegel's ethical terms. The references on pp. 464b and 465a to §"7" of the article are quite unmeaning. There is no §7 and "Hegel's technical sense of infinite" is not elsewhere mentioned, far less "developed," in the article. The article "Hell" contains the curious statement that Gehenna is Greek. Under "Herbartianism" (otherwise a good article) there is a very vague account of the Herbartian metaphysics, which includes such strange phrases as "the 'atomism' of Leibniz." One wonders why Herbart's metaphysics should be expounded, however imperfectly, when the work of much greater metaphysicians is left unexplained. "Heredity" is an excellent article. The general article on "History" gives a very insufficient treatment of the question of historical evidence. It speaks of the conditions of "an exact science of history," ignoring the manifest impossibility of such a thing. The other articles on "History" are very much better. But there ought to have been an article, however brief, on the historical method. "History of Philosophy" is a careful summary. But it is surely a mistake to suggest that the whole period from Augustine to the 13th century is "Scholastic." And the Scottish philosophy is not merely "contemporaneous with the development of the post-Kantian philosophy." It is partly contemporaneous with Kant and even pre-Kantian. In the article "Holy Spirit," Novantian is misprinted for Novatian, and one wonders what a theologian would think of the suggestion that Heraclitus was a "forerunnner of the doctrine of the Holy Spirit." Under "Homogeneity" a fuller statement of Spencer's view should be given. "Homoioeriae" should be either Homoiomerae or Homoiomeries. Homoiomeria is an abstract noun used by Lu-

Digitized by Google

cretius. It should be noted also that the word is otherwise used by Aristotle as a technical term of his own. And it is misleading to speak of the "atoms of Anaxagoras." "Hypothetical" is an excellent article by Prof. Adamson, which is spoiled by the interposition of Mrs. Ladd Franklin, in a paragraph which reveals nothing but an imperfect study of the subject. "Hypothetical Morality" refers the reader to "Absolute Ethics," from which he is immediately referred again to "Relative and Absolute Ethics." This and many other cross-references require revision. The references under "Idea" are quite insufficient. While Titchener and Baldwin are mentioned, there is no reference to Descartes, Spinoza or Hegel. And the article contains no hint of anything beyond picture-thinking as coming under the name "idea."

"Ideal" affords the curious spectacle of the psychologist struggling vainly with a metaphysical problem. This is sure to be confusing to the student, and his confusion will become worse confounded if he reads "Ideal (moral)" with the other articles to which it refers. He will gather that while the moral end is "the ultimate purpose which ought to be aimed at in conduct," the moral ideal is "contrasted" with this and is "a state of attainment reached by the pursuit of the end." He will then find that the moral ideal is "rather an intent than an end," and finally he will be told that an intent is "what the mind consciously means or intends, but has not yet attained." To a simple mind nothing could be more self-contradictory. In sharp contrast with this we have "Idealism," which is remarkably clear and good. The articles on "Identity" are also well done. "Illicit Process" refers the reader *simpliciter* to two other articles, in neither of which is the fallacy defined. "Illusions of motion and movement" is a long and interesting article, and "Imagination" is also good; but "Imagining (in Logic)" will be hopelessly obscure to the ordinary reader. "Immediate and Mediate" (mainly a psychological article) is on the whole satisfactory, though the omission of all reference to Hegel is curious. "Imitation" and "Immortality" should have references to Plato's *Republic*. The literature of "Immortality" is very incompletely given. "Implicit (in logic)" is a hopelessly bad article, evidently written from so peculiar a point of view that a logical concept can be described as a "representation" and it can be declared that "there is, strictly speaking, no implicit contradiction" (*i. e.*, no contradiction "which appears as soon as the terms are defined") "in the notion of a quadrilateral triangle"!

Digitized by Google

"Inability (in theology)" is repeated, without reference to "Ability," in which it has been already discussed. "Index (in exact logic)" expounds a theory which seems to be peculiar to the writer and regarding which much might be said by way of criticism. But it is given forth as if it were a generally accepted position. "Individual" is a good article; but the discussion of Aristotle's view is inadequate and there is no mention of Spinoza. The statement under "Individual (in logic)" that "the principles of contradiction and excluded middle . . . . imply that whatever exists consists of individuals" is true only if we take these principles in an abstract formal sense. And it is hardly accurate to describe the Stoics as "individualistic nominalists." "Induction" is a very unsatisfactory and inadequate article, and its account of J. S. Mill's position is thoroughly misleading. Nowhere in the article "Inference" is there any satisfactory treatment of the subject. That part of the article which professes to deal with inference "in logic" treats the matter entirely from a psychological point of view, ignoring the logical problems. The whole article is marked by a failure to discriminate clearly the logical and the psychological questions. "John is mortal" is erroneously described as an "immediate inference" from "John is human," and the objections to "unconscious inference" are far from convincing. "The Infinite and the Finite" is very scrappy and otherwise unsatisfactory and "Infinite (notion of)" refers only to one (and that not the best) sense of the notion. These articles ought to have been among the most important and valuable articles in the book. In "Innate Ideas" the literary and historical references are insufficient. The sentence about Descartes is so inadequate as to be misleading. There is no reference to the Greek or other philosophy earlier than Descartes. And it is misleading to identify Kant's categories with innate ideas. "Intent" as distinct from "Content" is on the whole a good article. But the deprecated use of "Content" has analogies in such terms as the German "inhalt." There is an excellent article on "Introjection" and those on "Intuition" and kindred words are well done. "Invention" is also a good article. In the last paragraph reference should be made to the use of "invention" in English as an element of style. "Involution" in Symbolic Logic should have some references to the literature of the subject, if there is any.

Under "Jealousy and Envy" we have the curious statement that "covetousness is another name for envy." "Judgment" is treated

Digitized by Google

practically entirely from the psychological point of view, and so far it is a satisfactory article. But surely judgment is not necessarily "declarative of results already reached in conception." "Justice" is a very good article. The term "Justify" or "Justification" in philosophy should have had a brief article.

"Kantianism" is inaccurate in so far as it speaks of "the 'phenomenal,' or that world of things or appearances to which these forms are applied." The "forms" are not *applied* to the phenomenal world: they are constitutive of it. The reference to "Criticism" in the section on literature is practically useless. "Kant's Terminology" is on the whole a valuable article, containing a large amount of useful information. But, like the article on Hegel's terminology, it omits all reference to the ethical terms, *e. g.*, to such distinctions as that between the theoretical and the practical reason, etc. We are told that "no space can here be given to the terminology of the later works of Kant." But the editor might easily have found space for this by cutting out some of the irrelevant and inaccurate matter, with which the book abounds. In the article itself there are one or two phrases which are misleading. For example, "Knowledge *a priori* is for Kant knowledge *in advance of all experience*" does not sufficiently distinguish between logical and temporal priority. And this distinction is not properly emphasized in the discussion of the term "transcendental." Again, it is misleading to attribute to Kant "the theory of the subjectivity of all our knowledge," although this statement is to some extent corrected immediately afterwards.

"Laboratory" is an article ten pages long, devoted mainly to a description of instruments, etc., many of which may become antiquated in a year or two and all of which will be better understood by a visit to a laboratory than by any amount of verbal description. It is difficult to see for whom all this can be of use, and it is irritating to find space occupied with lists of materials like "corks," "blackboard and chalk," "sticking-plaster" and "odorless paraffin," when space is denied for the proper explanation of great philosophical systems. "Language" is a long and excellent article. By a strange freak of chance, the writer uses the word "demeaned" in a wrong (though colloquial) sense at the very point in the article where wrong interpretations are being discussed. "Demean" means "behave" and not "make mean." The article on "Lassalle" is amazingly imperfect, even as a biography. "Latin and Scholastic Terminology" is an excellent article. "Substantial forms"

Digitized by Google

ought to be specially mentioned on p. 635. "Laws of Thought" is just the kind of article which a dictionary of this kind ought not to have. It is a somewhat peculiar and personal discussion of the subject, instead of a historical account, which, if well done, would have been of real value.

I have noted a considerable number of misprints, such as "Zeno of Elia" (p. 9), "Sterling" for "Stirling" (p. 26b), "Emminghaus" for "Ebbinghaus" (p. 40b), "Bradley, Studies in Logic" for "Principles of Logic" (p. 78b), "McTaggert" for "McTaggart" (p. 278b), "Affective in" for "in affective" (224a), "Adeckes" for "Adickes" (246a), "Chevreul" for "Chevreuil" (228b), "moves" for "motives" (229b), "Abbot" for "Abbott" (364b and 382b) "nature" for "naturalism" (312b), "Einfühlung" for "Einführung" (312b), "Mill's Logic 1893" for "1843" (320b), "Mansell" for "Mansel" (371b), "Sentential" for "Sententiae" (537a), "Sophisticae Elenchi" for "Sophistici" (554b), "Content (q. v. 2)" for "3" (560b), "Taylor" for "Tylor" (625a). There are many other minor misprints, some of which have been already noted, and there is a great deal of very bad English.

On the whole I am convinced that, if the book is to be of real use, it must have a very thorough revision by some competent person. Professor Baldwin in his preface warns off the individual critic by assuring him that "there is hardly anything in the work which has not the support of a group of men of the highest authority. This should be remembered by the single writer or student who finds this or that point unsatisfactory. He is one: we are many." The single writer may content himself with replying that the men of authority have much to answer for. The counting of many heads is not a test of truth, and the fact that the work is "written by many hands" only makes its errors the less excusable.

R. Latta.

University of Glasgow.

Leaders of Religious Thought in the Nineteenth Century. By S. H. Mellone. Edinburgh and London: William Blackwood & Sons, 1902. Pp. viii, 302.

One is bound, unless perhaps one shared Mr. Mellone's view of religious experience, to say that the title of his volume is not jus-

Digitized by Google

tified by the contents. The writers actually dealt with are Newman, Martineau, Comte, Spencer and Browning; and it is impossible to conceive any impartial principle of choice or exclusion upon which this somewhat mixed company could be said to be or to represent the "leaders of religious thought in the nineteenth century."

The author does not make any claim to originality, except in some degree as regards the view taken of Browning's teaching, but, though not particularly novel, his expositions and criticisms are always presented in a clear, simple and interesting way. Perhaps the best of the critical chapters is that on Martineau, and with one line of thought in Martineau's religious philosophy the author connects what he has to say positively about the nature of religion (in the chapter entitled "What is Religious Experience?")

This positive view he would describe as "Symbolism." "Every visible and invisible creature may become to us *an appearance of God.* . . . The presence of God may be discerned in the manifold experiences of life, in different degrees and with diverse values; and the highest value as a Divine manifestation belongs to the Ideals which humanity forms, in advance of all its past experience and attainment" (p. 154). Such "Symbolism," we are told, must be distinguished from "Mysticism," which "has always supposed that the experience of God can only be reached by means which are independent of the ordinary experiences of life" (p. 156). And this is unquestionably an important distinction. But it is less clear how such "Symbolism" is to be distinguished from what may be called a Hegelian Positivism. It differs apparently from the Positivism of Comte in discerning the presence of God in nature as well as in humanity; but in proportion as the presence of God is held to be most clearly manifested in human ideals, this difference seems to become unimportant. Now when we speak of our consciousness of ideals as being the very presence of God in us, there is always the danger that this statement may be read from the other end. The presence of God in us, it may be said, is just another name for our consciousness of ideals. The symbol and the reality fall together, or we can distinguish the reality from this particular symbol only by saying that it has other symbols or manifestations. It is not easy to see how Mr. Mellone can logically get beyond this positivism or philosophical pantheism, or how the vague sentiment of the religious experience from which he starts

Digitized by Google

can be prevented from shrinking up, when "interpreted" (to use his own expression), into just this philosophical doctrine, in which it seems to lose all its religious quality.

H. Barker.

Edinburgh.

The Religion of Plutarch. A Pagan Creed of Apostolic Times. An essay. By John Oakesmith, D. Litt, M. A. Published by Longman, Green & Co., 1902. Pp. xxviii, 229.

Whether the critic is prepared to ascend to Dr. Oakesmith's doctrine, that "around Plutarch's Religion revolves his conception of life," or not, he must nevertheless acknowledge gratefully that this essay fulfills its purpose in an admirable way. The author endeavors "to ascertain, from Plutarch's own account of his views, the principles, the method and character of his Religion; to learn in what manner he conceives the supernatural world and its relation to the human mind and to human interests; to discover and illustrate the processes by which these results are obtained; to note their philosophic bearing and tendency; and to exemplify their application in the sphere of practical ethics." To this endeavor the author brings the qualifications of great learning, of careful study of both Plutarch and his critics, of genuine sympathy with, and consequent real insight into, the mind of Plutarch in its attitude towards the problems of his age. The result is an interesting and valuable picture of a man of good taste and great learning, who has no special philosophical school either to attack or to defend but soberly and with a sound mind tries to ascertain the true facts of life by diligent inquiry into the history of the past. "There was not a tendency of Greek philosophy with whose history and results he was not familiarly acquainted; there was not a school from which he did not borrow something for introduction into the texture of his own thought;"—in other words, Plutarch was typically Greek in two characteristic aspects—as a disinterested seeker after truth, in his application of the maxim, "Moderation in all things," to every department of life and thought. The wealth of illustration with which Plutarch exemplifies or justifies his views makes the "Opera Morala" a mine of information upon the manner, beliefs, customs of a century peculiarly interesting alike to the profane historian and to the Christian student. It is by no means the least service rendered by this essay that it enables the "average

Digitized by Google

reader" to regard the apostolic age from a non-Christian, though not anti-Christian, standpoint.

This essay is intended to be the forerunner of a larger and more elaborate work. In its present form it is a reprint of a "volume issued for private circulation" a year ago in which numerous Greek and Latin quotations, now removed or translated, were given in full. Unfortunately this process has not been carried out consistently; there are still several passages in which the original Latin is incorporated into the text in such a manner as to make the meaning unintelligible to the "English" reader. In a future edition these quotations (about twenty in all, cf. *e. g.*, p. 187) should be placed in footnotes and the English equivalent printed in the text.

W. H. FAIRBROTHER.

LINCOLN COLLEGE, OXFORD.

BOOKS RECEIVED.

SPINOZA'S POLITICAL AND ETHICAL PHILOSOPHY. By Robert A. Duff, M. A., Lecturer on Moral and Political Philosophy in the University of Glasgow. Glasgow: James Maclehose & Sons, 1903. Pp. xii, 516. 10s. 6d.

A STUDY IN THE PSYCHOLOGY OF ETHICS. By David Irons, M. A. (St. Andrews), Ph. D., (Cornell); Associate Professor of Bryn Mawr College. Edinburgh and London: William Blackwood & Sons, 1903. Pp. xviii, 176. 5s. net.

A SURVEY OF ENGLISH ETHICS. Being the first chapter of Mr. Lecky's "History of European Morals." Edited with Introduction and Notes by W. A. Hirst, Sometime Scholar of Worcester College, Oxford, and Principal of Gujarat College, Ahmedabad. London, New York and Bombay. Longmans, Green & Co., 1903. Pp. li, 180. 3s. 6d.

THE BASIS OF MORALITY. By Arthur Schopenhauer. Translated with Introduction and Notes by Arthur Brodrick Bullock, M. A., Trinity College, Cambridge. London: Swan Sonnenschein & Co., Limited, 1903. Pp. xxiv, 285. 4s. 6d.

THE CONFLICT OF DUTIES AND OTHER ESSAYS. By Alice Gardner, Lecturer and Associate of Newnham College, Cambridge. London: T. Fisher Unwin, 1903. Pp. xii, 307.

THE REFORM OF MORAL AND BIBLICAL EDUCATION ON THE LINES OF HERBARTIANISM, CRITICAL THOUGHT, AND THE ETHICAL NEEDS OF THE PRESENT DAY. By Frank H. Hayward, D. Lit., M. A., B. Sc., Fellow of the College of Preceptors. London: Swan Sonnenschein & Co., Ltd., 1902. Pp. xxviii, 245. 4s. 6d.

STUDIES IN THE HISTORY OF EDUCATIONAL OPINION FROM THE RENAISSANCE By S. S. Laurie, A. M., LL. D., Professor of the Institutes and History of Education, University of Edinburgh. Cambridge: At the University Press, 1903. Pp. vi., 261. 6s.

Digitized by Google

THE THEORY OF EDUCATION IN PLATO'S REPUBLIC. By John E. Adamson, M. A., (Lond.), Principal of the Normal School, Pretoria. London: Swan Sonnenschein & Co., Ltd., 1903. Pp. xii, 258. 4s. 6d.

THE RELIGION OF PLUTARCH: A Pagan Creed of Apostolic Times. An Essay by John Oakesmith, D. Litt., M. A. London, New York and Bombay: Longmans, Green & Co., 1902. Pp. xxviii., 229. 5s. net.

THE PATHWAY TO REALITY: Being the Gifford Lectures Delivered in the University of St. Andrews in the Session 1902-1903. By the Right Hon. Richard Burdon Haldane, M. P., LL. D., K. C. London: John Murray, 1903. Pp. xix, 316. 10s. 6d. net.

THE TRUTH AND ERROR OF CHRISTIAN SCIENCE. By M. Carta Sturge. (Moral Science Tripos, Cambridge.) With an Introduction by the Rev. H. S. Holland, M. A., Canon of St. Paul's. London: John Murray, 1903. Pp. xxxii., 160. 6s.

WHAT IS MEANING? Studies in the Development of Significance. By V. Welby. London: Macmillan & Co., Ltd.; New York: The Macmillan Co., 1903. Pp. xxxi., 321. 6s.

LIFE AND LABOR OF THE PEOPLE IN LONDON. By Charles Booth, assisted by Jesse Argyle, Ernest Aves, Geo. E. Arkell, Arthur L. Baxter, George H. Duckworth. Third Series: RELIGIOUS INFLUENCES; Vol. 7, Summary. London: Macmillan & Co., Ltd.; New York: The Macmillan Co., 1902. Pp. xi., 432.

FROM THE ABYSS: OF ITS INHABITANTS, By One of Them. London: R. Brimley Johnson, 1902. Pp. 95. 1s. net.

A CLUE TO THE ECONOMIC LABYRINTH. By Michael Flürscheim. London: Swan Sonnenschein & Co., Ltd. Pp. 547. 7s. 6d.

L'ETICA EVOLUZIONISTA: Studio sulla Filosofia Morale di Herbert Spencer. By Dott. Guglielmo Salvadori, Torino: Fratelli Bocca, 1903. Pp. xv., 476.

WAS IST RAUM, ZEIT BEWEGUNG, MASSE? Von Julius von Olivier, Major a. D. Zweite bedeutend erweiterte und verbesserte Auflage. München: Louis Finsterlin, 1902. Pp. viii, 153.

EIGHTEENTH INDIAN NATIONAL CONGRESS, 1902: Presidential Address. By Surendra Nath Bannerjee. Pp. 44.

THE HIBBERT JOURNAL: Vol. I, No. 2, January, 1903. A Quarterly Review of Religion, Theology and Philosophy. London and Oxford: Williams & Norgate. Pp. 209-424. 2s. 6d. net.

THE HUMANE REVIEW: Vol. III, April, 1902, to January, 1903. London: Ernest Bell, 1903. Pp. 380.

THE HUMANITARIAN (with which is incorporated "Humanity"): The Journal of the Humanitarian League. Vol. I, No. 12, February, 1903. London: W. Reeves. Pp. 89-96. 1d.

OUTLINES OF PSYCHOLOGY. An Elementary Treatise with Some Practical Applications. By Josiah Royce, Ph. D., LL. D., Professor of the History of Philosophy in Harvard University. New York: Macmillan & Co.: 1903. Pp. XXIV, 392.

SAGGI PER LA STORIA DELLA MORALE UTILITARIA. I. LA MORALE DI T. HOBBES. By Rodolfo Mondolfo: Verona-Padova: Fratelli Drucker: 1903. Pp. 278.

Digitized by Google

HUMAN NATURE AND THE SOCIAL ORDER. By Charles Horton Cooley: New York: Macmillan Company. 1903. Pp. VIII, 413.

HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY. By William Turner, S. T. D.: Boston and London: Ginn & Company: 1903. Pp. x, 674.

CHURCH DISCIPLINE: AN ETHICAL STUDY OF THE CHURCH OF ROME. By Joseph McCabe: London: Duckworth & Company: 1903. Pp. 269.

THE STUDY OF MENTAL SCIENCE: POPULAR LECTURES ON THE USE AND CHARACTERISTICS OF LOGIC AND PHYCHOLOGY. By J. Brough, LL. D.: London, New York and Bombay: Longmans, Green & Company: 1903: Pp. VII, 129.

PLAIN TALKS IN PSALM AND PARABLE. By Ernest Crosby: Boston: Small, Maynard & Company: Pp. 188.

INVESTIGATIONS OF THE DEPARTMENT OF PSYCHOLOGY AND EDUCATION OF THE UNIVERSITY OF COLORADO. I. THE SURVIVAL VALUES OF PLAYS: II. A STATISTICAL STUDY OF EDUCATION IN THE WEST. By Harvey A. Carr, M. S., Boulder, Colo. University of Colorado: 1902. Pp. 78.

FEUERBACH: THE ROOTS OF THE SOCIALIST PHILOSOPHY. By Frederick Engels: Translated with Critical Introduction, By Austin Lewis: Chicago: Charles H. Kerr & Co.; 1903. Pp. 133.

GOD'S CHILDREN: A MODERN ALLEGORY. By James Allman: Chicago: Charles H. Kerr & Co.; 1903. Pp. 113.

THE LIGHT OF CHINA: The Tao Teh King of Lao Tsze: 604-504 B. C. An accurate metrical rendering, translated directly from the Chinese text, and critically compared with the standard translations, the Ancient and Modern Chinese Commentaries, and all accessible authorities. By I. W. Heysinger, M. A., M. D. Philadelphia: Research Publishing Company. 1903. Pp. 165.

EXISTENCE, MEANING, AND REALITY IN LOCKE'S ESSAY AND IN PRESENT EPISTEMOLOGY. By A. W. Moore, Assistant Professor of Philosophy, University of Chicago. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 1903. Pp. 25.

Articles by writers in Great Britain should be sent to
Prof. J. S. Mackenzie, Pendene, Llanishen, Cardiff, Wales.
Books to be reviewed, published in Great Britain, should be sent to
G. E. Moore, M. A., Trinity College, Cambridge, England.



Digitized by Google